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THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT



The Duke of Reichstadt.

as an Austrian Officer.

From a Portrait Collection of the Emp. Napoleon, owned by

THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT

(NAPOLEON THE SECOND).

A BIOGRAPHY COMPILED FROM
NEW SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

BY EDWARD DE WERTHEIMER
WITH NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

WHEN, a few years ago, I published "*Die Verbannten des ersten Kaiserreichs*" ("The Exiles of the First Empire") I stated in the preface: "I shall devote a separate biography to the most interesting of all the exiles of the First Empire—the Duke of Reichstadt." In the present volume I have endeavoured to keep my word. I believe it fills a gap in historical literature. For what has been written since the year of his death—1832—concerning this Prince, who was deprived of his throne, is practically summed up in Montbel's "*Le Duc de Reichstadt*" and Prokesch's "*Mein Verhältniss zum Herzog von Reichstadt*" ("My Relations with the Duke of Reichstadt"). It can scarcely be said that Welschinger in his book "*Le Roi de Rome*" (1897) has added essentially to our knowledge. In order to draw a true portrait of the Emperor's son, it was necessary to pursue a searching inquiry among the archives, in which any complete biography of the Duke of Reichstadt was lacking. I have done my uttermost to fulfil these indispensable conditions; and my trouble has not been without its reward. A wealth of material was offered by the Royal and Imperial Archives of State, the Archives of the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna, and the Archives of War. My best thanks are due to the following gentlemen who gave me their ready assistance with the above-mentioned archives: Court Counsellor Dr. Gustav Winter, Drs. Árpád von Károlyi, Anton Felgel and Johann Paukert, the Keepers of the State Archives Baron Franz von Nadherny and

Dr. Hans Schlitter, Dr. Thomas Fellner and Dr. H. Schuster, at present keeper of the Archives of Salzburg, His Excellency F. Z. M. Leander von Wetzer, Major von Prohaska and Captain Pallua. Abroad I have made use of the Royal State Archives of Prussia, where Dr. Reinhold Koser and Dr. Paul Bailleu earned my gratitude for their assistance in my work. I gained less from the Archives of Parma, which contain but little material bearing upon the history of the Duke.

I appealed with equal success to private collections. In the first place, I must recall with special warmth the generosity of his Serene Highness Prince Maurice Oettingen-Wallerstein, Bavarian General attached to the army, who kindly gave me access to the numerous posthumous papers of Count Maurice Dietrichstein, the young Napoleon's governor. I am equally indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus, who kindly placed at my disposal the Diary of Baron Joseph Obenaus, the Duke's tutor, as well as the letters addressed to him by Dietrichstein.

Less productive, yet not without information, were the Archives of their Highnesses the Archdukes Rainer and Frederick, for access to which I return my respectful thanks. I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to his Serene Highness Prince Paul Metternich and Dr. Frederick Schwarzenberg, who provided me with fresh material, derived from the Princely Archives.

Besides the copious literature in the French language dealing with events up to 1832, the exploitation of contemporary German literature was especially useful to me. Dr. Robert F. Arnold, *Privatdozent* of the Vienna University, was kind enough to call my attention to the abundance of information on this subject. With the aid of this important material, published and unpublished, I have endeavoured to create a true picture of the Duke, viewed in the light of contemporary history.

For the elucidation of this personality several pictures have been added to the book. Daffinger's portrait, although well known, cannot be omitted on account of its beauty. On the other hand, the picture of the Duke as a sergeant, from the collection in the Court Library, is here published for the first time. The water-colour by Isabey which, by his Majesty's gracious permission, I have been able to reproduce, is the original (in the bed-chamber of his Imperial Majesty) from which was probably made, with a few important alterations, the miniature published by Welschinger. Also from the original is the extremely touching water colour by Ender, in the Archducal collection, Albertina. It differs from that wide-spread representation which shows the Duke on his death-bed attired in uniform. The picture of Marie Louise, a fine oil-painting in possession of Franziska, Countess Bombelles of Pozsony (Pressburg), is completely unknown. Very acceptable, too, is the reproduction of the cradle, from the "Schatzkammer" in Vienna, and also the facsimile of one of the Duke's letters, for the original of which I am indebted to the Foresti family.¹

¹ Besides the illustrations enumerated above, we have been enabled, through the kindness of the author, to make the following important additions to the English edition: Napoleon I., from a miniature in the possession of the Emperor Francis Joseph I. (artist unknown); the King of Rome, from a water-colour drawing by Isabey, 1811; the Duke of Reichstadt's carriage; the King of Rome, in the possession of Dr. A. Heymann, of Vienna; the Prince of Parma, from a miniature by Natale von Schinavoni; the Duke Reichstadt, by Sir Thomas Lawrence, P.R.A.; the Reading of the Patent (1818) creating the Prince of Parma Duke of Reichstadt; Prince Metternich, Chancellor of State, from a painting by Joseph Axmann; Count Dietrichstein, governor of the Duke of Reichstadt, from a painting by Joseph Krichläber, 1839; Anton Count Prokesch-Osten, by Turner; the Duke of Reichstadt, from a painting probably by Daffinger; the Duke of Reichstadt holding a Review, by Von Hockle; the Room in which the Duke died at Schönbrunn; the Body of the Duke of Reichstadt borne from Schönbrunn to Vienna during the night of July 23, 1832.—[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.]

I must also avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my thanks to them for other valuable letters of the young Napoleon, previously published by me. My gratitude is also due to General Vilmos Count Pálffy-Daun for the lively sympathy which this lover of history has shown in the progress of my book.

One word as to the title of the present work. Napoleon's son, by the succession of historical events, was called : " King of Rome," " Prince of Parma," " Napoleon II.," and " Duke of Reichstadt." He bore the last title until his death ; it is, as it were, his historical designation, therefore I decided to choose it as the title of my book.

Finally, let me observe that all documents of which the place of deposit is not given in the footnotes are taken from the Royal and Imperial Archives of State in Vienna. For the sake of brevity I refer to the Archives of the Ministry of the Interior as M. I., and to those of the Princely house of Oettingen-Wallerstein as Pr. Oc.—W. A.

THE AUTHOR.

October 1902.

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THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT

CHAPTER I

THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF NAPOLEON I.

OWING to the execution of the Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais, Josephine became a widow in 1794. The period of mourning lasted none too long, for the marriage had never been a happy one. She soon abandoned herself to a very frivolous course of life, and there is no longer any doubt that she carried on intrigues with several different men.¹ One of her friends, Barras, the famous Director, was cynical enough in his Memoirs to lift the veil which had hitherto hung over his relations with Josephine.² It appears that this powerful member of the Directorate, tiring of her himself, tried to persuade the young General Bonaparte, who was one of his favourites, to marry her. His proposal was the more readily accepted because it flattered Bonaparte's vanity to wed a so-called "aristocrat." The wedding took place on March 9, 1796, before the authorities of the second arrondissement of Paris. The sanction of the Church was lacking, but, according to existing conditions in France, the civil contract was considered sufficient. Josephine gave herself unwillingly in marriage to the "Little General," or "Puss in Boots," as she nicknamed him.

¹ Masson, "Napoléon et sa Famille."

² Barras, "Memoires," vol. ii., ch. iv.

She had but little faith in the future of the Corsican, who, however, to her astonishment, was destined ere long to fill the world with his fame. Her happiness soon knew no bounds, and would have been complete had not the misfortune of a childless marriage been a continual trouble to her.

Napoleon, who had but to stretch out his hand for the Imperial crown, naturally desired an heir to all his acquired power. The apparent hopelessness of expecting one from Josephine was a continual source of disappointment. In a dark hour he spoke of his wife's failure to bear him a child as the great sorrow of his life. With a woman's unfailing instinct, Josephine realised that this would one day cause the loss of all her present glory. Napoleon, whose letters to her are full of passion, would never have dreamed of a separation, if only he had been the possessor of an heir. But this thought weighed increasingly upon his mind and received considerable encouragement from his own family, who bore a deadly hatred to Josephine.

There is no doubt that as early as the spring of 1804, after the perfecting of the Constitution of the new Empire, the subject had already been discussed. Overcome, however, by Josephine's tears—for her charms still exercised a strong attraction for him—Napoleon, already omnipotent, revoked his threat, and even promised that she should be crowned Empress beside him.

Josephine, who wished to make a separation impossible in the future, confided to Pope Pius VII., who had come for the Coronation, that her marriage was only a civil contract, which had not been followed by a religious ceremony. The Holy Father at once announced that the Coronation was not to take place until the marriage had received the sanction of the Church. Napoleon, infuriated at first by Josephine's disclosure, finally conformed

to the Pope's wishes, and allowed Cardinal Fesch to perform the marriage ceremony on December 1, 1804. That the new Empress caused her uncle the Cardinal to draw up a special marriage certificate for her own use availed her nothing in the end. It was impossible to silence the rumours of an approaching separation; and at the close of March 1808, Napoleon announced to the Empress his intention of getting a divorce. Her tears and entreaties, however, moved him so deeply that he once more shrank from taking this step. The attempt made upon his life in 1809, by Staps at Schönbrunn, seems to have finally put an end to his irresolution. He was now inexorable, and prepared to carry the divorce through, in order to secure the heir so needed by the country. It was a deeply affecting scene when, in the apartments of the Tuileries, on December 13, 1809, Josephine read aloud in a trembling voice the first lines of her declaration, wherein she consented to renounce all claim to the throne of France.

Was Napoleon, however, justified in releasing himself from the civil contract? Through her own vanity Josephine had put beyond reach her one means of legal defence. She was bitterly to rue having made a false declaration as to her age before the authorities in 1796, making herself out to be four years younger than she really was. According to Article 277 of the "Code Civil," a divorce was impossible when the wife had passed her forty-fifth year. This enactment would have served the Empress well had she not previously made a slight "correction" as to her age. But would Napoleon, who knew no consideration and ignored all obstacles, have been turned from his purpose through fear of violating this clause? Undoubtedly he would have made short work of Article 277, as of everything which had stood in his way so far. This is evident by the arbitrary manner in which he treated his own

family statute of March 30, 1806, of which Article 7 ran as follows: "Divorce is forbidden to members of the Imperial family, irrespective of sex or age." By setting aside this law he made his divorce from Josephine possible. It was hoped that this statute of March 30, 1806, would have prevented the annulling of the marriage. On the other hand, some maintained that since Napoleon had sufficient power to issue such a statute, he would also be strong enough to replace it by another.¹ On the grounds of this latest assertion of his will, the Senate declared his marriage invalid.

For marriage with a Princess of a non-Catholic house this divorce, granted by the highest legal body in France, would have been deemed sufficient. But how would it work now that Napoleon had resolved to form an alliance with a royal house of the Catholic faith, in whose eyes a divorce was not valid, unless it had been sanctioned by the Church? As long as Napoleon was negotiating with the Court of the Tsar with a view to marrying one of the Grand Duchesses,² it was unnecessary to have recourse to ecclesiastical law. The alliance with a Princess of the House of Hapsburg was, however, quite another matter, and Napoleon would have to secure the consent of the Church in this case. In the opinion of the Emperor Francis the declaration of the Senate did not suffice, and therefore he would not allow Marie Louise to ascend the throne of France until the dissolution of Napoleon's marriage was confirmed by the ecclesiastical authorities. As it was impossible to appease the Emperor of Austria's religious scruples by any other means, the omnipotent ruler was forced to leave the issue of his matrimonial suit to the verdict of an ecclesiastical court.

¹ Schnitzer, "Die Ehescheidung Napoleon I.," in the "Katholisches Eherecht," 1898.

² See "Napoléon I^{er}. et Alexandre I^{er}," by Vanda.

THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF NAPOLEON I. 5

It was hoped that the Pope would be the sole adjudicator in this matter, but this view arose from an error. His Holiness was accustomed to dissolve royal marriages rather on traditional than on legal grounds. Would it have been wise to appeal to the Pope as judge in this case, considering the ill-treatment he had received from the Emperor, who still held him a prisoner at Savona, and whom he had excommunicated in his turn? Naturally, it would not suit the Pope to forward an alliance between Napoleon and Austria, since by so doing he would deprive himself of all hope of humbling his worst enemy, the Emperor of the French, through the medium of the Court of Vienna.¹ Pope Pius admitted later that the marriage had been an exceptionally clever stroke of diplomacy on the part of Austria to destroy the dangerous friendship which existed between France and Russia.² But, in spite of this grudging recognition, the Pope must be regarded as *prejudiced*

¹ Account given by the Chevalier of Lebzelter to Metternich on June 19, 1810.

"The alliance, which has drawn together the two Imperial Courts and placed an Austrian Archduchess on the throne of France, must at first have made a very painful impression upon the Pope, the more so because he had all along set his hopes on the success of our arms," Lebzelter had been sent by Metternich on a secret mission to the Pope, who was then living at Savona. (Here I observe once more that, as in this instance, documents in which the place of deposit is not further indicated are borrowed from the Royal and Imperial State Archives in Vienna.) For this mission, see H. Chotard, "Le Pape Pie VII. à Savone," Paris, 1887.

² *Ibid.* "The marriage," said the Pope to Lebzelter, "which occupies all minds and has doubtless filled them with astonishment, although a blow to several of my affections, is, however, as I must acknowledge, a clever political manœuvre, indispensable in the situation wherein you have been left by the war, isolated and in need of a long rest in order to recuperate your forces. Austria is the sole remaining anchor of salvation. . . . For the rest, you should at all costs hinder the bond between Russia and France from becoming closer; this would be the crowning disaster."

against the union, owing to his attitude towards Napoleon. On the strength of a provision in the canonical law, which makes it permissible to set aside a prejudiced judge, the Emperor was within his rights in declining to refer this dispute to the judgment of the Pope.¹ Therefore he appealed to the ecclesiastical court of the diocese of Paris.

This court had first to prove that the union of Napoleon and Josephine had been illegal from the beginning, owing to an obstacle sufficiently weighty to bring about a separation. Could they succeed in doing this, they might at once pronounce the marriage null and void.

The trial took place in Paris on January 9, 1810, before the episcopal authorities. Guicu, who appeared as Napoleon's counsel, pleaded for a dissolution of the marriage on the ground that from the very first it had been lacking in the one essential to its validity, *i.e.*, *the mutual consent of both husband and wife*. He laid particular stress on the fact that Napoleon had never intended to form any real and lasting tie with Josephine. To prove this, he appealed to Fesch, Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc, who all played important parts in this divorce case. Napoleon had certainly consented to the marriage ceremony with Josephine, performed by Cardinal Fesch on December 1, 1804, but had at the same time taken care to rob the sacred ceremony of its legal character.² He had purposely allowed the marriage to take place without witnesses, and without informing the priest of his own diocese of his intention. Always on the point of divorcing his wife, he did not draw the line at fraud when he could obtain some advantage from it. Like a true general, he was prepared for any eventual attack. In order to leave his opponent no way of escape, he had been careful not only that the religious ceremony

¹ See Schnitzer, already quoted.

² For the following, see Welschinger, "Le Divorce de Napoléon."

should take place without witnesses, but also under compulsion—even *against* his will. By the Emperor's request, Fesch stated that he, Napoleon, *had already* told him, in 1804, that in the moment of founding an Empire he must not neglect to secure for it the benefit of a direct heir. Talleyrand also said that, to his knowledge, before December 1804, the Emperor had repeatedly declared he had never intended to allow the civil marriage of 1796 to be sanctioned by the Church. Fesch, Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc unanimously declared that Napoleon, tired of the pressure put upon him by his Imperial consort in 1804, could no longer withstand her desire for the religious ceremony: it had therefore taken place against his will. They certified that in 1804 the Emperor, with great forethought for the future, had excluded the presence of witnesses and of the priest of his own diocese. All this was confirmed by Fesch, who, after the wedding, had drawn up a document respecting the validity of the marriage. There is no parallel in history to this spectacle of the highest dignitaries of a kingdom, with the connivance of its sovereign, openly admitting that the ruler has intentionally deceived both the Church and his consort. But if in 1804 he had already intended to take this course, why did he permit his humble and compliant servants to remain silent for six years? Ought he not to have allowed his witnesses to make this declaration at the moment when the blessing of the Church was being accorded—as alleged—merely for the pacification of Josephine? But what did such objections matter to this supreme autocrat? His chief concern now was to get the necessary proofs—genuine or false—in which the ecclesiastical authorities agreed that he had acted under compulsion.

This transaction gave rise to the liveliest dissensions. Some lawyers would not acknowledge that compulsion, even though effectually proved, constituted sufficient

grounds for a divorce.¹ Others, on the contrary, maintained that actually the *moral will* to enter into a marriage contract had never existed; therefore the Paris authorities could lawfully order its dissolution.² But could the judges, while confirming the legality of the marriage of 1804, completely disregard the *religious element* in Napoleon's *civil marriage* of 1796? Was it not their duty to examine thoroughly into the matter? The ecclesiastical court could hardly be ignorant of the fact that, according to Roman Catholic ideas, a marriage is sacred, even if opportunity were lacking to seal the bond before a priest. In March 1796 it was extremely difficult to obtain the services of one of the clergy. Probably the members of the ecclesiastical tribunal purposely ignored this point, lest they should be compelled to arrive at results that might be attended with very serious consequences to themselves. If the Emperor's civil marriage was really valid, no power on earth could have dissolved it, neither that of the Pope nor of any other religious or secular authority. Therefore the ecclesiastical court of Paris avoided any further investigation into the religious character of the civil ceremony. Their decision can only be described as a misjudged one, based upon gross carelessness.³ Though

¹ See "Die Ehescheidung Napoleon I.," by Schling, in Friedberg-Dove's "Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht," vol. xx. Wolschinger also expresses himself to the same effect in his essay, "Le cardinal Fesch et le divorce de Napoléon" in the "Revue Napoléonienne," conducted by A. Lumbroso, February to March 1902.—Fleiner, "Die Ehescheidung Napoleon I.," Leipsic, 1893.

² Schnitzer, already quoted.

³ I must call attention to the fact that Schnitzer in his investigations arrived at the conclusion that Napoleon's second marriage—since the civil contract must be regarded as valid—was illegal from the Church's standpoint because an obstacle existed to its celebration. If only on account of the observance of the tridentine form—by which, at least the good faith of the bride was taken for granted—the alliance between Napoleon and Marie Louise may be described as a *matrimonium pul-*

THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF NAPOLEON I. 9

some might still look upon Napoleon's first marriage as *probably valid*,¹ and others as being lawfully dissolved, the significant fact remains that the misgivings of the Imperial Court were completely set at rest by this declaration of the ecclesiastical tribunal of Paris.

At one time it certainly seemed as if this particular point would frustrate every plan. The religious scruples of the Emperor Francis had been quieted; not so those of Count Hohenwart, Archbishop of Vienna. "So long," he said to his sovereign on February 28, "as the reasons of the civil and ecclesiastical courts in France for declaring the marriage of Napoleon null and void are not made convincingly and authentically known to me, I am not in a position to consecrate his approaching union with the Archduchess Louise; lest I should place the Holy Sacrament in danger of being annulled, and the bridal pair in a position at once dangerous and insecure, in which they would be exposed to cavilling and witticisms."² The Court of France had forwarded the original documents of the Paris tribunal to their ambassador in Vienna, Count Otto, so that he could produce them at once when requested. But whether due to Metternich's carelessness, or to extreme haste on Otto's part, the documents had been sent back to Paris before the Archbishop had time to become acquainted with their contents. This caused a delay of at least a fortnight before Otto—according to his promise—had despatched a special courier to Paris to bring back the desired papers. Otto, who knew his master's impatience, feared that he would incur his displeasure

alium. A putative marriage possesses the peculiarity that although it is itself void, the children of the same are legitimate (as was the case with the King of Rome, born 1811).

¹ See "Ehescheidung und zweite Heirat Napoleon I.," by Bernhard Dühr, in the "Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie," 12th year, p. 600.

² See "Marie Louise," by Helfert, p. 101.

through this mistake, and was, as may readily be understood, in a state of despair.¹ Metternich also realised to the full the great importance of the moment. He knew the Monarchy would be placed in a very critical position should they fail to induce the Archbishop to withdraw his refusal. At the same time, it was necessary to respect the scruples of the highest religious authority in Vienna. This frame of mind is the only explanation of his words: "The existence of the Monarchy is at stake, but conscience is of greater importance than this existence."² It was the Archbishop himself who suggested a compromise. For his own satisfaction, he demanded that the Chancery of State, or the Austro-Bohemian Court of Chancery, should draw up a document in which one or the other of the authorities should declare that "the nullity of the natural and civil marriage contract between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine had been duly and properly acknowledged and made public."³ Metternich did not repudiate this suggestion. He considered, however, that it would be best if Count Otto, who had the original documents, would issue a formal declaration that the judgment given by the diocesan and metropolitan authorities of Paris had already acknowledged the nullity of Napoleon's first marriage. On March 1, by command of the Emperor Francis, Metternich betook himself to the Archbishop. After careful examination of Otto's papers which were laid before him, Count Hohenwart declared he found in the words and character of the writer "more than sufficient to quiet his conscience."⁴ Metternich was

¹ Count Otto to Metternich, February 25, 1810. "I am really in despair at not having foreseen this incident and kept back the official documents for a few days."

² Metternich's Despatch, March 1, 1810.

³ Helfert, p. 401, already quoted.

⁴ Metternich's Despatch, March 1, 1810.

greatly relieved. A difficulty which had cost him many a sleepless night was at last arranged to his satisfaction. In his joy he at once despatched a messenger to Paris with the news that, in Vienna also, the last obstacle to the marriage of the Archduchess Marie Louise with Napoleon had been removed.¹

But was Metternich's satisfaction so great merely because he had at last come within sight of the completion of a work sprung from his own initiative, whereby he might regard himself as the saviour of the Monarchy? All along it has been asked: Who originally suggested the alliance between Marie Louise and Napoleon? This still remains a mystery. Metternich preferred to suppress the truth concerning the origin of the transaction.² Neither do we derive any guiding contemporary evidence from Napoleon himself. Only in an hour of distress, conscious that his downfall was approaching, he said to the Baron von Wessenberg: "Does Metternich forget that my marriage with an Austrian Archduchess was *his work*?"³ On the other hand, the Emperor Francis writes to Napoleon, March 12, 1810: "I will be the first to congratulate your Majesty on the event you desired."⁴ Between these two directly contradictory statements there exists yet a third piece of evidence, dating from 1809, in which Metternich attributes the idea of an alliance between the two Imperial Courts to himself.⁵ He, who since the peace transactions of Altenburg, wished for nothing so much as to become Stadion's successor,⁶ would naturally see that the surest

¹ Metternich's Despatch, March 3, 1810.

² Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. i. p. 98.

³ Arnetz, "Johann, Freiherr von Wessenberg," vol. i. p. 189.

⁴ Emperor Francis to Napoleon, March 12, 1810.

⁵ Eduard Wertheimer, "Die Heirat der Erzherzogin Marie Luise mit Napoleon I.," "Archives of Austrian History," vol. lxiv. p. 509.

⁶ Eduard Wertheimer, "Geschichte Oesterreich's und Ungarn's, &c.," vol. ii. p. 432.

means of obtaining promotion and influence would be gained by an alliance with Napoleon. His calculations were correct. The new matrimonial alliance had surrounded his name with fame and glory, so that he might well make it his proud boast that no saviour of the world could have been more honoured than was he himself on this occasion.¹ Metternich, who in a document of September 11, 1811, states that the suggestion of the marriage emanated from him,² in his Memoirs—written a long time after the event—denies any such intention, and attributes the initiative entirely to Napoleon.³ Psychologically, it is explicable why, at a later period, he did not care to claim any further connection with this marriage. After Napoleon's downfall, he might well shrink from being regarded as the originator of this union between the Archduchess and the Emperor, at whose ruin he so zealously connived. Recently, fresh doubts have been cast upon Metternich as the promoter of this marriage.⁴ Much, indeed, that deserves serious consideration has been urged against its probability. It is quite untrue that the Court of Vienna remained completely *passive and expectant*.⁵ Dating from the days immediately following the divorce, there exists a memorandum from the Austrian side which discusses in detail the *pros* and *cons* of the matrimonial alliance. The choice of an Austrian Archduchess was, in the opinion of the writer of this memorandum, such a masterly stroke, accompanied by so many ad-

¹ Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. i., p. 236.

² M. Duncker, "Aus der Zeit Friedrich des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm III.," p. 325.

³ Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. i., p. 98.

⁴ Demelitsch, "Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik," book II., ch. i. "Die Heirat Napoleons;" and Anton Becker, "Der Plan der zweiten Heirat Napoleons," in the "Mitteilungen des Instituts für österr. Geschichte," vol. xix., pt. i., 1898.

⁵ Becker, p. 137 (already quoted).



NAPOLÉON I

*From a miniature, artist unknown. In the possession
of the Emperor Francis Joseph I*

vantages, that Napoleon could not hesitate for a moment to prefer Marie Louise to a Russian Grand Duchess. If Austria granted the hand of the Archduchess in marriage, the hopes of all the nations oppressed by Bonaparte were destroyed at one blow, for they looked upon the Court of Vienna as their last support. In this way, the *moral* resistance of an entire generation to the tyranny of France must break down. Napoleon, on the contrary, gained a *moral* existence based on the assurance of political duration, and his only powerful enemy—the secret alliance between all the other nations—was now disarmed. But in proportion as Napoleon's moral credit increased through his marriage with an Archduchess, that of Austria waned. Yet ought the Court of Vienna, on this account, to have declined this matrimonial alliance? No, since Austria thus gained a *negative* advantage not to be undervalued. The warding off of the dangers which threatened at the moment by means of a *rapprochement* with France, brought about by the marriage of the Archduchess, was the only means of saving Austria at this juncture. "The latest tendency of our policy," runs the memorandum, "cannot be altered by an alliance with France; this alliance can only lend us new strength for the attainment of our aim. Some day, when the pressing moment of dissolution arrives, Austria must grasp the reins with a strengthened hand and once more guide a straying, frightened and bewildered generation into the deserted paths of right and order."

We do not know the author of this interesting document, but, as it emanated from the Chancery of State, it probably contained the opinions of the most influential personalities of the time. Where such views prevailed, there could be no question of a passive and expectant attitude. Still less would such an attitude be justified, since there was always considerable anxiety lest Napoleon

might after all decide to wed a Grand Duchess. According to the author of the memorandum, anarchy, the destruction of the intermediate States, the downfall of the Allies, self-government, ending finally in barbarism, would be the result of such a course.¹ But a testimony in Metternich's own handwriting proves conclusively that Vienna did not stand and look on with folded arms at this all-important event. In a report of February 7, 1810, Metternich declares that his instructions to Schwarzenberg in Paris had met with the best results and, "that the marriage transactions will certainly be to our advantage."² Although Metternich had not perhaps actually taken the first step, we may be sure that he jumped at it gladly enough when he was informed of Napoleon's desire for a matrimonial alliance with Austria. He did not doubt that Marie Louise was a suitable consort for the French ruler.³ Metternich had always held, since the rumours of divorce became more persistent in 1807, that the betrothal with a Russian Grand Duchess would be a great misfortune.⁴ Was not this comprehensible, since Austria would have been only too glad to see Napoleon cast a favourable eye on an Archduchess? Probably Metternich had had similar wishes expressed to him by the Fouché-Talleyrand party during his stay in Paris, particularly in 1808.⁵ When in 1809 the guidance of affairs was confided to him, and the dissolution of the marriage of Josephine took a more decided form, it naturally followed that, more than ever, he cherished the idea of raising an Archduchess to the throne of France. Having regard to the Emperor

¹ Memorandum.

² Metternich's Despatch of February 7, 1810.

³ "Diary of Count Karl Zinzendorf," January 22, 1810. "The latter (Metternich) spoke to me . . . about the marriage of Napoleon, and considered the Archduchess Marie Louise very suitable to him."

⁴ Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. II., p. 147.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 317.

Francis's feelings, he might well hesitate before he laid such a proposal directly before the throne of his master. If Metternich entertained this idea, which seems indisputable, it also found support, as unexpected as it was desirable, in other quarters in Vienna. According to the statement of a well-informed Austrian dignitary, Count Karl Zinzendorf, Minister of State, the suggestion came direct from Vienna and, once expressed, won the immediate support of the Emperor and his Ministers. Prince Trauttmansdorff, Lord High Steward, expressed an opinion to Prince Ligne, who was celebrated for his brilliant intellect, that the betrothal of the Archduchess to Napoleon was most desirable. Ligne did not hesitate to repeat this remark, which emanated from one of the highest Court officials, to Napoleon's trusty servant Count Narbonne, who was then—January 1810—in Vienna. Narbonne in his turn requested Prince Ligne to set forth the various reasons for the marriage in writing, and on receiving the document sent it at once to Fouché in Paris, in order that it should come directly to Napoleon's knowledge. Prince Ligne was so convinced of his valuable influence in the matter, that he boasted of having been the promoter of the scheme.¹ These facts are vouched for to a certain extent by Metternich himself. Upon Narbonne's being accredited Ambassador to the Bavarian Court, the Minister remarked to the Emperor: "The appointment of Narbonne to Munich is very important, since it must be regarded as the result of his letter (known to your Majesty) to Fouché touching the marriage."²

¹ "Diary of Count Zinzendorf," February 24, 1810: "The Prince de Ligne believed himself to have been one of the first promoters of this marriage. Trauttmansdorff had told him how desirable the marriage would be. Ligne repeated this to Narbonne, who begged him to make a written statement of his views, which Narbonne sent to Fouché."

² Metternich's Despatch of February 7, 1810. About Narbonne, see Becker, p. 141 (already quoted).

There is no doubt that Fouché had a hand in all this. It even appears that from Vienna they entered into direct communication with him concerning the matter.¹ All this is contrary to the hostile opinion which he expressed in the Council of January 31, 1810, against the marriage with an Archduchess. Probably the Minister of Police played a double part on this occasion, as he had done on many others. It is characteristic of him that he always had two strings to his bow. Although publicly opposed to Marie Louise, he still secretly wished to ingratiate himself with the new Empress of the House of Hapsburg, in case the Russian matrimonial alliance should prove a failure. In Vienna it was firmly believed that the powerful Minister of Police was their ally. This alone explains why the Emperor Francis advised his daughter at the moment of parting to place full confidence in Fouché.² But had this minister made use of Narbonne's information concerning Napoleon? If the event actually took place, he would find it still easier to gain access to the French Emperor, because, according to important proof furnished by Archduke Rainer, Napoleon's thoughts are supposed to have turned, even as early as July, and during the war of 1809 to the Archduchess Marie Louise.³ The report of the French Minister Champagny, in November 1809, with reference to the health of the Austrian Princess accords with this.⁴ An intimate alliance between France and Austria was in the minds of most influential Frenchmen. General Andréossy, Governor of Vienna during the occupation of this city, said: "The two Governments must come to an understanding and, approaching each other honourably, forget the past." Andréossy expressed

¹ Floret's Account, Paris, January 13, 1810.

² Louis Madelin, "Fouché," vol. ii., p. 199.

³ "Records of the Archduke Rainer," *Kod. Rain.* 59, in the Court Library at Vienna. "Already in July, during the war, Napoleon had this idea and was now to carry it out."

⁴ "Marie Louise," by Helfert, p. 73.

the opinion that should Metternich succeed in bringing this about, he would have rendered a great service to his country and his master.¹ Yet it was not until after the Countess of Metternich's audience with Napoleon that the whole business was put on a really firm footing. The French Emperor utilised the wife of the leading Austrian Minister in order to find out decisively whether the Court of Vienna would consent to give him the hand of the Archduchess in marriage. Napoleon no doubt told the Countess that her husband as Prime Minister could become very useful to France. Queen Hortense, in any case, discussed more closely the meaning of the Emperor's words at his audience held the following day. Josephine told the Countess, even more frankly, that she herself had advised the Emperor to make this marriage, and would not regard her sacrifice as vain, if only her wish were accomplished. "I think," she added, "that the Emperor would approve of this choice if he could count on a favourable reception from your side."²

The Prussian Ambassador in Vienna, Count Finkenstein, claimed to have heard from reliable sources that Napoleon had endeavoured to ascertain the feelings of the Viennese Court through the medium of Countess Metternich.³ According to Floret, Counsellor of the Austrian Embassy in Paris, we gather that he first gave serious consideration to the marriage from the time of Countess Metternich's audience.⁴

¹ From Hoppé to Metternich, Vienna, November 21, 1809. Appended to the correspondence between Metternich and Hudelist.

² Countess Metternich to her husband, Paris, January 3, 1810, in Metternich's "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. ii., p. 320.

³ Count Finkenstein, Vienna, March 15, 1810, Royal Prussian State Archives. "The first advances on the part of Napoleon to discover whether he would not demand in vain the hand of the Archduchess Louise, having been made by Countess Metternich." Compare this with his account of February 21, 1810.

⁴ Floret to Metternich, Paris, January 10, 1810. "The Countess Metternich's letter is to-day the most important item of our reports."

During these transactions, Marie Louise gave little thought to the idea of becoming Napoleon's wife. The sound of his name alone filled her with terror, for in him she saw the Antichrist embodied. From the depths of her soul she pitied any princess whom he might choose ; she herself was determined not to be the piteous sacrifice offered up to political exigencies.¹ Marriage with Napoleon appeared to her in a still less attractive light, since those who surrounded her lost no opportunity of fostering her hatred for the conqueror of her Imperial father.² To this party belonged more especially her stepmother, the Empress Maria Ludovica, Napoleon's zealous opponent, who would have preferred to make a match between her own brother, the Archduke Franz d'Este and the Archduchess,³ a plan which was only frustrated by the Prince's lack of means.⁴ When, however, an alliance with Napoleon became probable,

I implored her to be very explicit in her wording of it, and not to overlook any details that have passed since her presentation to the Emperor, as nothing dating from that day is unimportant." This passage can only refer to Metternich's letter in his "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. ii., p. 319. For it is highly improbable that a letter with such important contents, if written on January 3, would not have been sent until the 10th ; so it is to be taken for granted that the date in the "*Nachgelassene Papiere*" is not correct. One more proof is that Metternich would not have left the letter from his wife, dated the 3rd, unanswered until the 27th. From all this we suppose that the Countess's letter was written on the 10th. Bailleu had already sagaciously attributed the decision to this audience.

¹ "Correspondence of Marie Louise, 1799-1847," p. 143.

² "Records of the Archduke Rainer." Kod. Rain. 59, in the Court Library at Vienna. "They tried to fill Louise with dislike to Napoleon, but she was so sensible that it had no effect and she sur-rendered herself to her fate with patience and wisdom." See also "*Un Commissaire des Guerres*" in "*Le Carnet historique et litté-raire*," 1898, vol. ii., p. 575.

³ Eduard Wertheimer, "*Die drei ersten Frauen des Kaisers Franz*," p. 97.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

no one troubled themselves much about Marie Louise's personal feelings. They were not accustomed in Vienna to consult the tastes of an Archduchess when it was a question of politics.¹ Towards the end of January, Marie Louise received the first announcement of the fate which awaited her.² Although the Archduchess had told her friends in confidence that she would put no difficulties in the way of this marriage,³ at the last moment she changed her mind. From Ofen, where she was staying at the time, she sent urgent appeals against her marriage with the French Emperor, who was so repulsive to her.⁴ It appears that the Emperor Francis had to appeal to the filial affection of his most devoted daughter before he could induce her to make the necessary sacrifice. The Pope's Nuncio himself was entreated to dispel her scruples, which were probably of a religious nature, to this marriage,⁵ and on February 14 Metternich was glad to announce this important news in Paris.⁶

The way was now paved for the formal proposal of

¹ Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. II., p. 323. "Our Princesses are not accustomed to choose their own husbands according to the promptings of their hearts."

² Archduke Joseph to the Emperor Francis, Raab, January 26, 1810.

³ "Correspondence de Marie Louise," p. 81. The letter here referred to is incorrectly dated 1809. According to the contents it belongs to the year 1810.

⁴ Marie Louise to Emperor Francis, Paris, December 5, 1810. "I can only repeat to you how happy and contented I always am, and am convinced I always shall be. I cannot thank God enough for giving me such great happiness, and you, dearest papa, that you did not yield to my pleadings from Ofen." This passage disproves what Metternich writes (vol. i., p. 100) of his personal interview with Marie Louise. This could not have taken place, as Metternich was in Vienna at the time Marie Louise was in Ofen.

⁵ Metternich's Despatch of March 1, 1810. On the back of despatch is written: "Appended to a treatise by the Pope's Nuncio stating opinion against her Royal Highness the Archduchess Louise." This treatise unfortunately has not been preserved.

⁶ Metternich, vol. II., p. 326.

marriage, which was hourly expected. In Paris, however, they had not waited for this news before considering the affair complete. Napoleon was not a man to do things step by step, as they preferred to do in Vienna. On the morning of February 6 he read Caulaincourt's latest despatches from St. Petersburg. From them he gathered the information that the time had now come for breaking off the marriage negotiations with the Russian Court, which, however, had never had any serious intention on his part. It was evident to him that, having regard to the evasive answers of the Russian Empress-Mother, every further delay meant for him a sore discomfiture which would seriously undermine his prestige. On the very same day, therefore, he commissioned Eugène de Beauharnais, the Viceroy, to announce to Prince Schwarzenberg that the Emperor Napoleon was prepared to wed the Archduchess Marie Louise, on condition that the contract should be signed within a few hours. The assent of the Austrian Ambassador, who had no idea whether the Archduchess had consented or not, was thus to be won by taking him unawares. Beads of perspiration stood on the Prince's forehead when he realised what was expected of him.¹ As yet he had no authority to actually arrange such a matter. After a severe mental struggle, and with a feeling of overwhelming responsibility, he signed his name to the document which made Marie Louise Empress of France.² The simplest

¹ Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. ii., p. 260.

² Schwarzenberg to Metternich, Paris, February 7, 1810, Helfert (already quoted), p. 354, see also 358. On p. 358 is a "private letter" from Schwarzenberg. He seems to have been agitated by the extraordinary events, as he writes January 8, instead of February 8. The Journal mentioned in this letter is not forthcoming. We are therefore in complete ignorance of the events which preceded the signing of the contract. We gather, however, from both Schwarzenberg's documents as given by Helfert, that [he must have been threatened with the rupture of all further negotiations unless he signed at once.



Ann. Intern. Med.

The following figures are estimated from the
results of the survey of the "Bureau of Statistics".

demands of propriety were outraged. The marriage contract was to be concluded before any formal proposal had been made; without even waiting for the consent of the Archduchess, and far from the home of the bride. One might have supposed that the way in which the Ambassador's hand had been forced would have created a very painful impression in Vienna. But the result was exactly the opposite. "My arrival in Vienna," writes Floret, who had brought over the marriage contract, "has caused a very great and, I may say, pleasant sensation. There is only one opinion with regard to the marriage: never has an event been more popular with the nation. The Emperor is contented and happy; the young Princess just as one could wish to see her. Count Metternich conducts himself perfectly; everything has been done with the best intentions in the world; everything has been thought of; and it is the general desire that the festival shall not fail to do credit to the greatness of the occasion. Ducats, which on the day of my arrival stood at 22, fell the next day to 17 and 18. The following day no business was possible on the Stock Exchange, as no one wished to sell."¹ At the same time, the Emperor Francis, to save his own dignity, added one stipulation to his final consent: that the Paris contract, which could only be looked upon in the light of a promise, was to be followed by the signing of the real marriage contract in Vienna, in accordance with the domestic laws and formalities binding upon the descendants of the reigning house.² A formal proposal was also to be made to the Imperial bride. Napoleon chose Bertlier, Prince of Neuchâtel, his best friend and comrade in arms, for this mission.³ There was universal

¹ Floret to Schwarzenberg, in Paris, Vienna, February 19, 1810, Prince Schwarzenberg's Archives at Worlik (Bohemia).

² Hoffert (already quoted), p. 94.

³ It is said in a bulletin from Schwarzenberg on February 12, that

agitation consequent upon the great variety of views and impressions which prevailed. The Russo-English party were dumbfounded, and could hardly recover from the shock.¹ In Prague, the seat of Napoleon's most irreconcilable adversary, the general feeling was not favourable.² The Hungarian nobility looked upon the marriage as a bad omen for the constitution, and were afraid that the Court of Vienna, strengthened by the power of France, would now take steps to carry out their plan of crushing Hungary.³ But the Hungarian commercial classes rejoiced, for they saw in this alliance a guarantee for the maintenance of peace and an increase in the credit of the State.⁴ The Viennese also shared in these rejoicings. But although every one expressed their satisfaction at this important event, the popular wits soon found out the weak spot in the new situation, and on every side the question was asked: "What is the difference between the marriage of an Emperor and that of a peasant?" The answer was: "Peasants generally fight after the marriage; Emperors, on the contrary, do so before." Napoleon and the Emperor Francis were also depicted playing cards together, the former plays the King of Hearts and the latter the Queen of Hearts, whilst a Tyrolean, looking on, exclaims: "The deuce! so far the gentlemen have only played 'Grab,' but now they play 'Matri-

Talleyrand asked to be allowed to go to Vienna as the Emperor's proxy; but Napoleon had refused, saying that people would accuse Talleyrand of equivocal meanings, if he was so anxious to bring about the betrothal with Marie Louise.

¹ Helfert (already quoted), p. 95.

² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³ Hager, the Prefect of the Police, to the Emperor, Vienna, March 13, 1810. Archives of the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna. (I indicate these archives by the letters M.I., Minister of the Interior.)

⁴ Professor Schedius to the Court Secretary Arnbruster at Vienna, Pest, February 22, 1810. M.I.

THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF NAPOLEON I. 23

mony.'"¹ The answer to the question, "Is Napoleon's marriage with Marie Louise a *mésalliance* or not?" is also amusing. "No," says the Viennese wit, "because the father-in-law is a paper-maker and the son-in-law a sword-cutler."² All these jokes were of a good-humoured nature and not calculated to damp the happy humour of the Viennese. The populace of the provinces joined in the general rejoicings.³ All regarded the marriage of the Archduchess as a guarantee of a better future, and as the beginning of a much-desired period of peace. On March 8, Berthier as "Grand Ambassador" made his ceremonial entry at Court, amidst the loud cheers of the crowd. On the same day a magnificent ball took place, at which Marie Louise appeared. Count de Laborde, who was then in Vienna, writes: "The Archduchess was charming this evening. The fair hair, of which she possesses such quantities, was dressed high on her head, freely displaying her neck and shoulders. Her exceptional freshness, her smile and the expression of her face, the particular grace and modesty with which she made her appearance, created such an impression that we all said she would, without doubt, be one of the most agreeable ladies at the Court. There is no question that, apart from her beauty, it would have been impossible, even among the lower classes, to find a healthier person, or one who so rarely ailed anything. Her complexion is spotless, and I am convinced that

¹ "Grab" and "Matrimony" were two popular card games of the time.

² See my treatise, "Die Heirat der Erzherzogin Marie Louise mit Napoleon I." Archives for Austrian History, vol. lxiv., p. 523. "Paper-maker" is an allusion to the Emperor Franz's fondness for the production of paper money. "Sword-cutler" alludes to Napoleon's wars.

³ See accounts of the general feeling in the year 1810. M.I. The Poles only were thunderstruck at the news. See also the account of the Court Councillor, Von Baum, from Wieliczka, February 28, 1810. Archives of the Imperial and Royal Finance Minister in Vienna.

her children will be as strong and fresh as herself."¹ At half-past five on March 11, the provisional wedding ceremony took place in the church of St. Augustine, when the Archduke Charles represented his great enemy as bridegroom. In the evening the whole town was lit up, and decorated with all kinds of illuminated inscriptions. One of them ran as follows :

"Durch Röcke und Hoson
Vereinigen sich Oesterreicher und Franzosen."²

("The French and Austrians are united through petticoats
and breeches.")

But for Marie Louise the hardest hour of life was approaching. With tears in her eyes, she took leave of her family. So deeply moved was the Empress Maria Ludovica that grief rendered her unable to escort her stepdaughter to the carriage which was to bear her away from her own people.³ The father of the Archduchess watched her disappear in the distance with a heavy heart. His feelings are shown in a letter, written to his son-in-law the day after the wedding : "If the sacrifice I have made in parting from my daughter is immense, if in the future my heart bleeds for the loss of my beloved child, the only consolation I shall have, and I do not hesitate to say it, is in the complete assurance of her future happiness."⁴ The Emperor Francis wished to embrace Marie Louise once more before she crossed the frontier of his country. He therefore preceded her to St. Pölten with the Empress, and from thence accompanied her alone as far as Enns, where he took a

¹ Count de Laborde to the Duke of Bassano, Vienna, March 9, 1810. National Archives of Paris.

² See my treatise "Die Heirat der Erzherzogin Marie Luise," &c., p. 531.

³ See my book "Die drei ersten Frauen des Kaisers Franz," p. 99, also observations on, p. 82.

⁴ March 13, 1810.

fond farewell of her.¹ On March 16, in the pavilion built expressly for this purpose outside Braunau, Marie Louise was finally surrendered to the care of the French representative, the Prince of Neuchâtel. Hudelist, who acted as Austrian Secretary at the ceremony, left the place with the consciousness of having assisted at an important event. "I am now going back to Vienna as soon as possible," runs his letter, "with my heart full of hope for at least a peaceful future. We have given Napoleon a pearl of our Imperial House; if we gain peace thereby it is the greatest gift he could bestow on us in return, provided we can make good use of this respite. *Bella gerant alii.*"² Marie Louise was stirred by very different feelings. Although outwardly quite self-possessed, inwardly a cold shudder ran through her (this is her own expression) when the ladies and gentlemen of her late retinue kissed her hand for the last time with tears in their eyes. "God has given me," she writes to the Emperor Francis before she left Austria, "the strength to bear this last painful blow with courage—the parting from all my belongings; I have put my whole trust in Him, He will help me and give me courage, and I shall find peace in the consolation of having done my duty towards you by making this sacrifice."³ Quick to observe the difference between the "French and the Viennese ladies," and placing no confidence in her sister-in-law, Queen Caroline Murat, who came to receive her,⁴ she

¹ Account given by Hudelist, St. Pölten, March 14, 1810. He mentions particularly that the Empress journeyed back alone from St. Pölten to Vienna, and that the Emperor alone travelled to Inns.

² Hudelist to Metternich, March 17, 1810.

³ Helfert (already quoted), p. 119.

⁴ *Ibid.* It is interesting to see how Marie Louise's uncle, Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Würzburg, expresses himself in quite a contrary tone on the subject of Queen Caroline. He writes from Compiègne, April 19, 1810, to the Emperor Franz: "One thing which pleased me especially was that the Queen of Naples made the entire

comforted herself with the thought that she would be allowed to take her former chief maid-of-honour for a while to Paris. Napoleon himself had suggested her doing so, and Marie Louise was so delighted that she exclaimed: "This tender solicitude on the Emperor's part binds me to him already, and fills me with respect as well as with the hope of our future happiness."¹ But it was to be ruled otherwise. She was soon to learn that her joy was premature. Already in Vienna Berthier had told Metternich that Countess Lažansky must not go to France. The decision had been postponed from hour to hour, and in Braunau this delicate question was again discussed. Prince Trauttmansdorff, who accompanied Marie Louise to Braunau, was at great pains to prevent Countess Lažansky's dismissal, and told Berthier that just at this moment the Empress was especially in need of the greatest forbearance. All he could achieve, however, was an undertaking that this unpleasant news should not be communicated to her until they reached Munich.² Marie Louise was deeply grieved, and she writes without reserve, after submitting herself to the inevitable: "How much I feel the parting from her, and I could make my husband no greater sacrifice, although I am convinced the idea was not his own."³

Laborde gave Prince Trauttmansdorff to understand quite frankly that it was really Queen Caroline who had instigated the dismissal of Countess Lažansky, for she wished to have an unlimited influence over her young sister-in-law, and to keep her guidance solely in her own hands.⁴ Napoleon, however, remarked to Count Metternich on his journey with the Empress and showed herself so friendly towards her. I had the pleasure of knowing her well, and know what excellent services she can and will render her."

¹ Trauttmansdorff to the Emperor, March 25, 1810.

² *Ibid.*, March 25, 1810.

³ Helfert (already quoted), p. 122.

⁴ Trauttmansdorff to the Emperor, March 25, 1810.

nich, at a later period, that the order was only attributable to a stupid blunder on Berthier's part.¹ Yet it is certain that he actually gave the order himself.² This is all the more incomprehensible, as this harsh demand distinctly contradicts all his declarations that he intended to win his bride by means of the most affectionate advances. He had already written to her that he desired her happiness before all, and would make every effort to please her. He took great pains over the smallest things which gave her satisfaction. He inquired in Vienna if she had any pets, and when he discovered that she had two birds and a dog to which she was attached, he had them brought to Paris.³ He also paid great attention to his personal appearance, in order to make an impression upon his wife's heart. This mighty man, the terror of the whole world, sent for tailors to make him well-fitting clothes; and also for a dancing-master to teach him the Viennese waltz.⁴ He could hardly restrain his ardour for Marie Louise. The thought of being able to call an Archduchess of one of the oldest reigning houses of Europe his wife seems to have flattered his self-esteem and filled him with immense pride. This of itself explains his being unable to await the arrival of Marie Louise. Urged by his impatience, he hastened—accompanied by his brother-in-law Murat—to meet the Empress's carriage, in the guise of an ordinary artillery officer,

¹ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Paris, April 4, 1810. "As to Madame de Lutzansky," said Napoleon, "her dismissal is a stupid mistake of the Prince of Neuchâtel, who ought not to have hesitated a moment about letting her continue her journey. I commission you," he added, "to make my excuses to your master. My intention was good, but you see I am as badly served as others."

² Champagny to Otto, Paris, February 25, 1810. Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

³ "Zinzendorf's Diary," March 14, 1810.

⁴ Schlossberger, "Briefwechsel der Königin Katharine von Westfalen," L., p. 292.

who was merely to deliver a despatch. Unfortunately, much to Napoleon's annoyance, this carefully planned surprise was frustrated by Audenarde, Master of the Horse, who had not been initiated into the secret.¹ In consequence he arranged a surprise of a very different kind for Marie Louise. Inconsiderate, as he always was, he consummated his marriage at the Castle of Compiègne, without waiting for the ceremony in Paris. He had, as it was said at the time, and as he himself acknowledged later,² first taken counsel with a bishop to quiet his conscience. This prelate assured him that the ceremony which had already taken place in Vienna entitled him to all the rights of a husband over his wife.³ On the following day, the ladies-in-waiting served the Emperor's breakfast at Marie Louise's bedside. In the full enjoyment of his experience, he said to one of his confidants: "Do not marry any one but a German. They are the best wives in the world, good, naïve, and fresh as roses." In thus anticipating his marriage—which there is no doubt he did—Napoleon proved his own inconsistency, for he had previously declared that the ceremony by

¹ Schwarzenberg to Metternich, Paris, April 5, 1810. "It was the Emperor's intention to surprise the Empress by pretending to deliver her a letter in the guise of an officer of artillery; but M. d'Audenarde, who had not been warned of the plan, sprang from his horse on seeing the arrival of his sovereign, and opening the carriage door announced 'the Emperor.' At St. Helena Napoleon recounted that it was Queen Caroline of Naples who exclaimed, 'Here is the Emperor!' Gourgaud, "Sainte Hélène," vol. ii., p. 275.

² Napoleon at St. Helena mentioned the Bishop of Nantes, but it is doubtful if, as here stated, he also asked Metternich's advice. Gourgaud, "Sainte Hélène," vol. ii., p. 276.

³ "Zinzendorf's Diary," April 16, 1810. "It was written to Madame de Rombeck that Napoleon anticipated the religious ceremony and consummated his wedlock with Marie Louise before he had the right to do so." *Ibid.*, April 22. "Napoleon's anticipation of the event is being generally discussed. He went expressly to a bishop to find out if it was permissible." See the opinions of his contemporaries by Helfert (already quoted), p. 410.

the Archbishop of Vienna was a secondary consideration, and the only real authorisation was that of the officials in Paris. But what did one more brutality matter to Napoleon, who had behaved brutally throughout the entire marriage negotiation ? He was overjoyed at being able to fold Marie Louise in his arms at Compiègne ; according to his view of the matter the blessing of the Church would follow soon enough.

CHAPTER II

BIRTH OF THE KING OF ROME

WHEN Napoleon, on February 6, formally compelled Prince Schwarzenberg to complete the marriage contract in all haste, was it his exclusive aim to assure himself of Austria's consent by means of a solemn act, or had he not other and more secret motives ?

It is more than probable that through this transaction he intended to deprive the Court of Vienna of the possibility of acquiring any political advantages from the sacrifice made to him by the Emperor Francis, or of adding any conditions to the marriage contract that he would prefer to avoid fulfilling. This was a very clever move on his part, which Vienna strove hard to frustrate. Metternich, the leading Minister, went himself to Paris to try and recover there and then the lost advantages. Armed with the entire confidence of his Imperial master, and with no risk of being called to account, he desired an audience with Napoleon in order to demand the rescinding of the burdensome conditions of the last Peace Treaty of 1809, which hindered all development of Austria's internal forces. His personal mediation ought now to make it possible for the Monarchy to attain, through the marriage of the Archduchess, what it had kept in view from the first. The complaisance of the Imperial son-in-law would provide the remedy for the healing of those wounds inflicted during recent years.

Metternich's ideal was so to increase Austria's military power that she would be strong enough, not only to "maintain the Austrian throne in its present lofty position among the Powers of Europe, but also to defend it against any future assaults from outside."¹ The Emperor Francis was throughout in perfect agreement with his Minister.²

Metternich began his journey almost at the same time as the new Empress of the French. He overtook her in Strassburg, whence he wrote to her father as follows: "The way she behaves is splendid and meets with universal praise. She develops qualities which are very necessary in this country; on all occasions she speaks with much grace and dignity and improvises all her replies to the addresses presented to her, which are generally couched in language very inferior to her own."³

When Metternich arrived at Compiègne, where the Imperial Court was staying, he was astonished at the affectionate way in which Napoleon devoted himself to his young wife. "The Emperor, I assure you," he writes on March 29, "is almost entirely taken up with her; he pays her the most assiduous attentions and everything goes to prove how completely the Empress fulfils his expectations. Her behaviour is in every respect perfect; winning, affable, yet dignified, she gains all hearts, and among the Court officials opinion is

¹ Metternich's Report, March 14, 1810.

² Autograph reply from Emperor Francis to Metternich's Report of March 14. "Placing the fullest confidence in your personality, I have commissioned you to proceed to Paris in order to act for the good of my Monarchy. I therefore impose on you the duty of doing your utmost in our interests and of endeavouring to obtain for us the greatest possible advantages, including the various subjects for negotiation herewith proposed."

³ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Strassburg, March 23, 1810.

unanimously in her favour."¹ This bears out what Queen Caroline Murat said : that it was only necessary to see Marie Louise in order to fall in love with her.²

The fresh, healthy, unspoiled disposition of the Archduchess appealed in its simplicity to Napoleon, on whom she made a similarly fascinating impression. For that reason he wished to lead her to the altar with an almost unprecedented pomp and splendour, when, in Paris, the blessing of the Church was again to consecrate his second marriage.³

Metternich was also to learn from the Empress herself how happy she was in her new position. Marie Louise invited the Austrian Minister to visit her, and told him the Emperor had reproached her for not having sooner received him in private audience.⁴ He observed with pleasure that, although lacking in experience, her womanly instinct had already taught her how to adapt herself to the Emperor's character, and that all her previous fear of his overwhelming personality had now vanished. Metternich was proud of the fact that Marie Louise was greatly appreciated by the Emperor's family.⁵ Napoleon's

¹ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Compiègne, March 29. Masson's "Marie Louise," p. 117, states the contrary; he attributes the fact to the bad influence of Madame Montebello.

² "Zinzendorf's Diary," March 19, 1810. "The Queen of Naples said it was enough merely to see the new Empress, the Archduchess Marie Louise, to be in love with her."

³ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Compiègne, March 29, 1810. He adds to what has gone before: "The preparations of all kinds are on such an extensive scale that it is difficult, without having seen them, to form any idea of their magnificence."

⁴ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Paris, April 4, 1810.

⁵ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Paris, April 16, 1810. With this opinion Queen Katherine of Westphalia also concurs. See the correspondence published by Schlossberger, i., p. 298. Marie Louise herself writes to her father from Compiègne, April 22, 1810; "I get on very well with the Emperor's family." Masson's "Marie Louise," p. 116, states that Madame Montebello had raised endless

mother assured him, with tears in her eyes, of the happiness the Empress had conferred upon her son.¹

Although greatly pleased to know that his Archduchess had learnt to adapt herself to Napoleon's disposition, he was still more anxious to discover whether she had gone so far as to establish an influence over him. To Metternich it was of primary importance that time should provide him with an instrument, in the person of the Empress, through which he might exercise his influence upon the Emperor. On this point he was fortunate in being able to convey the most comforting assurances to his master, and presented them to the Empress's father with a freedom of speech few would have dared to use in addressing their sovereign.²

"The Emperor," so runs the gist of Metternich's remarks, "is entirely taken up with her, and everything proves to me that she begins to understand him thoroughly. He has possibly more weaknesses than many other men, and if the Empress continues to play upon them, as she begins to realise the possibility of doing, she can render the greatest services to herself and to all Europe. He is so evidently in love with her"—he continues—"that he cannot conceal his feelings, and all his customary ways of life are subordinate to her wishes. He loads her daily with presents, and her slightest wish is invariably anticipated; their intimate relations are perfectly happy, and—what pleases me most—she feels this completely. Above all," concludes Metternich, flattered by the success of his plan, "I can enjoy the pleasant conviction—since she herself assured me of the fact—that everything has turned out precisely as I had predicted. With her very straight, unprejudiced outlook,

disputes on questions of etiquette between the Empress and Napoleon's sisters, which were always attributed to Marie Louise's pride.

¹ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, April 16, 1810.

² The same to the same, April 16, 1810.

the Empress will succeed very well in her exalted but difficult position.”¹

The Emperor Francis, who had not parted from his favourite child without misgivings as to her future, was deeply touched by these tidings. Profoundly moved, he wrote himself to Metternich in Paris: “What you tell me about my daughter in your despatch of April 16 gives me true joy and comfort; God grant that her marriage with the Emperor Napoleon may bring happiness and a blessing to the whole world.”²

Napoleon, who was residing with Marie Louise at Compiègne, whither he had also invited Metternich, knew no rest until some account of the close and almost idyllic ties between himself and the Empress had reached Vienna. “Impress upon the Emperor,” he said one day to Metternich, “that his daughter is the most precious gift he could have bestowed upon me. He in no way deceived me, for the better I get to know her, the more perfect I find her, and she is destined to bring me happiness. Should this state of things ever come to an end, the fault would not be yours, but mine; all reproaches would fall upon my head. My gratitude therefore to the father who has confided such a treasure to my care cannot be less than eternal.”³

It was by her gentleness of heart, her piety,⁴ and other good qualities—rather those of a simple housewife than of a great Princess—that Napoleon was most

¹ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Paris, April 16, 1810.

² The Emperor Francis to Metternich, Vienna, May 2, 1810.

³ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Compiègne, April 27, 1810. Archduke Ferdinand also writes, Compiègne, April 19, 1810, to the Emperor Francis: “Thank God all goes well, and the Empress behaves just as one could wish, and could not doubt she would do. The Emperor is in his glory, and only one opinion prevails as to your daughter.”

⁴ Metternich to Emperor Francis, April 27, 1810. “The gentle piety of his wife is a great merit in the eyes of the Emperor; he said to me recently that without this quality she would lose for him half her attraction, which increases daily.”

attracted to his wife.¹ He was never tired of repeating to Metternich how he was now beginning to live, for the first time, how he had always longed for a home,² and now this dream had become a reality; for this new existence he had to thank the excellent qualities of his wife.³

Under this influence, life at Court took a new and different aspect to its former one. Easter week, the solemn character of which had hitherto only been emphasised by the Emperor and Josephine's retired life, was now celebrated in quite a different manner. Napoleon gave orders that during this festival the same ceremonies should take place as were customary at the Court of Vienna.⁴

Court life also underwent other changes. Josephine had always given audience to ladies in the morning. Marie Louise departed from this custom and saw no one in the early hours of the day, which she devoted to music and drawing lessons, or to embroidery. At any moment Napoleon would enter her room and, sitting down by her at the piano, listen while she played. While affairs of State were left to stagnate, the Emperor spent the greater part of his time with his wife, walking or driving with her. He interested himself in all she did.⁵

¹ Metternich to Emperor Francis, April 27, 1810. "Extreme disparities are so strongly united in a character like that of Napoleon, that those qualities by which the Empress is allied to the good housewife class of women are what he values most."

² *Ibid.* "He (Napoleon) has told me twenty times that he had never had a home, although he had often dreamed of one, but since his marriage his dream had become a reality."

³ *Ibid.* Paris, May 9. "Your Majesty," remarks Metternich again in this letter, "who only knew your Imperial daughter in her youthful and less independent days, would certainly find it difficult to realise the admirable attitude which she maintains under all circumstances."

⁴ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, May 9, 1810.

⁵ See on this subject the interesting chapter "La lune de miel," in Mar on's "Marie Louise."

He permitted her to invite five or six guests of her own choice to their dinner-parties, but took care that place should be made at her table for those people of importance who had opposed his marriage with an Archduchess. Marie Louise could not mistake his good intentions to secure her friends and adherents, even among her opponents, although at the same time, as a subtle diplomatist, he promoted his own political ends. In any case the Empress could have had but little of the woman in her, if his assiduous attentions, seductive amiability, and complete devotion had left her cold. Her feelings for Napoleon became gradually more tender. She already defended him against the malicious slanders and defamation of character by which some people tried to prejudice him with the Emperor Francis.¹ From Holland, where she was travelling with her husband, she wrote to a friend wishing her the same inimitable happiness which had fallen to her own lot.² It was said in Vienna that she was so deeply in love with the Emperor that she could not spend a single hour apart from him.³ A letter to her father confirms this: "Wherever I am with him I am truly happy."⁴ Alluding to Napoleon's evident love and tenderness, she remarked one day to Metternich: "All the world thinks that I fear the Emperor; I believe that he is afraid of me."⁵

Their mutual relations grew ever more intimate when, after repeated disappointments, it seemed at last certain

¹ Marie Louise to Emperor Francis, Compiègne, April 22, 1810. "I assure you, dearest papa, that many things are laid to the Emperor's charge which he has never done, for the more intimately one knows him, the better one learns to appreciate and love him."

² "Correspondence de Marie Louise," p. 147.

³ "Zinzendorf's Diary," Vienna, June 15, 1810. "The Empress of France is so much in love with her husband that she wept when, to save her fatigue, he wished to leave her to rest at Antwerp."

⁴ Marie Louise to Emperor Francis, Laeken, May 16, 1810.

⁵ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Paris, June 12, 1810.



THE KING OF ROMS

From a water-color drawing by J. W. G. 18th. In the Library of the Emperor Francis Joseph I

that Marie Louise was likely to become a mother. Depressed at first by the absence of hopeful indications,¹ her happiness was all the greater when—although somewhat doubtfully in the early stages—the symptoms became manifest. As confirmation of these hopes was for some time lacking, Metternich thought it wise to warn the Emperor, “who dreamt only of an heir,” that he must not count too prematurely on this happiness. He well knew the terrible depression which would possess Napoleon should he be forced to give up the hope of a successor to the throne.² All the more heartily did he share his joy when there was no longer any doubt that Marie Louise was to become a mother. “The Emperor,” announced Metternich, “is in a state of jubilation difficult to describe, and the Empress by this situation obtains an ascendancy which she already knows how to turn to account.”³

As Marie Louise had endeavoured to influence her husband for her father's benefit,⁴ so one may conclude that she now strove to support Metternich in his negotiations with Napoleon. His chief aim was to induce the Emperor to relax some oppressive conditions of the Treaty of Vienna, and to win from him a frank and unreserved declaration of his future policy.⁵ For this he had elected the daughter of his sovereign as his chosen ally, and he believed he had good reason to be satisfied with her activity behind the scenes.

¹ The Empress Maria Ludovica (third wife of Emperor Francis) to her husband: “She (Marie Louise) is very depressed because as yet there are no symptoms of pregnancy,” Karlsbad, June 7, 1810.

² Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Paris, May 9, 1810.

³ The same to the same, Paris, July 9, 1810.

⁴ Marie Louise to her father, Compiègne, April 2, 1810. “I think of you constantly, and speak of you almost every day with the Emperor. I assure him daily that he could have no better friend than yourself, and he believes as I do—who know it by experience—that no one could be a better or more tender father than yourself.”

⁵ Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Paris, July 9, 1810.

"The Emperor," he writes to Francis, "has now reached a point from which Austria alone affords a quieter outlook. His relations with the Empress, which grow stronger day by day, have had a good deal to do with this. Her Highness is beginning to acquire an influence over him which is most important, and her conduct is as unexceptionable in this as in all other respects."¹

Metternich was fortunate in being in Paris at a moment when entirely new relations were being formed between the greatest States of Europe, regarding which he says: "Please God, much good may result to your Majesty and to the kingdom."² In a serious conversation with Napoleon he achieved a piece of work which was "very complete and instructive for the future."³ Already he saw the clouds of a threatening conflict between France and Russia gathering afar. Convinced that he had placed the interest of the State, of which he was leading Minister, in the "clearest light," he saw in imagination Austria reaching out towards new and important acquisitions. He writes to the Emperor Francis: "It depends only on your Majesty to occupy Belgrade."⁴

Towards the end of September Metternich returned to Vienna, upheld by the consciousness that in the French capital he had smoothed the way for a new and happy alliance between Austria and France.⁵ At the same time

¹ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Paris, July 20, 1810.

² The same to the same, July 9, 1810.

³ Metternich to Emperor Francis, Paris, July 20, 1810. "True to the principles laid down in my last dutiful despatch, to elucidate, so far as is practicable, all questions without however precluding any individual one, I hope to lay before your Majesty a very complete work—instructive for the future—which I purpose sending by the next courier as soon as I have finished drawing it up."

⁴ The same to the same, July 20, 1810.

⁵ Metternich to Emperor Francis, July 17, 1810. "In this conflict between such great elements your Majesty's fair views cannot

his mind was at ease concerning the happiness of Marie Louise, in whom he had instilled the idea of sacrificing everything for the good of the Monarchy.¹ "I can only repeat to you," writes the Empress herself to her father, "how happy and contented I always am, and I am convinced I always shall be. You will only realise it when you come to know the Emperor personally, then you will see how good and lovable he is in domestic life, and what a noble-hearted man he is. I am persuaded that you would love him too."²

Napoleon, who loved his wife, not only for herself, but now also on account of the expected child, was more than ever kind and attentive. He counted on the birth of a son with almost fatalistic certainty, and followed the development of his desired happiness with keen attention. Although no heroine, as she herself remarks, Marie Louise looked forward fearlessly to the hour of her trouble.³ She enjoyed the best of health, as she states in a letter to her father on February 20. "I am feeling very well, but take care of myself as much as my horror of medical orders permits."⁴ But she was mistaken in assuming that this would be her last letter to her father before her confinement. More than once she was able to send him news before the great event—which had been expected much sooner—actually took place.⁵ "I still feel pretty well," she but triumph in the end, and in this conviction I find courage and strength."

¹ The same to the same, Paris, September 5, 1810. "The health of her Majesty continues very good. She accompanies her husband everywhere, and their intimate relations could not be better. Her gentle and serene presence has won the affection and confidence of the whole Imperial family. Their domestic happiness is safe on all sides, and I cherish the conviction that it is assured for the entire future."

² Marie Louise to her father, Paris, December 5, 1810.

³ "Correspondance de Marie Louise," p. 151.

⁴ Marie Louise to her father, Paris, February 20, 1811.

⁵ *ibid.*

writes to her Imperial father on March 5, "except for a sharp pain in my right side, and I am trying to arm myself with courage and resolution for the moment of my confinement. I hope to have an easy time, and promise you I will lay up for at least a month, for I am convinced that all my future health depends on this moment."¹ At last the event seemed imminent. For some time past every preparation had been made for the reception of an Imperial heir; and on the evening of March 19 the whole Court, including its most representative members, was assembled in the palace of the Tuileries. The Empress needed all her fortitude for the approaching hour, the most serious of her life. Things did not go as smoothly as she had hoped. Her agonised cries reached even the apartment where the Court was assembled; but this was only the beginning of her trouble, since the doctors present—Corvisart and Dubois—declared that the child might not be born for another twenty-four hours.

At six o'clock on the morning of March 20, Napoleon took a bath to quiet his nerves, and was still in it when Dubois, pale and trembling, reported to him at eight A.M. that the greatest danger threatened both mother and child, of whom the sex had already been ascertained.

"What would you do in a similar case if you were attending the wife of a citizen?" asked Napoleon, quickly regaining his composure. "I should make use of instruments," was the concise reply. "Well then," answered Napoleon, "do exactly as if you were in the house of a tradesman in the Rue Saint-Denis. Be careful of both mother and child, and if you cannot save both, preserve the mother's life for me." When, thus empowered by the Emperor, Dubois, instruments in hand, approached the bedside, Marie Louise exclaimed plaintively: "Ah! because I am an Empress I must let myself

¹ Marie Louise to her father, Paris, March 5, 1811.

be sacrificed." Napoleon, who had hurried at once to her side, tried to cheer her by tender words of comfort, although he himself stood as much in need of them as his suffering wife. The man who, on the battlefield, had been accustomed to the greatest horrors, dared not look on at Dubois's operations. Dropping Marie Louise's hand, and pale as death, he entered the adjoining room where, oppressed by care and anxiety, he received the reports which were brought to him every moment. At last came the news that the mother's life was saved, but the child appeared to be stillborn. Napoleon, deeply grieved at first, was beside himself with joy when this supposition was disproved, and five minutes later the son—for such it was—gave oral evidence of life.¹ The Emperor, noticing his valet near him, said: "Well,

¹ Before the birth of the King of Rome a French poet wrote the following verse:

"Le sexe de l'enfant, espoir de la patrie,
Même pour l'Empereur est encore un secret.
C'est la seule fois dans sa vie
Qu'il n'a pas su ce qu'il faisait."

After the birth, a Swiss, eighty years of age, parodied this little poem in the following way:

"Le sexe de l'enfant, espoir de la patrie,
Pour l'univers entier cesse d'être un secret.
L'Empereur a donc su en dépit de l'envie
Faire toujours ce qu'il voulait."

(From the Collections of Baron von Wessenberg, No. 15.)

Translation of verses:

"The sex of the child, the hope of the country,
Remains a secret for the Emperor.
This is the first time in all his life
That he has not known what he was doing."


"The sex of the child, the hope of the country,
Has ceased to be a secret for the world.
The Emperor then has known, in spite of envy,
How to get what he wants as usual."

Constant, we have got a fine youngster at last, but he has kept us a long time awaiting his pleasure." Then he gave utterance to the oft-quoted words: "My pages and a hundred and one salutes." At the same time he exclaimed: "This dear woman, what she must have suffered! At this price I desire no more children."¹

When, soon after 10 A.M., the first salute of the cannon resounded, every one stood still in the streets, in breathless expectation whether the twenty-first report would be followed by a twenty-second. Scarcely had its echo died away, than from the throats of millions came the cry of joy: "Long live the Emperor!" Even at the first salute those who were at enmity forgot their grievances, but at the twenty-second they fell into each other's arms.² Scarcely an hour had elapsed after the birth of the King of Rome before the renowned aeronaut, Madame Blanchard, mounted in her balloon, which had been held in

¹ The city of Paris ordered for the King of Rome a cradle which was to be executed from the designs of Pierre Prudhon by Odlot and Thomire jointly. The exhibition of this cradle at the last Paris Exhibition (1900) does away with the false legend suggested by French writers of the last century. Paul Mantz, Charles Clement, Henri Havard all state that this cradle was to be found in the "Musée des Souverains," or amongst the collections of national property. They frequently mistake the cradle of the Duke of Bordeaux for that of the Duke of Reichstadt. It is now difficult to prove exactly when the cradle of the young Napoleon was brought to Vienna. It is, however, certain that on April 4, 1826, "a small golden crown from the cradle of the King of Rome," together with two Napoleonic relics—a writing-case dating from the Hundred Days, and a drinking-glass—were purchased at a sale of property for the Imperial collection of treasures at Vienna. On October 8, 1833, Marie Louise presented to the collection of treasures—preserved in the stables—a baby carriage that had belonged to the Duke of Reichstadt, "as a suitable pendant to the cradle of his deceased Highness, already in their possession," which places its authenticity beyond a doubt. See on this subject, H. Modern's "Jean Baptiste Claude Odlot," in "Kunst und Handwerk," 3rd year, part iv. pp. 164, 165.

² Albert Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. iii. p. 120, note.



THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT'S CRADLE

*Executed by Odier and Thomire from the design of Pierre Paul 'hon. In the possession
of the Schatz-kammer (Treasure House) at Vienna*

readiness from an early hour. Amid the booming of guns she set forth to spread the news of the event—by means of printed bulletins—throughout the towns and villages of France.¹ The great and universal joy found eloquent expression by day and night in meetings, processions, pyrotechnic displays, illuminations, and all kinds of occasional poems.² Napoleon, from a window in the Tuileries, looked out on the doings of the crowd, who since early morning had assembled in the palace gardens. Tears of joy ran down his cheeks. He had at last attained that which he had so long desired. Here was now the successor to his throne, who would give stability to his dynasty; in whom the French could behold their guarantee for an assured future, who would strengthen their confidence in the Empire.

The Archduke Ferdinand, who was then in Paris, conveys the public feeling in the following terms: "One may realise, but one cannot describe, what every one has felt on this occasion."³

With prophetic instinct, Metternich, at the nuptial banquet in Paris, had raised his glass and drunk to the health of the future King of Rome.⁴ This title was conferred on the Imperial child while he lay in his cradle; a title which, until the overthrow of the German Empire by Napoleon, had always pertained to the House of Hapsburg. It denoted the great change which in the course of recent years had taken place in Europe. No longer now, as in ages past, would the son of the German Emperor bear the title of "King of Rome"; it had

¹ Georges Firmin-Didot, "Pages d'Histoire," p. 11.

² Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 17, and Desiré Lacroix, "Roi de Rome et Duc de Reichstadt," p. 31. In 1812 Goethe dedicated a poem to the King of Rome, "Goethe's Works," Hempel's Edition, vol. ii. p. 412.

³ Archduke Ferdinand to the Emperor Francis, March 20, 1810.

⁴ Barante, "Souvenirs," vol. i. p. 318.

passed to the heir of the Emperor of France.¹ Nor had Metternich, the Minister of the former Roman-Teutonic Emperor, considered it offensive to announce in the French capital itself—champagne-glass in hand—this monstrous transformation. It could not, therefore, have been a great surprise to Vienna when it was made known that Napoleon's new-born heir was to bear the imposing title of "King of Rome."

The first news of this great event was brought from Strassburg by the *Chef d'Escadron* Robeleau. On March 23, at 10.15 A.M.,² he arrived in Vienna at the Mariahilferlinie, whence he hastened direct to the French embassy. Whilst Robeleau rushed breathlessly up the staircase to Count Otto's apartments, his garrulous servant was relating the sensational news to the wife of the hall-porter. "A Prince!" she cried aloud, and instantly the carriage of the French courier was surrounded by the crowd, which had already been attracted by his arrival. The servant repeated his news. All seemed electrified by this embassy of joy. The people ran to every part of the town, shouting as they went:

¹ In a book of German humorous poetry of the year 1814, we find:

"Lieben Leute! Kommt und seht
Eine Königs-Majestät,
Die in Windeln eingepackt,
Sich bep . . . und bek . . . !"

Which may be translated:

"Come, dear people, come and see
How his kingly Majesty,
Swaddled warmly by his nurse,
. . . his little bed and . . . !"

(Communicated to "Der Volkswitz der Deutschen über den gestürzten Bonaparte," 1849, vol. i. p. 117.)

² Report of Commissioner of Police Hoffmann, Vienna, March 23, 1811. M. T. Helfert, "Marie Louise," p. 195, gives, erroneously, the date of Robeleau's arrival in Vienna as the 24th.

"Our good Archduchess Marie Louise has a Prince. What joy for our good Emperor!"¹

In Marie Louise's home, as in Paris, her confinement was celebrated as a joyful event both by the Court and the people.² Napoleon's enemies gave vent to their anger at his good fortune by various spiteful remarks. Count Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican, who hated his fellow-countryman, remarked to Sir Stratford Canning in a London drawing-room: "Wait for the end. Napoleon is a giant who bends down the mighty oaks of the primeval forest; but some day the woodland spirits will break from their disgraceful bondage, then the oaks will suddenly rebound and dash the giant to earth again."³ In Vienna, too, it was boldly said: "In a few years we shall have this King of Rome here as a beggar-student."⁴ A sinister prophecy, which troubled few in 1811. Nearly all, however, were dazzled by Napoleon's successes, and Count Otto, his ambassador in Vienna, celebrated his sovereign's triumph at a grand banquet given in his honour.⁵

Marie Louise revelled in bliss. With proud satisfaction she gazed on the beautiful child, the hope of France and of his father. "The birth of my son," she writes to the Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen, "increases, if possible, the felicity which has been my lot since my union with the Emperor. I cherish the desire that the child may resemble his father and, like him, make the happiness of

¹ Account by Commissioner of Police Hoffmann, Vienna, March 23. M. d. T.

² In the illuminations of March, 1810, among the transparencies was one that predicted that Marie Louise should have a male-child ("Kind mit Zipfel"). "Zinzendorf's Diary," March 13, 1810.

³ Adolf Schmidt, "Zeitgenössische Geschichten," p. 4.

⁴ Helfert (already quoted).

⁵ Maret, Duke of Bassano, to Napoleon, Paris, May 31, 1811. Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

all who surround him."¹ The Archduke Ferdinand reports to the Emperor: "The baby is very much alive and could not be healthier or more beautiful than he is."²

The Imperial Prince, who had already received the names of "Napoleon Francis Joseph Charles" at the private baptism on the evening of March 20, was now to be publicly christened with great pomp in the Cathedral of Notre-Dame on June 9. The streets through which the Imperial procession was to take its way were thronged with countless multitudes, attracted—according to an ill-natured observer—more from curiosity than from loyalty.³ If one may believe this eyewitness, the Russian diplomatist Tchernitcheff, there was on this day but little of the enthusiasm and jubilation that had been so striking a feature on March 20. He relates that murmurs were heard among the people, and even sharp shrill whistles, as Napoleon, surrounded by his satellites, rode through the Arc de Triomphe.⁴ The Russian explains the reasons of this sudden change by the fact that the Parisians, whose poverty had steadily increased in consequence of bad trade, felt injured at this display of magnificence.⁵ Might it not rather have been the tidings, recently received, of a fresh defeat of the French in Spain (the battle of Albuera, May 4) that had put the Parisians out of humour?⁶ If the people really exhibited such a hostile attitude during the christening ceremony, it is easy to comprehend that it could not have escaped the keen glance of the Emperor. Tchernitcheff also informs his sovereign that Napoleon during the whole ceremony

¹ Marie Louise to Duke Albert, St. Cloud, April 23, 1811. Archduke Frederick's Archives, Vienna.

² Archduke Ferdinand to the Emperor Francis, Paris, April 13, 1811.

³ "Ruskavo Sbornik," vol. xxi. p. 177. Tchernitcheff's account to Alexander I., Paris, June 5, 17, 1811.

⁴ "Ruskavo Sbornik," vol. xxi. p. 178.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 178.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 179.

looked straight in front of him in morose silence. Only when he took the infant in his arms to show him to the Paris crowd, did a gleam of joy light up his face.¹ The child enraptured him. Like Henry IV., the great sovereign was often to be found lying on the ground playing with his little son.² He loved to play all manner of tricks upon him. Already the infant was brought by his governess regularly at breakfast-time to the Emperor's room. One of his great jokes was to dip the child's finger in gravy and smear his face with it. Another time he would place his Majesty the King of Rome in front of a looking-glass and make faces at him. If the little fellow—frightened at the sight—cried, Napoleon would pretend to scold him: "How, sir, you are crying! What, a king, and crying! Fie, fie, how shocking!" Once he thrust his hat on the child's head so that it came down over his nose and also buckled his sword round him. He laughed heartily when the little feet got into difficulties with the long sword and the baby tottered comically from side to side.

Marie Louise's treatment of her little one was very different. Although not less fond of him than her husband, and always as careful for his welfare,³ she showed more dignity towards her son than Napoleon, who always beamed with joy at the mere sight of him. While the Emperor at times handled the child almost roughly,

¹ In grandiose style, Victor Hugo in his poem "Napoleon II." interprets the Emperor's feelings when he represents him proudly saying: "The future, the future, the future is mine!" See Victor Hugo's complete works, edition of 1880, vol. ii., p. 46.

² On April 21, 1811, Marie Louise writes: "The Emperor is astonishingly good to him, carrying him about in his arms; he is quite childish about him, and already insists on giving him food, which, however, generally upsets him." Helfert (already quoted), p. 201.

³ Marie Louise to her father, Trianon, July 22, 1811. "My son and the Emperor are both very well; my son grows strong and beautiful, but he begins already to suffer from teething, which makes me a little anxious."

she hardly ventured to take him in her arms or press him to her heart. There was no doubt that father, mother, and child offered a picture of the most intimate conjugal bliss to all who had the entry at Court. "I am convinced," writes the Empress to her father, "that you would be delighted could you see my domestic happiness with your own eyes."¹

Notwithstanding these assurances, there were constant rumours in Vienna regarding the relations between Marie Louise and Napoleon which were represented in a sinister light. It was said the Empress was unhappy in her married life, and was daily becoming thinner, owing to her mortification at her husband's infidelity with Queen Hortense and other ladies of the Court.² Thus rumour effected that which was actually intended: the disquietude of the Emperor Francis as to his daughter's fate.³ Tottenborn, the Austrian despatch-bearer, who brought the official tidings of Marie Louise's confinement to Vienna, was questioned by Francis as to whether these reports were all true. On learning the contrary, he burst into tears of joy.⁴ The Viennese police, commissioned to inquire into the origin of these malicious calumnies, soon discovered the focus of the intrigue. Strangely enough, it was Garonne, the French secretary to the Embassy, who confided to his mistress, Frau von Abel, that Napoleon cherished no love for his wife and sought compensation "in the lap of Marshal Lanne's widow," an obvious lie, emanating from the Quartier St. Germain.⁵

¹ Marie Louise to her father, Paris, December 9, 1811.

² Police report of January 20, 1812. M. I.

³ Maret to Napoleon, Paris, May 31, 1811. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

⁴ *Ibid.* This was related to the Duke of Bassano by Tottenborn himself on his return from Vienna.

⁵ Hager to Metternich, 1812 (January or the beginning of February).



THE KING OF ROME
In the possession of Dr. August Heymann of Vienna

The greater part of these calumnies, however, sprang from those circles in Vienna, numerically strong, which represented the Russo-English faction, and sought at all costs to embroil the Emperor Francis with his son-in-law. To this party, the marriage of Marie Louise had seemed a crime from the first. But now that a collision between Alexander and Napoleon became more probable every day, it could not do otherwise than press forward with all the more vehemence to the undoing of the concord between Paris and Vienna. Poison must be dropped into the heart of the Emperor-father in order to render him inaccessible to the blandishments of Napoleon. Even were the Emperor Francis's parental anxieties alleviated, he could not but admit that in giving his daughter to Napoleon he had made a sacrifice for which the duration of peace did not compensate. In the very day of rejoicing over the birth of the King of Rome, the report of an inevitable collision between France and Russia appeared like an ominous spectre.

Even while Metternich tarried in Paris, it became evident to him that the relations between the Paris Cabinet and the Court at St. Petersburg were much disturbed and would inevitably lead to an outbreak of hostilities. Napoleon himself, on February 3, 1811, assured the Austrian Ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg, that since his nuptials with Marie Louise coldness and distrust had replaced the previous friendship between himself and Alexander I. This event constituted only the external ground of offence. The actual causes of dissension lay much deeper, and belonged rather to the period before the betrothal of Napoleon and the Arch-duchess. They originated from the time when in 1809 Russia refused to take active part in the war against Austria. The Franco-Russian Alliance was shattered when the French Emperor desired to make the Duchy of Warsaw into a bulwark against the vast Empire of the

North. Since then all attempts to revive the crippled alliance between the two Imperial Courts had been useless, and now Alexander trembled at the thought that Napoleon might at length bend even him beneath the yoke and reduce him to a vassal, like the other Princes of Europe. Even the bare idea that his former ally might be preparing such a destiny for him caused him great agitation. In this frame of mind he rebelled against Napoleon.

Astounding commotion prevailed throughout Europe when the Russian Emperor raised a protest against the incorporation of Oldenburg into the French Empire; thus espousing the cause of a little State that had formerly belonged to a near relative of his house. But in reality it was not the annexation of Oldenburg which incited Alexander to this bold step; it served merely as a cloak to hide his wrath and anxiety at the aggrandisement of Warsaw. The Tsar did not doubt for a moment that Napoleon secretly intended to raise ancient Poland to its former dignity, which would inevitably lead to the dismemberment of Russia. This dangerous situation caused Alexander to turn his attention to Vienna, in order to win over and separate from France that Court which he had left helpless in its hour of need. But Metternich distrusted Russia; he feared that the St. Petersburg Cabinet might be reconciled to Napoleon, and that at Austria's expense. Far from hastening to range himself on the side of his northern neighbour, he was filled with malicious joy that the latter should now be obliged to sue for an alliance with the Monarchy, or at least bid for its neutrality. So little confidence had the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the power of Russia, that he thought its subjection inevitable. On this assumption it seemed to him a political precept not to involve the State which he guided in the downfall of Russia.¹ Austria's welfare

¹ Demelitsch, "Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik," p. 414.

appeared to him at the present time to rest exclusively upon the closest union with France, in the perfecting of the system marked out by Napoleon's marriage with the Archduchess. By a meeting between the rulers of France and Austria their friendly relations would win a far-reaching and visible expression in the face of the whole world.

At Dresden, where the Emperor Francis with his consort Maria Ludovica, and Napoleon, accompanied by Marie Louise, arranged to meet, it was to be openly proclaimed that the family tie between the Imperial Courts on the Seine and the Danube had been drawn still closer by the birth of the King of Rome.

The parts were now exchanged. Once upon a time, at Tilsit and at Erfurt, the French and the Russian Emperors had shared in the dominion of Europe; but now Napoleon and Francis were at Dresden, to the exclusion of Russia, in order to come to an understanding as to the future destiny of the Continent. Would the friendly union of the two Princes endure? Or did it not already hold the germ of destruction? At first it really seemed as if the policy of the Franco-Austrian system had come forth strengthened by the Dresden meeting. But, built upon insecure foundations and without the intimate concurrence of Austria, this system could not but fall to the ground and tend to the overthrow of the Napoleonic dynasty, to ensure the security of which its founder had divorced Josephine and bestowed his hand upon Marie Louise.

We will pursue in the next chapter the development of this drama, which was to rob the Imperial Prince of his throne.

CHAPTER III

THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE

NAPOLÉON had not led home the daughter of an Emperor merely to endow Europe at last with the long-desired peace; but rather with the intention of adding yet another glittering leaf to his crown of fame. He completely disillusioned all who had expected that the peace of the Continent would follow upon his marriage. He was already thinking again of war. Alexander I. of Russia, his former ally, was now to be vanquished, in order to remove from his path the last hindrance to his dominion over the world. But he did not resolve on this step so light-heartedly as is generally supposed.¹ Instinctively, he could not but forebode that such a combat of giants might entail a struggle for bare existence. It must have been of essential importance to him to attach Austria to his banner in order to strengthen his powers for this tremendous undertaking. Metternich stood by the French Emperor, not from enthusiasm, but from the compelling instinct of preservation. At the same time he wanted to secure for his country, by means of the alliance with France, the restoration of the territories lost in the peace of 1809. Napoleon offered as the price of co-operation the possession of the principalities on the Danube, but Metternich would have nothing to say to them because of their unproduc-

¹ Sybel's "*Historische Zeitschrift*," vol. xlv., p. 439; Baranto, vol. I., p. 131.

tiveness.¹ The Minister claimed before everything else the restoration of the Illyrian provinces,² together with the guarantee of Galicia. Only such an acquisition, he thought, could place the participation in a Franco-Russian war—so thoroughly unpopular in Austria—in a more favourable light.³ On this basis the treaty of alliance was brought about on March 14, 1812, by which Austria was pledged to provide an auxiliary subsidy of thirty thousand men.⁴

The friendship just concluded between the two Courts was, for the time at all events, more firmly welded together in Dresden. There, in the capital of Saxony, at Napoleon's instigation, the rulers of France and

¹ Confidential despatch from Metternich to Schwarzenberg, Vienna, January 24, 1812.

"The countries in question (the principalities of the Danube) bring in nothing; they furnish no men and are simply uncultivated lands which could only be made profitable by means of capital we do not possess, and should not think of investing in such uncertain securities."

² *Ibid.* "The most important question is, without doubt, that of the acquisition of the provinces of Illyria."

³ *Ibid.* "The co-operation of France and Austria is still very unpopular with us. We prove, in fact, that we do not attach any extraordinary value to this consideration. The Emperor knows too well that every government should show sufficient respect for public opinion to endeavour to lead it as a means of ruling, but must not be ruled by it; he is equally well aware that public opinion always follows the event. If it were possible to induce Napoleon to allow us to give out some assurances of the future restoration of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, if he himself would give support to this opinion by falling in to some extent with our meaning, he would double our strength."

⁴ Article 5 of the Convention set forth that in the event of the restoration of Poland, Napoleon should specially guarantee Galicia to the Emperor of Austria, to whom he had already promised possession of it; and paragraph 6 runs as follows: "That should it please the Emperor of Austria to cede to Poland part of Galicia in exchange for the Illyrian Provinces, Napoleon must pledge himself to agree to the exchange." See Demelitsch, "Metternich und dessen auswärtige Politik," vol. i., p. 518.

Austria met in personal interview. Metternich, who never doubted for a moment but that the French Emperor would inflict a crushing defeat upon Russia, was overjoyed that Francis and Napoleon had come to such an excellent understanding, contrary to all expectation. "We had," he writes from Dresden on May 23, "very excellent reasons for being satisfied with our visit. Napoleon is full of blandishments towards us. Both parties are mutually pleased, and the good result of the meeting will be that in future they will continue to estimate each other as they do to-day."¹

In spite of all assertions to the contrary,² this state of mutual satisfaction continued till the last day of the sojourn in Dresden.³ Metternich was glad he had succeeded, during his intercourse with Napoleon, in settling all the affairs he had at heart.⁴ He left the Saxon capital with the consciousness that, while there, he had effected everything that could be desired under

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Dresden, May 23, 1812. In this letter, Metternich mentions the following remark of Napoleon: "You are right, your Emperor is a hundred times superior to what I believed. Every moment he reduces me to silence." Hudelist had to represent the leading Minister during his absence. "His department (Hudelist's) is that of Home Affairs," says Metternich in the despatch of August 11, 1813, "according to our organisation, one of the most important and difficult." On August 13, 1813, Metternich proposed him as Councillor of State, an appointment which was shortly afterwards conferred on him. Despatch of August 11.

² Demelitsch (already quoted), p. 535.

³ Metternich to Hudelist, Dresden, May 25, 1812. "Both the Emperors are thoroughly pleased with one another, and the most favourable results will follow from our stay here."

See also Krones, "Aus dem Tagebuch Erzherzog Johanna," 1810-1815, p. 62.

⁴ *Idem*, Prague, June 3, 1812. "I have finished all the business which I had set myself to do in Dresden." This referred to the exhausted state of the Austrian finances, so that the pay of the auxiliary subsidies had to be provided from the central exchequer of the French army, as an advanced loan.

existing circumstances. He thus sums up the final result of the interview: "In short, we have every reason to be satisfied with our situation. Looking into future contingencies as thoroughly as I do, I am daily more convinced that no other line of action can be pursued, short of taking the direct road to ruin."¹

But though Metternich outwardly ranged himself on Napoleon's side, in his inmost soul he remained hostile to him. He was anxiously striving to prevent the destiny of his country from being permanently linked with the fortunes of France.² It was, in fact, his leading aim to secure a free hand for Austria's policy under all circumstances. Thoroughly convinced that Alexander would be defeated (as Napoleon had prophesied) at the first encounter,³ he sought nevertheless to prevent the rupture of all relations with his northern neighbour. Intercourse was resumed, though in all secrecy, with Count Stackelberg, the Russian envoy, a man whom he highly esteemed on account of his moral character and upon whom he thought he could rely.⁴ With the same

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Prague, June 6, 1812.

² Metternich to Hudelist, Prague, June 19. "You will see that I have been very assiduous in trying to keep the Alliance carefully separate from future conditions of war, and have tried to give it the colouring under which the embassy have to present it."

³ The same to the same, Dresden, May 26, 1812. "This country (Russia) lies already outside Europe, for in Europe its voice is no longer heard." The same to the same, without date or address, but it must in any case have been written after June 22. "The state of things is much the same. Napoleon seems to be *quite sure* of the matter." Hudelist was also convinced of Russia's downfall. On July 1 he writes from Vienna to Metternich: "The die is cast, and by now the Rubicon has probably been left far behind by the French army. The destiny of Russia will be fulfilled."

⁴ Metternich to Hudelist, in answer to the latter's letter of June 23, 1812. "Moreover you can rely entirely on Count Stackelberg's moral character. In him are united principles and partiality to the Chancellor which are all in our favour." Later on, July 15, Metternich writes again in reply: "Every day you will have further opportuni-

intention he wanted to keep in touch with Count Hardenberg, the Hanoverian ambassador, as the representative of English interests.¹ Both these great Powers must be made to understand that, in any case, no inference was to be drawn from the raising of the auxiliary corps as to the future demeanour of the Court at Vienna.² Metternich found himself in a very delicate situation. All his foresight and prudence were needed—on the one side not to awaken the suspicion of Napoleon, who did not trust him in any case; and, on the other, not to repel the Russians, who looked upon him as a foe.³ So, while he was tacking to and fro, and awaiting the issue of a first battle, in order that he might rise or fall with the tide,⁴ Napoleon had sent the Empress Marie Louise from Dresden to remain for some time in Prague. In this way a visible proof was once more to be offered to the world of the close intimacy which existed between the Courts of Vienna and Paris. How delighted was Marie Louise to return for a while to her family circle! The good news which reached her from Russia and Paris as to the excellent health of her husband and son completed her happiness.⁵ But just when she flattered herself that the Emperor would soon

tics of being convinced what a straight course Count Stackelberg takes in every occurrence great or small, and how little of a Russian he is (in an unfavourable sense)."

¹ The same to the same, Prague, June 13.

² The same to the same. In answer to Hudelist's letter of July 16, 1812, it states that Stackelberg is to confine himself to the point at issue. "That the actions of the auxiliary corps are separate from those of the Government, and must remain so."

³ The following utterance by Metternich is interesting as an answer to Hudelist's letter of July 14, 1812. "Our whole endeavour is to keep Galicia tranquil, and it will certainly be attained. A new proof of the excellence of the party we have espoused will be, you may venture to assert, the final result to Russia itself."

⁴ The same to the same, in answer to Hudelist's letter of July 1, 1812.

⁵ "Correspondance de Maria Louise," pp. 158, 159.

be returning, crowned with fresh laurels from the Russian battlefields,¹ the most bitter disappointment awaited her. Contrary to all rules of strategy, he had penetrated too far into a country where he had to cope not only with a strenuous opponent in the shape of the religious fanaticism of old Russia, but also with hunger and cold.

He, so far the most cunning of men, now became himself the victim of an enemy's cunning. Instead of following the dictates of prudence and making a timely retreat in good order, Napoleon clung tenaciously to the hope of compelling the Tsar to make peace on his own territory. The Russians feigned to accede to these proposals, thus luring on the French intruder until the precious moment for retreat was irretrievably lost, and the deadly cold had wrought unheard-of devastation in the ranks of his army.² Moreover, he dallied too long in Moscow, which the incendiary's torch had converted into a heap of ruins.

Napoleon does not seem to have immediately measured the whole significance of the moral impression which would be produced by his defeat in the snow-covered steppes of Russia. He was inclined to ascribe his failure to the disposition of the elements, rather than to his own errors of judgment. But he could not conceal from himself the meaning of the Emperor Francis's exclamation on hearing the news of the evacuation of Moscow: "The moment has arrived for me to show

¹ "Correspondance de Marie Louise," p. 161.

² Colonel Count Latour, whom Prince Schwarzenberg had sent on a mission to the French headquarters, writes on December 19, 1812: "There is no doubt that the Russians have been completely successful in deceiving the Emperor Napoleon during the whole time of his stay in Moscow, causing him to believe that they were in earnest about the resumption of negotiations for peace; his army shared in this deception, believing the promise given by the Emperor of a speedy return home."

the Emperor of the French who I am.”¹ At length the hour of release from the oppressive yoke of Napoleon had struck.² Metternich, like his master, believed the time had come for crying “Halt” to the boundless ambition of the Corsican. Yet nothing was further from the Austrian Minister’s intention than the dethronement of Francis’s son-in-law, who was hurrying from Russia to Paris to conjure new hosts out of the earth. Meanwhile, the Court of Vienna was actuated by the desire to put an end to the war and restore peace to Europe. This is very evident from the letter which Francis wrote to Marie Louise when there was a question of appointing her to the Regency in Napoleon’s absence, and of her solemn coronation. The Emperor writes: “In this plan of your husband’s you must see a great and flattering proof of his trust. God grant that events may not oblige you to make use of this confidence. Yet should it be otherwise ordained by Providence—follow the example of your ancestors, follow the counsel of a father rich in years and experience; seek your happiness in the love of the people entrusted to your care, and gain this love by the maintenance of peace

¹ Oncken, “Oesterreich und Preussen im Befreiungskrieg,” vol. i. p. 40.

² In “Der Volkswitz der Deutschen über den gestürzten Bonaparte,” 1849–1850, we find in vol. ix. p. 182, some nonsense verses entitled: “Napoleon unterrichtet den König von Rom im A.B.C.” “Bei A, heisst es noch: Allons, Angefangen, Aber, Aufmerksam, Achte, Auf, Alles. Bei W, lautet es schon anders: Wohin? Wie Wird Werden? Wehrlos! (Napoleon wird ohnmächtig). Wie Wird?—Wehe, Wehe! Wohlriechend Wasser! Den X, den Y, den Z, soll schon mit Nachdruck die Kosaken lehren, Bleib du nur ruhig hübsch zu Bett.”

Roughly translated as follows: “A stands for Away, At ’em, Attention Avenge and Annihilate, all to Arms. With W, Napoleon changes his tune: Whither? Where and oh Whither Wend We? Weaponless (Napoleon faints), Where Will We be? Woe, woe, perfumed Water! The Cossacks make us learn our X, Y, Z, but you stay quiet, little one, in bed.”

at home and abroad. By means of the latter you will safeguard your son's rights and secure the inheritance which his father has acquired and bequeathed to him."¹ Little as Francis and Metternich desired to wrest the crown from Napoleon, they were not inclined to let the favourable opportunity they had gained, thanks to the Russian campaign, slip by unutilised. Austria must now secure that commanding attitude of which she had been so long deprived. The Court of Vienna must be raised to a more imposing status both in the eyes of France and of victorious Russia. After the two opponents had torn each other asunder a kind of equilibrium might be restored to the Powers, and Austria might assume the office of mediator and peace-maker.² Metternich was too crafty not to know that his voice would ring hollow unless enforced by a considerable number of bayonets; therefore the needful preparations were actively carried on.³

It could not escape Napoleon's sharp-sightedness that the ways of the Court of Vienna were now running counter to his own. With unmistakable displeasure he remarked to Bubna: "I accepted your intervention for peace, but an *armed* mediator does not suit me." But just this kind of mediation was Metternich's foremost aim. It formed the basis from which a commanding and honourable position towards all parties could be maintained, and was the more important because the King of Prussia had gone over to the Russian camp after the treaty of Kalisch (February 28). Metternich wanted to take up an independent line of his own,

¹ Undated. This letter is characteristic because it is written entirely in Metternich's own hand, and recapitulates the Minister's opinions.

² Metternich's Despatch of February 3, 1813. Luckwaldt, "Oesterreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges, von 1813," p. 90.

³ As to these preparations see Criste, "Der Beitritt Oesterreichs im Jahre, 1813," in the Royal and Imperial Archives of War in Vienna, 1892, pp. 2202-27.

without allowing his plans to be influenced either by the allied Prussians and Russians, or by Napoleon. He continued to withdraw more and more from the French Emperor's sphere of activity, in order to bring about a *rapprochement* with the Russians and Prussians.¹

Surprising though it may sound, it is nevertheless true that the Austrian Minister would have preferred to throw down the gauntlet² to Napoleon on the spot. But the Emperor Francis would not hear of a war with his son-in-law. As it was, Metternich had a hard fight with his sovereign to prevent him from hindering the preparations for war.³ It is incorrect, therefore, to state that the Austrian Minister and Stadion were in opposition, and to ascribe the work of unification between Russia, Prussia, and Austria entirely to Stadion's energy.⁴ Metternich was completely at one with his representative

¹ Metternich to Stadion (in his own hand), Gitschin, June 13, 1813. "Napoleon's proceedings at this moment are entirely calculated upon the personalities of the Emperor of Russia and our master. He thinks he can induce *the former* to negotiate *promptly and privately* (Coulaincourt's embassy to Alexander I.), and *the latter* to leave the allies in the lurch. When he has fallen between two stools he will cease to shilly shally."

² Metternich to Stadion (his own handwriting), Gitschin, June 8, 1813. "As for *me*, I would have struck long since, but the *Emperor* is more unwilling than ever. My position in this matter is not cheerful any more than yours, but what is to be done? Short of throwing the handle after the hatchet, which simply means at this juncture certain and instantaneous death to the monarchy—I can only follow the plan I submit to you."

³ The same to the same, Vienna, May 24, 1813. "It would be difficult to be more disinclined for war than our Emperor is at present—increasingly so day by day; and it is only his *reason*, which has, however, the upper hand over his emotions, that compels him not to relax his military operations. I shall do all I can not to depart from the path in which we are completely established." On June 8 he writes to Stadion: "As to the military measures taken by us, you can rely upon their being *extensive* and *active*. The Emperor is *thoroughly convinced* of this necessity. L'appetit viendra peut-être en mangeant."

⁴ This is what Luckwaldt asserts from source already quoted, p. 274.

in the Russo-Prussian camp; and Stadion, in signing the secret treaty of Reichenbach on June 27, 1813, was only acting in the spirit of his chief's intentions.¹ Not only the Emperor Francis's love of peace, but also the prejudices which prevailed at the headquarters of the Russians and Prussians, restrained Metternich for the time being from unfurling the banner of war.² He therefore adhered to the policy enjoined upon him by the Emperor Francis's predilections for peace, which was based on the *principle* of being prepared for war whilst in *practice* inculcating peace, or at all events insisting on negotiations which would lead to it.³ For that reason he begged Stadion to act as soon as possible the part of "*médiateur dictateur*."⁴

His object seemed to be attained by the treaty of Reichenbach.⁵ Would Napoleon, however, recognise the armed mediation of Austria and fall in with the conditions she might impose? He made a last attempt,

¹ Metternich to Stadion (in his own hand), Gitschin, June 8, 1813.

² Metternich to Stadion (his own handwriting), undated. "Try to make them (the Russians and Prussians) understand; induce them to expect more from peace than from a war they do not know how to wage; plans they cannot carry out even after brilliant victories which it would be difficult not to recognise as such."

³ The same to the same (his own handwriting), Vienna, June 28, 1813. ". . . you must know that our *theory* (doubly underlined by Metternich) is to be war, and our *practice*, peace or negotiation that leads to peace, whilst with the Emperor peace is really the basis of all his desires."

⁴ The same to the same, undated (his own writing). "As far as you possibly can set yourself up—in a word—as a mediator dictator."

⁵ By the treaty of Reichenbach the Emperor Francis pledged himself to unite his forces with those of Russia and Prussia, in case Napoleon should not accept the conditions imposed upon him by Austria before July 20. These were: (1) The surrender of the Duchy of Warsaw, and the division of its provinces between Russia, Austria and Prussia; (2) The extension of Prussia by the addition of the town and territory of Dantzic; (3) The restoration of the Illyrian Provinces to Austria; (4) The restoration of the Hansa towns, or at least of Hamburg and Lübeck."

by means of a personal interview with Metternich, to induce the Court of Vienna to observe neutrality—even though an armed neutrality. It was a great historic moment when Napoleon and Metternich met face to face, on June 26, at the Markolini Palace in Dresden, and the Emperor tried by mingled threats and flatteries to win over the Austrian Minister to his side.¹ All Napoleon's persuasive cajoleries were shattered against Metternich's "iron front"; while, upheld by the consciousness of the new and powerful development of his country,² he repulsed all attacks made upon the position he had assumed. The Emperor Francis's representative—in his own words—"had fought bravely" and compelled Napoleon, after an "unparalleled struggle," to accept the armed intervention of Austria, which appeared to him to offer an immediate prospect of peace. "Tell your mama," he wrote to his daughter Marie, on July 2, 1813, "that I have returned from Dresden in a contented frame of mind, and that on the last day of my visit I had to carry on an encounter—which lasted over six hours—with the Emperor Napoleon, from which I emerged so triumphantly that he embraced me in the end. . . . Within a short time we shall have peace, or else an appalling war, and then I shall have the pleasure of joining in the campaign. But, bearing in mind the first moral victory which I have just gained over the Emperor, I still venture to hope for peace."³

¹ Metternich's Despatch, Dresden, June 26, 9 P.M. "It consisted of the oddest mixture of heterogeneous subjects, violent outbursts alternating with friendliness." This is the exact wording which has undergone some alteration from Oncken, vol. II., p. 385; see Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. i, p. 150.

² Despatch, June 28. In the original it runs: "was wir zur Stunde *erwirkten*." Oncken, vol. ii, p. 395, prints it "*bewirkten*," which does not express the meaning as well.

³ Metternich to his daughter Marie, Gitschin, July 2, 1813. Document relating to Prince Metternich's Archives.



PRINCE CLEMENT METTERNICH, CHANCELLOR OF STATE

From a painting by Joseph Axmann.

In the possession of the Imperial and Royal Court Library, Vienna

The interval which was to bring about the attainment of this aim was not long. By midnight on August 10 the preliminaries of peace had to be settled. On the stroke of 12 P.M. Austria was to declare war in case the preliminaries were not signed. The Congress was sitting in Prague, and the inexorable limit of August 10 drew ever nearer, yet the first step towards an agreement had not been taken, while, to use Metternich's drastic phrase, Napoleon struggled against the opening of any negotiations "like a devil in a vessel of holy water."¹ Even at the last hour, when all hope of a peaceful settlement of the differences seemed to have vanished, the Emperor Francis made a final attempt to influence his son-in-law through the medium of Marie Louise.² But Napoleon did nothing to comply with the Emperor's heartfelt wish. Metternich, too, no longer reckoned upon the possibility of peace, but rather directed things in such a manner as to prevent all chance of it.³ Napoleon, in his infatuation, actually let the 10th of August pass without heeding the warning to yield. At 12 o'clock (midnight) the Congress was declared to be dissolved, and by 1 A.M. Metternich had laid Austria's declaration of war before

¹ Metternich to Stadion, Brandeis, July 25, 1813. "Napoléon se bat contre la négociation comme un diable dans un bénitier."

² The Emperor Francis to Marie Louise, undated, but in any case shortly before August 10. The whole letter is in Metternich's handwriting.

³ Metternich to Stadion (his own hand), Prague, August 8, 1813. "I beg you to look at the actual position of things *in the best possible light* (underlined by Metternich) and to induce others to do so. The way in which we have set forth the question is as frank as it is natural; it admits of no possibility of an *affirmative* on the part of Napoleon; it even distracts his attention from the progress of the conferences; on the 11th we shall no longer admit *the six articles*; any questions which the Emperor Napoleon may wish to put to us will only be received if addressed to *the three allied courts*. Napoleon can only give further *proofs of weakness by parleying* with us, and bringing about another negotiation, side by side with the negotiation which must terminate in his utter disgrace."

the French representative. It appears that Napoleon was not prepared for such an issue from the Congress of Prague. He had announced in all directions that the Court of Vienna would co-operate with him, and that in conjunction with this Power he would dictate the terms of peace to Russia and Prussia.¹ Francis, too, was not well pleased to find himself obliged to join the enemies of France in consequence of his son-in-law's obstinacy. As soon as Metternich had despatched the declaration of war, the Emperor seized his pen to express to Marie Louise his deep sorrow at this turn of events.² "Keep calm," writes Francis to the Empress; "the war we wage is purely political; I am not, and never shall be, your husband's foe—nor he mine—so much I can vouch for. Extraordinary forces stand in opposition, a short space of time will probably decide what can be done to bring about by an appeal to the sword what we have not been able to effect by negotiation."³ The Emperor, knowing his daughter's anxiety as to the final consequences of her husband's eternal campaigns,⁴ felt con-

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Prague, August 18, 1813. "By all reports the most frightful consternation prevails amongst the French as to our declaration of war. Napoleon gave out a week ago *à l'ordre du jour*, that there would certainly be peace, or that Austria would declare for him."

² The Emperor Francis to Marie Louise. "That Fate which rules the world has frustrated all my endeavours for peace. I have done what I could to bring the matter to a sound conclusion, but all my attempts have been in vain." Metternich supplements this letter by a despatch of August 10, with the request that the Emperor will send it back on the morning of the 11th, so that the letter may go off that day. The Emperor must therefore have written it either on the evening of the 10th, or the morning of the 11th.

³ Emperor Francis to Marie Louise, August 10 or 11, 1813.

⁴ On January 31, 1813, Marie Louise had written to the Archduke John: "You know what sorrow and anxiety I have undergone both in Prague and since. Truly no one can be entirely happy, and I assure you that I often wished last year for complete obtuseness and

strained to alleviate her fears for the future by means of this letter. In reality, the sentiments expressed to her in writing were in direct opposition to the actual trend of politics of the Viennese Cabinet. All that Metternich carried out at this time, in perfect mutual agreement with the Emperor Francis, was far removed from a *rapprochement* with Napoleon. Moreover, he remained deaf to all the blandishments by which Caulaincourt sought to entrap him, in obedience to orders from the French Emperor. He saw through their real object. "Caulaincourt's recent advances," writes Metternich to his faithful *janulus* Hudelist, at Vienna, "give an impression of yielding to those who do not see clearly; and quite the contrary to those who *do*, especially that evident desire to turn everything topsy-turvy."¹ Metternich put a stop to this by a most decided rejection of all Caulaincourt's secret proposals. After the Powers had made common cause against Napoleon, the ambition of the Austrian Minister aimed at nothing less than becoming the Premier of the whole Coalition. He wished to impress the seal of his master-mind upon all the decisions of the Allied Powers, and also to publish to the outer world, with a skilful touch, the harmony that reigned within the Allied Courts. Now that with banners flying he had marched into the camp which represented that portion of Europe which pined for freedom from Napoleon's oppressive yoke, it must be made evident, by united action, that mere self-interest and egotism had not bound the Allies together, as Maret, Duke of Bassano, had asserted in his report to his Imperial master. It must be clearly demonstrated to the world, as Gentz writes, that "no persuasive suggestions, no deceptions, nor cabals" had been needed "to form a bond of insensibility." Contributed by me to Lumbroso's "Miscellanea Napoleonica," series iii. and iv.

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Prague, August 16, 1813.

union which every one had long had at heart, which was the outcome of urgent necessity, which was matured by mutual esteem and promised the happiest results to their amalgamated wisdom and perseverance."¹ This was particularly important at a moment when the language of diplomacy was overwhelmed by the thunder of artillery, and a turning-point had come in the relations between Napoleon and the hostile Powers who confronted him.

* * * *

Napoleon, as well as the Allies, had made use of the time for negotiations to strengthen his forces. The French Emperor had 440,000 at his disposal; the Allies 492,000. Such powerful hosts were to decide in mutual combat the future of Europe. The third division of the Allied troops was stationed at Trachenberg. The army of the North, in Brandenburg, was commanded by Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden. Under Blücher's generalship, the Silesian army occupied the centre of Silesia. The Bohemian army, under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg, encamped in the northern part of Bohemia bordering on the Saxon frontier. Isolated bodies of troops were ordered to avoid an encounter, unless they were in an undoubted majority. In this way it was hoped to take from Napoleon the opportunity of employing tactics frequently used by him with the greatest success: the annihilating of his opponents before they had effected a union. The initiative of taking the offensive was to be left to Napoleon who, with the main body of his army, was expected to throw himself on Bohemia, and from thence to penetrate into the heart of Austria.²

But the French Emperor did not assume the offensive,

¹ Gentz on the subject of Maret's report to Napoleon, from August 20, 1813.

² Gustav Roloff, "Die Entstehung des Operationsplanes für den Feldzug, von 1813," in the *Berlin Military Gazette*, 1892, No. 58-60.

as the Council of War of the Allies had expected. He did not contemplate an immediate march on Bohemia. He was much more anxious to annihilate Bernadotte, in order to free his rear, and to overpower part of Prussia, including Berlin. Only after defeating the Swedish Crown Prince did he think of falling back on Dresden, which he had strongly fortified. From thence he intended to strike powerfully with united forces. A great battle was to be planned to put an end to the whole campaign. Napoleon's attack upon Berlin was not undertaken as a mere stratagem, but in thorough earnest, and on that account he assumed the defensive for the first time with the main body of his army. The execution of the plan fell far short of the design: the faulty tactics in the action itself caused those reverses which shortly undermined for ever Napoleon's supremacy on German soil. First, Oudinot's expedition against the army of the North miscarried, for Bülow routed him completely at Grossbeeren on August 23. Meanwhile, greatly to the astonishment of the Emperor of the French, Schwarzenberg moved towards Dresden. At the first news of this, Napoleon allowed Blücher to continue his retreat to the Bober, although he had been on the point of attacking him. Taking a sudden resolve, he hastened to fall back upon the Saxon capital. But whilst he was successfully repulsing the attack of the Bohemian army on Dresden (August 26-27), Blücher was defeating Marshal MacDonald's army at Katzbach. Though the defeat of Oudinot had been of great significance for the Allied forces, the battle on the Katzbach marked the first truly important success. The increase in moral confidence with which this victory filled the soldiers must be estimated much higher than the liberation of Silesia which followed. Now they learned that the foe was not invincible. Schwarzenberg, it is true, had to fall back on the Erz Mountains, after suffering heavy

losses, but this severe defeat was counterbalanced by the annihilation of an entire French army corps under General Vandamme, who was himself taken prisoner at Kulm, on August 30. When his defeat was known at headquarters, every one drew a breath of relief. "Now things are looking up," wrote Metternich to Vienna on August 31, "since we have scored three victories against Napoleon,¹ the results of which cannot be ultimately measured."²

People were now fully convinced that Napoleon's star was doomed to set for ever.³ In this belief they were confirmed by the tidings that Marshal Ney had been overpowered at Dennewitz on December 6. Napoleon might truly say: "If I am not there, everything goes wrong." After these disasters the magic power which he had hitherto exercised as a general completely collapsed.⁴ The Allied Powers drew together with increased circumspection, in order to drive the Emperor across the Rhine. "From to-day," declares Metternich on September 12, "the whole army desires *his coming*, for we are all of one mind, and the chances are in our favour. A few hours will decide matters, and God will guide the cause aright."⁵

Every step Napoleon took was closely observed, and it was determined as soon as he made a movement towards retreat "to meet him"—says Metternich—"by a smart offensive action."⁶ Certainly Metternich was not so optimistic as the Emperor Alexander, who was of opinion that "the Corsican must be 'devoured' in a

¹ Metternich means by this the victories won at Grossbeeren, Katzbach and Kulm.

² Metternich to Hudelist, August 31, 1813.

³ The same to the same, Teplitz, September 5, 1813.

⁴ Metternich to Hudelist, Teplitz, September 9, 1813. "He has given no proof of his talent as a general since the opening of the campaign."

⁵ The same to the same, Teplitz, September 12, 1813.

⁶ Metternich to Hudelist.

week.”¹ Metternich would have preferred uniting all the forces before risking a great battle.² But the decisive hour came at length, even for him, when Napoleon began to retire upon Leipzig. “All proves,” he declares to his daughter Marie, “that the hour has struck, and that my mission, which is to put an end to so much evil, is supported by the decrees of Providence. I am certain that Napoleon thinks of me continually. I must seem to him a sort of conscience personified. I predicted everything to him at Dresden. He would not believe a word of it; and the Latin proverb, *Quos deus vult perdere dementat (prius)*, is again proved true.”³

Metternich already believed in the approach of a great day of retribution.⁴ There, in the wide plains of Leipzig, a great battle of the nations actually took place. Metternich was beside himself with joy at the glorious victory that followed. His policy having been long criticised and suspected in Vienna, his satisfaction at this brilliant overthrow of his accusers seems to be fully justified. “Now,” said he, “everything declares *for* the war, *for* myself and *for* Schwarzenberg.”⁵

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Teplitz, September 28, 1813.

² *Ibid.* “As soon as the hour of conflict actually arrives I shall be the first to advise its taking place, but I would like to see Napoleon lose half his army without danger to our own, Bennigsen draw near so that Bohemia and our main communication on the Elbe is secured, and then we could get to the Rhine if we had anything like good fortune.”

³ Metternich to his daughter Marie Louise, Teplitz, October 1, 1813. Records of the Princely House of Metternich.

⁴ Metternich to Hudelist, Komotau, October 8, 1813.

⁵ Metternich herein wishes Hudelist to raise the question of granting to him and to Schwarzenberg the freedom of the city of Vienna, “anything out of the common always has good effect! The ‘*salvata*’ of Vienna is worth something. Try to bring it about *sub rosa*. If Count Saurau received the solemn badge of citizenship on account of his general proclamation in 1797, we ought to have the same granted to us.”—Metternich to Hudelist, October 18, 1813.

His feeling of satisfaction at the issue of events increased still more when Napoleon made overtures for peace the first day after the battle. Although he was not inclined to respond till the Rhine had been reached,¹ Metternich prophesied nevertheless that in less than four weeks the war would come to an end and peace be restored to Europe.² But would the Emperor Alexander, who would have preferred to wreak vengeance on the ravager of Moscow, share in these peaceful aspirations? The Tsar's policy could not be relied upon with any certainty, inasmuch as it was guided by a very realistic outlook, as well as his desire for vengeance. Filled with the idea of uniting Poland with Russia, he could wish for nothing more ardently than to carry on a war *à l'outrance* against the Polish champion. From France, diminished in power, Alexander need fear no resistance. For this same reason, Metternich could not but wish to maintain the position of Napoleon, albeit with greatly curtailed supremacy. Supported by Prussia³ and England⁴ the Austrian Minister succeeded in winning the Tsar's consent to the despatch of Baron St. Aignan as an envoy of peace to Napoleon.⁵ In the name of the Allies he was to propose the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees—the "natural" boundaries of France since the Revolution—as the basis

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Rötha, near Leipzig, October 19, 1813, 10 A.M. "He (Napoleon) was in the position of a defeated general and showed himself ready to yield on many points, if not on all. We shall answer him from the Rhine."

² The same to the same, Leipzig, October 22, 1813.

³ Roloff, "Politik und Kriegführung während des Feldzuges von 1814," p. 4.

⁴ Oncken, "Aus den letzten Monaten des Jahres 1813." Historical Pocket-book, Series vi. 2nd year, p. 12. Metternich to Hudelist, September 14, 1813, on Lord Aberdeen.

⁵ Metternich to Hudelist, October 28, 1813. The same to Schwarzenberg, October 27, at Klinkowström, "Oesterreich's Teilnahme am Befreiungskrieg," p. 770.

of peace negotiations to be discussed at a Congress.¹ It is unjustly asserted that Metternich wanted to lay down his arms at all costs, even before the Rhine had been crossed.² Let it be emphatically repeated in this connection that his proposals of peace, which he regarded as useless, were only to serve the purpose of reconnoitring in order "to see his way clearer,"³ and at the same time to furnish the nation he governed with a stronger case against the ruler of France. Napoleon, indeed, returned an evasive answer, restricted to generalities, which was far from satisfactory.⁴ Steps were now taken towards the publication of a "declaration,"⁵ dated December 1 (in reality some days later), on the composition of which Metternich prided himself greatly, as emanating entirely from himself,⁶ although Lord Aberdeen pronounced it weak and lacking in spirit.⁷ In this proclamation it is expressly declared "that Europe does not make war on France, but only against the ascendancy which Napoleon had exercised all too long beyond the boundaries of his Empire." It was an exaggeration to infer from it that its object was to wrest France from Napoleon. But for those who already had in view the downfall of the

¹ Fain, "Manuscript de 1814," p. 48 and following.

² I refer to Fournier's opinion, Congress of Châtillon, p. 15.

³ Metternich to Hudelist, November 9, 1813.

⁴ Oncken (already quoted), p. 37.

⁵ Printed by Fain (as quoted before), p. 283. For the history of the origin of this declaration, see Oncken (in the publication quoted before), p. 37. In opposition to Roloff see Fournier's careful refutation already quoted, p. 24, note 2).

⁶ Metternich to Hudelist, December 11, 1813. "I am very glad you are pleased with the declaration which I wrote from the depth of my heart. It is the hardest bit of work I ever did in my life. For to write in the name of five Powers to one conquered nation is certainly not easy. I have not got it signed because I did not know by whom this was to be done. Who (is to sign)? The sovereigns? The Cabinets? If so, what Cabinets? One of them? Then which one? Moreover neither manifesto nor declaration will ever be signed."

⁷ Oncken, same source as before, p. 38.

existing French dynasty, this declaration seemed an uncommonly valuable document, awakening hopes of a better future. It could be used as a weapon, when occasion offered, for the dethronement of Napoleon. At the present time such a course was not to be thought of; for on December 5, the day of the proclamation, Napoleon declared that he accepted the conditions offered by the Baron St. Aignan as a basis of negotiation.¹ Metternich was already of opinion that Napoleon must conclude peace, unless he would deprive himself of his throne, also that Austria might very well put up with the man who had subdued the revolution, provided he could persuade himself to bridle his hitherto unrestrained greed of conquest. For us it is important to know that not only the leading Austrian Minister, but also Stadion,² intended to fulfil the aim and purpose of the great coalition of 1813, by the expulsion of the French from Germany and Italy. If Napoleon had been as great a politician as he was a warrior, he would not have closed his eyes to the realities of the situation. His blind infatuation prevented his making use of the favourable attitude which his father-in-law still maintained towards him. Metternich and Stadion knew very well that the Emperor Francis only wished for his son-in-law to be chastened and his powers limited, so that he might be maintained upon the throne, together with Marie Louise. The letters addressed at this time by Francis to his daughter testify more than anything else how strongly the feeling for peace dwelt within him. "As regards peace," he writes to Marie Louise, on December 20, 1813, "be assured that I desire it no less than you, than all France, and—as I hope also—your husband. In peace

¹ Fain (already quoted), vol. ii., p. 296. Metternich to Hudelist, Frankfort, December 5, 1813.

² "Mémoires du Comte de Stadion sur la situation de l'Autriche en janvier 1813," in the Wessenberg Collections, No. 15.

alone lies happiness and prosperity. My ideas are moderate. I only wish for what accords with a lasting peace, but in this world wishes are not enough."¹ Writing on January 9, 1814, he repeats that he would willingly offer anything to attain this end. The whole letter gives the impression of having been written for Napoleon to read; it is meant as a last warning to yield, as earnest as it is impressive.² Metternich was all the more inclined to support his master in this matter because political considerations, as already stated, made it desirable to retain Napoleon on the throne. He did not want to speak the decisive word: "It is all over with Bonaparte!"³ Therefore he induced the Emperor Francis to declare that he was ready to conclude peace with the present ruler of France on the basis of the existing terms of alliance with the other Powers; that, moreover, he respected the rights of every independent nation, and would never lend a hand to declare for the imposition or deposition of a sovereign.⁴ Thus, on Austria's part, permission to negotiate was granted to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Caulaincourt, whom Napoleon had sent on his behalf to the headquarters of the Allies. But it still remained to overcome the opposition of the Tsar, who desired to drive his opponent from the throne and proclaim the "infernal" Bernadotte ruler of France.⁵ Metternich had every reason for believing that Alexander had pledged himself to the French emigrants not to disarm as long as Napoleon was on the throne.⁶ He

¹ This as well as the second letter of the Emperor on January 9, 1814, is entirely in Metternich's handwriting.

² Emperor Francis to Marie Louise, January 9, 1814.

³ Metternich to Hudelist, Basle, January 20, 1814.

⁴ Fournier (already quoted), p. 65.

⁵ The same, p. 43, and note 4.

⁶ Metternich's second Report, Langres, January 28, 1814. Metternich here remarks that Alexander will possibly speak to the Emperor Francis about the promise which he is said to have given to the emigrants.

must therefore be prepared for a hard struggle with that monarch, who had so enjoyed playing the part of leader of the Coalition. Metternich did not shirk the combat; he could not at any price permit the Tsar to come off victorious in a matter of such importance to Austria. After a conference which took place during the night of January 27-28, of which, unfortunately, no verbal report exists, he won his case against Alexander, as he triumphantly informed his master. The Tsar agreed to the opening of a Peace Conference, and declared most distinctly that he did not wish to interfere in the dynastic question.¹ Metternich—at one with the English Ministry on this point—was able to succeed in treating the subject as a purely national one, which was to be settled on the initiative of France only, without the intervention of Europe. But the French nation had to decide whether Napoleon or the Bourbons were to rule. Metternich absolutely refused to hear of Bernadotte.

It now rested with Napoleon to make peace with Europe at the Congress of Châtillon, which was to be opened under the title of "Preliminary Conference to Promote Universal Peace."

* * * *

After the battle of La Rothière (Brienne) on February 1,

In which case he begs Francis to answer that the highest in rank among them, to whose ears the matter has reached, *do not believe it, and attach no importance to it*. On this report, Francis concludes: "The Russian Emperor, who was with me, together with La Harpe, did not speak of the subject under discussion, nor of any other business matter."

¹ Metternich's Report, Langres, January 28, 1814, 1 A.M. Beer, *Vienna Abendpost*, 1879, No. 298 (and not 278 as erroneously quoted). Beer published the report probably from a copy not quite verbally correct, and also with some not altogether unimportant words left out. Oncken, "Lord Castlereagh und die Minister Konferenz." Historical Note book, Series vi. 4th year, p. 26, surmises wrongly that the first

1814, Napoleon regarded his position as desperate; in his need he looked to Châtillon as to a safe anchorage. He gave Caulaincourt, his representative at the Congress, unlimited power "to bring the negotiations to a happy issue, to save the capital and avoid a battle, on which rested the last hope of the nation."¹

But the negotiations did not advance a step. The envoys of the Allied Powers demanded that the boundaries of France should be the same as before 1792—there was no longer a question of that unfortunate phrase used at Frankfort, "natural boundaries"—therefore the French representative came forward with a counter-demand to be informed, first of all, what indemnification there would be for the sacrifices made by him, and, furthermore, in whose favour they were to be made?

In striking contrast with the stagnation at Châtillon was the activity at Troyes, where Metternich was fostering negotiations as to the existence or non-existence of the Napoleonic dynasty. The Prussian Chancellor of State, Baron von Hardenberg, was for a speedy conclusion of peace with Napoleon, on the assumption that France should be restricted to its old boundaries prior to 1792. Had he followed his own secret inclinations he would rather have seen the legitimate ruler—a Bourbon—on the throne; but he shrank from sacrificing the lives of the Allied troops for such a purpose.² The Russian Minister, Count Nesselrode, declared himself in quite a contrary spirit. He demanded on behalf of his master that the solution of the dynastic question should be decided in Paris itself. If the capital declared for

"negociate". (negozieren) should read "operate" (operiren). The report in the original certainly gives "negozieren."

¹ "Correspondence of Napoleon I.," vol. xxvii., p. 216. Maret wrote these words to Caulaincourt by order of Napoleon.

² Oncken, "Die Krisis der letzten Friedensverhandlung mit Napoleon," in *Historical Note-book*, 5th year.

Napoleon, peace must be concluded with him. Only by installing a Russian as governor of Paris (which was what Alexander had in view) could the impartial expression of public opinion in France be really ensured.¹ Metternich and Hardenberg agreed, on the contrary, that all the efforts of the belligerent parties would be amply rewarded by restricting France to its boundaries of 1792. If it were the downfall of Napoleon at which Alexander aimed, the Austrian Minister openly admitted that the object of the conflict was not a change of sovereign. The Emperor Francis would not allow blood to be shed for such a purpose. But even if Napoleon were to bring about his downfall by his own fault, Austria would never suffer any one but Louis XVIII. —the only legitimate head of the Bourbons—to ascend the throne of France.² Alexander was therefore plainly told that none of the aspirants whom he favoured would have any prospect of being the successor of the Corsican. England ranged herself on the side of Austria and Prussia.³ But was peace to be concluded without Russia's co-operation, or even in defiance of this Power? Metternich threatened to break up the Coalition and cement a special alliance with Napoleon in case Alexander refused to fall in with the wishes of the Allies. The Tsar was not to be shaken. Even a heated interview with the English Premier could not move him. He was attracted by the effect of an entry into Paris. It was only under the influence of Napoleon's victories over Olsuwief, Sacken and Blücher that Alexander was finally induced to withdraw his opposition. But now it was Napoleon, flushed with recent victory, who would not give a thought to peace, as the Allies interpreted the word. He, feeling his own self once more, was already reckoning on the

¹ Sbornik (Collections), vol. xxxi., pp. 377, 379.

² "Austria's Vote," published by Fournier, "Congress of Châtillon," p. 286.

³ *Idem*, p. 285.

possibility of winning Austria over to his side. The Empress now attempted to influence her father,¹ but Francis showed himself quite as inaccessible to his daughter as to his son-in-law.² "If I stood alone in the field against him," he wrote to Marie Louise, "I could more easily arrange matters with him, but now a treaty with Austria would merely precipitate his ruin, instead of being of service to him. I shall never separate myself from an alliance which actually aims only at the general good. Thus, in order to win peace, the Emperor must do what is needful to bring it about. The greatest service you can render your husband, your son, and your new country, is to back up my friendly and paternal advice and counsel."³

Thus the decisive day, March 10, drew near. The Allies had appointed it as the final limit for the declaration of the French representative. It was owing to Napoleon that the Congress closed on March 19 without any result; neither Caulaincourt's remonstrances nor those of his brother Joseph⁴ could induce him to give a straightforward consent to the demands of the Powers. He allowed himself to be easily led away by every new victory from facing the danger that threatened him. He dared not confront his own misfortunes.⁵ Up to March 15 it rested with him to save himself and his dynasty.⁶ The Cabinets were ever ready, even then, to

¹ Helfert, "Marie Louise," p. 278.

² Francis to Napoleon, Chaumont, February 27, 1814, printed by Demelitsch, "Documents on the History of the Coalition of 1814," p. 294, in the *Fontes Rerum Austr.*, vol. xlix., second half.

³ Francis to Marie Louise, Chaumont, March 6, 1814. The handwriting is Metternich's.

⁴ Houssaye, "1814," p. 249.

⁵ Wessenberg's "Posthumous Papers," No. 97. "The conversations which the author of these pages has had with several of his (Napoleon's) generals and Ministers (Bassano, Caulaincourt, Bertrand and others) of his *entourage* leave him no doubt in this respect."

⁶ Talleyrand, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 154.

come to terms with him. Metternich could not conceive how "a blind passion could infatuate so long and so completely" as to make him put everything in jeopardy.¹ The breaking off of the negotiations at Châtillon convinced every one at last that no good understanding could be arrived at with this man.

From this moment, those tendencies got the upper hand which finally led to his dethronement. Henceforth the Bourbons gained in importance. Alexander I., who was enthusiastic in the cause of Bernadotte,² was never in their favour.³ The other Powers, however, had repeatedly declared they would never stir a finger for the old dynasty unless the French nation themselves demanded its restoration. Hitherto that had not occurred. When, however, it was observed that only the downfall of Napoleon could put an end to the war, people began to abandon their attitude of neutrality in respect of the Bourbons. At headquarters a willing ear was given to those who were working directly for the downfall of the Imperial power, and who recognised the exiled Bourbons as the only legitimate rulers. Their adherents were now bestirring themselves on all sides. As early as January 16, 1814, Schwarzenberg reported to Metternich from Vesoul that a certain M. de Virieu had informed him that the old dynasty commanded a strong party in France, who were ready to rise at the first signal from

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Bar-sur-Aube, March 23.

² Fournier (already quoted), p. 43.

³ Metternich to Merveldt, Vienna, April 21, 1815: "It would not be difficult to convince me that his (Alexander's) views are as unfavourable in 1815 to Louis XVIII.'s government as they were in 1814." Wessenberg, "Posthumous Papers," No. 19: "The Emperor has thought of the Bourbons late in the day and slightly. Pozzo di Borgo and Moreau sometimes recalled them to his recollection, but without inducing him to show them any actual favour." See Macdonald, "Mémoires," p. 277, in which Alexander says: "I do not care for the Bourbons. I do not know them."

the Allied Powers.¹ In this month, also, Noailles came on a similar mission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces.² These proposals acquired a firmer basis owing to the re-appearance of the Bourbon Princes on the Continent. The Duc d'Angoulême joined the camp of the Duke of Wellington. The Duc de Berry showed himself on the shores of Brittany, and the Comte d'Artois alighted in Vesoul. The presence of these Princes so near France, and above all the sojourn of foreign troops in the country, produced an agitation in the public mind which might easily have led to disastrous results for the Allied army.

Some sort of direction must be given to public opinion. Under these circumstances, Baron vom Stein demanded that the word liberation should be pronounced. No longer, he declared, must the Bourbons be hindered from openly unfurling their banners. Were this favourable opportunity allowed to slide, there might be some danger of the various parties making common cause and wreaking their wrath and hatred on the Allied forces.³ At the same time Stein called Metternich's attention to the written statement of a former officer of high standing in the French police, in which he asserted that the nation longed for nothing so much as to shake off Napoleon's yoke.⁴ Just at the same moment, Baron de Vitrolles—who travelled under the pseudonym of Monsieur de St. Vincent—entered the Allied camp, whither he had been sent by Talleyrand and Dalberg⁵ with secret despatches in the Bourbon interest. He arrived at Châtillon⁶ just

¹ Schwarzenberg to Metternich, January 16, 1814. Semallé in his "Memoirs," p. 139, calls him M. Loup de Virieu.

² The same to the same, January 29, 1814.

³ Baron vom Stein to Metternich, Château de Policy, près Bar-sur-Seine, March 20, 1814.

⁴ Stein to Metternich, March 20, 1814.

⁵ Talleyrand, vol. ii., p. 148.

⁶ Baron de Vitrolles, vol. i., p. 76. Talleyrand, vol. ii., p. 151.

when events pointed to a crisis. Stadion advised him to seek Metternich, who was staying at Troyes, to place himself under the protection of that Minister and to follow his advice.¹ Stadion himself gathered the impression from Vitrolles' account, that although disturbance might reign in the department of La Vendée, it would be barren of results unless one of the French Princes had the courage to land there and place themselves at the head of the malcontents.² Almost simultaneously a direct emissary of the Comte d'Artois, brother of Louis XVIII., who was then at Vesoul, announced his arrival to the Allies. Since the mission of François d'Escars had been fruitless,³ the new messenger was to plead the cause of the Bourbons once again—more urgently than before. This man was a native of Switzerland, who travelled under the name of Herr von Wildermeth.⁴ Although at the beginning of February Metternich had said: "the question of the Bourbons is still very problematical,"⁵ he now felt that the decisive hour had come. No longer hampered by the considerations which so frequently impede negotiations,⁶ he took up the dynastic question afresh. "The majority of the French nation,"

is wrong when he makes out that Vitrolles spoke to Nesselrode and Stadion for the first time at Troyes. Stadion was at Châtillon, where Vitrolles met him. Nesselrode, on the contrary, remained at Troyes.

¹ Stadion to Metternich, undated.

² *Ibid.*

³ Semallé, "Souvenirs," p. 142.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 145. He himself writes from Nancy, April 2, 1814: "I have a sense of pure satisfaction, which is more valuable than any recompense, because I have been one means, under Providence, of restoring the rightful King to the throne, and of giving peace to Europe, since I was the bearer of messages from the House of Bourbon to the Ministers of the great Powers, at the moment of the dissolution of the Congress, and because the first official relations have been the direct result of my actions."

⁵ Metternich to Hudelist, February 9, 1814. Fournier, p. 256.

⁶ Metternich's "Memoir," March, 1814. Minute written by his own hand.

he said in his report, "seems to declare against Napoleon. They regard him as the obstacle to peace, and believe his personality to be irreconcilable with a state of tranquillity." But was this majority prepared to overthrow the Emperor and recall the Bourbons in his place? To this objection the Minister replies: "It is more than proved that the French will never take the initiative for the Bourbons."¹ It was evident to him that the Powers would not go back upon the principle of the nation's right to self-government which they had already approved. But need they on this account obstruct the Princes in the assertion of their own rights? After the mission of Vitrolles and Wildermeth, Metternich considered the Courts justified in upholding the intentions of the Bourbons and granting the support demanded by them.² Now he hesitated no longer to allow Vitrolles as well as Wildermeth to gain some insight into the negotiations of the Congress of Châtillon. Vincent was now empowered to inform his party that full authority was to be given to the Comte d'Artois to take up his quarters at some place protected by the Allied arms, but situated in an isolated position. In spite of this favourable attitude, however, the world was to be offered, at all costs, the spectacle of a nation choosing its new ruler quite independently and upon its own initiative. Therefore, Vitrolles was frankly told that the co-operation of the Powers in the restoration of the Bourbons depended solely upon the attitude of the French. In any case the

¹ Metternich's "Memoir," March 1814. Had Metternich already written this before the declaration of Bordeaux for the Bourbons? At any rate it dates prior to Bombelles' mission to Artois, between March 20 and 25.

² Metternich's "Memoir," March 1814. "He would be authorised to inform his party that Monsieur (Artois) is to be permitted to settle at some place protected by the Allied armies, but sufficiently isolated not to allow of a cause ominently French being mixed up with alien interests."

Allied Powers would not pledge themselves to effect the final triumph of the Bourbons against the will of France.¹ On the other hand, full security as to their future safety was assured to all who might declare themselves openly for the new dynasty, even in the event of failure.² Therefore it is quite inaccurate to state that Metternich—as Talleyrand and Dalberg would have us believe—told the envoy of the Bourbons, with reference to the Princes of this house, that there could never be any question of their restoration.³

Hitherto Vitrolles had claimed the exclusive merit of the restoration of the Bourbons. He represents himself to have been the only envoy who had appeared in the Allied camp, and maintains that they were not rightly informed there as to the actual whereabouts of the Comte d'Artois.⁴ Now this was very accurately known from the lips of Wildermeth himself. But Vitrolles,

¹ Metternich's "Memoir," March 1814. "M. de St. Vincent (Vitrolles) would be commissioned to assure the party who sent him of the most direct support in case they succeeded in declaring themselves. He will not conceal from this party, however, the impossibility of the Powers pledging themselves not to lay down their arms until they have ensured success to the Bourbon cause *against the wishes of the nation, or without its powerful support*. He is to assure his party that the efforts of the Powers will move in harmony with the development of the national sentiment."

² *Ibid.* "He is to give an assurance that whatever be the condition of the party, the Powers will take care to stipulate for a complete amnesty for those individuals who have devoted themselves to this cause, and in no case will peace be made without the life and liberty of these individuals being guaranteed." See Fournier, from the source already quoted, p. 230.

³ Talleyrand, vol. ii., pp. 152, 259.

⁴ Vitrolles, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 103. Vitrolles also tells us (*ibid.*, p. 96) that Metternich had said he did not meet with a universal expression of dislike to Napoleon. On February 9, 1814, however, Metternich had written to Hudellst: "The general opinion in France is 'Down with Napoleon!'" Could the Austrian Minister have actually given utterance in March to such an opinion as Vitrolles attributes to him?

from whom it had been kept a secret, was not even aware that a special confidant of the Comte d'Artois had appeared in Troyes. As little did he know that Count Bombelles had been sent on March 25 to enter into further negotiations with Artois.¹ If he had known all this, he would have abstained from informing posterity in such a romantic style that it was *he* who had once more raised the fallen hopes of the Comte d'Artois, for which the latter had fallen upon his neck in gratitude.² It was not Vitrolles, but Count Bombelles who actually dispelled by his cheering news the last remaining doubts of the Royal Prince as to the future destinies of his house.³ Dating from that moment, Artois might look forward with greater assurance to the future.

* * * *

Whilst the Powers were taking this step in the Bourbon interests, Napoleon still believed himself to be the master of his fate. He thought to cut off the enemy's retreat through Lorraine and Alsace by a bold stroke. Such a brilliant success could not but revive his declining reputation. But he failed in his reckoning. He was defeated at Arcis-sur-Aube (March 20-21, 1814). If he had

¹ Bombelles to Metternich, August 3, 1814. "As far back as March 25, I was charged to negotiate with Monsieur, brother of the King (Louis XVIII.), whilst on April 2 the Emperor Alexander did not even know what sort of government would be restored to France."

² Vitrolles, as quoted above, vol. i., pp. 178, 183.

³ Wildermeth to ?, Nancy, April 2, 1814. "The arrival of M. le Comte (Bombelles) has done away with the least shadow of fear which might linger in Monsieur's (Artois) mind as to the intentions of the great Allied Powers and those of their worthy Ministers, with regard to the House of Bourbon." Comte d'Artois wrote from Nancy, on April 9, to the Emperor Francis: "I cannot deny myself the pleasing satisfaction of expressing directly to your Imperial Majesty how deeply I am touched by all the kind and gracious words communicated to me as coming from your Imperial Majesty." It is incorrect to state, as Semallé does in his "Souvenirs," p. 145, "that Wildermeth's mission had no practical result."

intended, as his unfinished letter of March 22 reveals, to draw his foes away from Paris by his march on the Marne, they—for that very reason—decided to make straight for the capital. There they desired to dictate peace. A manifesto to the French nation, which Metternich says “was quite to his taste,”¹ was to justify in the people’s eyes the advance of the Allied Powers, who were far from wishing to devastate the country. All responsibility for the ravages which laid waste France was put down to Napoleon’s account. Peace alone—so it ran—could heal the wound. However mild was the language of the manifesto, it was evident that the knowledge of the vicinity of the hostile hosts would have a paralysing effect on Paris. Deep depression had reigned in the capital for some time past. This increased perceptibly when it became certain that the enemy now stood between Napoleon and Paris. It was out of the Emperor’s power to help his capital. The Regency, which had administered affairs during the absence of Napoleon, was now forced to give serious consideration to their action at this threatening juncture. Was Paris to be defended, or given over to the advancing enemy? The National Guard would be prepared to fulfil their duty. Only a short time before, when they took leave of Napoleon on January 23, the officers of the Guard had sworn with tears in their eyes to protect his wife and child at the sacrifice of their own lives. The downfall of the Empire was certain if the Regent left the capital with the Ministers. At such a moment a similar step signified the voluntary surrender of the field to the Bourbons. Therefore, a great Council of the Regency declared, on March 28, for Marie Louise’s remaining. But at this decisive moment King Joseph, appointed

¹ Metternich to his daughter Marie, Dijon, March 29, 1814, 1 A.M.: “I send you the subjoined declaration, which is quite to my taste.”—Prince Metternich’s Archives

by Napoleon as his Lieutenant-General, read out a letter from the Emperor addressed to him on March 16, which effected a complete change of opinion. Therein the Emperor expressly stated that his wife and the King of Rome were to leave Paris directly the Allies approached in force.¹ "Remember," he continues, "that I would rather throw my son into the Seine than into the hands of the foes of France. The fate of Astyanax, captured by the Greeks, has always appeared to me the saddest in history."² What was Marie Louise to do now? Could she rely on the opinion of Talleyrand, who had protested against her departure in order that he might play the leading part in the Regency?³ Napoleon himself had undermined the influence of Talleyrand when he denounced him as the deadly foe of his dynasty. No one was bold enough to take the responsibility of giving contrary advice in face of the letter of March 16, announcing the Emperor's wishes. Hortense did indeed exclaim, "Were I the mother of the King of Rome, I should know how to inspire every one with the resolution which animates me!" Marie Louise should actually have been ready to betake herself and her child to the Hôtel de Ville to appeal personally to the loyalty of the citizens and to demand their defence of Paris.⁴ But in order to give free vent to this heroic impulse, and to carry those who still hesitated along with her, an iron force of character was needful, and that Marie Louise certainly did not possess. How could

¹ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 143. Savary, "Mémoires," vol. vi., p. 314. Houssaye, "1814," p. 32. All these references contradict Metternich who, writing about this scene to Hudelist (Langres, February 1, 1814), says: "The Guard however, remained silent."

² "Napoleon's Correspondence," vol. xxvii., No. 21, 497.

³ "Revue d'Histoire diplomatique," 1887, p. 247. Talleyrand to the Duchess of Courland.

⁴ "Mémoires de Madame Durand," p. 177.

she have found strength in herself to act independently upon her own convictions? Napoleon had never offered her an opportunity of independent action. His authority had always appeared to her so all-powerful that she considered it quite out of the question to disregard his orders. Even when instinctive feeling urged her to resist,¹ she dared not violate Napoleon's commands. When she resolved to quit Paris it was at the price of her crown. Equally instinctive seems to have been the protest made at the last moment against this act by a person of no less importance than the heir of the Empire himself. The King of Rome, not yet four years old, struggled evidently against entering into the carriage which was to bear him away from the Tuileries for ever. On the same day, March 28, when the members of the Ministerial Council separated with the conviction that they had assisted at the last act of the reign, a scene was being played at St. Dizier, Napoleon's headquarters, which seemed in like manner the forerunner of approaching overthrow. The Emperor declared to the Austrian diplomatist, Baron von Wessenberg,² brought a prisoner before him, that if the war were only carried on against himself in person, he would resolve to abdicate in favour of the Regency; "for," he added, "even ambition wears itself out, and I am not far from the age when one feels the need of repose." Hinting at this, he requested von Wessenberg, whom he restored to liberty, to convey to his Court the intelligence that he was prepared to leave the making of peace confidently in the hands of Austria.³

Napoleon came forward too late with all these fine assurances, to which no belief was attached. On hearing this, Metternich said: "We are no longer masters of

¹ Masson, "Marie Louise," p. 370.

² Houssaye, "1814," p. 408, erroneously speaks of him as Weissenberg; also Masson, "Marie Louise," makes the same mistake.

³ Arneth, "Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg," vol. i., pp. 188-192.

our actions to-day." ¹ A few days earlier it was still in his power to uphold Napoleon. ² He would have done so the more willingly because he experienced a mild shudder at calling upon the nation to arbitrate upon its own destiny. ³ That was indeed to proclaim the purest revolutionary principles.

But all this availed nothing. The Powers had involved themselves too deeply with the Bourbons to be able to retract. In Dijon, where Francis and Metternich tarried, everybody was preoccupied with the restoration of this dynasty. Those, indeed, who came into closer contact with the representatives of the old kingdom, as did Wessenberg when he visited Artois at Nancy, were horrified to find his reception-room filled exclusively with representatives of a period prior to 1789. Terror ⁴ seized upon Wessenberg on finding himself, as he describes it, among actual Knights of the Order of St. Louis, who were carrying on the most absurd conversations in the most violent manner. This did not augur much good for the future. Apparently no one at the moment thought of the great drama, tending to tragic conclusions, while the whole world held its breath. ⁵ Paris, that had hitherto dominated Europe, had been obliged ⁶

¹ Arneth. "Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg," vol. i., pp. 188-192.

² *Ibid.*

³ Nothing is more untrue than Houssaye's assertion in "1814" that Metternich had been conspiring against Napoleon since the Congress at Prague, and now for the first time dropped his mask. Masson, "Marie Louise," falls into the same error.

⁴ Wessenberg's account of his journey from London to the headquarters of the Powers in France, 1814. Wessenberg's Correspondence, No. 19.

⁵ Metternich to Hudelist, Dijon, March 28, 1814. "The present moment is one of indescribable importance. We are at the beginning of quite a new scene and, end as it may, it is not the less certain that we were hardly ever nearer the close of a great drama than now."

⁶ Schwarzenberg to the Emperor, Headquarters, Bondy, March 30, 1814, 11 o'clock. Royal and Imperial Archives of War in Vienna.

to capitulate during the night of March 30-31 and to open its gates to the enemy. Napoleon could not realise that the city had been given up; he, being in the neighbourhood, thought of hazarding one more attempt to save it or, as it is asserted, to reduce it to ashes,¹ simply to prevent its falling into the hands of the Allies. But his resources were no longer equal to this. Conscious of his powerlessness, he sent the devoted Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, to Alexander to negotiate and conclude peace. Caulaincourt, who had formerly represented the Empire, in the zenith of its glory, at the Russian Court, and could boast of his friendship with the Tsar, met the Russian Emperor at Bondy. Alexander received him cordially, but had hardened himself to every overture from Napoleon. The Tsar was burning to enter Paris as a conqueror at last. After a short interview, he invited Caulaincourt to visit him there.² Since Charles VII.'s time no hostile army had approached the soil of the French capital.³ Nor without apprehension was the coming event anticipated. "I wager," said Anstett the Russian to the Austrian Stürmer, "that we shall be received in Paris as in Warsaw. No one will be in the streets."⁴ Instead, however, of the dreaded, deathlike stillness, as a silent expression of hatred towards the conquerors, a moving

"Paris is in our hands. The foe obstinately defended the heights of the capital, but was driven back at all points. The great army stands united—as at Leipzig—on the heights, and before the barriers of Paris."

¹ Stürmer to Metternich, Paris, March 31, 1814. "... It has been positively given out that Napoleon wanted to march on Paris with 6000 men to burn the town." The same to the same, Paris, April 1, 1814. "It is certain that Napoleon intended to burn the town of Paris."

² Houssaye, "1814," p. 546.

³ Stürmer to Metternich, Headquarters, Paris, April 1, 1814. "Since Charles VII. no hostile army has reached Paris. They (the French) are humiliated, and the hatred that they have long cherished for the Emperor Napoleon has reached its height."

⁴ *Idem ad eundem*, Paris, April 1, 1814.

mass thronged the streets, to the astonishment of the invaders. The Royalists had mobilised their adherents with all secrecy,¹ intent on receiving Alexander, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwarzenberg, representative of the Emperor Francis, with white cockades and acclamations for the Bourbons. Although in a minority, they succeeded by their noisy demonstrations in impressing the foreigners with the idea that all Paris was rejoicing over the return of the Bourbons.² All the windows, so Stürmer informs Metternich, were crowded with people who waved their handkerchiefs to accentuate their shouts of joy.³ Alexander, whose face beamed with pleasure at the homage paid him, could scarcely contain his delight,⁴ and directly the review of the troops was over alighted at Talleyrand's house. A secret understanding already existed between the Tsar and the Grand Chamberlain of the Empire. Even in Erfurt he had warned Alexander against Napoleon's boundless ambition. The Russian Emperor could not but look involuntarily to Talleyrand as the coming man, even if the latter had not given assurances of his devotion through Count Orloff. The French statesman had recognised, with the sharpness of vision peculiar to him,

¹ See Scallé, "Mémoires."

² Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 255. His opinion merits consideration, in face of the exaggerated utterances of the Royalist authors. See also Housaye, "1814," p. 547.

³ Stürmer to Metternich, April 1, 1814. "But what was our surprise on seeing a crowd of people pressing up to the gates of the town in order to view the Emperor and the King and receiving us with shouts of joy."

The same to the same, Paris, March 31, 1814. "He (Nesselrode) desires me to tell your Highness that what M. de St. Vincent (Vitrolles) has told you, Prince, about the temper of the town of Paris is far short of what we found to be the case. The return of the Bourbons is unanimously desired." About the entry into Paris, see Béranger, "Ma Biographie," p. 144.

⁴ Stürmer to Metternich, April 1, 1814.

that after Marie Louise's departure Paris must be the centre of the new government, therefore he had had recourse to cunning in order to allow himself to be forcibly detained in the capital,¹ which by command of Cambacères was to be cleared of all who held high offices in the Empire.

The crafty man wanted, at any rate, to secure his price for reinstating the Bourbons, since he could not be the all-powerful Minister of the Regency. He had thought at first of the recall of an almost "out-of-date dynasty"—to use the phrase of a diplomatist of those days—only as an "*expedient in extremis*,"² but he was now quick enough to use the discovery at hand: that the Bourbons were an indispensable element for calming men's minds.³ Alexander, filled with hatred for his great opponent, glowed with the thought of striking Napoleon out of the list of sovereigns. But he would most likely have hesitated to venture on the last decisive step had it not been for Talleyrand's incentive.⁴ Now, he was not only ready for the dethronement of Napoleon, but also resolved to set aside his son and his whole family.⁵ On the evening of March 31 the famous declaration with Alexander I.'s signature (it emanated from Talleyrand's

¹ Pasquier, "*Mémoires*," vol. ii., p. 231. Talleyrand himself writes on March 31, to the Princess of Courland: "I found the barriers closed, and it was impossible for me to continue my journey."—"Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1887, p. 248.

² Wessenberg's "Posthumous Papers," No. 19.

³ Houssaye, "1814," p. 559.

⁴ Stürmer to Metternich, April 1, 1814, writes: "... We must no longer hesitate to dethrone the Emperor Napoleon; that it was the only means of securing peace to the world, nothing could lead back this sovereign to moderation and justice; that ambition would always remain his ruling passion; that he was at the head of the Jacobins, and for the happiness of France and of humanity we must be rid of him."—Pasquier, vol. ii., p. 258; Talleyrand, vol. ii., p. 163.

⁵ Pradt, "*Récit historique sur la restauration de la royauté en France*, March 31, 1814," p. 66—Vitrolles' "*Mémoires*," vol. i., p. 313.

pen) was placarded everywhere.¹ It announced that the Powers would no longer treat with Napoleon, and that they would recognise and protect the Constitution which the French should choose for themselves.² The right of the people to choose their own Constitution was proclaimed, remarkable to state, by the most absolute autocrat in the world. The revolution of 1789 could not desire a finer trophy.³ The Tsar, who recoiled from the sole responsibility of this portentous step, used all his persuasive powers to move Prince Schwarzenberg to sign the document. The generalissimo refused. He had not the courage to do so without his Emperor's sanction.⁴ This declaration—effectually the deathblow of Napoleon's government—was in reality a very arbitrary act on the part of the Tsar. Therefore Nesselrode deemed it expedient to excuse himself to Metternich; he must not take it amiss, he told him, "that he had acted at this decisive moment without his co-operation, on which, however, he had ventured to rely."⁵

Great surprise was felt at Dijon when the news of this declaration was received, on April 3.⁶ Metternich was

¹ Pasquier, vol. ii., p. 261, is of opinion that this declaration was not only composed at the conference held under the presidency of Alexander, but that it had already been mapped out by Talleyrand and Pozzo di Borgo.

² In the *Moniteur* of April 2, 1814.

³ This was Wessenberg's opinion. "Posthumous Papers," No. 19.

⁴ Stürmer to Metternich, April 1, 1814. Schwarzenberg could hardly have declared his consent (as Vitrolles tells us, vol. i., p. 313) to the dethronement of the King of Rome by a nod in reply to Alexander's look of inquiry. Stürmer, who was staying at headquarters as Metternich's special informant, and watched every incident closely, could not have possibly reported Schwarzenberg's refusal in that case. But even had the generalissimo so acted, as Vitrolles represents, then it was on his own initiative, without the sanction of the Emperor or Metternich.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Wessenberg's "Posthumous Papers," No. 19. "I shall never forget the astonishment that the Emperor Alexander's famous declaration produced at Dijon."

exercised in his mind, and hesitated whether to authorise its being posted on the walls, thus testifying his approval of Alexander's arbitrary action.¹ We know from the Minister's own lips that he was much perturbed by the proceedings of March 31 in Paris. "The declaration of the Russian Emperor," he wrote to Hudelist, "is a miserable performance, which would never have been couched in these terms if I had been at hand. We have published it therefore as a historical document."² The disapproval on the part of Metternich altered nothing in the course of events. Talleyrand redeemed his pledge to the Tsar that the Senate should pronounce Napoleon's dethronement.³ On April 2, 1814, the memorable revolution took place.

* * * *

On the same day that the Senate voted against Napoleon, Caulaincourt returned from Paris with the news that the Emperor Alexander insisted on Napoleon's abdication. But the French Emperor had 60,000 men at his disposal. He was therefore resolved not to yield. But he met with unexpected resistance from the marshals who surrounded him. Convinced that France under his further guidance was lost, they demanded his abdication in favour of the Regency for his son the King of Rome, a minor. They unanimously desired to pledge themselves for his succession with the Allied Powers. After a hard

¹ Wessenberg's "Posthumous Papers," No. 19. "Prince Metternich was so struck with astonishment that he hesitated for a moment as to whether he would permit the declaration to be posted. He was quite thoughtful and sad, alarmed perhaps at the result of his condescension in agreeing to the proposal of his illustrious ally, in the matter of refusing to treat any longer with Napoleon."

² Metternich to Hudelist, Dijon, April 4, 1814. "To-day you will hear the end of all things. . . . The proclamation which the Emperor Alexander has signed is bad, and I would not have agreed to it had I been there."

³ Talleyrand, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 164.

struggle, Napoleon yielded. Caulaincourt, Ney, and Macdonald betook themselves to Paris with this resolution of the Emperor. They represented to the Tsar with great zeal the need of a Regency. Napoleon, who knew his opponent accurately, and wanted to take him on his weak side, gave him to understand through Ney, that if he (Napoleon) had anything with which to reproach himself it was with having sinned against his truest ally; even now he reckoned upon his generosity, and looked with confidence to a decision as to the degree of power to be assigned to him. These words made a deep impression upon Alexander, the effect of which he did not seek to conceal from any one.¹ He who had reached the goal of his ambition seemed to waver and wish to fulfil the marshals' desire. That he wished for time to reflect, was so much gained for the Imperial cause. Just then the fateful intelligence reached him that Marmont, with his army corps, had seceded from Napoleon and crossed over to the enemy's lines.² The strongest argument on which Caulaincourt, Ney, and Macdonald had relied had thereby lost its value. Now it was proved that even the army was no longer absolutely loyal to its old leader. The secession of Marmont, who had turned traitor to his Emperor, decided the Tsar in favour of the Bourbons, to the detriment of the Regency. "You see," he said to Pozzo Borgo, "Providence wills it thus. The direction of Providence asserts itself. No more delay, no more wavering."³ Without delay, without hesitation, he told the Imperial Com-

¹ Stürmer to Metternich, Paris, April 7, 1814.

² As regards this occurrence Schwarzenberg reports to the Emperor Francis, Paris, April 2, 1814, Royal and Imperial Archives of War in Vienna. "The deputies of the hostile army, owing to Marshal Marmont's secession and their own conviction of the excellent spirit of the provisional government and of the people generally, feel disposed considerably to abate their demands."

³ Pasquier, vol. ii., p. 311.

missioners when he received them at 9 A.M. on the morning of April 5, that the Emperor must resign for himself and his heirs. He granted to his opponent nothing but the title of Emperor, with the sovereignty over Elba. When, a few days later, Hardenberg, the Prussian Chancellor of State, reproached the Emperor of Russia with this concession, the Tsar replied in his pious fashion : "Christianity enjoins us to pardon our enemies."¹

Napoleon, with a heavy heart, signed the abdication for himself and his heirs on April 6. With the words, "You want peace? Well, you shall have it," he handed the ever-memorable document to his marshals, who hastened to bear it to Paris.² They arrived during the night of April 6-7. The negotiations concerning the compact with Napoleon began forthwith. The Imperial Commissioners regarded it as their duty to consider the fate of Marie Louise. "They have declared," writes Schwarzenberg, "that they are pledged in the name of the army to demand a residence for the Empress more suited to her health than would be the climate of an island. In this respect they propose to assign Tuscany to her Majesty, where she would reside apart from her husband, only stipulating that she might visit him from time to time."³ Schwarzenberg did not venture to dispose of Tuscany on his own initiative, therefore he proposed to the marshals to let the matter rest until the arrival of the Emperor Francis in Paris. He told them they might place perfect confidence in the paternal disposition of the Austrian Emperor, therefore this question need neither disturb, nor delay, the progress

¹ "Hardenberg's Diary." State Archives of the Kingdom of Prussia, April 11, 1814. "I ventured to reproach the Emperor Alexander as to the convention with Napoleon. He pleaded the Christian spirit which enjoins us to pardon our enemies."

² Houssaye, "1814," p. 635.

³ Schwarzenberg to Emperor Francis, Paris, April 8, 1814. R. and I. Archives of War in Vienna.

of the remaining negotiations.¹ On account of the outspoken adherence of the army to Napoleon, and their open dislike to the Bourbons,² Schwarzenberg wished to hasten the conclusion of the agreement with Napoleon so as to get him speedily beyond the confines of France. The Austrian general feared with good reason that the presence of Napoleon would be a sufficiently powerful lever to raise the hopes of his adherents.³ Besides, a breach might be expected from him at any moment. As a matter of fact, the report was actually in circulation on April 7 that the Emperor had left Fontainebleau in a carriage and had taken the road to Bourgogne. When the marshals got wind of this, they declared at once that if Napoleon had betrayed their confidence they would deliver him up "dead or alive."⁴ The report, however, was an utter fabrication. Nevertheless, Schwarzenberg was of opinion that the decentralisation of the army, already decreed, must be reconsidered.⁵ In the confused and dangerous state of affairs he begged the Emperor Francis to come to Paris without delay.⁶

People were astonished at the self-dependence with which Alexander viewed the most important decisions, as if he alone were the head of the Coalition. It is conceivable that the Emperor Francis, who was delighted with the Royalist outburst of enthusiasm at Dijon,⁷

¹ Schwarzenberg to Emperor Francis, Paris, April 8, 1814. R. and I. Archives of War in Vienna.

² The same. "A feeling adhesion to Napoleon is still prevalent in the French army on the whole, whilst the Bourbons have hardly any following."

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Metternich to his daughter Marie, Dijon, April 5, 1814. Archives of the Princely House of Metternich. "Here we are in the midst of cries of 'Vive le Roi.' The public seems possessed. More than 20,000 cockades have been sold in one day. The milliners and the dressmakers do nothing else. All the street urchins have bits of white paper in their hats and caps. 'Richard Cœur de Lion' was represented this evening. The people went crazy. The Emperor

did not really wish to be in Paris at the moment when his daughter was dethroned.¹ But why did Metternich remain absent? Just at that time he made the singular discovery that he had nothing more to do in the French capital.² Later on he repented bitterly of this, and spoke of it as "one of his greatest misfortunes."³ Meanwhile he cherished the delusion that he had the whole conduct of affairs in the hollow of his hand.⁴ This was so far from being the case that it seemed to the Austrian diplomatist Stürmer a very serious matter that Alexander should be regarded by the French as the only influential member of the Coalition.⁵ Metternich's conduct appears the more enigmatical because he knew that "the Emperor Alexander needed some one who would keep him a little in check."⁶ Only when Talleyrand and Nesselrode pressed him, on April 5,⁷ to come to Paris did he set out for the French capital, but, strange to say, without any particular haste.⁸ On April 10 he

Napoleon is not beloved. This fact is certain. Everybody was embracing everybody else in the street, and saying, '*Mon Dieu!* after twenty-five years we shall have some quiet at last.'

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Dijon, April 7, 1814. "The Empress's father might naturally wish to avoid Paris at the very moment of his daughter's expulsion from the throne."

² Metternich to his daughter Marie, Dijon, April 5, 1814. Archives of the Princely House of Metternich. "I shall not go to Paris till later on, I have nothing to do there now."

³ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, May 13, 1814. "... especially my absence from Paris, where I arrived a week too late, it is one of my greatest misfortunes."

⁴ The same to the same, Dijon, April 4, 1814. "In any case we have the matter quite in our own hands, and the result of all our endeavours will be a speedy universal peace."

⁵ Stürmer to Metternich, Paris, April 7, 1814.

⁶ Metternich to Hudelist, Dijon, April 7, 1814.

⁷ Talleyrand and Nesselrode to Metternich, Paris, April 5, 1814.

"You are bound to come. Paris and Madame Junot expect you."

⁸ Metternich to Hudelist, Dijon, April 7, 1814.

reached Paris.¹ What right had he then to reproach the Tsar on his arrival—as we see from his Memoirs²—for ceding Elba to Napoleon? In all probability this account is but the subsequent fruit of his imagination, and he never really spoke to Alexander in that sense. Metternich's despatches at that time certainly contain no word of blame for the Tsar.³ He must have already been aware of this clause in the terms of the projected contract. It seems as though he intentionally absented himself from the Paris negotiations. He only took part in them at Alexander's express request, and then merely because one of the items in the contract that had to be settled treated of an independent establishment for the Empress and the King of Rome.⁴ The supposition is almost justified that it was desired to make Alexander answerable for all that took place in Paris. Had not this been his leading idea, he would have felt obliged to shorten his stay in Dijon directly after the Tsar's declaration of March 31, which so greatly displeased him. Even had there been no agreement as to the surrender of Elba to Napoleon, was it quite fair that Alexander should not only drive the Emperor from his throne but also exclude his son from the succession? He had already declared on February 9, 1814, that a "Regency was scarcely to be thought of during the present dreadful tension."⁵ According to Pradt, the proclamation of the Regency of Marie Louise would have been possible even on March 31.⁶ Metternich knew very well that at the first summons the whole army would have unanimously raised the King of Rome on their shield.⁷ He was not

¹ Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. i., p. 199.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 469.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Metternich to Hudelist. Fournier, "The Congress of Châtillon," p. 256.

⁶ Pradt (already quoted), p. 66.

⁷ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, April 21. "The revolution is accomplished. Its only opponents are those who clamour for the

unaware of the great regard which Marie Louise enjoyed with the nation,¹ who were for the most part more Imperialist than Royalist in their sympathies. Propositions in favour of the King of Rome came from various quarters, his cause, so it seemed, had found a warm advocate even in Gentz. The information received from Lucien Bonaparte, who was staying in London, was of a significance not to be underrated. Even before the fall of Napoleon, he had informed Metternich that the foremost men in France had asked him to head a movement to overthrow the Emperor and raise his son to the throne in his place.² But Lucien would not undertake anything without the active co-operation of Austria,³ which was just what Metternich refused.⁴ So greatly did people in Paris reckon upon the initiative of the Court of Vienna, that it was universally said Austria would not tolerate the restoration of the Bourbons, but thought only of a change in favour of the King of Rome,⁵ an opinion which Napoleon silently did his best to confirm by means of his adherents.⁶ Metternich would not hear of these plans,

Regency. This class is very important, especially as it includes the army."

¹ Metternich's Despatch, Paris, April 13, 1814. "It comes to this, that the Empress through her exemplary behaviour has a very strong party, among which the majority of the army must be numbered, who swear allegiance to this same opinion: the restoration of the Napoleonic dynasty."

² Lebzeltern to Metternich, Rome, July 16, 1814. "They were disposed," reports Lebzeltern, "from information received from Lucien (Bonaparte) in Rome, to make a revolution in favour of the Empress and the King of Rome." M. Lucien was invited to place himself at the head of the party. Napoleon was to be for ever excluded from the throne, from the government, and from France.

³ Lebzeltern to Metternich, Rome, July 16, 1814.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Metternich's Despatch of April 13, 1814. "The public cannot conceive that your Majesty is not in agreement about the change of government."

⁶ The same. "The Emperor Napoleon has caused it to be hinted

in regard to which he was of the same mind as his master. Like him, the Emperor Francis decidedly disclaimed all attempts to secure the succession to the throne for Napoleon's family through the weight of his opinion. Champagny, Duke of Cadore, who filled the office of Secretary of State for the Regency, came direct from Blois, where Marie Louise resided, to Dijon. He delivered a letter from the Empress in which she commended her own and her son's future to the heartfelt consideration of her father.¹ But Champagny was to interpret personally to the Emperor all that was left unsaid in the letter. It was his mission to persuade Francis to make over the French crown to the King of Rome, under the Regency of Marie Louise.² But the Emperor of Austria did not allow the Duke of Cadore to doubt for a single moment that there was not, and never would be, any question of this.³ The son-in-law had ceased to be a political factor in his father-in-law's eyes, and as a grandfather he would not assign such a part to his grandson. If he were disposed for a moment to receive Napoleon—in case he wished to come to Dijon—abroad that Austria will certainly lose no opportunity of replacing the Napoleonic dynasty on the throne."

¹ Helfert, "Marie Louise," p. 296.

² Prince Moritz Liechtenstein to Field Marshal Duka, St. Florentine, April 6, 1814. Stadion to Metternich, Châtillon, April 9, 1814. Stadion was with Emperor Francis.

³ Stadion to Metternich, Châtillon, April 9, 1814. "But his Majesty being fixed in his resolution to avoid altogether the question of the succession to the French Empire in Napoleon's family, and speaking to him about it with the habitual frankness he displays on such occasions, succeeded in persuading the French envoy of the uselessness of any overtures bearing on that subject." But Champagny was not to be dissuaded after his journey from writing once more on this question to Metternich, April 9, 1814. "... in depicting her Majesty (Marie Louise) as she has appeared during these last few months as courageous, as grand, as noble, as a grand-daughter of Maria Theresa should be, you may judge how worthy she is to occupy the throne upon which the will of her august father placed her."

with all the honours due to him,¹ the next minute he was again firmly resolved not to allow any intercourse between his daughter and her husband, consequently he showed great displeasure on hearing from Prince Schwarzenberg that the Russian general, Schuvalov, had been sent from Paris to Blois to conduct Marie Louise and her son to Napoleon at Fontainebleau.² He expressed his displeasure to Metternich through Stadion: "From the very moment"—Stadion had to write Metternich—"that the Archduchess"—as she was already styled—"is separated from her husband she belongs to no one but her father, and he alone can, and may, take her under his protection. He desires that his daughter and her child shall be handed over to him, so that he may have them brought to his own country, in a manner befitting her rank, and provide a suitable place of residence for them until such time as their ultimate fate can be decided." When these clearly worded injunctions reached Paris, the

¹ When Champagny on his return communicated to Field Marshal-Lieutenant Prince Moritz Liechtenstein his intention to persuade Marie Louise to repair to her Imperial father, to which the latter had consented, Liechtenstein wrote to F. M. L. Duka (Joigny, April 10, 1814): "I am convinced that the Emperor Napoleon might also come, especially if he spoke to the Duke of Cadore (Champagny), who has this project very much at heart, and regards it as the only means of safety." To this Duka replied at the Emperor Francis's desire (Troyes, April 11, 5 o'clock in the afternoon) that Marie Louise, in case she appeared, was to be received with all due ceremony, likewise Napoleon if he were to come, "nevertheless with this difference, that his escort must be strong enough to protect him (Napoleon) from any kind of insult which might be offered him." Liechtenstein was commanded to accompany Napoleon to Troyes in person, alone, or with Marie Louise.

² Schwarzenberg to Emperor Francis, Paris, April 8, 1814. "General Schuvalov was sent to Blois early yesterday morning to accompany the Empress Marie Louise to her husband at Fontainebleau." Méneval "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 265, is therefore under a misapprehension when he says that Schuvalov was commissioned to escort Marie Louise and her son to Orleans. Accordingly, Houssaye; "1815," p. 159, as well as Masson, "Marie Louise," p. 383, must be corrected.

³ Stadion to Metternich, Châtillon, April 10, 1814.

famous Convention of April 11 had just been concluded under Metternich's auspices. After receiving Napoleon's abdication, this Convention secured to Marie Louise the possession of the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastala, with the title of "Empress, Duchess of Parma," and for her son that of "Imperial Highness Prince of Parma."¹

Meanwhile, Napoleon, in a very dejected mood, was awaiting the issue of the Paris negotiation. A life full of the greatest, mightiest deeds, which had paved the way to the summit of earthly honour, was now undone, owing to his recent defeats. All the brilliant victories he had won on the battlefields of Italy, all his successes at Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, arose before him, showing up the present in still darker colours. It would not be strange if this man wished to put a violent end to his existence in an access of despair.² Those around him thought they saw indications of mental aberration.³ Marshal Macdonald maintained that he could not grasp two consecutive ideas.⁴ But he took his exile to Elba more quietly than was expected of him. He said to his

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, April 23, 1814. "In all newspapers and documents both Napoleon and Marie Louise are to retain their Imperial titles: Emperor Napoleon, Empress Marie Louise, Duchess of Parma, his Imperial Highness Prince of Parma. These are the titles to be used."—Metternich, "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. ii., p. 469.

² It has never yet been clearly ascertained whether Napoleon wished to commit suicide. Metternich did not think him capable of it (Helfert, "*Marie Louise*," pp. 435, 179, notes). Macdonald, "*Mémoires*," pp. 300-301, speaks only of the Emperor's state of ill-health.

³ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, April 15, 1814. "He (Napoleon) must in any case be very much indisposed mentally. Everything points to it." The same to the same, Paris, May 13, 1814. "Moreover, it appears from everything that he is on the verge of madness."

⁴ Metternich, "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. ii., p. 470. In the report before me there is the following sentence, wanting in Metternich's "*Posthumous Papers*": "It appears that he is in a frame of mind bordering upon a catastrophe."

generals: "It will not be so bad there. I would rather a hundred times live quietly on this island than rule over a France less great than I made it by conquest."¹ But he could not hide from himself the fact that for him Elba actually signified a prison.² Vanquished, he went into exile, but not without a hidden thought of returning one day under happier circumstances. He was perhaps hardly in earnest when he said to his courtiers: "I have played out my part. Serve the Bourbons with the same zeal with which you have devoted yourselves to me."³ It was only a pose when he affected to give himself up to intellectual pursuits, to chemistry and mathematics.⁴ His thoughts were certainly bent on quite a different object. Napoleon had been ruined with the help of that very same Austria that had lent him the greatest moral support through his marriage with the Archduchess Marie Louise. The Court of Vienna completely deprived him of every prospect of his restoration to the Empire when the Empress and the King of Rome were carried away from France.

The Imperial party had no longer its appointed head.⁵ Therefore Metternich—as he himself said—took up the leadership of the purely Royalist party⁶ and summoned the Emperor Francis to Paris, that he might sanction by his presence the accession of Louis XVIII. to the throne with due solemnity.⁷ Like bewitching music, Hudelist's

¹ Major Count Clam's account to Schwarzenberg, without date of the day of the month, 1814.

² Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, April 15, 1814.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Idem*, Paris, April 21, 1814.

⁵ *Ibid.* "Since we have taken away the Emperor and the Prince, the (Imperial) party remains without any actual prop."

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, April 15, 1814. "The arrival of the Emperor completely sets the seal upon what has already happened, and composes men's minds." Metternich's Report of April 13, 1814.

praise rang in his ears when that faithful friend applauded him for having accomplished a gigantic enterprise, compared with which "old Hercules' labours" were child's play. Only the gigantic work did not stand the two years' test which Metternich prophesied for it at the very beginning. It did not last, not only because he had conceded Elba to Napoleon, but still more because he had helped to victory the extreme Royalist party with Comte d'Artois and the Duchesse d'Angoulême at their head ; all this could not but lead to that revolution known to history as "the Hundred Days."

"I am convinced from hour to hour that your Majesty has become an active instrument of moral power in France, the finest rôle that can be reserved for a monarch."

CHAPTER IV

THE PRINCE OF PARMA

AFTER Napoleon had signed the deed of abdication, he addressed an altogether despairing letter to Marie Louise. He was ruined, his hour had struck; thus he wrote. To avoid being involved in his misfortunes, he advised her to throw herself into her father's arms.¹ She was quite prepared to do so without this advice, even before these lines reached her. Her brothers-in-law, Kings Joseph and Jérôme, compelled her to take this step. They wanted to abduct her from Blois, being resolutely determined to hold her as their hostage against the Allies. Only her own fearlessness, and an appeal to the loyalty of the officers who were present, frustrated this rash design on her person.² Immediately afterwards she was thrown into fresh disquietude as to the safety of herself and her son.³ The approach of 3000 Cossacks under the leadership of Tschernitcheff was universally dreaded. Marie Louise was firmly convinced that they had orders to take herself and her child prisoners. Napoleon's last letter had deprived her of any prospect of help from him. He had even allowed the expression to escape him that he scarcely believed he would reach Elba alive.⁴ Racked with anxiety, she wrote in feverish haste two letters to the

¹ Helfert, "Marie Louise," pp. 435, 179, note.

² The Memoirs of Joseph and Jérôme contain nothing about the matter. Bausset, on the contrary, mentions it in his *Reminiscences*.

³ Helfert, "Marie Louise," p. 303.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 435.

Emperor Francis, which she entrusted respectively to Bausset, her major-domo, and to M. Saint-Aulaire.¹ She gave most impressive utterance to her desire to be permitted to join her father, a desire which both her envoys strenuously reinforced by word of mouth.² Under the influence of these tidings, Metternich sent a letter forthwith by Saint-Aulaire to Marie Louise, with the comforting assurance that independent means of living in Paris would be secured to herself and her son. "But," he added, "of all desirable measures you could adopt just now, the most acceptable would be for your Majesty with your Illustrious Offspring to betake yourself to Austria, where you could remain until the establishment in Elba, as well as that intended for your Majesty in Italy, can be arranged. The Emperor would then have the happiness of doing his very utmost to dry those tears for the shedding of which, Madame, you have had such ample cause. Your Majesty would repose for the time being, and in the future be mistress of your destiny. Thus you could take care of your own health and of that of your son."³

¹ Helfert "Marie Louise" p. 177, note), however, maintains that the first letter was brought by Saint-Aulaire, the second by Bausset, whereas he is refuted by Metternich's Despatch of April 11, wherein exactly the contrary is stated.

² Metternich to the Emperor, April 11, 1814.

³ Autograph letter from Metternich to Marie Louise, Paris, April 11, 1814. The contents of this letter are given in Ménéval's "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Napoléon I.^{er}" vol. iii., p. 285, but the author has contrived to impart a not immaterial *nuance* which does not appear in Metternich's own letter. He writes: she is to repair to Austria, "pour attendre que l'établissement à Elbe soit formé ainsi que celui que l'on destinera à V. M^{te} en Italie" (to wait until the establishment in Elba is prepared, as well as that chosen for your Majesty in Italy). Ménéval, on the contrary, says: "En attendant qu'elle ait la choix entre les lieux où se trouvera l'Empereur Napoléon et son propre établissement." Metternich, it is certain, never thought of such a free choice being granted to Marie Louise, and not a syllable of it is to be found in his letter.

Scarcely had this letter been despatched to Marie Louise than Metternich had also to convey to her an invitation, through the Princes Paul Esterházy and Wenzel Liechtenstein, to betake herself to Rambouillet without delay, where she would have the opportunity of meeting her father in the course of a few days. Metternich informed the Emperor of this arrangement in the following words: "By these means the Empress and your Majesty are free to do what seems good to you, and her Majesty the Empress is relieved from a painful position."¹

Three hours after the arrival of Princes Esterházy and Liechtenstein, Marie Louise was ready to start.² Nothing was further from her thoughts in undertaking the journey to Rambouillet than the intention of separating at once and for ever from Napoleon. If Metternich cherished secret thoughts of preventing her return to Napoleon, he had not yet ventured to approach her with any such proposition. He only spoke of temporary separation. Marie Louise thought she might venture to agree to this, all the more readily because the proposal was pointed out to her as the most suitable solution of the crisis. Her declaration to Bausset was sincerely meant: Duty and desire enjoined upon her to be at the Emperor's side. But would Napoleon agree to this transplantation to Austria? She was obliged to admit to herself that he would never suffer his son to be left, even for a short time, in the hands of his enemies in Austria. For this reason she dreaded seeing Napoleon before starting for Rambouillet; she did not trust her power to resist him.³ Up to the

¹ Metternich's Despatch of April 11, 1814.

² The same of April 13. Marie Louise to Metternich, Orléans, April 12, 1814. "I intend to start at 5 P.M. for Rambouillet, where the hope is held out to me of the Emperor of Austria's arrival to-morrow."

³ The letters of Lady Burghersh, edited by Lady Rose Weigall, London, 1893, p. 226.

last moment she feared he might come to fetch her himself. Hence the haste in which she left Blois and Orléans.¹ In her distress, which cost her tears enough, and in which she sat brooding gloomily by the hour together, one thing above all was clear to her: henceforth as a mother she must sacrifice everything in order to ensure for her child a destiny as favourable as could possibly be arranged. This feeling prompted her to keep her husband, hated as he was by all the Powers of Europe, as much as possible in the background. Thus it is explicable why she who, according to all that we know of her at this period, still clung to Napoleon, at the same time displays in her letters only anxiety for her son. She entreats the Emperor Francis to obtain for his grandson some other possession besides Elba.² She did not know, as yet, how little her Imperial father tolerated the cession of this island to Napoleon. Francis would have preferred to see him banished far away to some remote corner of the earth. "Moreover," he declares, "we must be careful to see—since it cannot be put a stop to now—that after Napoleon's death we get Elba for Tuscany, that I am appointed guardian to the child for Parma, and that, in the event of my daughter's death and that of the child, these two States shall not revert to Napoleon's family."³

¹ Metternich's Despatch of April 13, 1814. "Her Majesty the Empress, who was always in a state of anxiety lest her husband should fetch her from Orleans, took the road to Rambouillet three hours after the arrival of my Lords (Esterházy and Wenzel Liechtenstein)." What Metternich says here, quite contradicts the communications published in the *Gaulois*, from the Memoirs of de Galbois (at that time Colonel de Galbois) in which Marie Louise utters the tenderest expressions of feeling for her husband, and was firmly convinced that her father would maintain her upon the throne with Napoleon.

² Helfert, "Marie Louise," p. 307.

³ From Metternich's "Posthumous Papers," vol. ii., p. 472. Here it is "reserviert," whilst in the original it is expressed "reversible," which alone gives the exact rendering. Massou, "Marie Louise,"

Marie Louise was guided by a true and right instinct when she wished to appear at Rambouillet exclusively as guardian of her son.¹ For here she was soon to learn that no one wished to have anything to do with her husband, and in the interests of her child and for the peace of Europe she felt obliged to sacrifice all intercourse with Napoleon.² But a great deal still depended upon the attitude of Marie Louise. It was well known that she represented a Power which, in her name, might easily initiate a decisive movement in favour of the Regency. It was therefore imperatively desired to get her out of France and not allow her to have any further intercourse with her husband. Napoleon had given his consort ill advice when he recommended her to take refuge with her father. He soon recognised his mistake. It was, however, too late to hinder her journey as he wished, so that she might accompany him to Italy and restore her shattered health at some watering-place in that country.³ Marie Louise, who received the Emperor's letter after she had started, could not then draw back. Napoleon had all the more reason to rue his former advice now that at Rambouillet she was

p. 396, gives a somewhat kindly-worded letter from the Emperor Francis to Napoleon, which directly contradicts his words quoted by us in the text; it seems to us quite impossible that Francis could have written any such letter as Masson publishes, we therefore treat it as apocryphal.

¹ Hardenberg writes on April 17, 1814, in his diary: "Metternich at Rambouillet with his Emperor to see the Empress Marie Louise." Royal Archives of Prussia.

² Wessenberg, who had intimate knowledge of these things, says in a document of 1814: "*Faits et documents relatifs aux réclamations de la reine d'Etrurie*": "... From the time when great sacrifices were required of Marie Louise in order to serve the political views which have restored the ancient dynasty to the throne of France." He expresses himself in much the same way in a document to be quoted later.

³ Ménéval, "*Mémoires*," vol. iii. p. 293.

deprived of every chance of seeing him again. Napoleon's complaint is therefore justified: that the Empress was forcibly separated from him.¹ In consenting to go to Austria with the Prince of Parma (as he was now entitled), Marie Louise always cherished the hope of travelling to Elba, at a later time, after she had taken possession of her new territory. She set forth, therefore, on her journey to her early home with a lighter heart, now that Napoleon himself had postponed the idea of a meeting until the autumn.² When he wrote in this strain, he only imagined that Marie Louise would be taking the baths at Aix in the meanwhile, as Dr. Corvisart had prescribed. His letter contained no word of consent to her establishing herself in Vienna and, according to his views, he would certainly never have given it. The Empress was to remain near him, and on the very day upon which he finally departed for his principality he sent her a new token of his love. "Farewell, my dear Louise," he writes, "under all circumstances you may rely on the courage, serenity, and friendship of your husband. A kiss to the little king."³ Three days after Napoleon

¹ Statement of the Imperial Austrian Commissioner, General Baron Koller, to Metternich, Rouanne, April 23, 1814. The same to Metternich, Fontainebleau, April 15. Koller here maintains that Napoleon sent Flahault to Rambouillet, at whose intercession he expected Marie Louise would give up her resolve to part from him. Respecting Koller himself, see Helfert, "Napoleon I.'s Journey from Fontainebleau to Elba."

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, April 18, 1814. "The Emperor goes to-day to the Island of Elba, and writes to me to save myself on account of my health, because otherwise he would be very anxious, and he begs me to follow my doctor's orders (Corvisart's) with regard to the baths of Aix; he writes he would rather not see me till the autumn than see me suffering." See also Helfert, already quoted.

³ "Correspondance de Napoléon," vol. xxvii., No. 21, 562. There is no cogent reason for assuming, as Helfert does (already quoted p. 327), that because this letter has only been met with in Mr. Jarriette's autograph collection, it had never been seen by Marie Louise. Many

sent her this letter, on April 23, Marie Louise set off, accompanied by her suite, which was under the direction of the Austrian general, Count Karl Kinsky.

She was impatiently awaited in Vienna, where her step-mother, Maria Ludovica, Napoleon's implacable foe, made all preparations herself for her step-daughter's reception at the country seat of Schönbrunn. She even wanted to travel a stage on the road to meet her. "You can imagine," she writes to the Emperor Francis, shortly before the arrival of the Empress's carriage, "with what emotion I shall embrace her once more."¹ Maria Ludovica had last seen her in Dresden in 1812, and certainly a greater contrast between the present meeting and the one that took place in the Saxon capital can scarcely be imagined. Then, Marie Louise shone in all the pomp and splendour with which the victorious Emperor surrounded her as the first Princess in the world; now, shorn of her glory, she returned with her child, like a fugitive, to her father's home. Did Marie Louise, longing only for repose after the violent excitements she had recently undergone, feel the change in her circumstances very deeply? Archduke John, who observed her attentively on her arrival, said: "She feels it and hides it."² Her step-mother, with kindly consideration, avoided everything that might make her position harder to bear. The Viennese also were taking pains to prepare a warm welcome for their Archduchess. When, on May 21, at a quarter past six P.M., she arrived in the Empress Ludovica's carriage at the avenue of Schönbrunn, she was greeted with an impetuous outburst

such documents have been preserved in private collections without it being possible to assert that they were never received by the persons to whom they were addressed.

¹ Eduard Wertheimer, "Die drei ersten Frauen des Kaisers Franz," p. 125.

² Krone, "Aus dem Tagebuch Erzherzog Johanns von Oesterreich," p. 159.



THE PRINCE OF PARMA

*From a water-colour drawing by Isidore (1815)
In the bedroom of the Emperor Francis Joseph I*

of joy which penetrated to the interior of the castle itself.¹ Ten minutes later a second carriage drove up, containing Napoleon's son, whose arrival was awaited with the greatest curiosity. Prince Trauttmansdorff lifted him from the carriage and delivered him to Count Kinsky, who carried him up the steps of the palace as far as the great hall, where the Court was assembled. Every one exclaimed with enthusiastic delight on beholding the beauty of the Emperor's youthful son. They shouted, "Long live the Prince of Parma!" and the distinguished ladies who were ranged on either side of the stairs would not be restrained from kissing his little hands, so that Count Kinsky could with difficulty pass along.² "The people," writes Hudelist to Metternich, "were assembled in great numbers, and heartily cheered the Empress Marie Louise, who graciously acknowledged the greetings of the crowd. They were still more enchanted with the little Prince of Parma, whose friendly behaviour and fine healthy appearance they are never weary of praising. Hitherto, why I know not, reports to the contrary have been publicly circulated, and people are now agreeably surprised, which must have a very beneficial effect. To-day half Vienna is rushing to Schönbrunn to see all this for themselves."³ There was in fact no end to the pilgrimage to the Imperial country seat. People could talk of nothing but the gracious and beautiful little Prince in whose features they wished to trace a resemblance to the Hapsburgs.⁴ The people declared quite openly: "He belongs to our family. Now we are convinced that he is no spurious child."⁵ But soon the warm sympathy shown to their former Archduchess veered completely

¹ Police report of May 21, 1814. M.I.

² *Ibid.*

³ Hudelist to Metternich, Vienna, May 22, 1814.

⁴ The same to the same, Vienna, May 23, 1814. "The Prince of Parma continues to receive great adulation, and people notice that he has the features of our Imperial family."

⁵ Police report of May 21, 1814. M.I.

round. Suddenly nothing but complaints were heard; that her demeanour was proud and haughty, that she preferred to play the Frenchwoman and that her looks betrayed an utter contempt for the Viennese. "She is an Austrian no longer," they said, "she is altogether spoilt—she is a Frenchwoman."¹ She was perpetually found fault with; her dress was too theatrical, her manner of taking her meals too French.² She was most severely censured for never being able to forget her former *rôle* of sovereign lady of France. It was said she still wept over her lost throne, talked to her child of nothing but Napoleon, and would have preferred to join him immediately in Elba.³ Such reports were gladly circulated by the attendants of the Imperial Court, to whom the French *entourage* of Marie Louise was a thorn in the flesh.⁴ Moreover, the highest Court officials—such as Trauttmansdorff—made it a ground of reproach against the ex-Empress that she behaved and talked as if Napoleon were still ruler of France.⁵ She created a feeling of resentment by sternly refusing to see any likeness between the Prince and herself, and is reported to have said: "He resembles the Emperor. No one will admit it, yet it is certain he has his face and all his ways and manners."⁶ In diplomatic circles also, she gave offence because she would not put the slightest control upon her partiality for the Emperor. It was rumoured that, pointing to a bracelet on her arm, which contained a likeness of Napoleon, she had said, this was all that now remained to her of a husband whom she loved and with whom she had lived in the most

¹ Police report from Schönbrunn, presented May 30, 1814. M.I.

² Police report, presented June 2, also one of June 10, 1814. M.I.

³ Police report of June 10, 1814. M.I.

⁴ Hudelist to Metternich, May 27, 1814.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Baroness Reede to Princess Louise of Prussia, Baden, near Vienna, May 31, 1814. Intercept. M.I.

perfect harmony.¹ "The Empress Louise," wrote Hudelist to Metternich, "must be ill-advised, for she loses the public sympathy here day by day, because she shows herself too French, too wanting in affability, and displays too great an attachment to Napoleon."² It was not only the Viennese who so violently condemned their Archduchess's predilection for a malefactor, as it was now the fashion to call Napoleon.³ The Berlin Ministry also considered her bias incredible, and wished for nothing more ardently than that her Imperial father should interpose his authority and refuse to allow his daughter to follow her tyrannical husband to Elba.⁴

Doubtless at this time, Marie Louise's thoughts dwelt continually upon Napoleon. She was also in constant correspondence with him, so that it is improbable that she had renounced all idea of meeting him again. Besides, how could she have forgotten so soon the glory of past days? Thus her health began to suffer. She had started upon "a cure" in Vienna. She did not, however, expect complete restoration to health except from the Baths of Aix (in Savoy⁵), a course of which had been already promised to her by her father, while at Rambouillet. But before going to Aix, she wished to speak to the latter, whose return from Paris was expected at any moment. On June 9 she writes: "It is necessary for me to speak to you, dearest papa. I cannot tell you how I long for your coming. All that is being said in Vienna

¹ Picquot's Report, Berlin, Vienna, May 28, 1814. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² Hudelist to Metternich, Vienna, June 9, 1814.

³ Police report from Schönbrunn of June 11, 1814. M.I.

⁴ Count Goltz to Picquot at Vienna, Berlin, June 7, 1814. Royal State Archives of Prussia. The same to the same, April 23, 1814. *Ibid.* " . . . It is difficult to believe that Marie Louise should wish, or that she would ever be permitted, to follow her tyrannical husband to Elba."

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, June 9, 1814.

makes my head whirl, and as my entire confidence is placed upon you alone, I am indeed impatient to open my heart to you."¹ We shall not go very far wrong in connecting the talk that made her head whirl with the insinuations against the journey to the Baths at Aix. It was no secret in Vienna that from this watering-place in Savoy she meant to visit Napoleon in Elba.² That was more to be feared than anything else; hence the attempts to dissuade her from the idea.³ Marie Louise reckoned, however, with full confidence on her father's promise, and he did not hesitate for one moment to redeem his pledge. All the representations of State Councillor Hudelist were futile in face of the Emperor's resolve.⁴ It is erroneously stated that this journey was undertaken with Metternich's sanction.⁵ He was staying in London at the time, and was not a little astonished when tidings to this effect reached him from Vienna. On account of the great sensation this journey would excite on all sides, more especially just then in Paris, he expressed his strong disapproval as soon as he arrived in the French capital. He declared that he would never have consented to it.⁶ What an impression

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, June 9, 1814.

² Baroness Reede to Baron Bentinck at the Ilaguc, Baden, near Vienna, May 28, 1814. Ministry of the Interior.

³ Krones (already quoted), p. 162, June 3, 1814. "Marie Louise fears that she might be prevented from going to the Baths, and to Parma. Not entirely without foundation."

⁴ Hudelist to Metternich, Vienna, June 19 and July 1, 1814.

⁵ Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 87.

⁶ He expressed himself thus to Louis XVIII. on his return in Paris, "Correspondance de Talleyrand," p. 275, note; in the same terms Metternich wrote to Count Merveldt, Austrian Ambassador in London, Paris, July 6, 1814: "This journey, which I regard as unsuitable under the existing circumstances, which can only give offence here, and which I should have tried to prevent had I been in Vienna, cannot but excite surprise in England."

See also "Correspondance Diplomatique du Conte Pozzo di Borgo," vol. I., p. 21.

would be created by Marie Louise's appearance on French soil which she had so recently been obliged to leave! The adherents of the Empire, who had only submitted with difficulty and reluctance to the new condition of affairs, now derived fresh hope. Queen Hortense wished to start immediately for Aix to do homage to the Empress. She only gave up the journey by the express advice of Pozzo, the Russian Ambassador in Paris.¹ The widespread reports that Austria favoured the Napoleonists now gained credence. It was said that the secret purpose of this journey was to be a meeting between Marie Louise and Napoleon in Elba.² Blacas, the favourite of the French King, declared to Count Bombelles, Austria's representative in Paris, that Marie Louise's arrival in France signified a violation of the treaty of Fontainebleau.³ This language was dictated by anxiety lest the Court of Vienna should thus promote the Regency of Marie Louise, who still numbered many adherents in France.⁴ Bombelles endeavoured to counteract these fears by remarking that the Emperor Francis would not have deemed it necessary to send his daughter from Paris to Vienna, if he had wanted to make her Regent. "Certainly," replied Blacas, "we have full confidence in the Emperor personally, but Marie Louise is ill-advised, especially by her physician, Corvisart, who keeps up a secret correspondence with Napoleon."⁵ Louis XVIII. trembled for his tottering throne, which

¹ "Correspondence of Count Pozzo di Borgo," vol. i., p. 20.

² Maroscaichi to Metternich, Parma, August 11, 1814. "Here, as elsewhere, the journey to the Baths of Savoy has given rise to reports as to her suspected desire to cross over to the island of Elba." Klinkowström, "Oesterreich's Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen," p. 399.

³ Bombelles to Metternich, Paris, June 29, 1814.

⁴ *Ibid.* "Napoleon is generally abhorred, but the Regency of the Empress has had the support of the greater part of the army and of a portion of the provinces of the North and Centre."

⁵ Bombelles to Metternich, Paris, June 29, 1814.

the least convulsion might serve to overthrow. It is said that the council of ministers decided to veto Marie Louise's crossing the frontier, and only failed in their plan owing to a protest on the part of the King.¹ In Vienna it had been considered advisable from the first to reassure the King of France with regard to Marie Louise's journey, which had no underlying political motive, and had been ordered solely for reasons of health.² To these explanations Francis also added with laconic but pithy brevity: "The Prince of Parma, her son, remains in Vienna."³ This concluding sentence by no means allayed the anxiety of Louis XVIII. The ghost of the Revolution hovered perpetually before his imagination. He did not fail in his reply to express some censure of the Emperor's conduct who, in his care for his daughter, had probably overlooked the fact that her presence at Aix might be productive of evil results quite out of proportion to the desired effect of the Baths.⁴

¹ "Correspondence of the Count Pozzo di Borgo," vol. i., p. 20.

² Emperor Francis to Louis XVIII., Vienna, June 18, 1814. On July 23, 1814, Count Neipperg writes from Aix to the Emperor: "Doctor Corvisart and the Duchess of Montebello, who enjoy the unbounded confidence of the Empress, and to whom the Baths of Aix seem more convenient than any other on account of their proximity to Paris, have certainly been chiefly influential in bringing about the journey hither."

³ The Emperor Francis to Louis XVIII., Vienna, June 18, 1814.

⁴ Louis XVIII. to the Emperor Francis, Tuileries, June 28, 1814. If Pozzo di Borgo in his "Correspondence," vol. i., p. 20, on June 24 and July 6, informs Nesselrode from Paris that Louis XVIII. had written to Francis saying he could not sanction this journey, and if it took place, Marie Louise would not be treated with that consideration which her exalted rank would under other circumstances command—the actual truth is quite the reverse. Louis XVIII. says in his letter: "I hasten to assure your Majesty that nothing shall be wanting on my part to make the visit of the Princess to the Baths of Aix in Savoy both satisfactory and agreeable, and it only remains for me to hope that in other respects she will find there conveniences and comforts which contribute so efficaciously to the success of such treatment."

The ex-Empress left Schönbrunn on June 29, 1814, to set out on her journey to Aix under the incognito of "Duchess of Colorno," a name she had borrowed from one of her future country houses. Whilst still on the road, she wrote to the Emperor Francis as follows: "I beg of you once more, dearest papa, to take care of my son during my absence, for if I did not know that he was in such good hands I should be terribly anxious."¹ After she had travelled through a part of Switzerland, she found awaiting her at Carrouge, not far from Geneva, a man on horseback. The cavalier who now saluted her, was destined to play a great and—in Napoleon's estimation—an extremely dishonourable part in her life. This was the Austrian Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Adam, Count von Neipperg. It has been stated that Metternich was responsible for the choice of Neipperg as equerry to the Empress, and that he deliberately selected the Count as the man best suited by his personality to banish every thought of Napoleon from her heart.² This is altogether false, for Metternich, who was far away from Vienna at that time, could have had no voice in the matter. When the journey was resolved upon, the Emperor Francis desired Prince Schwarzenberg to name an officer capable of conducting Marie Louise to Aix, "of reporting matters to me and, in case of need, of helping my said daughter with advice."³ Schwarzenberg recommended Count Neipperg, who was at that time in command of a troop in Pavia,⁴ and the Emperor sanctioned the appointment. The Count had

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Meersburg on the Bodensee, July 4, 1814.

² Welschinger, "*Le Roi de Rome*," p. 88. Houssaye, "*1815*," vol. i., p. 161.

³ Royal and Imperial Archives of War, Vienna. Ménével's statement in his "*Mémoires*," vol. iii., p. 328, that the Emperor Francis's choice fell on Prince Nicholas Esterházy is incorrect.

⁴ Welschinger (already quoted) erroneously makes him out to have

already met the Empress three times, although only for a few moments. The first occasion was in March 1810, when Marie Louise passed through Strasburg on her wedding journey; again in the summer of the same year, in Paris, at the great *fêtes* held in honour of the youthful mistress of France. But it can be accepted with tolerable certainty that neither in March 1810, nor in the summer of that year, had Neipperg been observed by the Empress. It is much more probable that she made his further acquaintance during her stay in Prague, in June 1812. There he formed one of the gentlemen, twelve in number, whom the Emperor Francis placed at her disposal. Ménéval is wrong¹ in making the Count appear as chamberlain to Marie Louise as far back as the visit to Dresden, where the Empress stayed a short time with Napoleon, and in depicting her as addressing a few words to Neipperg as she hung upon the Emperor's arm. Neipperg at that time was not even in the Saxon capital. Untrustworthy as this account of Ménéval has been proved, Hérisson is equally wrong² when he maintains that the Count accompanied the Empress, after Napoleon's first abdication in April 1814,

had a command close to Geneva. Wurzbach falls into the same mistake, vol. xx., article "Neipperg."

¹ Ménéval, "Napoléon et Marie Louise," vol. i., p. 369.

² Le Comte d'Hérisson, "Le Cabinet noir," p. 267. In this single instance Houssaye ("1815," p. 164, note), who generally looks upon Neipperg as nothing but an Austrian adventurer and makes wholly inaccurate statements about him, now critically investigates the fiction quoted by Hérisson. It is not true that Marie Louise had written to Neipperg in the beginning of 1814, as is asserted in the "*Mémoires d'une Inconnue*," Paris, 1894. The malicious anonymous author of the publication, "*Marie Louise und der Herzog von Reichstadt, die Opfer der Politik Metternich's*" (Paris, 1842), makes out on p. 154 that Metternich entered into relations with Neipperg with a view to make him the favourite of Marie Louise, immediately after the first Peace of Paris, May 1814. At this time Neipperg had not appeared upon the scene.

from Rambouillet to Vienna, and had even then entered into intimate relations with her. It was not Neipperg, however, but General Major Count Kinsky who acted as equerry upon the journey of the dethroned Princess in 1814. Certainly there was no question of Neipperg at that time. The first impression he made upon Marie Louise is said to have been a highly unfavourable one. Possibly it arose from the idea that the Count had been placed in her suite merely as a secret informer, a tiresome spy upon every step she took which might bring her into contact with her husband. If this were really the case, her dislike to the Count did not last long. Only five days after her arrival in Aix she writes to her father: "Count Neipperg is most attentive to me and his manner pleases me very much."¹ He himself announced to his sovereign on July 18: "The Empress has received me very graciously,"² and again on July 23: "She treats me with favour and confidence."³ Neipperg, who was thirty-nine years of age at the time,⁴ was a great lady-killer. At first sight he might pass as a plain soldier whose martial air was enhanced by the black shade over the right eye, which he had lost in battle. But on closer inspection there was something fascinating in his graceful appearance, which was quite compatible with his military bearing, and was even heightened by the

¹ Helfert, "Napoléon und Marie Louise im Sommer, 1814," appeared in the "Dioskuren," third year, 1874, p. 22.

² Neipperg to Emperor Francis, Aix, July 18, 1814.

³ The same to the same, July 23.

⁴ Neipperg was born in Vienna on April 8, 1775. In Helfert's "Napoléon und Marie Louise in the Summer of 1814" ("Dioskuren," 1874), he relies only on a printer's error in giving the date as 1765. Houssaye, "1815," p. 161, erroneously makes out that Neipperg was forty-two years of age in 1814. Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 88, puts his birth in the year 1771, consequently he would have been forty-three years old in 1814.

closely-fitting, picturesque uniform of a general of hussars. Added to this, his conversation was of that refined and captivating quality to which people involuntarily succumbed. Certainly it was not without intention that he continually referred in conversation with Marie Louise to her husband's campaigns,¹ so as to create an impression of impartiality towards him. As an excellent musician, he commanded an almost unfailling means of captivating feminine hearts: an art in which he had also shown himself a past master on various occasions. To these capacities he joined polite and insinuating manners; and although full of ambition, he sought rather to let appreciation come from others, whilst speaking of himself with a certain modesty and self-restraint which gained him the sympathy of many, and caused him to be looked upon as the most amiable of men.² Assuredly, intercourse with such a man was too dangerous for a woman³ whom it was the object of political intrigue to estrange from her husband. But there is no proof of the assertion that this gentleman boasted, on his arrival at Aix, that he would be Marie Louise's husband within six months.⁴ He could not have made use of this expression, since, whatever may be said, this was never meant to be part of his mission. It was expressly stated in the instructions given to him⁵ that, "his first duty was the silent, unobtrusive—it

¹ Neipperg to the Emperor Francis, Aix, July 23.

² See the characteristics of Neipperg in Ménéval's "*Mémoires*," vol. iii., p. 341.

³ Neipperg was married to a lady whom he had taken from her husband. There were several children of the marriage. Neipperg's wife died early in 1815, after an illness which only lasted two days. Ménéval, vol. iii., p. 594.

⁴ Masson, "*Marie Louise*," p. 404, takes Ménéval as his source in vol. iii., p. 343, of Ménéval's "*Mémoires*."

⁵ Particulars of instructions to General Count von Neipperg, Vienna, June 27, 1814. Drawn up at the Emperor's command by State Councilor Hudelist, in the absence of Metternich.

might indeed be called inoffensive—observation of the conduct of the Duchess of Calorno, as Marie Louise was then styled. Moreover, the Count was to find out whether she were in epistolary communication with Napoleon. His further duty was to prevent Marie Louise from visiting the ex-Emperor. The injunctions on these points read as follows: "Count Neipperg will carefully seek to alienate the Duchess of Colorno from any idea of a journey to Elba, which could not fail to fill the paternal heart of his Majesty the Emperor with the tenderest anxiety for the well-being of a beloved daughter; he is to leave no means untried to divert her from her purpose, at all events he is to endeavour to gain time, so that decisive information may reach his Majesty; but in the worst case, supposing all remonstrances should be in vain, he is to follow the Duchess of Colorno to the Island of Elba."¹

Great anxiety was felt in Vienna lest Marie Louise should betake herself to Elba from Aix. She had maintained an obstinate silence on the subject, which convinced them all the more that she meant to go her own way.² She was also very reserved towards Neipperg, and gave the impression that she had not been quite frank with him. She no longer appeared to be thinking about the journey to Elba, which caused Neipperg to assume that she had submitted to her father's wishes. "Although her Majesty," writes Neipperg to the Emperor on July 23, "always speaks with affection of him [Napoleon], yet she has never expressed any desire to share his lot on the Island of Elba. I could almost confidently assert that if such a project had

¹ Neither is it correct when Masson says, "Marie Louise," p. 405, that Neipperg had instructions, should the Empress insist on going to Elba, "absolutely to forbid her to do so" ("passer à la défense absolue si elle persistait.")

² William von Humboldt to the King of Prussia, Vienna, September 3, 1814. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

ever existed, or were still in progress, it would never reach maturity, not only on account of the difficulties attending it, but also because of the objections of her suite.”¹ Neipperg, who assures the Emperor he will leave nothing undone to gain his end, tries to get round Marie Louise on her weak side, by appealing to her feelings as a mother. In his insinuating way, he seeks to persuade her that her child’s happiness should compel her to sacrifice her meeting with her husband in his exile. On July 28 he announces to the Emperor: “In confidential talk she often mentions the Emperor Napoleon, but she has deigned to inform me herself that her views for her son, which come before anything else, would induce her—however great her own inclination to share her husband’s fate—to renounce it completely, and devote herself entirely to her son’s education. She added that if the Emperor Napoleon were unhappy, or had an unworthy fate overtaken him, no consideration would have induced her to disunite her fate from his; but under present circumstances she believed that her attitude, and especially her maternal feelings, justified her in the eyes of the world.”² But could Neipperg already boast of an actual conquest? Was this really the expression of her opinion? She had not by any means broken off all correspondence with Napoleon, and she was deeply moved when in his hasty, excitable fashion he expressed his longing for wife and child. Without Neipperg’s knowledge,³ she delivered into the hands of a servant of the Emperor Joseph—passing through in disguise—some hastily written lines, with a lock of her hair, which he was to

¹ Helfert, “Napoleon and Marie Louise in the Summer of 1814,” p. 29. I quote from the original, which differs in some trifling points from Helfert’s version.

² Neipperg to the Emperor Francis, July 28. Helfert (already quoted), p. 29.

³ *Ibid.* August 11, 1814.

hand over to the Emperor on his birthday.¹ Neither was the Count aware that on this same birthday, August 15, she had written in strict confidence to Ménéval during his visit to Paris: "To-day is one of my sad days! How can I be cheerful on this 15th, since I am doomed to pass this festival apart from the two beings I hold most dear?"² She was indeed in a most unenviable position, so that sometimes she completely lost her head and longed for death³ as the only release from this depressing situation. On the one side, Neipperg urged her not to go to Elba; on the other, Napoleon importuned her to trust herself to him, without any further parleying—by which he meant with the Emperor Francis.⁴ Her answer,⁵ that she dared not undertake the voyage without her father's consent, aroused all Napoleon's anger. As he had formerly treated his generals without mercy, so he now harangued his consort in very plain language. He reproached her for having deserted him in his misfortune, and for having separated herself from their son.⁶ If Marie Louise still cherished the wish, although only with her father's consent, to proceed from Parma to Elba, at some later date, this letter quenched every inclination in her heart. Fear of Napoleon⁷ now took possession of her, which increased still more when he went so far as to threaten her with forcible abduction in case she did not obey his

¹ Neipperg to the Emperor, August 11, 1814.

² Ménéval, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 349.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

⁴ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Aix, August 30, 1814. "Three days ago I received an officer from the Emperor, with a letter in which he desires me to start immediately, all alone, for Elba, where he awaits me with ardent longing." Marie Louise had imparted the contents of this letter to Neipperg. Neipperg to the Emperor, Aix, August 3, 1814.

⁵ *Ibid.* Helfert (already quoted), p. 39.

⁶ Neipperg to the Emperor, Aix, August 31, 1814.

⁷ *Ibid.*

call of her own free will.¹ It was only the intense bitterness of feeling he experienced at Marie Louise's refusal that drove him into such unbridled language. He considered this enforced separation from wife and child, as he declared to an Englishman, a crime against God and humanity.² This measure stirred his whole being to revolt, not only because it injured his feelings as a husband and father, but also because it isolated him politically, and destroyed that fable of an understanding with Austria which he had given out to the world. Tired at last of this continual pressure brought to bear on Marie Louise, he wrote to her once again, but expressed no further desire to see her.³ This must have been the last letter which he wrote from Elba to the Empress, of whom Neipperg daily assured the Emperor that she wished to place her "whole future destiny"—thus the

¹ Neipperg to the Emperor, Geneva, September 6, 1814 ". . . in the letter just received, there is even a threat of forcible abduction in case of continued refusal." Neipperg had taken all possible precautionary measures to hinder such a project.

² General Major Count Goltz (Prussian Ambassador to France), Paris, November 7, 1814. Prussian State Archives. Wellington had himself informed Goltz of these words of Napoleon's, from the letters of the English Agent in Elba. See also Campbell, "Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba," pp. 297-298.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Borne, September 22, 1814. "I have received a letter from the Emperor at Louk, which is very unimportant, he only speaks of his health and says nothing of his wish for me to go to the Island of Elba. I would not fail to announce the arrival of this letter, as a proof that I have no secrets from you. With your permission I will send my answer unsealed, so that you may read it first and send it on to him." It is very questionable whether, as Houssaye maintains ("1815," p. 164, note 2), Marie Louise wrote finally to Napoleon on July 31. It does not appear from the letters of Marie Louise whether the Emperor Francis allowed her to send off the above mentioned letter. But when Houssaye (in "1815," p. 164) says that Marie Louise had no opportunity during her journey through Switzerland and, thanks to Neipperg's influence, no desire to write to Napoleon, he is contradicted by this letter from Berno, of September 22, 1814.

Count's statement runs—at the disposal of “your Majesty's paternal heart,” as also that of the much-loved Prince, whose future happiness constituted her only aim in life.

Neipperg triumphed. The Court of Vienna might well be satisfied with his execution of the mission entrusted to him. He had succeeded in estranging the Empress from Napoleon, and in refusing to the latter the only consolation he expressly demanded. It was a political act of violence to withhold from the exile his wife and child. No administration in any degree law-abiding could excuse such a step. His throne had been taken from him, but there was no justification for depriving him also of family ties; it was an utterly despicable measure to keep Marie Louise altogether apart from her husband by means of Neipperg. It would have been greater and loftier, had she persisted in adhering to her original opinion that “wish and duty alike called her to the Emperor's side.” Yet it must not be overlooked that under these distressful circumstances her motherly love, which was skilfully worked upon, made also a powerful appeal. How could the everlasting theme so cleverly handled by Neipperg fail of effect: namely, that she would jeopardise her son's future and would destroy his chance of the throne of Parma? In this way they gradually succeeded in destroying the feeling which had first prompted her to share her fate, under all circumstances, with such a man as Napoleon—that had warned her she would lower herself by not following his colossal spirit into exile. Posterity, in order to place her transgressions against him in a stronger light, has contrasted her with the ideal figure of Queen Catherine of Westphalia, whom no threat, no arbitrary decree, could induce to leave her husband Jérôme Bonaparte in the day of his misfortune. But Marie Louise was not fashioned of the same stuff as was the ideally strong character of Catherine of

Westphalia. This woman was bound to Jérôme by bonds of the strongest affection, from which she drew strength to resist with energy every attack upon her wifely loyalty. Marie Louise, on the contrary, although sincerely attached to her Imperial consort, and grateful for the numberless attentions which he heaped upon her, had never felt any genuine passion for him.

Now that Napoleon had fallen, she was incapable of feeling his greatness when deprived of its outward show. Neipperg had recognised this at once, and divined that the right way to succeed in subduing the wife was by appealing to the mother. Her nature was too limited to fill both parts at one and the same moment.

Neipperg had, however, still another commission to execute, on the due discharge of which Metternich laid great stress. Marie Louise desired to travel to Parma as soon as her cure was completed, in order actually to take possession of the Duchy which had been promised to her; the more speedily because she hoped thereby to elude a bold stroke on the part of France. She was not entirely unaware of the report, intentionally spread by the French Ministry, that she would never acquire Parma, but would be obliged to resign her claim to it, as well as to Piacenza and Guastalla, in favour of the former Queen of Etruria, the Infanta Maria Louisa,¹ in return for an indemnification in money, or an exchange for a part of the Papal lands. On that account she had already written to her father on July 22 that she would go to Parma, but without giving her real reason for this determination. She only said she could not remain in Vienna "with decency" while so many Princes were attending the Congress there. "If you have no objection," she says, "I will go to Parma at the beginning of September; I believe it to be indispensably necessary

¹ Neipperg to the Emperor, Aix, August 8, 1814.

to arrange my house. I am longing to go."¹ In Vienna, however, they were not favourably inclined to the Duchess's plan. Metternich thought it very dangerous for Marie Louise to appear in Parma under the circumstances. He represented to her that the elder Bourbon line, which had formerly ruled in Parma, supported by France and Spain, would leave no stone unturned in order to expel Marie Louise. The least uneasiness which she might cause would utterly destroy her chance of the kingdom. She must therefore wait until the Congress of Vienna had solemnly sanctioned her possession. Then only could she go to Parma and reign over the States "in full and perfect security."² Metternich also urged the Emperor to write in the same strain to his daughter,³ and begged Neipperg to leave no means untried to make Marie Louise understand that a journey to Italy was not only incompatible with her own and her son's interests, but would also be attended by insurmountable difficulties.⁴ Unhappy at being obliged to return to Vienna, and not wholly convinced by the reasons which Metternich had put forward,⁵ Neipperg had to use all his persuasive arts to induce her to give up the journey to Parma.⁶ "I willingly give my father a proof of my acquiescence in his advice," she wrote

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, July 22, 1814.

² Metternich to Marie Louise, Baden, near Vienna, August 6, 1814.

³ The Emperor's reply (in his own handwriting) to Metternich's despatch of August 6, 1814. "I fully agree with what you say, and am writing to my daughter to the same effect."

⁴ Metternich to Neipperg, Baden, near Vienna, August 5, 1814. "Kindly direct your conversations with the Empress into the same channel. Her journey to Italy would be not only injurious to her interests but it also presents insurmountable difficulties."

⁵ Ménéval, vol. iii., p. 351.

⁶ Neipperg to Metternich, Aix, August 20, 1814. "I have employed all my persuasive arts to convince her Majesty the Empress Marie Louise that her journey to Parma would be injurious to her interests, and to those of her son."

herself to Metternich, "by repairing to Vienna on October 5 or 6. Besides which my son's interests are so sacred and precious to me that for love of him I am prepared to make this sacrifice. I entrust my cherished interests to you, convinced that I could not leave them in better hands, and I am sure I shall not be disappointed."¹ With these beautiful sentiments of confidence—as set forth in a letter to her secretary, Ménéval²—she tried to win over Metternich to her side. Not only did she reckon on his support in respect of Parma, she also hoped he would uphold her desire to remain in Switzerland during the sitting of the Congress.³ She looked for compliance with this wish, because she had yielded on the more important question. But Metternich had vital reasons for the speedy return of Marie Louise. He knew only too well the worry and anxiety which her presence in Aix excited at the French Court. Talleyrand was for ever reminding him that her visit to the Baths of Aix kept the public mind in a state of tension.⁴ Metternich feared complications for the Imperial Court if Marie Louise continued to prolong her stay abroad. "Our political relations," he argued in a report to Francis, "become so much involved by the Empress's journey that I urgently beg your Majesty to refuse your consent distinctly and finally, in case her Supreme Highness should ask permission to remain outside the

¹ Marie Louise to Metternich (her own hand), Aix, August 18, 1814. The same to the Emperor, Aix, August 19, 1814.

² Ménéval, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 353.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor, Aix, August 19, 1814. "I do not wish to arrive till after the departure of these exalted personages. It would go against my feelings to be in Vienna at the same time as these Princes."

⁴ Metternich's despatch, Baden, August 18, 1814. He must be alluding to Talleyrand's letter of August 9, which is given in the "Corresp. inédite du Prince de Talleyrand et du Roi Louis XVIII., publiée par Pallain," p. 275, note 1.

hereditary dominion during the session of the Congress."¹ Metternich proposed Brünn, Pressburg, or some convenient castle on the confines of Hungary as her place of residence, thus meeting her wish to remain "somewhere outside Vienna, but in the vicinity of the capital."² By this arrangement the Minister wished to demonstrate to all the world openly and incontestably that the Emperor's daughter was no longer in a position to conspire with Napoleon. While agreeing to her desire to pass through Switzerland on her return journey, he impressed upon her to limit this visit to the shortest possible time. Above all he enjoined upon her to be careful as regards her demeanour towards Napoleon's brothers, who were staying near Geneva.³

At last, on September 5, Marie Louise left Aix,⁴ where she had been continually "shadowed," just as in Paris.⁵ Now, at length, the world began to breathe more freely when there was no longer any danger of seeing the Empress start some day for Elba.⁶ At her express wish,

¹ Metternich's despatch, Baden, near Vienna, August 18, 1814.

² *Ibid.*

³ Metternich's despatch of August 28, 1814.

⁴ Neipperg to the Emperor, Aix, August 31, 1814. "Although the French Government seemed to be completely relieved in mind about us during the latter part of our stay in this country, yet they rejoiced at our speedy departure."

⁵ Helfert, "Napoleon und Marie Louise im Sommer, 1814," p. 24.

⁶ Bombelles to Metternich, Paris, August 18, 1814. "You cannot imagine how pleased Blacas was, when I told him the Archduchess was shortly returning to Vienna. This proceeding does much to raise our actions in the estimation of that Court." Welschinger's statement that Marie Louise did not leave Aix at the wish of the French Court, but because she had finished her cure, is not quite in agreement with the above. Soon after Talleyrand's letter of August 9, and in consequence of Neipperg's account, Metternich said in his despatch to the Emperor of August 18: "This [Neipperg's report] confirms the necessity of her Majesty returning here as soon as possible, so as to put an end to the unpleasant complications, to which her sojourn at Aix, or at any other place on the confines of France, cannot but give occasion."

Neipperg accompanied her on the return journey to Vienna;¹ not because she had any tenderness for him at this time, but because, once accustomed to a person's presence, she did not care to see new faces about her. We should form too low an opinion of this woman were we to accuse her of a false step with Neipperg at the very moment when only her father's express command had been able to keep her from Elba. This regrettable incident in her life belongs to a later period. Had a mutual understanding already existed between Neipperg and herself, he would hardly have shown himself so unwilling to carry out the task imposed upon him. In reality he would have preferred to return forthwith to his command in Pavia.² He remembered his instructions, which were to remain near the Empress only so long as she was living upon French soil.³ So little did he think of being permanently attached to Marie Louise, that just at this time he requested Metternich to give him the post of Ambassador at Turin, for which he deemed himself specially qualified.⁴

On the evening of October 6 Marie Louise arrived at Schönbrunn, where she could at last clasp to her breast the son for whom she had been longing with all her heart. If we are to believe la Montesquiou, the young

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor, Aix, August 30, 1814.

² Neipperg to the Emperor, Aix, August 20, 1814. The same to Metternich, August 20, 1814. Helfert (already quoted), p. 41, note.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Neipperg to Metternich, Berne, September 22, 1814. "I hope to be of some use in the diplomatic, as well as the military service at Turin." On December 26, 1814, Count Bubna writes to Metternich from Turin, he had heard with pleasure that Neipperg had been mentioned for the embassy at Turin. "This general," he adds, "is well known and much esteemed in the country; he will do better service for the Court than any one else in this position." I must add that Neipperg had applied to Prince Metternich on August 20, to be admitted to the diplomatic service in which he had already served as Ambassador at Stockholm.

Napoleon's governess, the ex-Empress had not the slightest affection for her child. She even goes so far as to say most explicitly that the mother showed less care for her son's future than the veriest stranger.¹ This defamatory assertion can only be explained by Montesquiou's idolising love for the Prince. It was inconceivable to her that Marie Louise could forsake her child in such troublous times in order to travel to so remote a place as Aix ; moreover her uncle, the Archduke John, shared this opinion.²

It was, however, no want of love that separated the ex-Empress from her child ; nothing but her enfeebled health would have induced her to absent herself. All that the Empress did and thought at this juncture had reference to her son alone. During the whole period of her sojourn at Aix she never forgot to implore her father's special protection for the child. "I commend to you most urgently, dearest papa," she writes from Berne, "my son's interests and my own. I am convinced that I cannot place them in better hands than yours, and that your fatherly and tender care will do all that is possible for us."³ It was for the Prince's sake, too, that she now wanted to set off for Parma, and only on his account did she become involved in a fierce contention as regards these States, which she desired to keep intact for her child. The Bourbon Courts were then thinking seriously of expelling her and her son from the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, so as to acquire these possessions for the widowed ex-Queen Infanta, daughter of the Spanish King Charles IV. This rapacious idea originated with Talleyrand.⁴ Not content with having

¹ Jung, "Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 182. Letter of Mme. Montesquiou, July 29, 1814.

² Krones, "Tagebuch Erzherzog Johanna," p. 165.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, September 22.

⁴ "Correspondance de Talleyrand avec Louis XVIII., publiée par Pallain," pp. 233, 273.

brought about Napoleon's fall, he now endeavoured to deprive his wife and child of their last remnant of power. His former Empress might be indemnified with money, or, if that were not possible, with Papal territory. "I must tell your Majesty," he writes to Louis XVIII. from Vienna, "that I lay great stress upon this, because in this way the name of Bonaparte will be erased from the list of sovereigns both now and hereafter, since he only possesses Elba for his lifetime, whilst no independent sovereignty can accrue to the Archduchess's son."¹ According to his views he would not have recoiled² from employing assassins to remove the great exile from the world, and he desired to reduce Marie Louise and the Prince of Parma to mere shadows of power. After posing before the foreign representatives assembled in Vienna as a Minister of Louis XIV.'s reign, he went on to direct his energies against Parma. He never doubted the attainment of his object.³ Presumably the ex-Queen of Etruria only followed his advice, when she repeatedly applied to the Emperor Francis in order to claim her inheritance directly from him.⁴ But had the Infanta any right to Parma? Was Marie Louise the legitimate owner of this Duchy? There is no doubt the Infanta had forfeited, by her own fault, all claims to this

¹ "Correspondance de Talleyrand avec Louis XVIII., publiée par Pallain," pp. 233, 273.

² See my feuilleton, "Talleyrand in Wien zur Kongresszeit," *Neue Freie Presse*, April 11, 1896. Welschinger (already quoted), pp. 107, 111.

³ "Correspondance de Talleyrand," pp. 41, 155, 191.

⁴ Ex-Queen Marie-Louise to the Emperor, Rome, June 18 and July 1, 1814. Besides the Spanish Ambassador Labrador, there was also her representative in Vienna, the Parisian banker, Goupy. About Goupy the Emperor Francis writes to the President of the Police, September 30, 1814 (Ministry of the Interior), that he had come to Vienna supplied with plenty of money (according to Magawly's account) in order to use it for the assistance of the ex-Queen. Francis therefore recommended him to the supervision of the police.

country. It must be admitted that she had formerly ruled over Parma as Queen of Etruria, a creation of Napoleon's, but she had surrendered Parma to France by agreement, not by force; an agreement which the King of Spain, Charles IV., had also ratified. By this means all the claims of Spain—and those of the elder Spanish branch—to Parma had become extinct. When the great war began in 1813 and 1814, this Duchy was in the possession of France. The allied armies recovered it, but not in favour of her who had signed away its possession by solemn contract. They took possession of Parma as a country without ruler which they could freely bestow at their own discretion.¹ It was not only Austria, but the whole of Europe that had guaranteed the Duchies to Marie Louise and her son as independent possessions,² without conditions or restrictions of any kind.³ It was the duty of all Europe, which had solemnly subscribed to the treaty of Fontainebleau by the signatures of its Princes, to protect the rights of Marie Louise and the Prince of Parma against every aggression. It would have been a breach of faith had Europe permitted the spoliation of the ex-Empress and her son—a spoliation which, especially as regards Marie Louise, had no justification whatever. Had she been ambitious she certainly would never have needed to appear, as now, in the

¹ Stadion's "Memoirs," undated.

² *Ibid.* "It is not Austria only, it is the whole of Europe which awarded them to the Archduchess Marie Louise: by what right can they be reclaimed to-day by a power which is only involved in the transaction by its adherence to a principle of conformity which has been adopted equally by all those who took part in it?"

³ Wessenberg's notes on the Congress. "This gift was not conditional. The Empress ought to have been looked upon from the moment of the ratification of the said treaty (April 11, 1814) as the independent sovereign of the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, and the individual actions of Napoleon could invalidate neither the spontaneous gift of the sovereign donors, nor the sovereignty of the Empress and her proprietary rights over the countries in question."

humiliating character of a Duchess of Parma begging for her rights. Undoubtedly it had depended on her alone to become Regent of France.¹ To her sacrifice, made for the repose of Europe, the Bourbons owed the restoration of their throne; therefore, their own honour ought to have pledged them to respect a compact made by the Government of France.² But even if this country, or rather Talleyrand—and under his influence Louis XVIII. also—prepared to set aside the dictates of honour, was Austria therefore obliged to take part in the Bourbon spoliation? A few—including Gentz, Wessenberg and Stadion—were of opinion that it was impolitic to deprive Marie Louise of the Duchies and to hand them over to a Princess who was entirely under the influence of the Bourbons. Others took a different view. They thought that with the exception of Piacenza, which was strategically important to Austria, Marie Louise would be very well indemnified for Parma and Guastalla by a sum of money which should be greatly in excess of the fluctuating revenue derived from these States. The residue of the property they would apply to making the Prince of Parma a wealthy private gentleman. Why create him Prince of so insignificant a State as Parma, he who had once been designated ruler of half Europe?³ Among the number of those who were ready to lend a hand in the spoliation of Marie Louise was Metternich;⁴ he who a short time before had given

¹ Wessenberg. “. . . (Marie Louise) who would still reign in France if ambition had been able to influence her decisions, and who might again exercise a great influence over the affairs of Europe, if she chose to take part in the destiny of her husband, from whom she only separated to give an additional pledge of peace to the world.”

² *Ibid.* “This dynasty (the Bourbons) should be interested as much for honour's as for policy's sake in the maintenance of this agreement.”

³ Memorial of Gentz, February 12, 1815, in the “Nachgelassene Papiere,” of Metternich, vol. ii., p. 498.

⁴ “Nachlass Wessenbergs,” No. 53. “Prince Metternich at the



THE PRINCE OF PARMA

*From a miniature by Natale von Schiavoni
In the Collection of the Emperor Francis Joseph I*

his solemn assurance that she would be able to take possession of her new State in November. Now he was inclined to listen to Talleyrand's representation and dismiss the claims of Marie Louise with an indemnification in money, or a gift of Church property which would have brought a curse along with it.¹ It was not Neipperg, as French historians relate,² but Baron von Wessenberg,³ her representative at the Congress, who lodged the most decided protest against such an illegal proceeding. The contest was all the harder because Talleyrand had already won over the English to his pretensions.⁴ But Wessenberg was not to be shaken. Moreover, it was his opinion that the English statesmen would only laugh at Austria if she were to give way upon a question in which her own interest was concerned.⁵ It was a matter of inestimable importance to the Court of Vienna, which had striven for powerful influence in Italy, not to relinquish its position in Parma, which was governed by them.⁶ "Undoubtedly," wrote Wessenberg at that moment, "it is greatly to our advantage not to permit our hands to be tied in Italy. And why," he continues, "should we burden ourselves with the maintenance of the Emperor's son at our own expense? We are sufficiently

instigation of the Spanish Court, and perhaps also of that of Louis XVIII., wanted to revoke the treaty (April 11, 1814), and proposed to convert the dowry of Marie Louise into a pension."

¹ As regards the negotiations, see "Corresp. de Talleyrand avec Louis XVIII.," published by Pallain, p. 272 and following ones.

² Houssaye, "1815," p. 139. Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 96.

³ "Nachlass Wessenbergs," No. 53. "I have negotiated for her about the Duchy of Parma." The Emperor Francis had appointed him representative for Marie Louise at the Congress.

⁴ Wessenberg to whom? Probably Metternich. Undated.

⁵ *Ibid.* "I think Mr. Whitehead will laugh at us if we give way about this question."

⁶ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, April 21, 1814. "The Empress will place the administration of the Duchy of Parma in *our* hands, in order to obviate the influence of Napoleon."

master of the situation," adds Wessenberg, "vigorously to enforce the clause respecting the establishment of Marie Louise in Parma, consequently this must be carried out."¹ Upon his advice²—not upon Neipperg's, as has been asserted³—Marie Louise applied to the Tsar for assistance as well as to the King of Prussia. With the consent of the Emperor Francis and his Minister, she reminds Alexander I. of the assurances he had given her that she should never be disturbed in her peaceful possession of Parma. "Never," she declares, "could pledges have been entered into with more assurance of their inviolability than those which have been guaranteed by a compact between all the Allied Powers. Will you, Sire, support the excellent designs which my father cherishes for the interests of my son, the guardianship of whom he shares conjointly with myself?"⁴ I am certain that under such protection my just hope of the stability of my claims, and my confidence in the loyalty of your feelings towards me, will not be disappointed."⁵ Not in vain did she appeal to Alexander I.,⁶ nor to the King of Prussia.⁷ The Tsar, touched on his most sensitive side—he liked to pose as the champion of the oppressed—forthwith informed his Minister, Count Nesselrode, that he was to conform strictly to the provisions of the

¹ Wessenberg to whom?

² Wessenberg's "Nachlass," No. 53. "I won over the Emperor Alexander to the interest of Marie Louise by means of a letter which I got her to write."

³ Houssaye, "1815," p. 139. Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 96.

⁴ Marie Louise had written, "Que mon père . . . me montre à cette occasion," which Metternich changed into, "que mon père . . . voue à ses intérêts."

⁵ Marie Louise to Alexander I., Vienna, November 21, 1814.

⁶ Alexander's reply to Marie Louise has not been preserved. But Wessenberg expressly says in his "Posthumous Writings," No. 53: "He (Alexander) hastened to declare himself her champion in this matter."

⁷ We do not possess Marie Louise's letter to the King of Prussia, whereas we have the answer, dated November 23, 1814. M.I.

Treaty of Fontainebleau.¹ For the moment Marie Louise was saved. Backed by the emphatic opinion of Russia, Metternich also changed his tone. He, who only a short time previously had been mercilessly opposed to the Duchess of Parma, would now hear no more of her exclusion from Italy. He had the more reason to think that he could arrive at some friendly arrangement with France, because in the meanwhile a more intimate understanding had arisen between the Courts of Vienna and Paris as regards other questions. Alexander's design of incorporating Poland with his dominions, and a similar attempt on the part of Prussia with regard to Saxony, had split up the Congress and brought an appeal to arms within very measurable distance. Austria, England and France, owing to their influence, would by no means suffer the aggrandising schemes of Russia and Prussia. Thus in all secrecy a self-defensive alliance, directed against such greed of power, was concluded between Austria, France and England on January 3, 1815, which was kept, however, from the knowledge of the world. Owing to the pressure of these important events, negotiations were again renewed, at the instigation of Louis XVIII. himself, as to the fate of Marie Louise and her son.² They were no longer to form the subject of official *pour-parlers*, but to be discussed directly and informally between France and Austria.³ Louis XVIII., fired by the ambition of reinstating all the Bourbon dynasty in their former posses-

¹ Wessenberg's "Posthumous Papers," No. 53. "It was indeed time, for the transaction, in Metternich's opinion, had already been clearly set forth. The Emperor Alexander gave his Minister, Count Nesselrode, precise orders to keep strictly to the terms agreed upon in Paris, and thus the Duchy of Parma was secured to Marie Louise. The affair remained a secret, but I possess the papers which establish the fact."

² Metternich to Vincent, February 18, 1815. Private despatch.

³ "Corresp. de Talleyrand," pp. 305 and 314.

sions, in order to pass as their acknowledged head,¹ now appeared, to Metternich's disgust, with very exacting demands. Not only was Parma to be given back to the ex-Queen of Etruria, but the hated Murat was to be driven out of Naples and the former King Ferdinand re-installed there. Austria, which had secured to Murat by treaty his maintenance on the throne, recoiled from such a hazardous step at a moment when there were so many far more important matters to be arranged. Metternich declared this transaction could not be settled at the Congress, but should be put off to a more convenient time.² But Louis XVIII., advised by hot-headed Royalists, would not hear of this. Metternich agreed. But in return for the concession of Naples he demanded Parma. "If we humour France in Southern Italy," he said, "the northern part of this country must be at our disposal."³ But in spite of the defensive alliance of January 3, 1815, there was to be an embroglio over these questions.

The Emperor acquainted his daughter with the critical state of her affairs. He advised her once more, on February 15, 1815, to write to Alexander I.,⁴ who assured her two days later that he had never ceased for a moment to show the most active interest in her affairs, and laid great stress upon his desire to justify the confidence

¹ Vincent to Metternich, March 4, 1815, postscript: "It seems that the King is flattered at the idea of being able to promote the restoration of all branches of the House of Bourbon, and of being considered its chief and counsellor; this motive, rather than any reasons of State, seems to me to have influenced his desire for the re-establishment of the infant Don Charles Louis, in Parma."

² Metternich to Vincent, February 18, 1815.

³ *Ibid.* "It is only fair that on the day in which we are willing to employ our own forces to replace Southern Italy under the Bourbon dynasty, we should still further concentrate our influence in the north of the peninsula." See also "Corresp. de Talleyrand," p. 305.

⁴ Marie Louise to the Emperor Alexander, February 15, 1815.

which she placed in him personally.¹ At the same time Metternich selected as mediator the English Premier, Lord Castlereagh, who was about to leave Vienna for London by way of Paris. He was to secure the compliance of Louis XVIII. In a farewell audience, the Emperor Francis assured the English peer that he was ready to meet the requirements of the French King; but as a father and guardian he must protect his daughter's rights, which his own interests as Emperor of Austria further compelled him to do.²

Metternich also gave Castlereagh a "confidential memorandum," which was to serve as a basis of negotiation. In this, Austria announced her decided intention of dethroning Murat on the very first opportunity which he himself should offer, and also expressed a desire to accommodate France in other particulars.³ But the claim of Marie Louise to Parma was not to be infringed upon.⁴ In one altogether important point Metternich attempted still further to meet the King's views. He was willing to pledge himself secretly never to permit Napoleon's son to attain to sovereign dominion; to nothing less, in fact, than his exclusion from the succession to the throne in favour of the descendants of the ex-Queen of Etruria.⁵ But even this concession did not

¹ The Emperor Alexander to Marie Louise, February 17, 1815.

² Metternich's despatch, Vienna, February 12, 1815. In this despatch Metternich begs the Emperor to put things in this light to Castlereagh, which he actually did. He adds: "Let your Majesty make it understood that the whole affair is most disagreeable to your Supreme Highness, and that you are only actuated by a strong spirit of conciliation."

³ Confidential memorandum enclosed in Metternich's instructions to Vincent, February 18, 1815.

⁴ Metternich's "Remarques sur les articles du memorandum confidentiel," enclosed in the instructions of February 18, 1815.

⁵ Confidential memorandum. "Secret understanding on the part of Austria never to establish the son of Napoleon and Marie Louise in a position of sovereign power."

satisfy Louis XVIII. "Let us come to an understanding about Parma," he declared to the Austrian Ambassador, Baron Vincent, "and I am at one with you as regards everything else."¹ No agreement was, however, arrived at, for the simple reason that at this juncture Napoleon's sudden re-appearance in France cut short their deliberations. It is therefore incorrect to assert, as Houssaye does,² that Marie Louise was required to sacrifice her son for the sake of the Crown of Parma, and that she was "weak enough" to consent immediately. Houssaye simply transfers to the early days of March 1815, an event which only took place at the end of December of that year, consequently after the second downfall of Napoleon, when a state of affairs already unfavourable to his son had become essentially worse.

¹ Vincent to Metternich, Paris, March 4. P.S.I.

² Houssaye, "1815," vol. i., p. 140.

CHAPTER V

ATTEMPTED ABDUCTION OF THE PRINCE OF PARMA

ALL correspondence between Napoleon and Marie Louise had ceased since the Empress had returned to Vienna from Aix. The ex-Emperor received no further direct token of her existence. He supposed her to be a captive at the Court of Vienna,¹ and strictly forbidden to have any intercourse with him. This line of conduct wounded him in his inmost soul. However assiduously he might avoid mentioning the Empress's name² to those about him, his wrath was often stronger than his purpose; he could not master his fury. In cutting terms, he accused his father-in-law of inhumanity. "They have even taken my son from me," he said to Campbell, "just as in olden times conquerors carried off the children to grace their triumph."³ He felt it an additional insult to his person when he learnt that it was desired to compel Marie Louise to separate from him and marry the King of Prussia.⁴ Some such plan was actually rumoured abroad.⁵ More particularly it was asserted that the Nuncio at Vienna had secretly caused a pamphlet to be circulated which was intended to establish the in-

¹ Campbell, "Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba," p. 297.

² George Firmin-Didot, "Royauté ou Empire," p. 121.

³ Campbell (already quoted), p. 327.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 326. Statement from Florence, December 3, 1814.

⁵ George Firmin-Didot, "Royauté ou Empire," p. 190. Report of the Commissioner of Police Gölhausen, Vienna, November 24, 1814.
M I.

validity of Napoleon's marriage with Marie Louise.¹ It is probable that the idea of a divorce commended itself in certain quarters.² The Emperor Francis, however, certainly did not think of it. At the first mention of such an idea, he commissioned Prince Metternich to take measures against it at the Papal Court, "as such a proceeding could not be viewed with indifference."³ Therefore, Gentz designates these reports "idle gossip."⁴ It was, however, the decided wish of the Imperial father to keep his daughter permanently apart from her husband. Marie Louise seemed the more easily persuaded to take this course, because for some time past she had shown signs of an increasing inclination for Count Neipperg.⁵ Thus the Empress entered upon that new phase of her existence which is bound up with the most painful memories concerning her. Even though her return to Napoleon were prohibited, she ought to have borne in mind his greatness and the rank he had bestowed upon her. As the wife of so remarkable a man, she could not surrender herself to her passion for Neipperg without lowering her reputation. But Marie Louise was wanting in perception of the sublimity of the situation in which the downfall of the Empire had placed her.

In full measure, therefore, she deserves those crushing

¹ Note by hand from the Emperor to Metternich, Vienna, September 17, 1814.

² Krones, "Aus dem Tagebuch Erzherzog Johann's," p. 165.

³ Note by hand from the Emperor Francis to Metternich, Vienna, September 17, 1814.

⁴ Klinkowström, "Oesterreich's Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen," pp. 472-473.

⁵ Account of March 12, 1815. M.I. Account of March 27, 1815, *ibid.* "Meanwhile I venture to assert that this connection between Marie Louise and Neipperg can only have good results, since he has obtained an ascendancy over her which does not permit of her taking any step without her friend's advice, and the Count's character is a sufficient pledge that this advice can only be such as he believes to be in keeping with her illustrious father's views."—Report of March 18, 1815. M.I.

condemnations of her character which have been heaped upon her, alike by her contemporaries and by posterity. Only the weak nature of the ex-Empress, accessible to every passing impulse, can explain this unprecedented change in her sentiments. She was one of those characters on whom the impression of the present totally effaces the memory of the past. Marie Louise, who had none of the greatness of soul of her grandmother Queen Caroline of Naples, needed a guide in every situation of life. Such she found in Neipperg, who understood how to attach her completely to himself. She surrendered willingly to the fascination he exercised over her. Devoid of any feeling of ambition, she readily decided to pass her existence with a not undeserving, but certainly not famous, general, who appealed to her temperament more than Napoleon had done.

Only a woman so swayed by erotic emotions could have played this not very dignified part. Since Neipperg had won her for himself, Napoleon was for ever shut out from the approach to her heart. Now she had ceased to think how painful to the great man in his fall was the separation from wife and child, nor how much he missed their consolation. With what joy he had made arrangements for the reception of Marie Louise and their son in Elba!¹ But all these preparations had been made in vain. She did not come. He spoke no word of accusation against Marie Louise. But he, the embodiment of power, was seen weeping at least once before the picture of his beloved son.² He never called him anything but "*mon pauvre petit chou*."³ "I have a little of a mother's tenderness," he said, "even a great deal, and I do not blush to own it. It would be impossible for me

¹ "Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}," vol. xxvii., p. 439. Pons de l'Hérault, "Souvenirs et Anecdotes de l'Ile d'Elbe, par Pélissier," p. 68.

² Pélissier, Pons de l'Hérault, "Souvenirs et Anecdotes," p. 206.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

to reckon upon the faithfulness of a father who did not love his children."¹ The appearance in Elba of the Countess Walewska with his illegitimate child—a circumstance which momentarily gave rise to the reports of the landing of the Empress and the King of Rome on the island²—could not compensate Napoleon for those who remained afar. But it was precisely these cruel proceedings, directed against his domestic life, which should have opened his eyes to the dangers which threatened him from hostile quarters. These alone should have already warned him to be on his guard. He was aware of other plots directed against his personal safety. He knew that Talleyrand had proposed to the Congress at Vienna to have him transported to some inhospitable region where he would be practically buried alive. In the same way he heard of the hired assassins who only awaited an opportunity to plunge a dagger into his breast. For some time past the French Government had ceased to pay the sum guaranteed by the treaty of Fontainebleau which was necessary for his maintenance. All this caused him to mature his plan of a flight from Elba. The tidings from France of the great dissatisfaction which prevailed there encouraged him to attempt an incursion into that country. The memory of the mighty victories of which he had been the hero was still very keen—above all, it dominated the mind of the army. Silently, he formed the resolution to leave Elba and surprise the world by his sudden apparition. On February³ 26 he set forth, accompanied only by a few hundred

¹ Pélissier, Pons de l'Hérault, "Souvenirs et Anecdotes."

² Pallain, "Correspondance de Talleyrand," p. 72, note. Pellet, "Napoléon à l'Île d'Elbe," p. 32. Pélissier, Pons, "Souvenirs et Anecdotes," p. 578.

³ Pélissier, Pons (already quoted), p. 381. Hitherto the statement had been accepted that it was only the arrival of Fleury de Chaboulon between February 12-13 that decided Napoleon to escape from Elba (Houssaye, "1815," vol. i. p. 179). Pons combats this assertion in his

men, sustained by confidence in his star which had so often led him to victory. However great his achievements in the past, they bear no comparison with his present triumphal progress, which is one of the most daring deeds that history has ever recorded.¹ Without any communications with his adherents in France, upon whom he had burst as unexpectedly as he did upon the unheeding Royalists, trusting only to the magic of his name, he accomplished incredible feats in the shortest possible time. After all France had paid him homage in his rapid advance from village to village, from town to town, he was able, as early as March 20, to make his entry into the Tuileries which Louis XVIII. had been obliged to evacuate in all haste.

On March 7 the news of Napoleon's landing reached Vienna, where the Princes and their Ministers were conferring as to the new disposition of Europe. This action filled every one with astonishment. "Any one who had said on March 5 that on the 22nd Napoleon would be sitting on his throne again, would have been pronounced crazy"—thus runs a letter written from the capital.

If one is to believe the somewhat unreliable statement of Metternich as to the way in which the tidings of the flight from Elba reached him,² the Powers had scarcely

"Souvenirs et Anecdotes de l'Île d'Elbe," published by Pélissier (p. 379). The Florentine Minister, Fossombroni, writes to the Prince Corsini in Vienna, Florence, March 4, M. L., that he has learnt that "on Saturday evening, February 25, a little boat arrived in Porte Ferrajo from the coast of France, with two of his subjects, who immediately had speech with Bonaparte, and that directly after the consultation he decided to set off." According to Pons (already quoted), the day of the departure was February 26, actually a Sunday.

¹ Klinkowström (already quoted). Gentz, Vienna, March 29, writes: "History shows nothing like it; if old Oriental legends represented such a thing as fact, we should accuse them of exaggeration and absurdity."

² From Metternich's "Posthumous Papers," vol. i., p. 209. According to these a despatch arrived for him from the Imperial-Royal General Consulate in Geneva, in the night of the 6-7 March, which he

been informed of this new development before they were all unanimously agreed to sacrifice their last soldier in crushing Napoleon.¹ On the other hand, it is said that the Princes did not regain their composure so quickly in face of this unexpected action.² We must not, however, overlook the fact that several days elapsed before they resolved, by means of their famous Proclamation of March 13, to declare Napoleon an outlaw—in other words, a man at the mercy of the public vengeance.³ This unique measure was first urged by Talleyrand,⁴ who lost no time in showing himself the most merciless opponent of his former Emperor. By repeatedly proclaiming that Napoleon must be exterminated like a mad dog,⁵ he intended to avert any suspicion of being himself

only opened at 7.30 A.M., because he had been occupied till 3 A.M. at a conference. From this despatch he learnt of Napoleon's flight. He immediately betook himself to the Emperor Francis, and, with his consent, to the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, so that by half-past eight in the morning war was declared against Napoleon. In other reports the story is rather differently given. Thus, Count Salis writes to his son, Vienna, March 8, M.I.: "Yesterday a concert was being given at Court when the news came." A later note in Archduke John's diary tallies with this statement (see Krones, already quoted, p. 208), where, however, March 5 is given as the date, which must surely be wrong, unless it is merely a printer's error; on page 211 John says the same thing. According to Pertz, Baron vom Stein (vol. iv., p. 367), it was Wellington who first received the news on March 7. Metternich's further account (already quoted, p. 210) that while everyone was in doubt as to whether Napoleon had wended his way, he knew at once that the ex-Emperor had made direct for Paris, is also calculated to throw doubt upon this statement.

¹ From Metternich's "Posthumous Papers," vol. i., p. 210.

² Gentz (see Klinkowström, already quoted, p. 575) writes, March 10: "The news of Napoleon's escape has excited the greatest anxiety in Vienna." See Archduke John's statement, Krones (already quoted), p. 211.

³ Printed in Talleyrand's "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 111.

⁴ Klinkowström (already quoted), p. 597.

⁵ See my article, "Talleyrand in Wien zur Kongresszeit," *Neue Freie Presse*, April 11, 1896.

involved in the ex-Emperor's action. The notorious text of the proclamation is only a feeble echo of the rough draft which Talleyrand would have liked to see published. In this extremely violent document, propounded by him, every one was expected to treat Bonaparte as a bandit, should they succeed in getting him into their power.¹ We should be wrong in considering this document, which is an important testimony to Talleyrand's frame of mind at that moment, merely as a memorandum² which was to prove to the assembled Princes and their Ministers the necessity of proclaiming an act of outlawry. As a matter of fact, the French Minister recommended that this document—which, although couched in the most violent terms, was expressly called a rough draft—be adopted by the Congress.³ The ferocity of Talleyrand's language offended even the Emperor Francis.⁴ Only after a long and lively debate, during the evening session of March 13, did they decide upon the wording of the proclamation to be issued to all Europe.⁵

¹ " . . . and constitute an act of highway robbery, in the precise and proper sense of the term. This individual has placed himself beyond the pale of every law, human and divine ; *it is just that he should fall beneath the blow of the first who strikes him* and, moreover, he is liable to all pains and penalties that the codes of civilised nations impose on malefactors and brigands."—Welschinger, "*Le Roi de Rome*," p. 111.

² Welschinger (already quoted), p. 110.

³ In the copy preserved in the State Archives of Vienna it is expressly entitled, "*Projet français d'une déclaration contre Buonaparte.*" Gentz also bears witness to this in his "*Vertrauliche Denkschrift*," Vienna, April 24, 1815. See Klindowström (already quoted), p. 597.

⁴ Metternich's report, in his own writing, Vienna, March 13, 1815 : "Receive [your Majesty], in the annexed, the form of the declaration definitely decided upon at our evening session to-day, which your Supreme Highness will doubtless consider very superior to the rough draft which I took the liberty of submitting to your Majesty by Floret. All the passages which your Majesty rightly considered objectionable are entirely omitted, and the whole document bears a much more dignified character." The Emperor Francis endorsed it immediately in his own writing : "By all means."

⁵ Klindowström (already quoted), p. 597.

However crushing it might appear as regards Napoleon, it was nevertheless quite moderate by comparison with Talleyrand's original proposal. This diplomatist, however, was not to be satisfied with the first declaration of outlawry. Directly after Napoleon's arrival in Paris, he sought to induce the Powers to publish a second manifesto against "the enemy of Europe." As the Emperor had succeeded, against all expectations, in taking possession of the French capital, the Allied Princes were to renew their solemn undertaking of March 13. The disturber of the peace must be deprived of every semblance of hope of obtaining any advantage for himself or family from his "criminal action."¹ In view of Napoleon's successes, the Powers were not inclined to allow themselves to be hurried into repeating a measure as to which, even prior to March 13, they were not all in agreement.² Now it was all the more important to avoid that kind of rhetorical performance, which might be described as "unnecessary, untimely and perhaps dangerous." The same man—it was Wessenberg—who expressed himself in these terms was the keenest critic of Talleyrand's work, which was mainly sacrificed to his protestations.³

¹ Draft of declaration suggested by M. Talleyrand. It bears date March 3. Since, however, this official document refers to Napoleon's entrance into Paris as having already taken place, the date can only be interpreted as April 3. In Pallain's "*Correspondance de Talleyrand*," p. 383, this declaration is given, but not with the correct date. Here, too, the following passages are missing, which occur in the draft: "It was out of regard for her [France] that the Powers had accorded an honourable refuge to the man who had had the honour of being her ruler. They have now cause to regret that this sentiment made them overlook for a moment the fact that he was a man to whom nothing had ever been sacred." ² Klinkowström (already quoted), p. 597.

³ Wessenberg, "My opinion upon a new declaration against Napoleon proposed by Prince Talleyrand. April 5." He says here: "Declarations will not disarm France. It seems to me we had a sufficiently painful experience of them in 1792-1800." For the opposition to this new declaration, see also Gentz, April 19, 1815, in Klinkowström (already quoted), p. 489.

Marie Louise suffered many anxious hours after Napoleon's flight from Elba. She is said to have heard the news just as she was returning from a walk.¹ Longing for repose, and hoping to find it at last in Parma, she foresaw at once that Napoleon's reappearance would expose her to fresh agitations. She was already estranged from a husband whom she had once loved and to whom she had borne a child. The advice of her French attendants, to declare herself in his favour, met with scant attention from her who had been so easily able to banish Napoleon from her heart. Ménéval accuses her of having, in this mood, removed the last obstruction which hindered the publication of the famous proclamation. According to him, she wrote to Metternich on March 12 that she stood completely aloof from the Emperor's plans, and placed herself under the protection of the Powers. After such a statement, the Courts felt themselves relieved of every scruple and the act of outlawry was unanimously pronounced against him on March 13.² But did Marie Louise actually address such a letter to Metternich? If we may believe the statement—although certainly not given at first-hand—of her confidential friend Countess Lažansky, Marie Louise was very unpleasantly agitated by the proscription of Napoleon. According to this testimony, she is reported to have hastened to her father in order to insist upon the proclamation being rescinded forthwith. When he replied that he could do nothing by himself, she directed her efforts towards Frederick William and Alexander I., but without success. The Tsar said very plainly that her husband was a rebel and must be treated as such.³ From

¹ Ménéval, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 412.

² Ménéval (already quoted), pp. 418, 419.

³ Report of the police officer Weyland, March 16, 1815. M.I. Weyland had this story from the chambermaid of the Countess, to whom it had been confided by Marie Louise.

Marie Louise's attitude, therefore, we may conclude that she abstained entirely from taking a step which would hand over Napoleon to the mercy, or inclemency, of his foes. In contradiction of this, however, we have two police reports which refer expressly to her letter to Metternich.¹ Indeed, one report contains even a proposal to commend in the newspapers the conduct of Marie Louise in this respect in order to disarm her enemies.² In spite of diligent search, we have not succeeded in discovering among the archives any such letter by the ex-Empress.

On the other hand, it is proved that on March 18—just after Napoleon's proscription therefore—she wrote to her father imploring his protection for herself and child. "My dear father," she writes, "at the moment of a new crisis, which endangers the peace of Europe and threatens to bring down fresh disasters on my head, I can find no surer refuge, no kindlier haven, than that which I implore your fatherly tenderness to provide for myself and my son. To your arms, my dearest father, I flee with the one being who, of all the world, is most precious to my heart. I place our fate in your hands and entrust it to your fatherly protection. I could not leave it in a holier shelter. We will acknowledge no will save yours; you will deign in all tenderness to guide my footsteps in this dark hour. Entire submission will be the first token of my gratitude and respectful attachment."³

Contrary to her invariable custom of writing to her father in German, on this occasion she made use of the French language—the strongest proof that the letter was intended to be laid before the Congress of Princes at Vienna. In this way Metternich probably wanted to give the Powers the comforting assurance that they had

¹ Report of March 14 and 15, 1815. M.I.

² Report of March 15, 1815. M.I.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor, Schönbrunn, March 18, 1815.

nothing to fear from Marie Louise. She was faithful, only too faithful, to her promise of blind obedience. Henceforward she had no more secrets from the Emperor Francis, and whatever Napoleon might write, or whatever message he might send her, she brought at once to the knowledge of her father. It was only natural that the French Emperor's most urgent efforts should be made to secure the return of his wife and child to Paris. Nothing could have convinced the French people more strongly of a secret alliance with Austria than the return of Marie Louise and her son to France. Was not Carnot's first question to the Emperor: "Have you assurances from the Powers, or only from Austria itself?" When Napoleon was obliged to answer in the negative, Carnot shook his head and retorted: "Then you have still more to do than you have done already."¹ But what he confessed to his Minister of the Interior, might not be disclosed to the public. The nation must be still further imbued with faith in Austria's assistance. "Every day"—so runs a report from Paris at that time—"the falsehood gains ground that the Archduchess Marie Louise is expected, that her carriages are held in readiness and her apartments arranged, that couriers from Vienna have come in, and that Madame Montesquiou and Count Bausset have arrived."² Scarcely had Napoleon set foot in France than he insisted—even from Grénoble—on Marie Louise coming to him with the King of Rome. This letter was brought to Vienna enclosed in a nutshell.³

¹ Wellington's "Supplementary Despatches, &c.," vol. x., p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 56. Auguste Talleyrand to Dalberg, Zürich, April 30, 1815. M.I. "Bonaparte gave such positive assurance that the Empress Marie Louise and the King of Rome would be in Paris in a few days, and that the Powers, notably Austria, were agreed with him that no war would take place, that the people were persuaded of this, which added to his following every day."

³ Wessenberg's notes, No. 53: "Arrived at Grénoble, he addressed a pressing letter to her [Marie Louise] urging her to join him. This

It was followed at brief intervals by others still more imperative. Count Anatole Montesquiou, son of the young Napoleon's governess, who arrived at the Imperial capital about March 20, was also the bearer of letters from his master.¹ Napoleon left nothing undone in his efforts to win Marie Louise. On March 28 he repeated his request that she should meet him, with their son, about April 15 or 20 at Strasburg.² Some days later, April 4, he wrote again: "My good Louise, I have written several times already. Three days ago I sent Flahault to you. Now a man is being sent at my orders to tell you all is going well. I am idolised here and master of the situation. I only want you, my good Louise, and my son. Come to me then, by way of Strasburg. The bearer of this will inform you as to the tendency of public feeling in France. Adieu, my friend. Your devoted Napoleon."³ This letter, as well as two other communications from Joseph Bonaparte and his wife, were delivered to Marie Louise by Ménéval, to whom they had been entrusted by

letter reached Vienna concealed in a nut." Field-Marshal Lieutenant Count Bubna writes to Metternich from Genoa, March 17, 1815, that General Songeon, Commander of the Department of Mont Blanc, had sent an officer named Nion on March 14 to deliver him a letter from Napoleon to Marie Louise. Songeon mentions in his communication to Bubna that he will have already received the letter sent by Napoleon to Marie Louise from Grénoble. But Bubna did not receive this letter. Who, then, conveyed it to Vienna?

¹ Wessenberg's notes, No. 53: "More pressing letters arrived by other means, one through young Montesquiou."

² Fournier, "Ein Brief Napoleon I. an Marie Luise," *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. lxxxvii., p. 270. Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 122.

³ Welschinger (already quoted), p. 123, gives one part of this letter, but undated. According to the copy lying before me, however, it bears the date of April 4, which Metternich confirms in the note written in his own hand. Thus Fournier (already quoted), p. 271, is wrong when he alludes to the letter of March 28 "as being perhaps the only and last news of Napoleon" which reached Marie Louise's hands.

the bearer.¹ But Ménéval absolutely refused to give the name of the man who had served as courier to Napoleon.² True to her promise of March 18, the ex-Empress did not hesitate for one moment in laying before her father this epistle of April 14.³ Napoleon not only importuned Marie Louise, but also his father-in-law, urging him⁴ to restore his wife and child. The Emperor Francis, however, no longer recognised his son-in-law. When Metternich informed him that news had come from Kehl of the arrival of an Imperial envoy from the French Court, travelling through to Vienna, Francis replied: "You must so arrange matters that if any one is sent by Napoleon in future, he will not reach here."⁵ Flahault, to whom Napoleon had entrusted his letter to the Emperor Francis, as well as the one of April 4 to Marie Louise, was not in fact able to reach Vienna.⁶ It remains a problem how the French Emperor's missives succeeded all the same in reaching Ménéval. Napoleon was not the sole advocate of his own interests; he also employed his Minister of Foreign Affairs to negotiate for him. By his medium he endeavoured to make it understood in Vienna that the restoration of the Empire signified universal peace.⁷ Appealing to the most sacred of laws—that of family life—the oldest social institution, Caulaincourt thus apostrophises Metternich: "The Emperor desires the happiness of France; he desires the preservation of

¹ Metternich, probably to Hager, undated, but still belonging to the month of April 1815.

² *Ibid.* "Ménéval refrained from telling Marie Louise that he kept the notes he had opened."

³ *Ibid.* Fournier (already quoted), p. 272, is wrong in making out that the Emperor Francis ordered all communications from Napoleon to be withheld from his daughter; as has been seen, it was rather she who laid Napoleon's letter before the Emperor.

⁴ "Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}," vol. xxviii., p. 60.

⁵ Metternich's despatch of March 30, 1815, with the Emperor's decision.

⁶ Caulaincourt to Metternich, Paris, April 16, 1815.

⁷ *Ibid.*, April 4, 1815.

peace; he desires the return of his wife and son. He is not ashamed to lay bare all these, his most heartfelt wishes, and in this respect the French nation supports him."¹

The sole answer returned to such immoderate demands on the part of the Emperor and his Minister was an order for the strictest surveillance of the Prince of Parma, with a view to the frustration of any plot for his abduction. Soon after Napoleon's entry into Paris, Lord Castlereagh drew Metternich's attention to the danger of an attempt to carry off the Prince, which might be possible with the help of Marie Louise's French attendants.² The public mind was also agitated at the thought that some audacious and enterprising Frenchman might seize the young Napoleon by a bold stroke. "And as such a hostage would be very important in every respect," writes Count Chotek to Baron von Hager, "ought we not to double our vigilance and remove the all too numerous persons of this nationality who infest Schönbrunn and inhabit Vienna, upon whose intentions we cannot rely with any certainty?"³ For Hager—Prefect of the Police—this warning was unnecessary. As early as March 14 he had told the Emperor frankly that nothing would be easier to effect than the abduction or flight of his grandson from Schönbrunn—if any such design lurked in the mind of Napoleon and his adherents.⁴ Metternich shared this opinion. "If at first sight," he writes to the Emperor, "this anxiety seems somewhat exaggerated, it is certainly not without foundation, and in my respectful opinion prudence demands that measures should be taken to make the Prince of Parma's abduction practically an impossibility."⁵ Suspicion was chiefly directed against

¹ Caulaincourt to Metternich, Paris, April 11, 1815.

² Count Merveldt to Metternich, London, March 26, 1815.

³ Chotek to Hager, Schönbrunn, March 18, 1815. M.I.

⁴ Hager's report of March 14, 1815. M.I.

⁵ Metternich's despatch of April 3, 1815.

Colonel Count Anatole Montesquiou, the young Imperialist who was welcomed in the best Viennese society on account of his attractive appearance and winning manners. How simple it would be—thought Hager—for Count Anatole to procure from the French Embassy a passport for himself and a child, made out in an assumed name. Already he pictured him awaiting with a travelling-carriage in the outskirts of Vienna, until his mother, on pretext of taking the child for a walk, should deliver him up to be borne off with all possible speed. “If, contrary to all expectations,” says Hager, “Marie Louise were to favour the abduction, pursuit from Vienna could only follow discovery too late to be of use. The Prefect of Police therefore advocates the most stringent measures : the Prince should be transferred at once from Schönbrunn to the palace at Vienna ; the French attendants dismissed and the carriages of the Imperial Court should supersede the French equipages then in use. Besides this, trustworthy agents should be sent immediately to stations on the frontier to hinder the escape of persons known to them by sight.”¹ Hager especially distrusted Eugène de Beauharnais. He was aware that only a few weeks previously the latter had been requested by a part of the French army to place himself at their head and drive out Louis XVIII.² Night and day Hager kept him under the most careful supervision, “because,” as he says in his report, “I am morally convinced of the depravity of this Prince who—even by the King of Bavaria himself—is still invariably entitled the Vice-King of Italy, and, neither from his father-in-law, nor from the Emperor of Russia, can I find any guarantee that Beauharnais is not capable of joining in designs on the Prince of Parma, or even of secretly conspiring with Napoleon himself.”³

¹ Hager's report of March 14, 1815. M.I.

² *Ibid.*, March 24, 1815. M.I.

³ *Ibid.*

According to the Emperor's orders of March 16, the guard at Schönbrunn was doubled, and two capable police officers were also sent there. Owing to want of room in the palace (Hofburg), where the various foreign Princes had been lodged during the Congress, it had not been possible so far to remove the young Napoleon to the town.¹ Recent anxieties, however, brought about a change in this arrangement. Now it was decided that the Prince should leave Schönbrunn. On March 20—the very day of his father's entry into Paris—the son was brought to those apartments in the Imperial palace of Vienna, previously occupied by the King of Württemberg.² Now he was no longer permitted to see his beloved governess, who had tended him with such genuine devotion. As early as March 14 Hager had demanded her removal as an extremely urgent measure.³ Not on Count Wrba, as Ménéval asserts,⁴ but on Wessenberg devolved the very unpleasant task of announcing to the Countess Montesquiou her dismissal from the Court of Marie Louise. Wessenberg discharged his delicate commission with due deference to this estimable lady, for which she seemed to feel herself indebted to him.⁵ At the same time Count Anatole was commanded to leave Vienna; his mother was to follow in the course of a few days.⁶ This arrangement was deemed all the more necessary because a report had gone about that Napoleon's notorious spy Charles Schulmeister

¹ The Emperor's decision of March 16 upon Hager's report of March 14. M.I.

² Siber to Hager, Vienna, March 19, 1815. M.I. Talleyrand to the King, March 23 (*see* Pallain, p. 359).

³ Hager's report of March 14, 1815. M.I.

⁴ Ménéval, "*Mémoires*," vol. iii., p. 426.

⁵ Wessenberg's Records, No. 53. "The task devolved upon me of announcing to Mme. Montesquiou that she must resign her charge and leave the Court of Marie Louise. I carried out this commission with every possible consideration, which Mme. Montesquiou seemed to value."

⁶ Hager's report of March 10, 1815. M.I.

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had arrived in Austria in order to effect the abduction of the Prince of Parma, in conjunction with the dancer Duport and the French painter David. This report speedily¹ proved to be only the outcome of imagination.² On March 19 Anatole was to leave for Paris. Before starting, he begged Marie Louise to entrust letters to his care. She had only handed him an unimportant communication for the Duchess of Montebello. Influenced probably by Neipperg, she showed some anxiety lest young Montesquiou might also be the bearer of more compromising documents from her French attendants. Therefore she was extremely desirous that Anatole should be stopped at the frontier and his papers taken from him. She insisted all the more urgently upon this because—as Neipperg puts it—she regarded the whole affair as something menacing to her peace (!) of mind.³ However, the matter stopped short of an examination of Anatole's baggage; because meanwhile—March 22—orders were given that neither the Countess nor her son should be allowed to start.⁴ It would appear that they were regarded as less dangerous under strict supervision in Austria than they would be in France. Count Anatole, however, did not fall in with this compulsory stay in Vienna. He hoped to escape from this enforced detention by flight. Since March 28 Hager had been aware that he was thinking of getting away secretly in company with

¹ Account of March 20, 1815. M.I.

² Metternich's report of March 28, 1815. It turned out that no one had any actual information about Schulmeister; David was not the famous painter, but the manager of the china manufactory in Ludwigsburg, who had come to Vienna to inquire into the secrets of the china works there, and Duport the dancer had no other design in view than to conclude a contract with directors of the theatre. Metternich pronounced him extremely dangerous.

³ To Metternich. From the handwriting, Empress Maria Ludovica must have written this letter. Undated—Neipperg, to whom?—March 19, Court Councillor Neuberg to Hager, March 19. M.I.

⁴ Hager's report of March 22, 1815. M.I.

Bresson de Valensole,¹ who had obtained leave to return to France as agent of the French Marshals. The police immediately adopted measures to prevent this escape; measures which were inefficient in any case, since Anatole succeeded notwithstanding in absconding, disguised presumably as a servant.² When on March 30, during a supper given by the Russian Princess Bagration, it was related, with much scoffing at the police, that Montesquiou, in company with Ménéval, had set off that afternoon for Paris, Hager indignantly exclaimed: "Then Heaven help Aichner and Tappenberg [the two police officers involved]. I can endure no more!"³ A vain search was made in all directions. Meanwhile the fugitive had slipped over the frontier by some circuitous route. Here, according to preconcerted agreement, he met the French courier Vanier, who was travelling with Imbert Saint-Amand, and took a place on the box of their carriage as their servant.⁴ At night, when Vanier arrived in his close carriage at Ebelsberg and gave up his passport, the commissioner of police asked him what business he had with a servant. In spite of the reply that he had no special authority for his presence, the official, who had to get off several other travellers, allowed the courier and his companions to proceed unmolested.⁵ Montesquiou was not so fortunate at Lambach, the next station on the road. Ilger, the police superintendent of the frontier, inspected his people somewhat more closely. He demanded to see Montesquiou's pass also. As this paper, which had only been endorsed by the French police and not by the Viennese authorities, did not seem to him quite in

¹ Hager's report of March 30, Vienna, 1815. M.I.

² Report of March 29, 1815. M.I.

³ Hager to the superintendent of the Viennese police, Siber, March 30 and 31. M.I.

⁴ Police Report of April 4, 1815. M.I.

⁵ Aicholt, Governor of Upper Austria, to Hager, Linz, April 1, 1815. M.I.

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order, he informed the Count that he must remain at Lambach until his passport had been examined at Vienna. This decision fell upon Anatole like a thunderbolt. St.-Amand then tried to bribe Ilger with fifty ducats, and finding that was of no avail, endeavoured to suborn the military police, but still without success. These attempts at bribery only warned Ilger to exercise greater caution. Directly after St.-Amand's departure he went to Montesquiou's room in order to assure himself personally of his presence. On entering the apartment, profound silence reigned, and it appeared as though Anatole were in bed. But on approaching nearer, Ilger found only the mock effigy of a sleeping man. After this discovery the house was immediately searched. We can imagine Ilger's delight when he found the fugitive hidden in a corner of the yard, into which he had let himself down by means of a rope.¹ Afterwards Montesquiou always stoutly maintained that his attempt was not made in earnest; he only wanted to make a fool of the police officer.² But Ilger did not see the joke, and for the future set a double guard upon the room.³ On April 1 the chief superintendent of police, Schuster, together with two constables, repaired to Lambach in order to bring Anatole back to Vienna, where they arrived on the 3rd.⁴ Hager, who would have preferred to see Montesquiou consigned⁵ to a fortress, wished to place him under arrest on his arrival in Vienna. Metternich,⁶ however, raised objections to this. By his command Anatole was assigned two comfortable rooms in the house of the Counsellor of the Government, Kleinschmied, the windows of which, although

¹ Ilger's report. Lambach (not Lambach, as Welschinger, already quoted, prints it), p. 117, March 31, 1815. M.I.

² Anatole Montesquiou to his mother, April 4, 1815. M.I.

³ Ilger's report, Lambach, March 31.

⁴ Siber to Hager, Vienna, April 5, 1815. M.I.

⁵ Hager's report of April 4, 1815. M.I.

⁶ *Idem.* Report of April 1, 1815. M.I.

not barred, might only be opened with the greatest caution. Day and night a police officer was stationed in the room occupied by Anatole, while in the adjoining department two members of the force remained continually on duty. Apart from this he was very well cared for, and treated with the greatest civility.¹ All this, however, could not satisfy Montesquiou, who longed for freedom. "They load me with every respect and attention in my captivity," he wrote to Hager; "they try to gild my chains, but the impression always remains the same."² Mme. Montesquiou was deeply moved by her son's fate. In her trouble she turned to Talleyrand³ for advice and assistance. Being very favourably disposed towards her, he spoke to Metternich directly on the subject. "If," replied the Austrian Minister, "the Countess will pledge her word in writing that her son shall not leave Vienna without permission from the Government, he may be set at liberty without delay."⁴ The Countess hastened to comply with this condition.⁵ Metternich scarcely waited to be in possession of this written declaration before releasing the prisoner.⁶ Hager, who did not trust Anatole, and was afraid unpleasant complications might arise from his release, did not agree to this proceeding.⁷ But he was obliged to submit to

¹ Siber to Hager, Vienna, April 3, 1815. M.I.

² Anatole Montesquiou to Hager, April 5, 1815. M.I.

³ Welschinger (already quoted), p. 117, note.

⁴ Talleyrand to Mme. Montesquiou, April 5. M.I.

⁵ This declaration was handed in on April 5. The son also made a similar statement, which runs: "I pledge my word of honour to keep exactly to the agreement made by my mother."

⁶ Talleyrand to Mme. Montesquiou, Vienna, April 6. M.I. Metternich's report of April 10.

⁷ Hager's report of April 1, 1815. M. I. "He [Anatole] will respect his promise just as little as the French Marshals respect their most sacred oath to their King. The public will be much scandalised by his re-appearing at liberty here. The foreign diplomatists might even suspect in such condescension the trickery for which they are

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Metternich's orders. Montesquiou, who found this strict supervision of all his doings extremely irksome, and was longing for his wife and child, soon grew tired of life in Vienna. He repeatedly begged to be released from his painful position.¹ In June he received the long-desired permission to set out for France in company with his mother. On June 14 Marie Louise received once more her son's former governess, to whom he was so deeply attached. By the express wish of the Empress, Wessenberg was present at this interview. Now, it was Marie Louise herself who was consumed with impatience to see the Countess depart.² Immediately³ after this farewell, mother and son left Vienna; and thus terminated a most unpleasant and uncomfortable incident for both of them. Although nothing had been proved against Montesquiou, yet it is characteristic of him that both at home and abroad he was considered capable of having planned this abduction. Talleyrand⁴ and Dalberg⁵ believed this, and the Hanoverian Minister, Count Münster, pointed him out as the moving spirit of the whole conspiracy.⁶

The departure of Countess Montesquiou and her son did not entirely alleviate anxiety as to the abduction of

always on the watch in the policy of Austria." It had already been reported at the time of his capture at Lambach that Anatole would be set at liberty in return for his promise given on his word of honour.

¹ Hager to the Chief Superintendent of Police, May 4, 1815. Anatole Montesquiou to Metternich, May 29, 1815. M.I.

² Wessenberg to Hager, June 14, 1815. M.I.

³ Report of the head of police at Linz, June 17. M.I. "They both passed Linz in order to proceed to France by way of Bavaria."

⁴ Talleyrand to Louis XVIII., Vienna, March 17, 1815. "Correspondance inédite de Talleyrand," by Pallain, p. 351.

⁵ Dalberg to the Duchess of Dalberg, Vienna, March 20, 1815. "Her son [Mme. Montesquiou's] came from Paris, and we all think it was with the design of carrying off the little Prince."

⁶ Münster, "Politische Skizzen, 1815-1867," p. 237. Münster to the Prince Regent of England, Vienna, March 25, 1815.

young Bonaparte. As early as April 1, Hager had drawn attention to a fresh source of danger. The precautions which had been taken so far had not altogether calmed his fears. He was particularly anxious lest some of Marie Louise's attendants—whose sympathies were French—might dress the Prince as a girl and, thus disguised, lead him through one of the many outlets from the city to a carriage waiting in readiness to bear him away.¹ Even Metternich deemed it absolutely necessary to dismiss the French servants on the spot, and replace them with reliable and loyal Germans. "But since it would be unseemly to have the Prince surrounded all day long by his attendants," says Metternich to the Emperor, "may it please your Majesty graciously to appoint a German gentleman to whom the superintendence of the Prince's Court would be entrusted; who should receive express injunctions to attend the Prince everywhere—especially when he visits Schönbrunn for a few hours—and to entrust him with no one else. This prudential measure," he continues, "would have the twofold advantage of allaying your Majesty's anxiety under all possible circumstances, while it would also make a highly favourable impression upon the public, whose attention has been too strenuously fixed upon the possibility of an abduction."²

It was, in fact, impossible to silence these rumours of a flight, successful or the reverse. It was reported in Schönbrunn that Napoleon had offered a very considerable sum as a reward to any one who would bring his son to him. It was also said he had sent one of his Marshals to Vienna on the same errand in some sort of disguise.³ Others—still more worked upon by their imaginations—related with full details how on the night of April 5 every-

¹ Hager's Report of April 1, 1815. M.I.

² Metternich's Despatch of April 3, 1815.

³ Siber's account of April 6, 1815. M.I.

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thing had been prepared for flight with Marie Louise's knowledge, but that she had been surprised by her father in the very act of writing a letter to Napoleon. Thereupon a most violent scene had taken place between father and daughter.¹ It is characteristic of the Viennese that in spite of all proofs of Marie Louise's abandonment of Napoleon, they could not be persuaded but that she remained faithful to her husband, and wished for nothing more ardently than his ultimate success. Public opinion was fundamentally in error. But although Marie Louise did not wish to have anything to do with the Emperor, and was by no means inclined to favour the Prince's abduction, she certainly did not take sufficient care of the child. The Prefect of Police was often in despair at the insufficient supervision which at any moment might lead to a catastrophe. He was particularly disturbed by the carelessness shown in guarding the inner apartments. He was constantly harping on the removal of the French household.² But when Marie Louise and the Prince, accompanied only by a few French attendants, stayed out in the lonely, wooded country of Haimbach beyond Hadersdorf till nearly six o'clock in one evening, Hager was completely beside himself. "I cannot, your Majesty, repress my constant anxiety," he exclaims to the Emperor, "permit me to repeat most respectfully that under these circumstances I cannot be answerable for what may occur ; in fact, I look forward with horror to the moment when your Majesty departs, leaving the Prince of Parma in his former surroundings."³ The Emperor promised the substitution of German for French servants,⁴ and also signified

¹ Account of April 7, 1815. M.I.

² Hager's Report of April 9, 1815. M.I. "These attempts could only be frustrated with any certainty if the Prince were entirely surrounded by German attendants wherever he went, by which means, may it please your Majesty, to relieve us of our responsibility."

³ Hager's Report of April 10, 1815. M.I.


⁴ The Emperor's decision on Hager's Report of April 9, 1815. M.I.

to Metternich that he was to consult with his daughter as to the appointment of a German gentleman who was to accompany his grandson wherever he went.¹ But Francis contented himself with half-measures, and only dismissed the male members of the French household. Hager had no confidence in the French women in whose care the little Napoleon still remained. Once it happened that the German servants left the Emperor's son quite alone in the Schönbrunn Gardens with the French female attendants; "should this occur again," remarks the Prefect of Police, "an attempt on the person of the Prince would be rendered easy."² For safety's sake a personal description of the Prince was sent to all the frontier and other police authorities, while it was impressed upon them that no one must be permitted to leave Austria accompanied by a child whose personal appearance in any way tallied with this description, which was as follows: "He is 2 ft. in height, rather thick-set, has a very smooth, beautiful, pink and white complexion, full cheeks, blue eyes, rather deep-set, a small turned-up nose with rather wide nostrils, a small mouth with somewhat pouting lips, in the middle of which is a little cleft, large, very white teeth, long flaxen hair, parted on the forehead and falling round his face and shoulders in thick curls. The Prince usually speaks French, but also some German. He talks in a lively manner and gesticulates with his hands. His behaviour is very vivacious."³ This course was all the more necessary because news was continually arriving which testified to Napoleon's efforts to secure his son as well as his wife. Thus, it was asserted, the most precise information had been received that Bausset, Marshal of the Palace to Marie Louise, intended to carry off the Prince on the day of the Emperor Francis's departure for camp.

¹ The Emperor's decision on Metternich's Despatch of April 3, 1815.

² Hager's Report of May 31, 1815. M.I.

³ Hager's letter to the Provincial Governors, June 4, 1815. M.I.



THE DEPT. OF RECREATION'S CARRIAGE
In the Empire, a set of R. 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904

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Presumably his project was to consist in seating the Prince in a carriage similar to the Imperial equipages, and to drive off with him without being recognised, or asked for a passport at the frontier.¹ Duke Duras sent intelligence from Ghent to the Court at Vienna that a certain Vincent de Borderie was travelling to the Imperial capital, well provided with funds and every conceivable aid to temptation, in order to execute Napoleon's ardent desire.² Schönbrunn, whither the Prince of Parma was to be transferred for the summer season, still appeared to Hager to offer the most favourable opportunity for the execution of such a plan. Therefore the Prefect of Police began to insist once more upon the final dismissal of the whole French household. "The most important thing in my opinion," he writes, "is to have trustworthy servants and door-keepers wherever the Prince may be, for it has happened before now that the gentlemen with the key behind them [allusion to the key carried backwards by the chamberlains as a symbol of their dignity] are not always the most vigilant."³ Nevertheless, if we are to believe the confidential agent of police entrusted with the guardianship of the Castle of Schönbrunn, Karl Tapp Edler von Tappenburg, in spite of all these precautions one attempt at abduction did really succeed. According to a story which he related some years later to a circle of friends, two French ladies of high rank, who had followed Marie Louise to Vienna of their own accord, had risked some such enterprise. They intended to profit by their return to France in June 1815, in order to take the son of the ex-Empress away with them. Scarcely had Tappenburg heard of the attempt—he did not say how—before he set out in pursuit. The fugitives were travelling in an enormously large carriage. Instead of unmasking their

¹ Police Counsellor Schmid to Hager, May 20, 1815. M.I.

² Hager's Report of June 15, 1815. M.I.

³ Hager to Siber, May 22, 1815. M.I.

designs when he came up with them in the Linzer Strasse at Steinberg, he allowed them to have their mid-day meal in peace. It was only at the next posting-station, where the horses were changed, that he requested one of the ladies to enter the post-house with him. The result of this interview was a thorough inspection of the travelling carriage, which was quite hollow at the back. In this part of the equipage, which obtained light from a little window contrived in the roof, and air by means of knobs and bolts, he found the Prince of Parma seated upon a pretty little chair, and beside him a little table laden with toys and sweetmeats. After this discovery, Tappenburg escorted the travelling party back to Schönbrunn. Whilst he obtained, in recognition of his services, a post as Inspector of the Imperial Residences, the ladies were afterwards allowed to return unmolested to France, but this time under police escort.¹ Besides Mme. Montesquiou and Mme. Montebello, who had already returned to France in June 1814, and the Marquise de Brignolles, who had died in April 1815, we do not know of any other ladies of high rank who were likely to have followed the ex-Empress into exile in Austria. Cut off from all access to the Prince since March 20, they could not possibly have found an opportunity of getting him out of the palace unobserved. Why did not Tappenburg arrest the two ladies at Steinberg, instead of letting them travel on to the second station? Why does he not say how he became possessed of the Frenchwomen's secret? Could he—without saying a word to Hager—have so quickly obtained the necessary money and documents with which to pursue these two ladies? It is noticeable, however, that the Prefect of Police never once mentions

¹ Feuilleton der *Neue Zeit* (Olmütz), 1864, No. 7. This story is related there by a friend of Tappenburg's shortly after his death, which occurred just before 1864. Tappenburg died at the age of 82, as Inspector of the Royal-Imperial Residences.

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a partially successful abduction in his numerous reports, but speaks only of such possibilities. What a powerful lever in his hands such an occurrence would have afforded in urging his demands for the dismissal of the French household! The French female attendants could not have remained near the Prince an hour longer. Is it possible that no trace of this adventure of Tappenburg's should be discernible in any of the countless documents which touch upon this question of the abduction of the young Napoleon? Most distinctly, therefore, the police officer's story—supposing it really to have originated with him—may be relegated to those fictions in which the history of these times is so rich. It is indeed conceivable that, so long as Napoleon sat upon the throne, people would suspect the French of all sorts of machinations for the liberation of his son from the power of the Court of Vienna. Only when the Corsican was overthrown and banished for ever from France, were men's minds set at rest.

Napoleon's flight, however, as well as the attempts universally ascribed to him to get his family back to France, exercised a prejudicial influence on the fate of Marie Louise and the Prince of Parma. The conditions of the treaty of Fontainebleau of April 11, 1814, were now opposed with renewed vitality and with a greater show of justice than before. Its opponents declared it to be completely invalid, in consequence of the ex-Emperor's breach of promise. Supported by England, France and Spain disputed the sovereign rights of Marie Louise and her child over the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. When this matter was to be brought forward at the Congress, before the departure of the Princes to the Allied armies in May, a collision between the friends and opponents of Marie Louise appeared inevitable.¹ Alexander I., who wished

¹ Klinkowström, "Oesterreich's Teilnahme, &c.," p. 562.

to pose as champion of the Emperor Francis's daughter, was determined not to allow her, or her child, to suffer political disinheritance—a course of action to which Metternich and his Imperial master were specially inclined.¹ Lord Clancarty, England's representative, laid down the most decided protest against the cession of the Italian Duchies. The tension between Russia and Great Britain became so great that some anxiety was felt lest neither of these Powers should subscribe to this important part of the proceedings of the Congress. In this critical situation, it was Metternich who devised an expedient for settling the dispute. The Austrian Minister put forward that clause—known henceforth as "clause 99" of the acts of the Congress of Vienna—the composition of which—the work of Metternich himself—Gentz eulogises as a masterpiece of diplomatic ingenuity.² As a matter of fact, no one could have shown greater cleverness in bending to the blast of a momentary political tempest. This was the chief concern to Metternich, who wished to ensure the repose of the moment. Metternich would not have been Metternich had he allowed himself to be disturbed for an instant by the consideration that his masterpiece of diplomacy would only be the cause of severe conflicts in days to come. The clause, accepted at the sitting of May 27, 1815, secured to Napoleon's wife the possession of the Italian Duchies—a ruling which pleased the Emperor of Russia.³ The statement that the decision as to the escheatage to Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla should stand over to the future, satisfied Lord

¹ Klinkowström, "Oesterreich's Teilnahme, &c.," p. 562.

² *Ibid.*, p. 562.

³ Klinkowström (already quoted), p. 562. The clause runs: "Her Imperial Majesty Marie Louise will possess entire right and sovereignty over the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, with the exception of the districts wedged in between the States of his Imperial and Royal Apost. Majesty on the left bank of the Po."

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Clancarty.¹ This final clause secured to Austria the possibility of a favourable solution of the delicate question of her interests in Italy, without taking from the ex-Queen of Etruria all hope of the ultimate possession of the Duchies.² But Metternich had accommodated all parties by entirely ignoring in the clause all question of the succession of the Prince of Parma.³ This piece of pre-meditation might tend just as much to the advantage as to the detriment of the Emperor's young son. Above all, in this respect the Cabinet of Vienna had kept Alexander in view, since he would by no means have suffered the positive exclusion of Marie Louise's son from the succession to Parma. He was so little inclined to do so that he declined to acquiesce in this silent acknowledgment. On his own initiative⁴ he invited Austria and Prussia to enter into an agreement with him to protect the rights of the ex-Empress and her son—an agreement which the remaining Powers should only be asked to recognise in more peaceful times. Thus was established the secret treaty of May 31, 1815, between the Courts of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Prussia, by which the possession of the Duchies was guaranteed not only to Marie Louise, but also to the Prince of Parma.⁵ Metternich declared some years later that he only agreed to this treaty unwillingly and from pressure of circumstances. According to his own account, as early as May 1815, he

¹ Klinkowström (already quoted), p. 562. The passage referring to it runs: "The reversion of these lands will be determined by common consent of the Courts of Austria, Russia, France, Spain, England, and Prussia, having at the same time regard to the reversionary rights of the house of Austria and of his Majesty the King of Sardinia over the said countries."

² *Ibid.*, p. 563.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 562.

⁴ Metternich to Vincent, January 12, and February 18, 1817.

⁵ The treaty is given by F. Martens: "Recueils des traités conclus par la Russie," vol. iii., 1808-1815, p. 534. The clause respecting the Prince runs: "They [the Duchies] will pass to her son [Marie Louise's] and to his descendants in the direct line."

had foreseen that Alexander was not in earnest about the matter, but was merely playing a diplomatic game, guided by the desire to pose as knight-errant.¹ If Metternich really penetrated the Tsar's motives at that time, he cannot have experienced any disillusionment when, in 1818, Alexander was the first to lend a hand in abolishing the Prince of Parma's succession to the throne.

¹ Metternich's Despatch of February 18, 1817.

CHAPTER VI

NAPOLEON II

NOTHING could have been more terrible to Marie Louise than to see Napoleon issue victorious from the struggle with his enemies. Then his decisive orders would have brought her and her son back to his side. Nothing disquieted her more than this possibility. Far sooner would she have passed her days in a cloister than share the Emperor's throne.¹ Neither did she wish to see France again.² It is remarkable that she was disgusted with the French for doing precisely what she was guilty of herself. It appeared to her, an unpardonable crime on the part of the French nation, first to abandon Napoleon, and then to turn from Louis XVIII. with the same fickleness with which they had treated their Emperor. "What a nation!" she said to Magawly, Minister of Parma. "Unrighteous, shameless, godless. I am determined never again at any price to set foot on the abominable soil of France!"³ Therefore she—once Empress of France—desired success to the flag of the Allied armies. She writes to Francis: "I pray God that He will soon bring you back successful and bless

¹ Statement by Marie Louise, as given in a report of April 14, 1815. M. I.

² On July 7 she writes to the Emperor Francis: "I beg you, Sir, to remember what I said to you the day before your departure—that it would never be possible for me under any circumstances to return to France." See also Talleyrand's despatch of April 23 to Louis XVIII. Pallain, "Corresp. de Talleyrand," p. 407.

³ Report of April 3, 1815. M. I.

your arms.”¹ Certainly her sister, the Archduchess Leopoldine, who addressed the following lines to Marie Louise, was of a different opinion: “Dear Louise,—I am directed to send you the enclosed letter immediately.² I can give you very good news of the Emperor Napoleon, who is quite well.”³ The young and inexperienced Archduchess had no perception of what was passing in the heart of her elder sister who, for the sake of her passion for Neipperg, disowned her lawful husband, and the nation whose Princess she had been. Napoleon was deeply wounded that Marie Louise, with the King of Rome, did not answer to his call. It was a matter of the utmost importance to him to be able to prove, by the presence of his wife and son, that the Court of Vienna was not opposed to him. Before taking the field, he endeavoured once more to separate Austria from alliance with his opponents. For that purpose he sent Montrond, one of Talleyrand’s devoted adherents, to Vienna, to inquire into Metternich’s sentiments, as also those of the Powers in league with the Emperor Francis.⁴ Montrond went not only in the character of the Emperor’s plenipotentiary; he was at the same time the envoy of Fouché,⁵ who wanted in this way to obtain more reliable information as to what his present master might expect from the Allied Powers. This double part speaks to the adventurous nature of this diplo-

¹ Marie Louise to her father, June 3, 1815.

² The letter mentioned here is not to hand.

³ Tapp von Tappenburg, the Commissioner of Police at Schönbrunn, found the Archduchess’s letter in Marie Louise’s apartment on July 5. Although in fragments, he was able to piece them together. On July 6 it was handed over to Hager, Prefect of Police.

⁴ Fleury de Chaboulon, “Mémoires avec annotations manuscrites de Napoléon 1^{er},” published by Lucien Cornet, 1901., vol. i., p. 289, and notes, p. 289.

⁵ Metternich to Merveldt, April 21, 1815. Supplementary despatches of Wellington, vol. x., p. 146. “Corresp. de Talleyrand avec Louis XVIII. par Pallain,” p. 381.

matic agent, who was described as a highly "dangerous revolutionary."¹ Metternich had known him from the time of his embassy in Paris, where he had lost many a good gold piece to him at play.² Wessenberg points him out as one of those people who fumble in everybody's pocket without being actually stigmatised as a thief.³ Montrond was soon convinced that Napoleon had no hope of finding favour in the sight of his opponents. With Alexander's consent, Metternich and Nesselrode told him plainly, no one would ever make terms with the usurper.⁴ This information was not meant for Napoleon's benefit only. His adherents, especially Fouché, must be informed how matters stood. With these they went even a step further. The Powers were prepared to grant them every guarantee for providing themselves with a monarchical and representative form of government. They were willing to pledge themselves that the new Ministry should be formed of the men who were most clearly denominated by public opinion. Also that two-thirds of the most important offices at Court and in the civil and military services should be given to those persons who had played a part in the expulsion of the Bourbons.⁵ The Princes also promised that in case the French

¹ Hager's Report of April 6, 1815, M.I.

² Report of April 11, 1815. M.I.

³ Wessenberg Posthumous Papers, No. 80: "He was one of those men who pick every one's pockets without being treated as a thief." For information as regards Montrond, see Welschinger's article in *La Revue de Paris*, February, 1895.

⁴ Metternich to Count Merveldt, in London. Vienna, April 21, 1815. In a memorandum jotted down for Montrond on behalf of the Powers it says: "... M. de Montrond, who appeared at Vienna to sound the intentions of the Powers, returns to France to insinuate as follows to the leaders of the day: 'The Powers will never consent to Bonaparte or his family reigning.'"

⁵ Instructions for Montrond's use. "That two-thirds of the posts at Court, civil as well as military, are to be filled by men who were among the Revolutionists."

declared for Louis XVIII., they would prevail upon him to accept the conditions imposed by them.¹ Should the King, however, refuse his consent, the nation would then be free to choose another ruler.²

On April 9, Montrond left Vienna.³ Some days earlier Bresson de Valensole, the agent of the French Marshals, had set out on the return journey to France. Metternich had given the Prefect of Police, Baron von Hager, the following instructions with regard to him: "He may have what he chooses about him, but his instructions are of such a nature that he must be allowed to leave us in good temper."⁴ Through the medium of these two men, Fouché became intimately acquainted with the intentions of the Powers. From this moment, by various methods of which we have no knowledge, a brisk intercourse was started between Napoleon's Minister of Police and Metternich. To the monarchs assembled at Vienna, it was highly important that in France itself they should sap the ground of renewed activity beneath the feet of the Emperor who had recently returned to the country. No one was more fitted for that task than Fouché. For this reason nothing was to be omitted which might induce this influential personage to make a public abjuration of his present sovereign; and not of Napoleon only, but of his whole dynasty; for such was the desire of the Viennese Cabinet. It is, therefore, absolutely inaccurate to doubt this design of Metternich's and to accuse him of double-dealing with Fouché.⁵

¹ Metternich to Merveldt, April 21, 1815.

² Montrond's instructions. "That the whole must be accepted by whoever is to reign; by Louis XVIII., if he consents, but on the condition that shall have been notified to him, that on his refusal he will be considered to have refused for himself and his whole family."

³ Metternich's despatch of April 10, 1815.

⁴ Metternich to Hager, April 1, 1815.

⁵ Welschinger, "*Le Roi de Rome*," chapter viii.: "The intrigues between Fouché and Metternich in 1815."

It has been said of Metternich, that while he exclaimed to Montrond: "The Regency! we would not have it in any case,"¹ he was actually aiming for this goal, with the secret co-operation of the French Minister of Police.² Fouché who only cared to rule, no matter under whom, had certainly made a proposition in Vienna, in April 1815, to proclaim the Prince of Parma Emperor of France.³ But Metternich was by no means inclined to consent to such an idea. He had given no such authority to Baron Ottenfels who, under the assumed name of Mr. Henry Werner, was to meet Fouché's emissary at Basle. We know that Napoleon received information of this pre-concerted meeting even earlier than Fouché himself, and that he sent Fleury de Chaboulon to Basle to spy out Metternich's plans and the intrigues of his own Minister of Police.⁴ It is also equally well known that no actual expression of opinion passed between Ottenfels and Fleury de Chaboulon, because each strove to get the other to speak first. But when Fleury tells us that the Austrian emissary sounded him on the subject of Marie Louise's regency,⁵ the Frenchman certainly reports more than was ever said by Ottenfels. From Metternich's notes at this time, written in his own hand, it is clearly evident that he would not hear of a regency during the minority of Napoleon's son. Ottenfels—unless he voluntarily exceeded his mission—was not empowered upon his own initiative to acknowledge the young Prince of Parma as ruler of France. In the "Declaration" entrusted to him for Fouché's confidant, it is expressly

¹ Talleyrand to Louis XVIII., April 13, 1815, in "Corresp. de Talleyrand, par Pallain," p. 381.

² Welschinger, already quoted.

³ Metternich's Posthumous Papers, vol. ii., p. 212.

⁴ Fleury de Chaboulon. New edition, 1901, vol. ii., p. 1, and following.

⁵ Fleury de Chaboulon, vol. ii., pp. 12 and 21.

stated: "Neither Napoleon nor his issue."¹ On the contrary, the following proposals were made: "1. Louis XVIII. No emigrants. All exiled. 2. Louis XVIII. No Prince of the elder branch. No emigrants. The succession to pass over to the house of Orleans. 3. The Duke of Orleans and his line."² In return for the acceptance of one of these three plans, Metternich promised a cessation of hostilities. Ottenfels was not to wait more than ten days for an answer; in view of military operations, on no account could a longer term be granted. It was not Austria, but the Emperor Alexander, who advocated the establishment of a regency. In case this were impossible, the Tsar wished the Duke of Orleans, rather than Louis XVIII., to succeed to the throne.³ To the same influence must be attributed the fact that Metternich, in his instructions, empowered Ottenfels to listen to any suitable proposals as regarded the regency, without putting forward any suggestions himself.⁴ At the same time he was to make it clear from the first, that the regency was in decided opposition to the wishes of the Court of Vienna.⁵ This expression on the part of Ottenfels was no mere pretence. That is best demonstrated by the communications which Metternich made to England. "The principles laid down by me," he writes to Count Merveldt, "do not allow the

¹ "Pièce B. Déclaration." "Pas de Napoléon ni de sa race." Written in Metternich's own hand.

² *Ibid.* "1. Louis XVIII. Pas d'émigrés; tous bannis. 2. Louis XVIII. Pas des Princes de la première branche et point d'émigrés. La succession passant à la lignée d'Orléans. 3. Le duc d'Orléans et sa lignée." It is therefore inaccurate of Metternich to say (vol. i., p. 213) that Ottenfels' instruction runs: "Listen to everything and reply to nothing."

³ Metternich to Merveldt, April 21, 1815: "He [Alexander] desires the regency in the first place, in default of that he wishes that the crown should pass to the duc d'Orléans."

⁴ Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. ii., p. 515.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Emperor to exclude the possibility of a regency: but, far from supporting or maintaining it—rather completely averse to its establishment than otherwise—the Emperor will never permit it to be the sole aim for which the Powers are striving.”¹ According to Metternich’s opinion, any active intervention on the part of Austria in the internal affairs of France would be seriously harmful to the Viennese Cabinet in the position it occupied, not only towards that country but, especially, towards the other Powers. “This,” he continues, “would certainly be the case in which the Emperor would find himself placed, were his grandson, now a minor, to ascend a throne which has long been shaken by storms.”² After all this, it cannot be seriously contended that Austria wished to allure Fouché with the prospect of the regency. For Napoleon, however, the mission of Ottenfels was of decided importance. That which he had still deemed feasible, in spite of the act of outlawry of March 13, 1815, must now appear to him impracticable. The meeting between Fleury and Ottenfels no longer left any doubt that the Powers were firmly resolved not to lay down their arms until Napoleon had been rendered harmless for evermore. Now, at length, he realised that all efforts to win Austria to his side were useless. Thrown exclusively on his own resources, Napoleon did not hesitate to take the well-defined path which proclaimed him the armed confederate of the Jacobins. Even towards the middle of April, Dalberg had said: “Bonaparte has thrown off the mask; he is Mohammed at the head of his army of fanatics; he is Robespierre, girt with the sword, as head of all the Jacobins in the world.”³ A man so keen-sighted as Napoleon could hardly have overlooked the fact that this letting loose

¹ Metternich to Merveldt in London, April 21, 1815.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dalberg to the Baroness Dalberg, in Mannheim, Vienna, April 11, 1815. M.I.

of the revolutionary element would not adequately reinforce his strength for the struggle with his opponents. He had been irrevocably injured by the widespread knowledge of a fact that could be no longer controverted; namely, that his fictitious negotiations with the Powers, especially with Austria, had only been intended to deceive the populace. Now he might strive in vain to make the Court of Vienna detested by his false representations. Who would now believe that Marie Louise was suffering intensely from her enforced separation from him, or that she had spent thirty sleepless nights on this account? ¹ Already, even, we see him obliged to adopt stronger methods in order to rouse the nation to a voluntary sacrifice. By means of the so-called "additional clauses to the Constitution of the Empire," which assured freedom of worship and of the Press, the conversion of the former legislative body into a Chamber of Representatives, and the Senate into a Chamber of Peers, he hoped to bind the liberal classes to himself. It soon became evident, however, that the new Constitution satisfied no one; it was seen to be nothing more than a compulsory charter, a revised and improved edition of the Constitution of the Empire.² The voting on the new liberal Constitution signified a failure for the Emperor which could not even be concealed by that scene, enacted with the greatest pomp in the "Field of May," where the result of the voting was made known. The question put by Napoleon to the National Guard, whether they were ready to defend with their lives the eagle entrusted to them, obtained no inspiring echo. Only the old Guards took the oath for their former leader with enthusiasm and genuine affection. "When they defiled before the Emperor,"

¹ "Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}," vol. xxviii., p. 246.

² Broglie, "Souvenirs," vol. i., p. 304. Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iii. p. 214.

relates the Duc de Broglie, an eye-witness, "their looks were illumined with ardent and unwonted fire, while on their lips one seemed to read, '*Morituri te salutant.*'" ¹ That Napoleon had no longer the whole French nation at his back was very evident from the election of Lanjuinais, a Senator hostile to the Empire, as President of the Deputies. After this election the Emperor must perforce resign all hope of guiding and governing the Assembly according to his wishes. Soon he was to regret the convocation of this Chamber as one of his greatest mistakes.

Under somewhat unfavourable auspices, Napoleon joined his army on June 12. He entered upon the campaign with none of that consciousness of victory which had formerly led him on to battle. Now his mind was agitated by very different feelings. Although intoxicated by the review of 100,000 men, he could not but admit that France did not possess sufficient weapons to supply so great a number, and that eventually he must succumb, even were he at first to win two or three victories.² He had prophesied aright. Six days had scarcely elapsed ere he was a ruined man. At Waterloo he had suffered the most crushing defeat. Broken down and shattered with grief, mentally and physically exhausted, he returned to the Palais Elysée on June 21, at four o'clock in the morning.³ "Do not remain here an hour," Carnot said to him; "depart at once and place yourself at the head of the army." "I have no longer an army," was the Emperor's laconic reply, as he buried his face in his hands.⁴ He would have done better to follow Carnot's advice, instead of looking to

¹ Broglie, "*Souvenirs*," vol. i., p. 307.

² Lebzeltern to Metternich, Rome, November 9, 1815. Thus Lucien expressed himself to the Austrian Ambassador in Rome.

³ Thibaudeau states this, vol. vii., p. 393. Pasquier, "*Mémoires*," vol. iii., p. 239, gives 8 A.M. as the time of his arrival.

⁴ Carnot, "*Mémoires*," vol. ii., p. 510.

the Chamber of Representatives for help in his misfortunes. Having left his troops in the lurch in order to hasten to Paris, he ought to have taken over the Dictatorship, to have proclaimed a state of siege throughout France, and to have collected all patriots about his person by an appeal to their love of the mother country. This was also his brother Lucien's idea, who urged the Emperor to mount his horse and ride at the head of his faithful adherents to the Chamber, the dissolution of which he should pronounce forthwith.¹ This last measure seemed all the more urgent since the Chamber, on the proposal of Lafayette, had been declared to be permanent, and any one who ventured to dissolve it would be declared guilty of high treason. This resolution was sufficient proof that henceforth the Assembly of Deputies meant to be the masters of France. If Napoleon intended to hold his position against them and to keep the power in his own hands, he ought to have followed Lucien's advice. But the Napoleon who was now struggling with his destiny was no longer the Napoleon of old. Even before he joined his army, the authoritative tone, the self-confidence of earlier days, had deserted him. After the defeat of Waterloo he was still more exhausted. He vacillated, and could no longer summon up the energy which Lucien demanded of him. Whilst Napoleon failed to take the decisive step which might possibly have made him once more the undisputed ruler of France, the feeling against him in the Chamber increased more and more. Regnaud, one of his most faithful followers, considered it his duty to inform him that the Chamber had pronounced his deposition, unless he would abdicate of his own accord—which all the world expected of him.² Thus the word was

¹ Jung, "Lucien Bonaparte," vol. iii., p. 332. Carnot, vol. ii., p. 511. Miot de Melito, vol. iii., p. 407.

² Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 240.

uttered which would lead to the solution of the crisis. At first Napoleon would not hear of abdication. He strode up and down the room from end to end in his excitement. "Even though they deprive me of power," he was heard to say, "I will not abdicate. The Chamber consists only of Jacobins and place-seekers. I ought to have expelled them."¹ Regnaud, Davout, General Solignac, Durbach, struck by the imminence of his peril, persuaded him to submit himself to the deputies. Almost yielding to the insistence of these men, he still asked time for further consideration. The Chamber, admonished by Fouché,² was only prepared to grant him an hour at the utmost. Lafayette had already announced his intention of moving the Emperor's deposition unless he decided immediately. Once more Solignac appeared at the Elysée, accompanied by several deputies; his language was now that of a man who has to make a last, solemn appeal. Then Lucien and Joseph, who had hitherto been opposed to the abdication, united their efforts to those of the other personages assembled at the Palace. Finally, upon the day after he returned from the battlefield to the Palace, Napoleon's resistance was completely overcome. "Write to these gentlemen"—he turned to Fouché with a smile of irony—"to keep calm; they shall be satisfied."³ Hereupon he dictated his form of abdication to Lucien. This document, famous throughout all ages, contains the following words: "My political life is ended, and I proclaim my son Emperor of the French, with the title of Napoleon II. . . . Be united, all of you, for the common weal, and remain an independent nation." If one is to believe Lucien, the Emperor would never have thought of abdicating in favour of his son. "What!" he had ex-

¹ Thibaudeau, "Histoire de France, Empire," vol. vii., p. 405.

² Carnot, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 512.

³ Thibaudeau (already quoted), p. 405.⁷

claimed, "an Austrian regency! Rather the Bourbons!" It was only in consequence of vehement reproaches that he resolved to insert this passage in his act of abdication: "I proclaim my son Emperor of the French, with the title of Napoleon II.," murmuring to himself meanwhile, "my part is played out."¹ Lucien seems only to have thought of replacing the Emperor by the King of Rome. At least he assures us that even in June 1815 he had expected Napoleon would retire at the "Field of May," and place the crown upon his son's head.² In all probability Lucien intended to secure for himself the leading part in the regency which then seemed to be inevitable. This was again his secret design. But Napoleon saw through his brother. Whilst apparently yielding, he certainly flattered himself that he was still the man to circumvent all such intrigues. It was an excellent idea to link together in his deed of abdication the independence of the nation with the proclamation of his son. In this manner, he still hoped to carry a majority of the deputies along with him, and especially the army, and to create a barrier between it and the Bourbons which would have made their return at any future time an impossibility.³ He was still able to foster secret hopes of remaining the leading spirit, and of being able to seize the first favourable opportunity of recapturing the real authority, under the ostensible rule of his son; a state of things which Fouché feared above all else. But would the Chamber agree to the Emperor's wishes and declare Napoleon II. actual ruler of France? Before it came to that, both

¹ Lebzelten to Metternich, Rome, November 9, 1815: "It was only by dint of reproaches that he consented to abdicate in favour of the King of Rome; then he kept on repeating: 'My part is played out;' there was no means of rousing him from his apathy." So said Lucien himself to Lebzelten.

² Lucien to Cardinal Consalvi, July 14, 1815, communicated to the *Revue Napoléonienne*, February to March 1902, p. 248.

³ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 243.

Chambers resolved to elect an executive commission, consisting of five members. Regnaud, prompted by Fouché, had brought forward this motion. All unconsciously he served this foe of Napoleon as a tool to prevent a council of regency being formed. The Minister of Police was intriguing on all sides to render the candidature of Napoleon II. impossible. The game he had to play was all the easier, because the majority were dominated by the fear that Napoleon might take the opportunity of his son's proclamation to throw himself into the arms of his soldiers and thus defend the rights of his heir.¹ Fouché said to the patriots: away with the Bourbons, but let us be prudent, and avoid pledging ourselves wholly to any government whatsoever. He admonished his adherents to declare themselves formally in favour of the old royal dynasty, to whom they would be in a position to dictate terms, in the event of their return becoming inevitable.² These agitations on the part of Fouché hindered a unanimous vote being given in favour of Napoleon II. Such was the spirit of the deputies on learning the answer given by Napoleon when the Chambers offered their thanks to him for his voluntary abdication. "Unless my son is proclaimed," he declared to the deputation of Peers, "my renunciation is invalidated." Under the influence of this threat, the question of Napoleon II.'s succession was discussed at the evening sitting of the Peers on June 22. Joseph, Lucien, Jérôme, Cardinal Fesch, and other dignitaries of the Empire, eighteen in number, had been present on this occasion, in their richly embroidered robes of State, which tended to give the impression of something quite unusual. All present felt themselves to be taking part in an event which should decide the destiny of the State. In fact this Assembly recalled the

¹ Thibaudeau (already quoted), vol. vii., p. 410.

² *Ibid.*

great sessions during the time of the Revolution of 1789.¹ The most ardent adherent of Napoleon II. was General Labédoyère who, after the return of the Bourbons, expiated his fidelity and devotion to his Emperor with his life. Full of youthful ardour—he was scarcely thirty years of age—he made straight for his aim. He sided with Lucien Bonaparte, who had cried: “The Emperor has abdicated, long live the Emperor!” He was deeply hurt when Count Pontécoulant declared he would never acknowledge a child as his king, much less a sovereign who did not even reside in France. But when at last Count Boissy agreed with Pontécoulant as to the adjournment of this question, and wanted the constitution of a provisional government settled before all else, Labédoyère’s indignation knew no bounds. In a voice excited by unrestrained passion, he cried aloud to the Assembly: “If the son is not recognised, not crowned, the father’s abdication is null and void.” He did not shrink from declaring that Napoleon would, in that case, find sufficient Frenchmen to shed their blood for him.² He saw himself in the front rank of these. Then, suddenly fixing his flashing eyes upon a certain corner of the hall, he burst forth in bitter invective. “Probably,” he said, “the Emperor will be betrayed again; there are perhaps corrupt generals who are at this very moment preparing to desert him. But let us bring in laws to brand them as traitors. If the betrayer’s name be cursed, his house demolished, his family exiled, there will soon be no traitors, no more base intriguers, such as have brought about this final disaster, whose confederates, or even instigators, are perhaps even now sitting in our midst.” A tumult of wild anger followed this speech. “Do you imagine yourself among a regiment of the Guards?”

¹ Pontécoulant, “Souvenirs,” vol. iii., p. 397.

² Villemain, “Souvenirs contemporains,” vol. ii., p. 338. “Archives parlementaires,” vol. xiv., p. 508.

rang out from Lameth's seat. Masséna hurled these words at him: "Young man, you forget yourself."¹ When the uproar—which echoed long in the memory of those present—had subsided, the struggle for the rights of Napoleon II. was renewed. Count Ségur now entered the lists on behalf of the Prince's succession. In his name alone—he opined—could the provisional government negotiate with foreign powers, and it must therefore adopt the title of regency. In this he was supported by Lucien, Joseph, the Duke de Bassano, the Counts Röderer and Flahault. Their opponents, however, demanded that at this critical juncture they should no longer concern themselves with individuals but, in the words of Count Decrès, Napoleon's former Minister of the Marine, think first of their country, which stood in such pressing need of the formation of a government for its defence.² This appeal to patriotism produced its effect. They proceeded to choose two members whom the Peers were to send to the new provisional government which was to be appointed. The choice fell on Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, and Baron Quinette, who, together with the three representatives chosen on the same day by the two Chambers—Carnot, Fouché, and General Grenier—constituted what Napoleon mockingly described as the Government of the "Five Emperors."³ The attitude of General Labédoyère—passionate rather than politic—led to defeat, in spite of the assistance accorded him.⁴ When the Peers separated at 1 A.M., they bore away with them the impression that the Empire of Napoleon II., scarcely come to the birth, had already ceased to exist. This at all events was the

¹ Pontécoulant, respecting this sitting, vol. iii., p. 397, and following. Villemain, "Souvenirs," vol. ii., p. 322, and following. "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 505, and following.

² "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 510.

³ Ernouf, "Duc de Bassano," p. 662.

⁴ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 252.

conviction of a prominent contemporary who witnessed this remarkable sitting of the French "Lords."¹ Nor did the further course of the debate upon the proclamation of the Emperor's son contradict this view. Fouché, in whose house a secret meeting of several influential deputies was held during the night of June 22-23, had made sure of that. Under the presidency of the Minister of Police, a plan was evolved by which the numerous Bonapartists present in the Chamber might be hindered from proclaiming Napoleon II. It was unanimously agreed not to drive them to extremities, but to deprive them of the fruits of their endeavours by pretending to agree with them,² although in reality this was an unsubstantial and feigned agreement. Thus prepared for the fray, the session of the two Chambers opened at half-past eleven in the morning of June 23. The question of the succession, still left undecided on the 22nd by the Peers, who had now cleared the way for it by putting aside the orders of the day, was to come to the vote at the memorable sitting of the 23rd. The debate was opened by young Béranger, who was greatly esteemed. After eulogising the abdication of Napoleon as one of the most brilliant examples of his patriotism, as a deed which would entitle him to rank in the eyes of posterity with Titus and Marcus Aurelius, he asked the Assembly: "Is the newly elected provisional government responsible for its actions or not?" Béranger himself pleaded for its responsibility.³ Count Defermon, a very able counsellor of the late Empire, at once profited by these constitutional doubts to gain the votes of the Chamber in favour of Napoleon II. In his eyes there was no ques-

¹ Villemain, "*Souvenirs contemporains*," vol. ii., pp. 343 and 344. See also what Gentz is reported to have said on this subject, *Klinkowström* (already quoted), p. 656.

² Duvergier, "*Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France*," vol. iii., p. 75.

³ "*Archives parlementaires*," vol. xiv., p. 522.

tion of the non-liability, or the responsibility of the five men elected, since the Empire had certainly not ceased to exist with Napoleon's abdication. "I ask you, my lords," rang out his address, "have we an Emperor of the French? Yes or No? There is not one amongst us who would answer otherwise than: 'We have one in the person of Napoleon II.'" "Yes, yes," resounded from all sides of the hall. "If it were made apparent," he continued, "that we rallied round the Constitution and declared in favour of the head whom it indicates, it would no longer be possible to say that the National Guard hesitate to give their assistance because they are expecting Louis XVIII." Cries of "No, no," from many voices now interrupted the speaker. "We shall pacify the army," he continued, "who desire the maintenance of a Constitution, so that any future doubt of the constitutional stability of the Napoleonic dynasty disappears." After this clear and convincing speech, devoid of all ambiguity, indescribable jubilation prevailed in the hall. Hats were waved, and the enthusiastic cry was heard, "Long live the Emperor!"¹ This tide of sentiment in favour of the Bonapartists was now to be utilised by another Imperial counsellor, Count Boulay de la Meurthe, in order to induce the Chamber to proclaim Napoleon's son Emperor on the spot.² But this proposal did not meet with the same enthusiastic reception as the speech of his predecessor. Exclamations of approval were indeed heard, but they were drowned in the noisy commotion which prevailed throughout the Assembly. Many desired to give utterance to their own views, indeed several spoke simultaneously from their places, without waiting for the President's authorisation.³ Great as was the fear of the return of the Bourbons,

¹ "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 523.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* Villemain (already quoted), p. 379.

they shrank nevertheless from tying their hands for ever by such a declaration as that which had been demanded by Count Boulay de la Meurthe. Fouché had not worked upon men's minds in vain ; his insinuations had succeeded in paralysing the resolution of the deputies for any decisive step. But the Bonapartists themselves also committed some tactical mistakes. The Imperialist General Mouton-Duvernet said : " Proclaim Napoleon II. and the army will be at the disposal of the nation for Napoleon II." " If you do not pronounce Napoleon II. Emperor," declared Count Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, " the army no longer knows whom it has to obey, under whose banner it has to fight, and for whom it sheds its blood "—a speech which brought upon him the rejoinder: " For the nation ! " The injurious impression made by intentionally identifying the nation with the person of Napoleon II. could never be eradicated—it paved the way for those who came forward to speak against the proclamation of the Emperor's son as ruler of France.¹ Dupin, above all, knew how to arrest attention, not only by his fiery eloquence, but also by the reminder that first and foremost came the national interests, to which all others must give way. " If Napoleon I., by his own confession, could not save the State," he proceeded to say, " how could Napoleon II. succeed in so doing ? What power, what importance, has he in the eyes of the foes united against his father ? What power does he possess to draw us together and march at our head ? Besides, are not this Prince and his mother captives ? Are we sure of their being restored to us ? And what probability is there that their return will reinforce us ? Therefore," he concluded, " we must struggle and act in the name of the Nation ; it will be the true guide of our actions, and this word has more weight than any other. To the Nation, to its free and

¹ Duvergier (already quoted), vol. iii., p. 78.

independent choice, we must look for a sovereign." "Why not the Republic at once?" a voice retorted.¹ With a motion of his hand, as though in repudiation, Dupin waved off the suggestion. It was evident that he wanted neither Napoleon II. nor the Republic. Because he gave no distinct expression to the thoughts by which he desired to win over the Chamber to his views, his speech left no lasting effect.² The Deputies wavered between two opinions. As the tumult grew, and irresolution continued to take possession of those present, they longed for a man who could show them the way out of this labyrinth leading to destruction. In this crisis of uncertainty, which exercised a paralysing effect upon the will, a young advocate from Aix, named Manuel, ascended the tribune. As the confidant of Fouché he had attended the secret nocturnal conclave of June 22-23. The Minister of Police had chosen him to be the mouthpiece of his own opinions on account of his great intelligence and the clear and lucid gift of oratory which made him a skilled debater.³ With Fouché, the law of self-preservation forbade the Chamber to lend itself just now to an act of the Bonapartists which should make the elevation of Napoleon II. to the throne of France appear an undoubted fact, a legitimate action of the people. He must have discussed in detail each phase of his plan of campaign with Manuel. Apparently, according to mutual agreement, the advocate from Aix conceived it his duty to allow all outbursts of excitement or anger to subside before he interfered at the critical juncture. His success seems to prove that he did not fail to profit

¹ "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 525.

² Villemain (already quoted), vol. ii., p. 382.

³ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 256. As to Manuel's *début*, see Villemain (already quoted), vol. ii., p. 382: likewise Pontécoulant, "Souvenirs," vol. iii., p. 417, and Duvergier (already quoted), vol. iii., p. 79.

by the psychological moment. From this hour dates Manuel's reputation as a weighty speaker; and it was he alone who, cleverly outwitting the most cunning Bonapartists, destroyed Napoleon II.'s chance of the Imperial crown. "It has been already pointed out to you," he began, "that the Allied Powers have made known their firm resolution not to treat with Napoleon, and it is to be feared that his son will meet with the same opposition on their part. But," he continued, raising his voice, "I ask you, is it a question of an individual man, or of a particular family? No, gentlemen, it is a question of country. The matter at issue is not the undoing of anything, not the banishment of the lawful heir to the throne, nor yet the renunciation of the hope that the Allies will distinguish between father and son. This is the sense in which, to my mind, we must fix the basis of this discussion; a discussion which I admit to be a great blunder. But inasmuch as it has been entered upon, the question must be decided."

As though he were an enthusiastic adherent of Napoleon II., he argued that his rights must be maintained inviolate under all circumstances, whether viewed from the constitutional standpoint, or from that of existing conditions. From the constitutional standpoint, because Napoleon had merely abdicated conditionally, in favour of his son; from the standpoint of existing conditions, because the nation, split up into various factions, needed for the defence of the country a name round which it could rally. Scarcely had this sentence left his lips before he gave vent to an opinion which had all the appearance of a murderous onslaught from a hidden ambush and cancelled all he had previously said on behalf of Napoleon II. To all appearances, he was actually convinced that the Powers would not pledge themselves to recognise the Emperor's son. "Even should it be otherwise," he said in cold-blooded tones, "remain

resolute not to place the interests of any individual over those of our country, and, gentlemen, however great your devotion to Napoleon, resolve to sacrifice your desires to the highest good of the State. *Till then* we must rally all France and consolidate all patriots in one firm and decided expression of opinion.”¹ Quite openly Manuel declared that they might now vote for Napoleon II. and afterwards let him drop, on pretext of the good of the State. But this clever advocate from Aix did not let the matter rest at the first blow. He effected a deeper and still more cutting stroke. Since Fouché feared nothing so much—and justly—as the establishment of a regency consisting of Napoleon’s brothers, Manuel also took the field against the latter, whereby he undermined at the same time a strong reason for the existence of Napoleon’s government.

After bringing the Chamber into the requisite frame of mind, he proposed a fictitious “order of the day,” which ostensibly upheld the claim of Napoleon II., while actually giving it its deathblow. In this pretended “order of the day,” Napoleon II. was acknowledged Emperor, in consequence of the abdication of Napoleon I., and by virtue of the Constitution of the Empire.² But there was no question of an *oath of allegiance*, which would have bound the French nation. And the full delusiveness of this acknowledgment—which only granted the outward form, while the spirit was disregarded—is made apparent in the second paragraph of the “order of the day,” which makes over all power to the Commission of the Provisional Government.³ As the Duc de Pasquier justly remarks: “If the Napo-

¹ Duvergier (already quoted), p. 81. “Archives parlementaires,” vol. xiv., p. 527.

² “Archives parlementaires,” vol. xiv., p. 527. “On Napoleon II. becoming Emperor of the French owing to the fact of the abdication of Napoleon I. and to the strength of the Constitutions of the Empire.”

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leonist party were satisfied with the mere form of words the actual results remained with their opponents."¹ But Fouché harvested the greatest triumph, together with his pupil Manuel, whose clever advocacy of his cause had helped him to victory.² The anxiety as to the result of the sitting which Fouché had experienced on the eve of the 23rd was not justified.³ There was now no need to trouble himself about Napoleon II. This was soon apparent. The appeal addressed to the French people by the Provisional Government contained but one brief mention of Napoleon II., as though for form's sake. The secretary, Berlier, who was entrusted to draw up the appeal, wished to have the recognition of Napoleon II. more decisively expressed, but Fouché struck out the passage and replaced it by these few words, "The son is proclaimed."⁴ But even this seemed too much for Fouché. True to his maxim that Napoleon II. must be disposed of first, and then the Duke of Orleans, so that finally the crown might be placed on the head of Louis XVIII.,⁵ he now wished Napoleon's son to disappear altogether from the political horizon. When the question was raised in council, in whose name should the acts of regency be published, and Carnot in his frank way said, "simply in that of Napoleon II.," Fouché, the actual President of the Provisional Government, replied: "That is not so; they can only be issued in the name of the French people."⁶ Henceforward they appeared with the superscription: "*Au nom du peuple français.*" To Fouché, the whole debate upon the acknowledgment had been nothing but a comedy with which he had befooled the

¹ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 261.

² Villemain (already quoted), vol. ii., p. 387.

³ Pasquier (already quoted), vol. iii., p. 256.

⁴ "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 528.

⁵ Vitrolles, "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Bonapartists. The Commissioners of the Provisional Government, who had been sent to the enemy's camp on account of the opening of peace negotiations, were instructed not to mention the Emperor. "Give us peace," they said, "at whatever price you please; *we will submit to any government*; but bear in mind that we need some security in order that no new revolution shall break out."¹ When it was represented to them that this declaration did not tally with the recognition of Napoleon II, published in the *Moniteur*, they replied: "Regard all that as a farce; we have a free hand to do as we please." It is easily understood that such statements led to Metternich's remark: "In any case, a fine Government with fine securities!"² But when Fouché believed himself completely master of the situation and thought he had laid for ever the phantom of Napoleon II., the discussion which took place in the Chamber of Representatives on June 30 and July 1, must have been an unpleasant reminder of the deception he had practised. On this occasion the cry of "Long live the Emperor!" was repeatedly heard; an eloquent echo of the great enthusiasm of the army for its new chief.³ When Manuel again performed some of his juggling tricks, and did not even mention Napoleon in his address to the French people, which emanated from him, the Bonapartists could no longer restrain their dissatisfaction.⁴ They would not be pacified until the name of the newly acknowledged sovereign was inserted in the address.⁵ But nothing more came of it; Fouché got off with a mere shock. Even on July 1 he had deemed it advisable to be provided with a protest from the Powers against the rule

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, Hagenau, June 29, 1815.

² The same to the same.

³ "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 575.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 579. Pasquier, vol. iii. p. 282.

⁵ "Archives parlementaires," vol. xiv., p. 587. "His son is called to the Empire by the Constitutions of the State."

of Napoleon II.¹ Only in this way could the proviso made by Manuel in the Chamber on July 23 be fulfilled. Under the pressure of the protest made by the Allied Powers, to which Manuel had referred, the decisive moment arrived. Now, without being considered a renegade, it became possible to demand in the interest of the nation, as a sacrifice from the French people, that the son of Napoleon be declared to have forfeited the throne to which he had only just been raised. Fouché wanted a clear field for his intrigues in favour of the Bourbons, from whom he expected to receive a Minister's portfolio as the reward of his labours. He was not the man to bestir himself vainly on behalf of Napoleon II., whose cause he could not but deem completely lost, owing to the dominating influence of the Powers. Metternich said very plainly that the Emperor as an outlaw could never abdicate in another's favour;² just as he also disputed the right of the Chambers invoked by him to regard themselves as representatives of the nation's wishes.³ Fouché was well aware of

¹ "Supplementary Despatches, &c., of Wellington," vol. x., p. 641. Fouché to Wellington, Paris, July 1, 1815. "I must speak frankly to your lordship. Our condition of possession, our legal position, which has the double sanction of the people and the two Chambers, is that in which the grandson of the Emperor of Austria is the chief of the State. *We could not think of changing this condition of things, unless the nation had acquired some certainty that the Powers would revoke their promises, and that their united wishes were opposed to our actual Government.*" Friedrich von Weech is mistaken in his inference that this letter is favourable to Napoleon II. (*Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. xvi., p. 357).

² Metternich and Nesselrode to Wellington, Mannheim, June 26, 1815: "It is impossible to admit the legal power of Bonaparte and of the rights that he might wish to establish in favour of a third person by his abdication, because this very fact would mean the admission that we recognised a power of which we dispute his possession."

³ *Ibid.* "Neither the convocation of these Chambers, instituted by an illegal power, nor their composition, authorises the admission of a contrary principle, especially under circumstances in which these

this mental attitude of the Allies, as well as of their united resolve to suffer no one but Louis XVIII. as the sovereign of France. And since Fouché did nothing from enthusiasm, but always with a view to his own advantage, he forwarded the cause of Louis XVIII., from whom he had everything to hope. In order that he might not be taken unawares in his movements by Napoleon himself, who was dangerous even now, and hit upon all manner of adventurous plans, Fouché conveyed to him the advice to quit France as quickly as possible, since he could no longer vouch for his safety. For once Fouché did not lie, for a Prussian detachment had actually received orders to secure Napoleon and shoot him. In spite of all the base actions of which Fouché was capable, he did not wish to stain his life with this the most ignoble of all deeds: the betrayal of the fallen Emperor to his foes. It was indeed high time for Napoleon to escape. Not only the Prussians, but also the other Allied Powers, wanted to seize and render him for ever harmless to the world. Already the French Commissioners, who had gone to Hagenau to discuss the negotiations for peace, had been plainly told by the Allied Princes that unless Napoleon were given up to them, peace could not be concluded.¹ "Let him go wheresoever he will," wrote Metternich to Hudelist, "Napoleon must still be actually challenged."² On hearing that he had betaken himself to the harbour of

Chambers permit themselves to sanction two changes of Government in less than a fortnight's session."

¹ Overtures made by the Commissioners of the three Courts to the French Commissioners. Hagenau, July 1. "The three sovereigns consider the removal of Napoleon Bonaparte beyond the power of disturbing the tranquillity of France and of Europe as an essential and preliminary condition of peace and of a true repose. After what occurred last March the Powers must insist upon his being entrusted to their keeping."

² Metternich to Hudelist, July 3.

Rochefort, the Austrian Minister opined: "It would be very desirable to have him arrested."¹ Orders for this purpose were given forthwith.² "I hope, rather than expect," says Metternich in this connection, "that we may capture him. He has too many loopholes and ways of escape to fall into our hands so easily. The most stringent orders have been given for his detention. The town and garrison of Rochefort seem attached to him. The frigate is manned with his devoted followers."³ Watched by the English men-of-war, he could not slip out of harbour unobserved to set sail for America, which was his immediate goal. With the mistaken idea that by the English—his bitterest enemies—he would be treated with generosity as a fallen foe, and even received as a guest, he sought refuge on board the *Bellerophon* with Maitland, the captain of the vessel.⁴ At the same time he wrote to the Prince Regent. He placed himself under the protection of English laws. The Prince Regent and his Minister cared nothing for generosity or hospitable reception. They saw in him only "General" Bonaparte, who was beaten and their prisoner. "Now we may reckon upon a lasting peace," remarked Metternich on the news of the Emperor's capture, "for the focus of all enterprise is lacking."⁵ The English Premier was of opinion that Napoleon should on no account be allowed in England, where within a few months he would become an object of universal

¹ Metternich to Hudelist, July (no date of day).

² *Ibid.*, Paris, July 12, 1 o'clock A.M.

³ The same to the same, Paris, July 15, 1815.

⁴ Count Becker, accompanying Napoleon by order of the Provisional Government, wrote from Rochefort, July 15, 11 P.M., to St. Cyr, Minister of War: "His Majesty, convinced of the impossibility of getting away to the United States on any of the ships of war, and disdaining accessory means which might facilitate his passage to America, has taken the noble resolution of writing to the Prince Regent in England to ask his hospitality."

⁵ Metternich's despatch of July 18, 2 A.M.

sympathy and thus be the cause of increased agitation to France.¹ He would have preferred him to have fallen into the power of Louis XVIII., so that he might have brought him before a court-martial and condemned him to death as a rebel.² But since he had succeeded in evading the French myrmidons of the law, it was necessary to devise some plan—such as had already been projected before his return from Elba—for conveying him to a place where, removed from all communication with Europe, he would probably soon fall into oblivion.³ In the eyes of the English Minister the island of St. Helena answered these demands best, because it possessed but one approachable anchorage, under the sweep of its batteries, so that no one could get in or out of the harbour unobserved.⁴ The other Powers gave their consent, and thus it was determined that Napoleon, under the supervision of an English governor, appointed by the Commissioners of the ruling Powers,⁵ should be confined on the barren rock of St. Helena for the remainder of his days. On August 7, this great man, whose deeds for years past had filled the world not only with wonder and admiration but also with abhorrence, left Europe for ever, a solitary captive, on the English ship of the line the *Northumberland*. Never again would he wield that power, the exercise of which had become indispensable to him; never again would he see wife and child face to face. At the news of Napoleon's removal to St. Helena, Marie Louise, who had wished success to the enemies of her husband, and had welcomed his

¹ "Correspondence of Castlereagh," series ii., vol. x., p. 434.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 415 and 430.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Metternich to Hudelist, July 28.

⁵ Metternich to Hudelist, July 28: "We still continue to insist on the sending of Commissioners, not that the duty of safeguarding Napoleon will devolve upon them—since *divided* responsibility in this world is only *half* responsibility—but in order to keep us informed as to his life and well-being for the reassurance of the European public."

capture as the surest guarantee for a long-desired and universal repose,¹ awoke once more, for the last time, to a sense — although but a fleeting sense — of her wifely duty. "I hope," runs her letter of August 15 to the Emperor Francis, "that we shall now have lasting peace, since the Emperor Napoleon can no longer disturb it, I hope that he will be treated kindly and with clemency, and I beg you, dearest papa, to enjoin it. This is the only request I venture on his behalf, and the last time I shall concern myself about his fate, since I owe him some gratitude for the calm indifference in which he has allowed me to live, instead of making me unhappy."² How sharply this language contrasts with her earlier assurances of tender affection for the Emperor, uttered in the days of his glory! Now, indeed, there stands between Napoleon and herself a third person for whom her heart beats strong and full. With her letter of August 15, which remains to us as a very undesirable testimony of her state of mind, she herself annihilated her past history, and defaced the page wherein she is recorded Empress of France. So estranged does she feel from the country in which she once reigned, that she will have nothing — absolutely nothing — more to do with it. She is overjoyed that Louis XVIII. should resume possession of the throne which was once occupied by her illustrious husband. On July 9 the Bourbon had actually made his re-entry, now, as before, under the protection of foreign bayonets. After the imprecations called forth in the Chamber by the name of Louis XVIII., we may naturally suppose that "only hirelings and old women" would give him a good reception.³ Even that

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Baden (near Vienna), July 28, 1815. "I hope that if you are going to Italy shortly, it may be possible to let me come with you, especially now that the capture of the Emperor Napoleon promises repose, at least for a time, to the whole of Europe."

² The same to the same.

³ "Supplementary Despatches," vol. x., p. 676.

much was doubtful. On the day before his arrival, the voices hired to cry, "*Vivent les Bourbons!*" found no better echo than, "*A bas les Bourbons!*"¹ Even on the morning of July 9 a man was torn to pieces on the Place Vendôme because he wore the white cockade; for the same reason a Marshal was threatened with a similar fate, had he not effected a timely escape. Nevertheless the unexpected actually happened, and can only be explained by the celerity with which the French are wont to change their opinions. That same day Louis XVIII. was greeted by the Parisians with loud acclamations of delight—just as in 1814. "All accounts agree," so runs a letter of Schwarzenberg's, "and an eye witness has said that it is impossible to describe the enthusiasm of the populace, because none could depict or tell how great was this display of favourable sentiment towards the King. The people flung themselves to the ground, begging forgiveness with sobs and tears. What a nation!"² This spectacle of the French—who a short time before were hailing Napoleon as their saviour—now cringing before the Bourbon, awakened in Metternich the feeling that this nation was utterly and wholly bad at heart.³ "How deeply," he says on July 20, "the events of the last three months have taken hold upon the moral principle of the nation, and shattered the remains of that principle, can scarcely be realised. The difference between France in 1815 and in 1814 is no less marked than between the same France in the year 1814 and 1793."⁴

¹ "Supplementary Despatches," vol. x., p. 676.

² Prince Schwarzenberg to the Court Council of War, Dieuville, July 12, 1815. M. I.

³ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, July 28, 1815.

⁴ Metternich's Memoirs, upon the condition of affairs in France (in his own hand), Paris, July 20, communicated to Hudelist. He says: "The only service which Bonaparte rendered to France, and to Europe, was the curbing of Jacobinism; but even this service was not to outlast

Metternich, who noted this change, was not to be deceived as to the weakness of the new Government by the brilliant reception accorded to Louis XVIII. From the Royalists themselves, he heard the corroboration of their fears that the throne of the Bourbons would have no lasting existence.¹ The hatred felt for this dynasty made itself increasingly evident.² The adherents of Napoleon II. looked up once more. "Orleans, or the regency of the world-renowned child," writes Varnhagen von Ense from Paris, "this is all the French are in a condition to tolerate; the nation is more than ever imbued with the desire for independence."³ This disposition was not a little aggravated by the demeanour of the so-called "*Jacobins blancs*," as the Royalists of the first water were designated. At their head were the royal Princes, and the Duchesse d'Angoulême, who desired to eradicate everything which proceeded from the Revolution of 1789, or the Empire. Opposed to them, and united in a single class, were the Red Jacobins, the Orleanists and friends of the regency.⁴ The latter wore red carnations as their particular badge. It is interesting to note how the cult of Napoleon actually flourished during the presence of the foreign Princes. We can but wonder at the daring of the people who ventured to cry,

him, and he let loose Jacobinism once more, as his farewell to the world."

¹ Metternich's Memoirs, upon the conditions of affairs in France (in his own hand), Paris, July 20, communicated to Hudelist.

² Varnhagen von Ense to his wife, Paris, July 22, 1815. M. I.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Metternich to Hudelist, Paris, October 3, 1815. "France is split up into three great parties: the *Royalists*: these are for King and Constitution. There is the King. The *White Jacobins*; at their head stand the Princes of the Royal house, and at the head of the Princes the Duchesse d'Angoulême (a calm, gentle woman, like the late Queen of Naples, but far more circumspect). The *Red Jacobins*, the *Orleanists*, *amis de la régence*, &c. All these form a class consisting of people who are against kingly government, or are convinced it cannot last."

"*Vive l'Empereur!*"¹ in the Tuileries itself, in spite of the certain knowledge that they would be apprehended. The shopkeepers themselves said their best trade was done in likenesses of the Imperial family.² In the Palais Royal pieces of ten and twenty sous bearing the image of Napoleon II. sold at ten and twenty francs.³ At the barrier of Fontainebleau some one cried, "*Vive le Roi!*" and when, being joined by a few delighted Royalists, he hastily repeated, "*Vive le Roi—de Rome et son Papa!*" he naturally brought upon himself a severe thrashing.⁴ One caricature represented Louis XVIII., supported by nobles and clergy, climbing up a pole surmounted by a crown. The Archduke Charles and the King of Rome are looking on below. Suddenly the child says to his uncle, "I should like to go up, too," whereupon the Archduke checks him with the words: "The time for that has not yet come."⁵ Now, as formerly, the nation still hoped that Austria would support the Emperor's son. Hence the report that the Austrian soldiers, garrisoned in Paris, were taught their drill in French, with a view to being employed as the bodyguard of Napoleon II.⁶ The world was convinced that the Archduke Charles, the conqueror of Aspern, would come forward to protect his nephew's rights,⁷ and the establishment of a regency would be discussed between Talleyrand, Fouché, and Metternich.⁸ Fouché, when questioned on the subject by Gruner, replied that he was well aware of the accusation that he desired to place Napoleon II. on the

¹ Gruner's report to Hardenberg, Paris, August 7, 1815. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² *Idem, ibid.*

³ *Idem, August 22, ibid.*

⁴ *Idem, Paris, August 29, 1815, ibid.*

⁵ Gruner, Paris, September 17, 1815, Royal State Archives of Prussia.

⁶ *Idem, Paris, September 21, ibid.*

⁷ Gruner, Paris, September 16, 1815, Royal State Archives of Prussia.

⁸ *Idem, Paris, September 12, ibid.*

throne, but he did not trouble himself about such gossip.¹ What seems of far more importance is the fact that both Gruner, who was entrusted with the direction of the Prussian police in Paris, and the Crown Prince of Würtemberg, never doubted for a moment that Metternich was plotting in earnest to make the King of Rome Emperor of France.² But such an intention was just as remote as ever from the Court of Vienna. The Emperor Francis could not divest himself of the idea that only "bad" people cherished the desire for a regency;³ he knew well enough that his daughter had no wish to return to France and assume the reins of government under any title whatsoever. It is indeed true that some Bonapartist leaders, together with several generals, importuned Prussia with petitions in favour of the King of Rome or the Duke of Orleans. For fear of a reaction of hot-headed Royalists, which threatened their

¹ Gruner, Paris, September 16, *ibid.*

² *Idem*, Paris, September 14, *ibid.* : "... and I am firmly convinced that the policy of the Austrian Cabinet is very ambiguous, because it partly keeps Napoleon II. in view and partly its jealousy of Prussia, and, in all its secret negotiations, never loses sight of these two considerations." *Idem*, Paris, October 3, *ibid.* "The Crown Prince of Würtemberg holds the same view as I do regarding Prince Metternich and the Austrian Cabinet. He is convinced that the restoration of Napoleon II. is its secret end and aim."

³ The Emperor Francis's reply (in his own hand) to Metternich's despatch of July 18 : "No party is restrained or contented by the miserable and slack proceedings of the Government. This causes disquiet, excites a desire for the regency in the evil minded, so that they may acquire ascendancy ; in the great mass of the people, because they see in it the only chance of repose ; with the well-disposed there is a desire for an established succession, for the removal of the disaffected and of traitors, and a wish for a firm government ; so it comes about that no confidence, no security, reigns in the present state of affairs, one person does not trust another, and a delusion is dominant that after the withdrawal of the foreign troops the King may be dethroned and a civil war break out." A despatch of July 28, M.I., states that according to letters from Paris, "the Jacobin rabble" wishes for the regency of Marie Louise so that it may be able to rule during her supremacy.

existence, they initiated Gruner into their seditious schemes, which they desired to put into execution as quickly as possible.¹ They were thwarted by Prussia's disinclination to further the alliance between France and Austria by raising the Imperial Prince to the throne, thus lending new strength and prestige to the Court of Vienna at the expense of Berlin.² Deserted on all sides, the Bonapartists were not strong enough by themselves to proclaim the son of their idol as Emperor. In vain did Lucien Bonaparte remain in Rome, awaiting Austria's commission to restore his nephew to the throne of France.³ According to Gentz,⁴ it might perhaps have suited Austria's interests to intervene openly on behalf of Napoleon's son, whose adherents, at the least sign of encouragement from Vienna, would have become the most powerful of all parties in France,⁵ and would have borne back Napoleon II. in triumph to their country.⁶ But without the

¹ Gruner, Paris, September 20, *idem*, two despatches of September 24, *idem*, September 26, October 5, 13 and 18. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² *Idem*, Paris, September 24, *ibid.* "Napoleon II. would give such a preponderance to Austria and France that we must secure ourselves against it [his accession] as far as possible."

³ Lebzeltern to Metternich, Rome, November 9, 1815. "As soon as Austria wants me," said Lucien to Lebzeltern, "she will know where to find me. I am at her disposal, and she can count on me on every occasion."

⁴ Gentz, Vienna, July 19, 1815 (see Klinkowström [already quoted], p. 676): "When one thinks to what heights Austria might rise if she were to adopt openly the interests of Napoleon's son, we are astonished (and posterity will be still more so) that such a resolve is not counted as one of the probable—or even possible—contingencies of the hour."

⁵ Wessenberg's Posthumous Papers, No. 21, "Sur l'état de la France au commencement de juillet 1815." "With the least encouragement the party of Napoleon's son would doubtless have become the most numerous—it had already an immense majority before the return of the Bourbons."

⁶ Gentz says distinctly: "France would have received him without a dissentient voice." Klinkowström (already quoted), p. 696.

active support of the Emperor Francis, it was useless to think of such a project, which found its most determined opponent in the Emperor's daughter.¹ Now, after the capture of his son-in-law, Francis was less inclined than before to consider any enterprise of a nature likely to imperil the newly restored peace. Contrary to all expectation, however, the position of Louis XVIII. improved, and with this improvement vanished all hope that the young King of Rome, who was living in Vienna, ignorant of all these disputes, would ever be proclaimed as Napoleon II.

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815: "I kiss your hands a thousand times for all you say about France; you make me happy, for under no pretext could I have made up my mind to return to a country where the people are so corrupt and so faithless."

CHAPTER VII

THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT

By the secret treaty of May 31, 1815, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had pledged themselves to secure the succession to Parma, for all time, to Napoleon's son. They had also agreed to¹ win the consent of England, France, and Spain to this arrangement, when a suitable occasion arose. Marie Louise considered the return of Louis XVIII. to Paris the most opportune moment for the fulfilment of this article of the secret treaty. "Do you not think," she writes on July 20, from Baden, near Vienna, to her father, who was staying in the French capital, "that this would perhaps be a good moment in which to get from the English and French Cabinets their consent to that secret clause which secures the succession to the Duchies for my son? Perhaps this moment, when the King is so much indebted to you, would be favourable. Pardon me, dearest papa, for reminding you of this, but I know your goodness and your intentions as grandfather and guardian of my child, who has no protector but yourself."² She thinks of nothing beyond taking her Prince with her to Italy; she is full of impatience to make her entry into Parma in company with him.³ Powerless to bequeath a royal crown to

¹ "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," by F. Martens, vol. iii., No. 97, *see* chap. iv.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, July 20, 1815.

³ *Ibid.*, July 7, 1815.

him, she would like, at least, to see him adorned with a ducal coronet. But she seems to have forgotten what terror the name of Napoleon excited even yet at every Court, and not least at that of her father.¹ Metternich had only lent himself ostensibly to the secret treaty of May 31; he was far from raising a finger to assist in its consummation. On no account could the young Napoleon be allowed to visit Parma, where his appearance might revive hope in the adherents of the ruined dynasty.² Marie Louise was not to be left in doubt on this point. Already in August 1815 she was aware that she must take possession of Parma *alone*, or not at all. For her comfort, the prospect of a temporary separation was held out to her. But even if the Emperor Francis had demanded her immediate renunciation, she would not have delayed an instant, as an obedient daughter, to comply with this request. "It will cost me a great deal," she writes to Francis, "to separate from my son when, with your gracious assurance, I must travel to Parma; but you know what is best for me and for him, and I follow your fatherly advice blindly, in this as in everything else."³ Completely convinced that she had only to make the sacrifice, it never occurred to her that she could act otherwise, that there were duties which she owed to her child as well as to her father, and that above all she was called upon to remain near her infant son. Probably if it flashed across her mind that she ought not to leave him, she was alarmed at the same time by the threatened loss of the Duchies, which would leave her son without provision. A stronger character than Marie Louise would have let things come to extremities, but she, a weak woman, only "dared" to obey. Marie

¹ "Dépêches inédites de Gentz," vol. I., pp. 227-228, 307, 309.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I., p. 310.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815.



By Thomas Lawrence, P.R.A., painted.

[W. Brouncker, A.R.A., engraved.]

THE DUKE OF REICHSTAAT

Louise received no support from her father in her conflict with Metternich, whom she might otherwise have ventured to defy. The Emperor carried his delicacy towards the other Courts much too far. Not at any price would he allow himself to be suspected of upholding his daughter and grandson contrary to the will of Europe. Gentz is no doubt right in doubting whether Alexander I., had he been Napoleon's brother-in-law, would have sacrificed the interests of his family with such apparent ease.¹ Francis, always more the Emperor than the father, wished to appear entirely above all partiality; for this reason he invariably put forward the Tsar as the champion of his daughter. When Marie Louise resolved to leave Vienna alone, without the Prince, it was in the belief that she was undertaking the journey solely as administratrix of his inheritance. "Meanwhile I implore you," so runs her letter to the Emperor, "not to forget my son's interests and, when peace negotiations are at length concluded, to insist very strongly upon his succession being firmly secured and confirmed by those Powers who have not already subscribed to this arrangement—this assurance is very necessary, both for my peace of mind and for his future welfare, so you must forgive me if I am always troubling you about it."² The statement that she was weak enough to abandon her son in order to don the purple of Parma³ herself must therefore be regarded as an injustice. She went to Italy far more with the intention of acting there on his behalf. Convinced that she had already suffered enough for the peace of Europe, she thought it impossible that still further and heavier sacrifices could be required of her. But already the idea was firmly fixed in Metternich's mind that the

¹ "Dépêches inédites de Gentz," vol. i., p. 229.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, November 14, 1815.

³ Houssaye, "1815," vol. i., p. 140.

Prince must be kept in Vienna and never permitted to ascend the throne of Parma. With Neipperg and the Emperor, he had long been trying to remove from Marie Louise's surroundings anything that could remind her of her former splendour, in order to lead up to the final step. Before setting foot on the soil of Parma, she must lay aside the imperial title by which, until now, she had always been distinguished. To avoid all appearance of abdication, this change of title was to be effected by means of a simple order of the Government of Parma. In future, all acts of Government were to be signed: "In the name of her Majesty the Archduchess Marie Louise of Austria, Duchess of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla."¹ "I confess," writes Metternich to Hudelist on this subject, "that I myself should have voted for the omission of the title of Majesty, were it not that an Infanta of Spain (the ex-Queen Maria Louisa of Etruria), filling a less exalted position both now and in the past, is travelling all over Europe, also invested with the title of Majesty."² Nothing in future is to remind her of her former imperial dignity. On that account Francis requested his daughter to make over to him an excellent portrait of herself by Gérard, which represented her as Empress of the French. He promised her in return a copy of a picture by a well-known Viennese artist, in which, however, she is not attired as Empress.³ Many subtle considerations lay behind this gradual divestment of her imperial state. Royalist France had every reason to be satisfied with such attentions.⁴ But

¹ Metternich to Neipperg, Milan, February 15, 1816: "Everything that might seem like abdication must be scrupulously avoided." *Idem* to Hudelist, February 15, 1816.

² Metternich to Hudelist, February 15, 1816.

³ Metternich to Neipperg, Vienna, August 7, 1816.

⁴ Duc de Richelieu to Baron Vincent, Paris, March 19, 1816: "The King has been deeply touched by the motives which have induced the Emperor of Austria to urge this decision." Royal State Archives of Parma.

the Court of Vienna was to furnish Louis XVIII. with still further proofs of its complete estrangement from Napoleon, whose son received at the same moment his official designation: Most Serene Highness Prince of Parma.¹ To avoid all possible misconceptions, Marie Louise was henceforth to appear as an Italian princess. Hard as it might be, her French attendants must be dismissed; for, according to Metternich, "at whatever cost she pensions them off, she gains enormously, not only in a pecuniary sense, but in moral consideration."² She, who so pressingly implores the Emperor to let Neipperg remain about her person,³ had no idea that he was precisely the man who had proposed to get rid "of the inconceivable swarm of French attendants."⁴ But on this point she did not show such compliance as in her resolve to renounce her imperial dignities. In laying these aside, she had a reasonable prospect of satisfying still further her profound desire for repose. This was hardly the case with the dismissal of her attendants, to whom she was so thoroughly accustomed. Here personal comfort and her reiterated expressions of dislike to new people played a decided part. "With respect to those of my household who are French," she writes at the first hint of such a demand, "it would

¹ Metternich to Neipperg, February 15, 1816.

² Metternich to Hudelist, February 15, 1816.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Baden near Vienna, July 28, 1816: "I will also beg of you, dear papa, to permit and command General Neipperg to return to me at Vienna, after he has brought his troops back to their destination,"—he was fighting against Murat in Naples—"he would be extremely useful to me in my household concerns, and also because I have confidence in him, and I should prefer to have one of my own countrymen with me, and I do not care to make new acquaintances. I have written to tell him this, and he is prepared to come, if you will give the order, especially as he has quite given up the diplomatic service."

⁴ Metternich's despatch of January 4, 1816.

be impossible to send them all away, for the unhappy creatures have followed me out of devotion and of their own free will, and I cannot leave them without bread; they are also good, peaceful people, to whom I am accustomed and attached."¹ Her firmness, however, as was so often the case with her, did not hold out long. At first, she was only prepared to dispense with "the Italian cooks and steward of the household." "Unfortunately," she adds, "there are examples in Parma, as indeed in the whole of Italy, that they are not to be trusted, and in this respect I should never know an instant's repose."² Her fear of poisoning extended even to the doctor; she was not willing to entrust the care of her person, nor the preparation of her prescriptions, to "Italian hands."³ But in Vienna they understood Marie Louise. There it was known well enough that her first resolution was not always her last. Consequently the attack upon her attendants was resumed, and this time her Imperial father himself stepped into the breach, "so as to leave her no loophole of escape."⁴ To the Emperor she replied: "To give you a fresh proof of my filial affection and submission to your will, I have made this further sacrifice for you, and the greater portion of my French attendants will be dismissed from my service and sent back to France, notwithstanding that they have given me the strongest proofs of fidelity and attachment."⁵ She would have been glad to retain Count Bausset in her service, since no one understood

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Metternich to Hudelist, February 15, 1816.

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, February 17, 1816: "I only retain in my service," she continues, "those attendants, women and cooks, and a few men in the stables, whose services I cannot dispense with, for whose good conduct I can vouch as well as for my own, and from whom I am firmly determined never to part."

the management of an establishment so well as he did.¹ Neipperg was entrusted with the delicate task of dismissing him. At Bausset's own request she granted him the title of "Honorary Grand Master" (*Grand-maître Honoraire*) "lest the people at home might think he had been ignominiously dismissed."² Hereafter she obeyed the demands of the Court in all these matters, and even went so far as to give up, at Neipperg's first suggestion, the green livery of Napoleon, because it was still used in the households of his family, adopting the archducal livery in its place, "because," as she remarks, "I will keep nothing that might remind the people of the past."³ After the dismissal of her French household, Count Neipperg remained the most important person in her *entourage*. She cannot show the Emperor sufficient gratitude for his kindness in leaving her "such a faithful servant and friend" in this strange and unknown land.⁴ After this man, so full of chivalrous feelings towards her,⁵ next in her affections stands Countess Scarampi who, at her request, agreed to accompany her to Parma. In gratitude for this, Marie Louise now begged her father that Count Scarampi, then staying in Paris, be permitted to take up his permanent residence in Parma; "and I should be very glad"—runs these lines—"for my good Countess to have the pleasure of meeting her husband again there [in Parma], for she is really making a great sacrifice by accompanying me to a country where people say there are no distractions, no society, no cultivated—and few worthy—women."⁶

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815.

² The same to the same, February 24, 1816.

³ The same to the same, January 5, 1816. According to her habit of continuing to use the date of the recently expired year, Marie Louise again writes 1815 by mistake for 1816.

⁴ The same to the same, December 16, 1815.

⁵ "Dépêches inédites de Gentz," vol. i.

⁶ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Oct. 31, 1815, and March 3, 1816.

At last the day of her departure, for which she had longed so impatiently, drew near;¹ but now she was terrified at the prospect of leaving her son alone in Vienna. "At the first moment," she wrote on receiving the news that she might start on her journey to Italy, where the Emperor Francis was staying, "at the first moment, I thought only of the pleasure of seeing you again, dearest papa. . . . It was only after some minutes that there came over me the painful thought of the separation from my son. I could make no greater sacrifice to his welfare, or to your wishes, and I do not know how I shall find strength to bear it. It also costs me a dreadful pang to separate from all my family and from my fatherland, where I have been so kindly received after all my misfortunes. I can only find comfort with you, and in the hope that you will often allow me to see you and my son again. I need this consolation, and also the consciousness that I am fostering the future interests of my child by going to a country where few rosy days, but much unpleasantness, await me."² We have no grounds for supposing that in giving expression to these sentiments she was merely playing a part.³ It is conceivable that, to her friends, she might try to make herself appear better and more full of feeling than she really was,⁴ but why to her father, from whom she had no secrets and who knew his daughter thoroughly? Over and over again she showed him her grief in letters⁵ which she knew would come to the knowledge of no human being but himself, with the exception perhaps of

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, January 5, 1816.

² *Ibid.* February 24, 1816.

³ Welschinger (already quoted).

⁴ "Correspondance de Marie Louise. Lettres intimes et inédites à la Comtesse de Colloredo et à Mme. de Poutet, depuis 1810, Comtesse de Crenneville." Vienna, 1887.

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, October 31 and December 12, 1815.

Prince Metternich, and then only on very rare occasions. Although she had not shown herself a noble and devoted wife, yet nothing proves that at this period she was an indifferent mother to her child. She lived in the utterly false illusion that she was making a sacrifice for the Prince, enjoined upon her by the necessity of establishing him independently of the Court of Vienna.¹ Judging by the descriptions which reached her of her new possessions, a certain courage and decision of character were needed in order to set foot upon the soil of Parma, without regard to the dangers that awaited her there. The finances, indeed the entire administration, were in a very neglected condition.² Agents from the Spanish Court, who would give her Government no peace in their efforts to frustrate it, were rife throughout the country. "Your arrival here," Neipperg writes to her from Parma, "is not desired, but dreaded. I do not conceal it from you. I do not know whose doing it is, but it is a fact that you are reported to be entirely devoted to the old French system and to Napoleon's principles; so that the repetition is feared in a small way of what occurred in France on a large scale. The pecuniary condition of the nobles and private gentry is most precarious, and they all tremble at the prospect of being utterly ruined if they have to attend the Court."³

Supposing the question be asked, "What did Marie

¹ Edward Wertheimer, "Die drei ersten Frauen des Kaisers Franz," p. 130.

² Neipperg to Marie Louise, enclosed in Marie Louise's letter to her father of July 28, 1815. She says: "I have received letters from Count Neipperg, who has been spending some days in Parma, and gives me a very sad—but by all accounts a very true—picture of the state of the Duchies. . . . Cousin Francis also gives me a terrible description of them, he says that the inhabitants are much exasperated, and that hunger and privation prevail to such an extent that people are found dead in the streets."

³ Neipperg to Marie Louise.

Louise really sacrifice for her son ? ” the reply, “ Nothing whatever,”¹ would by no means represent the truth. For the desired repose, which she could have enjoyed to the full in Austria, she exchanged a hazardous sojourn in Parma, where at any moment she might expect the dagger of some fanatical supporter of the Infanta Maria Louisa to be unsheathed against her. Without fear or anxiety she hastened to Parma, inspired only by the desire so to order affairs there that she might some day be able to bequeath a well-administered inheritance to her child. Little did she dream that she was only holding the reins of government for a stranger. On her arrival in Parma, April 20, 1816, she was pleasantly surprised to meet with quite a different reception from that which she had pictured to herself from Neipperg’s descriptions. “ The people,” she informs her father, “ received me with such enthusiasm that I was moved to tears ; this reception has impressed me more than ever with a sense of the sacred duties now laid upon me, and has strengthened me in my resolve to do my utmost to make this people thoroughly happy. . . . I hope I may live here in calm and content . . . and be able to take care of my son’s future.”² Just as in Vienna she had already devoted herself most assiduously to the affairs of the Duchies, she now profited by being on the spot to make herself far more closely acquainted with all branches of the Government.³ With great energy she repressed the inherent vice of the land : the propensity to beg, rather than to work. She did not even shrink from the application of forcible measures to compel the countless swarm of beggars to build a bridge over the Taro.⁴ After such strenuous activity,

¹ Welschinger (already quoted), p. 208.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, April 21, 1816.

³ The same to the same, Parma, May 1, 1816.

⁴ The same to the same, Piacenza, May 21, 1816.

she longed for leisure at Colorno, her summer residence. She looked forward with delight to the moment when, freed from the business of State, she might give herself up to the undisturbed companionship of the friends she had brought with her from Vienna. "Society here is dull beyond all conception," she informs her father, "for it is impossible to drag a sensible word out of the ladies."¹ But this enjoyment, so she assures him, is overcast by the thought that many hundred miles separate her from the Emperor and her son.²

Limited to the narrow circle of her immediate surroundings, and unwearying in her endeavours to give no cause of complaint, either to the Court of Vienna or to the Bourbons, Marie Louise, mindful of the earnest advice given her by the Emperor Francis,³ carefully avoided all contact with members of the Bonaparte family. The bare rumour that Madame Mère, Lucien, Pauline, and Cardinal Fesch intended to go to Lucca, which was invested by Austrian troops, was enough to affect her most unpleasantly.⁴ With her consent, Neipperg requested Count Saurau not to admit any member of the Bonaparte family within his jurisdiction, a measure afterwards warmly commended by Metternich.⁵ The sole exception was made in favour of Princess Pauline Borghese who, on account of ill-health, received permission from Austria to make a sojourn in Lucca. Metternich considered her "far too insignificant a person"

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Piacenza, May 21, 1816.

² *Ibid.*

³ Marie Louise to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Colorno, July 7, 1816: "My father advised me to avoid any sort of contact with the family, and I thought his advice too good not to conform to it." Welschinger (already quoted, p. 208), who also uses this quotation, but in another connection, writes "*accueil*," which would be quite unintelligible here; it must read "*conseil*."

⁴ Neipperg to Metternich, Colorno, June 21, 1816.

⁵ Metternich to Neipperg, Vienna, July 6, 1816.

to cause any unpleasantness. In spite of which, he recommended that she should neither be received nor visited.¹ It seemed far less desirable that the ex-King Louis, or, as he was now called, Comte St. Leu, should wish to visit Leghorn, where Marie Louise had also thought of going. On this account she resolved to settle down at Viareggio, which Count Saurau had promised to "close hermetically" against all the Bonaparte family.² Afterwards, when Louis actually arrived at Leghorn, she persuaded her uncle, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to induce her brother-in-law to leave the place. She was convinced that Louis, whose political demeanour had always been without reproach, and whom she valued more than any other member of the Bonaparte family, would comply at once, on the slightest hint of harm to herself or to her son.³ In order to give Louis XVIII. no cause for suspicion, and also because she did not wish her peace of mind to be disturbed, all letters addressed to her by Napoleon's sisters, the Princesses Elise and Pauline, were left unanswered on her part.⁴ "You may rest assured," writes Neipperg, military commander-in-chief and diplomatic representative at Parma, to Metternich, "that in accordance with the strict injunctions communicated to me by his Majesty, nothing will be left undone by me to put a stop to anything which might compromise her [Marie Louise's] exalted rank."⁵ But let Marie Louise be ever so "hermetically sealed" and excluded from the family into which she had married, Louis XVIII. still mistrusted her, and suspected her of secret plans. The Government

¹ Metternich to Neipperg, Vienna, July 6, 1816.

² Neipperg to Metternich, Parma, July 9, . . . : "the little port of the State of Lucca, which Comte de Saurau has promised me he will close hermetically to all the members of the Bonaparte family."

³ Marie Louise to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, July 7, 1816.

⁴ Neipperg to Metternich, Florence, August 30, 1816.

⁵ The same to the same.

of Paris accused her of placing suspected Frenchmen about the Court, and of receiving among her troops officers like Guillot, who had deserted to Napoleon at Grenoble,¹ in 1815. But Marie Louise had done neither the one nor the other, and Guillot, who certainly did come to Parma, had been expelled at once. Neipperg might truly say it would be desirable for the French Court to obtain more reliable information, instead of coming forward continually with suspicions which his [Neipperg's] presence in Parma alone should have proved to be baseless.²

Nothing would be more incorrect than to accuse the Emperor Francis, or Marie Louise, of benevolent intentions towards the great exile of St. Helena. Even Napoleon's request that in case of serious illness the Austrian Commissioner, Baron Stürmer, then staying in the island, should be allowed to see him, remained unanswered. It was his intention to send his last dispositions—meant exclusively for the Emperor Francis—to Vienna through this medium.³ But neither Francis nor his daughter cared to know anything about him. For Marie Louise, Napoleon no longer existed. Since her letter of August 1815 she had entirely severed her lot from his. She lived as though she had never had any connection with this man; as if he were not the father of her child. It never again entered her head that Napoleon in his exile might be longing for her and for his son, and yearning for the embrace of the beings dearest to him on earth. We can well imagine that in his bitterness at such heartless conduct he sometimes cursed his marriage with her. But this wrathful mood was not long-lived. Soon afterwards he would

¹ Neipperg to Metternich, Parma, December 13, 1816.

² *Ibid.*

³ Schlitter, "Napoleon auf St. Helena," "Archives of Austrian History," vol. 34.

speak of Marie Louise with love and longing. He raged incessantly in his inmost soul because his enemies had robbed him of his family. At the close of 1816 he said to Las Cases, who had to leave the island at the command of the English Governor: "If you see my wife and my son, embrace them for me! For two years past I have had no news of them, direct or indirect. Six months ago a German botanist stayed here who had seen them in the gardens of Schönbrunn some months before his departure. The barbarians prevented him from giving me news of them." But this botanist from Vienna, the Court gardener Welle, who had accompanied Baron Stürmer to St. Helena, had contrived to convey to Napoleon a lock of his son's hair with a few lines. This present gave the Emperor extraordinary delight. Madame Marchand, who was entrusted with the care of the Prince's person, had given it to Boos, the Director of the Imperial gardens. She had begged him, through the medium of Welle, to get the lock of hair delivered to her son, who was in attendance upon Napoleon. This happened without Stürmer's knowledge. The whole affair, unimportant as it was, caused the greatest agitation in the Cabinets. Suspicion immediately became rife that the Court of Vienna had a finger in the pie. "Why had they sent a botanist to an island where there was nothing to botanise?" asked the Marquis de Montchenu, French Commissioner at St. Helena.¹ He was convinced that Marie Louise must have persuaded the Director of the Schönbrunn gardens to get the little packet containing the lock of hair² conveyed to Napoleon. The Austrian Commissioner, who feared the most unpleasant complications, subjected the gardener to the strictest examination, as though he had actually com-

¹ "Rapports inédits du Marquis de Montchenu," par George Fermin Didot, p. 106.

² "Rapports inédits du Marquis de Montchenu," p. 96.

mitted an act compromising to the State and dangerous to the peace of the whole world! How petty these diplomatists appear in comparison with a Napoleon who, deprived of all power, is begrudged even the possession of a lock of hair! They were more inhuman than important. It seems difficult to believe to-day that the rulers of that period, with all their leading Ministers, awaited the result of this investigation in a state of the utmost tension. All that came of it was that Welle declared he had no idea this lock of hair came from the King of Rome's head; he maintained obstinately that he had supposed it to be Madame Marchand's hair. In any case his statement was not quite accurate; for, in the first instance, he denied having brought any note with it.¹ Later, however, he admitted that the following words were written in French on the paper containing the lock of hair: "Enclosed you will find some of my hair; if you have the opportunity of being painted, send me your portrait. Your mother, Marchand."² Welle's conduct appeared in quite a new light when it transpired after he had left St. Helena that, besides the lock of hair, he had handed over a silk handkerchief and an unsealed letter quite casually to General Gourgaud, who belonged to the Emperor's suite.³ After hearing Stürmer's report, even Metternich had no doubt but that the silk handkerchief had been used for secret correspondence, as in the case of the pieces of dress-material sent by Las Cases through a secret agent to Madame Clavering.⁴ The truth must be fathomed at all costs. Perhaps it might lead to further important discoveries. Directly after his arrival

¹ Schlitter (already quoted), p. 29.

² Philip Welle's declaration. M. I. The date given in this document, St. Helena, November 29, 1816, cannot be correct.

³ Schlitter (already quoted), p. 80.

⁴ Metternich to Sedlnitzky, Vienna, September 20, 1817. M. I.

in Vienna Welle was personally interrogated by Count Sedlnitzky, the Prefect of Police. The gardener made a perfectly frank confession. He admitted that while staying in Paris in October 1815 he had received a silk handkerchief from General Gourgaud's mother and sister, through the medium of Michael Baron Arnstein, formerly lieutenant in the Imperial Hussars. But he denied that a letter had also been given to him. If any such thing had reached Gourgaud through his agency—he continued—the General's mother must have put it into the paper in which the handkerchief was wrapped. It would never have occurred to him, he protested, to open the packet, therefore he did not know whether the handkerchief had been written upon in chemical ink—or indeed at all. He stoutly denied having undertaken any other commission whatsoever. Welle's statement gave Sedlnitzky the impression of absolute sincerity.¹ Even the English Government, to which Metternich communicated the result of the inquiry, appeared perfectly satisfied.² But Hudson Lowe, the instrument of torture at St. Helena, had already worked up his story, together with that of the lock of hair, into an affair of State. His despicable ambition to discover plots in all directions found fresh material when, soon after this affair of Welle, a sailor named Radowich, on board an English vessel, succeeded in getting a marble bust of the King of Rome conveyed to the Emperor. To all appearance this may be regarded

¹ Sedlnitzky to Metternich, Vienna, September 27, 1817. M.I. This is the exact gist of the judicial examination, of which Metternich had a full report transmitted to London. Schlitter (already quoted), p. 249. At Metternich's suggestion Director Boos was called to account, because he failed to hand over the intercepted packet immediately to his superior authorities, Metternich's report of March 11, 1817.

² Schlitter (already quoted), p. 251.

as a mere attempt to dip into Napoleon's purse.¹ In spite of all, it was believed that this tender attention could only be ascribed to Marie Louise. Yet how wanting she really was in such humane feelings!

Under all these circumstances, Metternich considered it his duty to the English Government to testify to the blameless conduct of the Empress, or—more correctly speaking—to her irreproachable indifference.² In fact, she played no part whatever in the story of the lock of hair, or the marble bust. All these presents had been secretly conveyed to Napoleon, because barbarity had pledged itself to this: no sign of life from the outer world! He was not permitted to be either husband or father, and Hudson Lowe had a genius for outraging nature. Napoleon was to be as a dead man, out of mind. The Marquis de Montchenu would have been only too glad could he have reported to his King the death of this bitter foe of the Bourbons.³ But neither Napoleon nor his adherents, hunted to death on all sides though they were, had given up every hope of freedom. A bold plan actually existed to carry off the captive from St. Helena to America. In May 1816 it came to the knowledge of the Spanish Minister in Washington that Carpenter, an American, had proposed to Joseph Bonaparte to liberate his brother—a piece of news which also reached the ears of the English Government. It was even maintained that Joseph had offered the sum of eight million francs as a reward for the success of the undertaking. Everything pointed to attempts to establish written communications between Europe and St. Helena. Thus, in the winter of 1816 the *Anti-Gallican*, a London newspaper, published a cipher, which at once attracted the attention of Prince Esterházy,

¹ Schlitter (already quoted), p. 250.

² *Ibid.* p. 58, n.

³ "Rapports inédits du Marquis de Montchenu," p. 116.

the Austrian Ambassador in London. His suspicion that there was more in it than a mere trick of numbers was justified. In Vienna, where the whole thing was deciphered, it was recognised that an attempt was being made in this way to open up epistolary communication with Napoleon. The Emperor's friends had purposely chosen the *Anti-Gallican*, a paper hostile to Napoleon, on the assumption that it would be much more likely to be sent to St. Helena than journals more favourably disposed to him. Without the discovery of the cipher, this would most likely have happened. But the affair of the *Anti-Gallican* furnished the Cabinets with unmistakable proof that the Bonapartists would not shrink from any attempt whereby they might gain freedom for their hero. The most extreme measures might be expected from that Bonapartist faction which had its centre in North America and looked upon Joseph Bonaparte as its most prominent member. Its chief meeting ground was the Portuguese island of Fernando da Noronha; about midway between which and St. Helena lies Ascension Island, whence Napoleon could be reached in four days. Two officers in particular, Colonel Latapie and General Brayer, had undertaken the task of getting the Emperor away from St. Helena. Preparations had already been made. A spot in the island was to be reached by strategy, and the English garrison overpowered. They were willing to meet death for his sake in an encounter with the English. This bold plan only failed of execution owing to the timely capture of Latapie.¹

These attempts did not tend to promote very friendly feelings towards the Napoleonists on the part of the Allied Powers. They could not fail to be convinced that sufficient glamour still attached to the mere name of Napoleon to lead people to acts of violence which might

¹ Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz und die Napoleoniden," chap. ii.

easily call up the deep-seated unrest that smouldered on the Continent. The Bourbons had especial reason to tremble for their authority; for their position in France rested at all times on very insecure foundations. They, above all, scarcely needed such occurrences as had recently come to light to induce them to strive for the annihilation—at all events for the political annihilation—of the entire Napoleonist party. Marie Louise and her son must always remain a thorn in their flesh. France, it is true, had recognised their sovereign rights by solemn treaty, yet she sought in underhand ways to circumvent the political existence of the Empress and the King of Rome as rulers of Parma. True to this principle, the Royal Almanac ignored them as completely as though they did not exist. Metternich immediately conjectured that an avowed attempt was being made to refuse a new, solemn sanction to Marie Louise's present position.¹ The French Premier had indeed excused the omission by saying that it was not desirable to announce Marie Louise by the title of "Majesty," nor her son as "Napoleon." Metternich was not inclined to accept such a reason as final. Through Baron Vincent, Austrian Ambassador in Paris, he drew Richelieu's attention emphatically to the fact that it was to Louis XVIII.'s own interest to keep inviolate those treaties which recognised the sovereign rights of Marie Louise and her son, because it was only to those solemn pledges—by which he meant the Congress of Vienna and the Peace of Paris of November 20, 1815—that Louis owed his authority in France.² Metternich insisted on having the names of the Duchess and the Prince of Parma

¹ Metternich to Vincent, June 30, 1816. Private despatch. ". . . that they"—the reasons—"seem to us to show plainly that the French Ministry only put them forward to hide the real motive, which made it wishful to avoid the appearance of giving fresh sanction to the actual political condition of the Duchies."

² *Ibid.* June 30, 1816.

inserted in the Royal Almanac. It was only necessary, he opined, to print: "Marie Louise, Archduchess of Austria, Duchess of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla . . . and Francis Charles, her son . . . by which the crux of the whole difficulty would be surmounted.¹ Louis XVIII. was very much annoyed at having to recognise Marie Louise as "Majesty." He declared himself ready to send a letter couched in the most friendly and amiable terms in answer to her notification, but the word "Majesty" would never flow from his pen.² Metternich's representations were not without result. In the Almanac of 1817 Marie Louise was to be entitled "Duchess of Parma"; her son, on the contrary, was simply mentioned as her child, and not as Prince of Parma. But the Austrian Court had now shown that it would not yield an inch in defence of Marie Louise's claims; on the other hand, no difficulty would be made about sacrificing those of the Prince whenever a suitable occasion offered. That was an alluring prospect, which could be turned to account some day, to oust the hated Napoleonists entirely from the political arena.

But whereas Louis XVIII. did not venture to insist more directly upon the spoliation of the Emperor's daughter, and only tried underhand means for gaining his end, Spain went to work quite openly. She fought indefatigably against that clause of the Vienna Congress which recognised Marie Louise's possession of the Duchies. The Spanish Premier, Cevallos, declared to Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Ambassador, that his King felt himself personally insulted by the small amount of consideration which had been shown in Vienna to his sister the Infanta Maria Louisa, and her son. He demanded the immediate restoration of the Duchies, since Spain did not recognise the treaties concluded under Godoy, the "Prince of Peace."

¹ Metternich to Vincent, June 30, 1816.

² Vincent to Metternich, July 24, 1816.

He thought a double marriage would be most likely to influence Austria in favour of this demand. The Infanta, ex-Queen of Etruria, in possession of Parma, should marry the Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Tuscany ; whilst the Infant Don Louis, future ruler of Parma, should be united to the Archduchess Caroline.¹ But as it would not do to let the Austrian Marie Louise go quite empty-handed, Cevallos thought she might be compensated with Lucca, as well as with the revenues arising from the Bohemian estates belonging to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Kaunitz at once put an end to all hope of such a compromise. He pointed out that this matter could certainly only be settled with the ex-Queen herself, who was now residing in Rome.² The poor Queen of Etruria, who was at that time much straitened for want of money, would have preferred to dispense with her brother's intervention in her dealings with Austria,³ which was willing to portion her with Lucca and a yearly income of five hundred thousand francs.⁴ At one time the Court of Vienna would not have committed itself to such a promise ; it yielded now, rather than inflict new burdens on the pressing obligations of the King of France. Willingly as the ex-Queen would have snatched at this offer, she could not arrive at any decision. Her brother pointed to the vision of a marriage with the Archduke Ferdinand ; moreover he assured her that her interests could be better safeguarded by himself in Madrid than in Rome.⁵ Thus he hindered the possibility of a direct understanding between Vienna and the ex-Queen. The Spanish Court, which feared above all lest the burden

¹ Metternich to Kaunitz, April 30, 1816. Kaunitz to Metternich, January 13, 1816.

² Kaunitz to Metternich, Madrid, January 13, 1816. P.S. II.

³ Lebzeltern's statement from Rome of February 8 and 22, 1816.

⁴ Article 101 of the Acts of the Congress of Vienna.

⁵ Kaunitz to Metternich, Madrid, January 13, 1816. P.S. II.

of the Infanta's maintenance should fall upon it,¹ busied itself with the whole question. It adopted a tone as though Parma ought to form an integral part of the Spanish monarchy.² Nor did it rest satisfied with intrigues, but commissioned Labrador to present Prince Metternich on January 16, 1816, with a notice containing an angry protest against all the treaties of 1814 and 1815.³ Whence did Spain, amid such internal agitations, without money and without an army, summon courage openly to defy the universal wishes of Europe? Guided by Tatitscheff, the Russian Ambassador in Spain, and the Papal Nuncio, Cardinal Gravina—both violent opponents of Austria—Spain never doubted for a moment that the treaties of 1814 and 1815 did not actually give the true views of the Allied Powers; on the contrary, she was convinced that no real mutual understanding existed among them. The Spanish King, as well as his Minister, Cevallos, listened only too readily to the insinuations of Tatitscheff and the Cardinal, that it was only needful to resist persistently for a time, in order to win Parma ultimately for the Infanta Maria Louisa, with the help of those Cabinets unfavourable to the interests of Austria.⁴ A secret plan also existed to revive the old Bourbon family compact by means of matrimonial alliances, so as to secure for themselves a new means of defence against the Court of Vienna. The Duc de Berry, whom Pozzo di Borgo had assigned to the Russian Grand Duchess Anna, was to marry the Infanta of Portugal. The Papal Nuncio and Tatitscheff desired to arrange a marriage between the King of Spain and the daughter of Prince Francis of Sicily,⁵ for

¹ Instructions for Kaunitz, November 25, 1815.

² Kaunitz to Metternich, April 11, 1816.

³ Metternich to Esterházy in London, Milan, February 27, 1816.

⁴ Kaunitz's Despatches of January 13 and May 28, 1816.

⁵ Kaunitz to Metternich, January 13, 1816.

fear of his choosing an Archduchess for his consort.¹ Prince Kaunitz believed a family compact had already been concluded between the three Bourbon Courts of France, Spain and Naples; under the protection of this family alliance he already saw the Court of Madrid taking possession of the Duchies.² So far Metternich had maintained a profound silence, and neither Labrador's appeal of January 16, 1816, nor the Spanish King's letter to the Emperor Francis, had yet been answered.³ Only after assurances of support from the principal Allied Powers did he deem the moment come in which to lay aside his reserve, and finally to make his views clear to Spain.⁴ At no price would he permit the audacious revolt of this State against all the decisions of the crowned heads of Europe to proceed further. While defending Austria's interests, he believed he was also protecting the interests of Europe, where the tranquillity so recently restored appeared to be menaced by a continued struggle with Spain.⁵ In forcible terms he requested that Spain should no longer withhold her recognition of Marie Louise's sovereignty over Parma. He knew that in face of the imposing attitude which Austria could now assume, Spain would quickly change her tone.⁶ The result was all the more certain; because meantime—owing to a remonstrance lodged by the Emperor Francis in St. Petersburg⁷—Tatitscheff had received a reprimand

¹ In the instructions for Kaunitz, November 25, 1815, it is stated: "In case the King does not marry the Infanta of Portugal, Austria is prepared to give him an Archduchess in marriage."

² Kaunitz to Metternich, March 25, 1816.

³ Metternich to Kaunitz, April 30, 1816. Apparently No. 2.

⁴ The same to the same, April 30, 1816. Apparently No. 3.

⁵ Metternich to Steigentesch in St. Petersburg, May 1, 1816. "His Imperial Majesty, by defending his own cause in Madrid to-day, equally defends that of his allies."

⁶ Metternich to Kaunitz, April 30, 1816. Private despatch.

⁷ *Ibid.* See also Metternich's report of January 12, 1817.

from his Ministry, and there was a reasonable prospect that the present Papal Nuncio would be replaced by a representative more amicably disposed towards the Court of Vienna.¹

"If Spain," wrote Metternich, full of self-confidence, to Prince Kaunitz, "wishes to quarrel with us, we await the developments of such an event with the greatest equanimity."² Proud of the victory which he had just gained over the far more powerful and dangerous state of Bavaria, by the treaty of April 14,³ through which he had reduced it to submission, Metternich could well afford to look with a certain scorn upon the impotent position of Spain and await its further proceedings with indifference. Nevertheless his expectations that the Spanish King, Ferdinand VII., would allow himself to be intimidated by the declarations of Austria which Kaunitz laid before the Spanish Ministry⁴ on May 25 remained unfulfilled. Cevallos contemptuously remarked to the Ambassador that the unanimity of the Powers in all questions, small and great, on which he laid such stress, could not be so unqualified, since Russia always spoke of the question of Parma as one which exclusively concerned Austria, the Infanta and Spain.⁵ Called to account by Kaunitz, Tatitscheff replied that the Spanish Premier, being very imperfectly acquainted with the French language, always misunderstood things.⁶ This statement did not satisfy Kaunitz. He insisted that the Russian Ambassador should leave Cevallos in no uncertainty as to the actual intentions of his Emperor. From this moment a change came over the behaviour of

¹ Metternich to Kaunitz, April 30, 1816. Private despatch.

² *Ibid.*

³ In reference to this see Arneth, "Wessenberg," vol. ii., p. 40-44.

⁴ Kaunitz to Metternich, May 28, 1816.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.* Madrid, May 28, 1816.

the Spanish Minister; he showed himself essentially more amenable.¹

Just at this juncture, Russia proposed to submit the whole affair to the decision of the Parisian Ministerial Conference. But first milder methods were to be attempted, and Louis XVIII. must be requested to exert his influence as a relative in order to reduce Spain to submission.² Meanwhile, independently of this step, Labrador had entered on the path of conciliation in Paris. He begged for England's intervention. The British Ministry was to intercede with Austria, so that upon the death of Marie Louise, Parma should revert to the ex-Queen of Etruria and afterwards to her son.³ Lord Castlereagh warmly advocated these proposals. He considered such a compromise all the more feasible because it had never really been the Emperor Francis's intention to establish his grandson as an independent Prince in Italy,⁴ and Metternich himself had advocated at the session of the Congress of May 27, 1815, that the reversionary right to the Duchies be secured to the ex-Queen.⁵ Had any one been able to penetrate the Minister's

¹ Metternich to Esterházy, July 29, 1816, No. 3, and Kaunitz to Metternich, July 17, 1816.

² Metternich to Vincent, August 12, 1816, in which the Russian instruction of June 27 is quoted.

³ Vincent to Metternich, Paris, July 31, 1816.

⁴ Lord Castlereagh to Stewart, September 6, 1816. "As for the motives which may govern the policy of the Austrian Government, I can understand that the Archduchess may complain at seeing her son without any ostensible provision; yet if my memory serves me right, the Emperor never intended to encourage the claims of Napoleon's son to this inheritance and, influenced by political considerations, he said he would provide him with some establishment other than a sovereign dominion."

⁵ Lord Castlereagh to Stewart, September 6, 1816. "... in which (an extract from the protocol of the session of Congress of May 27, 1815) you will find that Prince Metternich himself put forward the proposition that the reversion of the Duchies be secured to the Infant."

inmost thoughts, it would have been evident that Metternich had long been seeking an opportunity to make the Prince's succession impossible. He was truly glad to learn that henceforth the Spanish Court would only claim the reversionary right to the Duchies for the Infanta. "This is the exact point," he wrote Prince Kaunitz, "to which we wish to bring the negotiations, and it is also the point to which it is desirable to limit them, in order to use them to our own advantage."¹ But however greatly Metternich might rejoice at an expedient which coincided with his own desire to put an end to the prevailing dissensions with Spain, he declined to bring the question of the reversion to an immediate issue. To Castlereagh he assigned a reason for desiring this delay in the negotiations. He told him the question was one of European importance, which necessitated his discovering first of all the views of the principal Courts of Europe.² But this was not his real reason. The secret treaty of May 31, 1815, between Austria, Russia and Prussia, was actually a far greater hindrance to immediate arbitration; but of this treaty neither France nor England had any knowledge.³ In May 1815, Alexander I. had compelled the Courts of Vienna and Berlin formally to conclude this protective alliance in favour of the rights of Marie Louise and her son.⁴ Metternich could not be sure whether the Tsar, who had then come forward as a zealous champion of the Archduchess and the Prince, would not even now persist in playing his part. Before taking another step he must clearly understand whether

¹ Metternich to Kaunitz, October 20, 1816.

² Metternich to Esterházy, September 26, 1816.

³ Metternich to Lobzein in St. Petersburg, February 18, 1817. "The first and simplest of the considerations which might hinder us from going further into this question would have been the existence of the secret treaty of May 31, 1815."

⁴ Metternich to Vincent, February 12, 1817. Private and secret despatch.

Alexander wished to use this treaty to expose Austria in the eyes of England.¹ The Minister had never trusted him, and had always seen through the fact that, as regards this secret treaty, the Russian Emperor was playing his own game in order to gain the respect of those who looked upon him as the champion of Marie Louise.² It must also give food for reflection that this precious document had never been ratified, which clearly proved its invalidity. Everything pointed to the fact that Alexander had never seriously thought of its being carried into effect.³ But the Tsar did not draw the line at this; he was striving, as Metternich puts it, "to build bridges at our expense over which he intends to glide comfortably himself."⁴ While never uttering a single word to the Viennese Court as to the compact which had emanated from himself, he revealed to England—without first informing Austria—the secret hitherto so carefully concealed. He did not even hesitate to represent himself as a co-signatory, led away by the artful wiles of the Court of Vienna.⁵ But after Alexander had broken the seal of secrecy and lifted the veil, Metternich, who apprehended most critical results to the relations between Austria and England from this arbitrary action of the Tsar, could no longer refrain from speaking. Not only did he deem it expedient to inform Castlereagh of the secret treaty of May 31, but also to initiate him into its previous history, a proceeding which could not fail to destroy the glamour of Alexander's reputation in England.⁶ This clever move restored those happy relations with the British Cabinet which had been tem-

¹ Metternich to Vincent, January 12, 1817. Private and secret despatch.

² Metternich's despatch, February 18, 1817.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* See also Gentz, "Dépêches inédites," vol. i. p. 313.

⁶ Metternich to Esterházy, February 18, 1817.

porarily disturbed by the Tsar's intrigues. Lord Castlereagh acquired fresh confidence in Austria. Metternich profited by this moment to enlighten the English statesman as to Alexander's menacing ambition, thereby promoting a closer union between England, Austria, Prussia and France against Russia.¹ He pointed out that the Tsar had also denied in Madrid his participation in the treaty of May 31 and, contrary to the true facts of the case, had represented himself there as the protector of the Spanish interests. The Austrian Minister exposed the actual motives which had moved the Russian Emperor, in his passion for conquest, to this disloyal proceeding. In this way he dealt a successful blow at Russia; Metternich's revelations could not but have an unpleasant effect in England, especially the one which revealed Spain's agreement to concede to Russia a military station on the Mediterranean, as a point of attack upon Turkey.² Metternich might now congratulate himself that English statesmen were gradually recovering from their bigoted prejudices in favour of Alexander.³ Thus the general policy of Europe interfered in the question of the Duchies, turning it into a matter of the utmost importance to the Allied Courts, so that increased significance attached to it.

But Metternich was not only forced to delay the negotiations respecting Parma on account of the secret treaty of May 31; there was also another reason for this—regard for Marie Louise. Although she had not signed the treaty of May 31, Metternich still felt some anxiety

¹ Metternich to Esterházy, March 26, 1817. Private despatch. "The surest moral safeguard, in fact the only one that I could suggest to-day, to check the ever-growing tendency of the Emperor of Russia, is to be found in the most open community of interests and opinions between ourselves, England, Prussia and France." See also the instructions to Esterházy, of April 11.

² Metternich to Esterházy in London, March 26 and May 14, 1817.

³ The same to the same, March 26. Private and secret despatch.

lest she should refuse her consent to the projected deposition of the Prince of Parma. It was precisely upon his daughter's consent that the Emperor Francis laid the greatest stress.¹ Before Metternich therefore could advance a single step in the negotiations, he was obliged to secure Marie Louise's consent to the change in the succession to the throne of Parma. This was the more doubtful, because he knew that in her inmost thoughts she was confident the Prince would one day rule over Parma. In this dilemma he thought of his trusty co-adjutor, whose influence had never been refused whenever a change of mind on the part of the Emperor's daughter had been thought desirable. On October 5 Neipperg received orders to come to Vienna in order to consult about matters which could only have a favourable bearing on Marie Louise's affairs. In public the Count was not to assign any importance to his journey; he was to let it be known in all directions that he was going to the Imperial residence in order to congratulate the Emperor upon his new matrimonial alliance with Caroline Augusta.² These instructions of Metternich's, the motive for which Marie Louise seemed to divine, threw her into such a state of excitement that her health, weak at the best of times, grew worse in consequence. "It seems," she declares to her father, "that new questions are arising as to my States and my peaceful possession of them. Is it possible the world is not yet satisfied with the many heavy sacrifices which I have been compelled to make—and have made—for the common good? I would never submit to humiliating conditions, and still less would I restore a part of that which Europe has unanimously accorded me—unless considerable advantages for myself and my son were guaranteed to me. Again, under these circumstances, I commend to you, dearest

¹ Metternich's despatch of February 18, 1817.

² Metternich to Neipperg, Vienna, October 5, 1816.

papa, the well-being of your very loving daughter and of your grandson."¹ Full of impatience, she awaited Neipperg's return, in order to learn from his lips what had been decided in Vienna. "I am convinced, dearest papa," runs another letter, "that you would laugh me out of my anxiety, but I am so little accustomed to happiness that, until I see Neipperg before me, and his report sets my mind at rest, I shall always be imagining unpleasant things. I have one comfort, that if all the other Powers have designs upon my peace of mind, you would always help me with your interest; nothing matters to me at all except my son's future."² At last Neipperg, the long-expected, arrived in Parma. His journey to Vienna had given rise to the most sensational rumours.³ His communications had an overwhelming effect upon the Archduchess. In the Emperor's name, the Count was obliged to tell her in the bluntest terms that her son could never be her successor. She was not prepared for such a disclosure. She still placed her entire confidence in the secret treaty of May 31, 1815, which, owing to the signatures of Austria, Russia and Prussia, she regarded as fixed for all time. Now she was to learn, to her sorrow, that even this compact offered no sufficient protection against the attacks on her son's position. Where should she now find a refuge, and assistance in supporting her son's claims? Not for a moment did Metternich leave her in any doubt as to the futility of relying upon Alexander, who had never taken her affairs very seriously and, like the rest of the Powers, wanted to be freed from the anxiety of seeing a

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Colorno, October 17, 1816.

² Marie Louise to her father, October 28, 1816. Schlitter quotes two lines of this letter in his little essay, "Der Herzog von Reichstadt," in the "Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung," vol. xv., page 117. The correct date reads October 28.

³ Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, February 18, 1817.

Napoleon on any throne in the world.¹ Cowed by the authority of her father, and by the will of the Allied Courts, this weak woman, incapable of energy, and devoid of all qualification to be the mother of heroes, yielded once again. She dared not wage war against all Europe. As on former occasions, she was now ready to sacrifice her son's position as a Sovereign out of "filial piety," and as a proof that—to her—the universal good ranked higher than private interest. She still possessed the somewhat unworthy courage to claim, in return for her renunciation, certain advantages which she pointed out as indispensable to her son's interests. She now demanded, as compensation for the succession to Parma, that immediately after the conclusion of the negotiations, her son should be placed in possession of the estate of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the so-called "Bavarian Palatinate" territories,² situated in Bohemia, which were to be incorporated with her own private property. Only on condition that an estate of equal value, in some other part of Austria, should be granted to her son, would she relinquish possession of these lands; "for," she adds, "it is my duty as a mother, and my decided wish, to see that the foundation of my son's future establishment should not only be laid, but also legalised, during my lifetime." With regard to her own position, she desired furthermore that the Prince should retain the title of Duke of Parma as long as it was practicable. Should a pressing need arise of making a change in this respect, only then must

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Colorno, November 24, 1816. This letter which, contrary to her usual custom, is written in German, is not in the usual familiar style, and has quite an official tone, as though to serve as a basis for negotiations.

² The estates of the Bavarian Palatinate in Bohemia, including also Reichstadt, near Leipa, had been since 1805 in the possession of the Archduke Ferdinand, then Archduke of Tuscany, and formerly Elector of Salzburg. Before this—from 1692 to 1805—these estates belonged to the Dukes of the Bavarian Palatinate.

a suitable and "most appropriate" title be chosen in its place.¹ Whatever may have been Marie Louise's determination not to cede a single point in these demands, and almost to let things come to a fight, she was nevertheless filled with the dread of having to encounter opposition. "The future destiny of my son," she declares to her father, "often troubles me, in spite of the resolution I have formed and sent to you at Milan, for I am so little used to happiness that I am always afraid lest something should stand in the way of this arrangement."² Her anxiety was the more firmly rooted because she had never really believed for an instant that she would succeed in obtaining the *immediate* cession of the Palatine Bavarian property in accordance with her desire. In making this demand she was simply risking an attempt to secure something which in any case would afford her son some protection against the danger which threatened him, so that after the renunciation was accomplished, he would not come off quite empty handed.³ On this point Metternich immediately set her mind at rest, assuring her that the Emperor would never suffer his grandson to be left unprovided for. At the same time, however, he declared it would be most unreasonable to put forward such a demand as that which Marie Louise wished to address to the Grand Duke of Tuscany.⁴ Metternich was more especially of opinion that Marie Louise must give way because she possessed no rightful claim.⁵ But

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, November 24, 1816.

² *Ibid.* December 16, 1816.

³ Metternich's despatch of February 18, 1817.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* "But had she any such claim, I should be the first to advise her to secure to herself the peaceful possession of these Duchies, and freedom to dispose of her savings, instead of submitting her quiet life and the future of her son to a mere piece of fustian (for the secret treaty of May 31 amounts to no more) which, now that the time has come for its practical application, is treated to some extent as null and void by one of the chief contracting parties (Alexander I.)."

if, in spite of this, she were to make good her claim, by adducing the treaty of May 31, he believed that he still possessed sufficient means to persuade her to withdraw from such an attempt. This "saving means" he saw in the attitude of Alexander, and in the decisive wishes of all the Powers, who would never permit Napoleon's son to reign in Italy under any circumstances.¹ But this high pressure was not yet required, since Marie Louise had already consented to her son's deposition, in the hope of obtaining for him the greatest conceivable benefit. Freed from the anxiety of having to back up the secret treaty of May 31, 1815, and compelled at length by Russia and England to open negotiations respecting the reversionary rights of the ex-Queen of Etruria, Metternich demanded the necessary assent to this from the Emperor Francis. He felt the more impelled to take this step, because he feared that these two Powers might otherwise be turned from friends into the active opponents of Austria.² Francis gave his assent, whilst addressing to his Minister the following words: "In this matter I make you strictly responsible for my daughter's interests, and in return for the sacrifice she is again being called upon to make, you must demand the most advantageous terms possible, without any cost to the Monarchy, but rather, if possible, derive from it the greatest profit to Austria."³

It appeared as though Metternich would not be able to comply with his master's injunctions. He caused it to be stated through the Austrian Ambassador in Paris—the seat of the negotiations—that the Emperor Francis was prepared to make the sacrifice of maintaining his grandson at his own expense. This was to be done later

¹ Metternich's despatch of February 18, 1817.

² *Ibid.*

³ The Emperor's decision upon Metternich's despatch of February 18, 1817.

on by the cession of the estates of the Bavarian Palatinate which had formerly belonged to Francis. For the ceding of these, the Grand Duke of Tuscany was to be compensated with Lucca, when Parma passed into the possession of the Spanish Bourbon line.¹ But Austria intended to be paid for this compromise. The disinheriting of the young Napoleon was to bring in some profit. If Austria were forced—although it fell in with her own wishes—to cede Parma, after the death of Marie Louise, to the son of the ex-Queen of Etruria, at least she expected to secure Piacenza, which was of the utmost importance to her, as a centre of defence for her Italian possessions. The Court of Vienna was well acquainted with its opponents, and was aware that they were trying to snatch away Piacenza. Austria therefore strove to place her voluntary sacrifice in the most favourable light. France and Spain ought to be grateful to her for erasing the line of Napoleon from the roll of sovereigns; Russia and Prussia ought equally to recognise her services to them in nullifying the secret treaty of May 31, 1815.² Strange to say, France made no objection to an Austrian garrison at Piacenza. All the more, therefore, Alexander I., with his customary duplicity, intrigued with Spain against such a project. While he was endeavouring to prejudice the Cabinets against leaving Piacenza under Austrian rule, he was offering at the same time to help the Court of Vienna in protecting the rights of the young Napoleon in Parma, as guaranteed by the treaty of May 31, 1815.³ A further point of dispute in the negotiations was raised by Spain's demand that the succession to Parma should pass not only to the male, but to the female, issue of the

¹ These arrangements were enacted by Article 101 of the Vienna Congress.

² Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, February 18, 1817. Private despatch.

³ Metternich to Esterházy, June 22, 1817.

future ruler of the Duchy, which was strenuously opposed by Austria. Should Spain succeed, a complete change in the succession would follow, which would lead to the installation of the third branch of the House of Bourbon.¹

The negotiations in Paris were at a deadlock. Spain persisted in its opposition to an Austrian garrison in Piacenza; she would only accede to such a plan on condition that Austria would raise the ex-Queen's income from half a million to a million francs. But the Court of Vienna would not hear of this. Supported by France and Russia, the Court of Madrid showed no disposition to yield. Wellington, who had behaved throughout the whole affair as a warm friend to Austria, was anxious lest the continued tension of affairs should have an injurious effect upon the interests of the Court of Vienna. He endeavoured therefore to induce Baron von Vincent to come to some arrangement. With this object in view, he pointed out the injury this continued hostility with Spain would inflict upon Austria's commercial interests in the Mediterranean.² The English Duke, who intended to return to London in a few days, wished to see this dispute settled during his stay in Paris, since it might easily endanger the tranquillity recently restored to Europe. "You may be convinced," he said to Vincent, "that once I have taken my departure, you will never get this matter settled."³ These words made a deep

¹ The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748, which created Parma, expressly decreed that in case of the extinction of the heirs male of the Infant Don Philip, Parma and Guastalla should pass into the possession of Austria, and that of Piacenza to Parma. For this reason the Court of Vienna opposed the surrender of the succession to the female line of the ex-Queen of Etruria's son. The provisions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were re-affirmed by a secret clause in the treaty of May 20, 1815, between Austria and Sardinia. For the reason here given, Austria avoided the expression, "reversionary interest," and would only agree to "succession."

² Vincent to Metternich, January 8, 1817.

³ The same to the same, June 6, 1817.

impression on the Austrian Ambassador. He saw clearly enough himself that after Wellington's departure, France, Russia and Spain would unite to impose upon him the hardest conditions possible. He was forced to recognise this more especially by the equivocal attitude of Alexander and his Ambassador in Paris.¹ Now, he could still avoid all appearance of seeking reconciliation with Spain under compulsion, instead of voluntarily.² At no other time could the Austrian occupation of Piacenza have been purchased at so small a cost.³ All these considerations caused Vincent to sign, at the Duke of Wellington's bidding—and without referring to the Court of Vienna—the treaty of Paris of June 10, 1817, by which the Prince of Parma was struck out for ever from the list of Sovereigns.⁴ Metternich entirely approved of the conduct of his representative in Paris; he wrote to him saying that he would not have acted otherwise in his place.⁵ The ex-Queen of Etruria was beside herself with joy because Parma was to come to her, or her son, on the death of Marie Louise. She might well be satisfied with a decision which made her moreover Duchess of Lucca, and put into her almost depleted exchequer a yearly income of half a million of francs, levied on Austria.⁶ Marie Louise was also pacified by the contents of the

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, Florence, June 22, 1817.

² The same to Vincent, Florence, June 22, 1817.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The treaty is printed by Neumann, "Recueil des Traités," vol. iii., p. 246.

⁵ Metternich to Vincent, June 22, 1817. "In your place I should have acted as you have acted, and I did not hesitate to bring the matter before the Emperor, to join myself with you in the hope of inducing him to ratify this important transaction, which will no doubt be appreciated in history as a memorial of the rectitude and loyalty of the House of Austria."

⁶ Kaunitz to Metternich, Rome, July 13 and September 16, 1817. Kaunitz had been transferred from Madrid to Rome, where the ex-Queen resided.

treaty of Paris, as communicated to her.¹ She was not acquainted with the official text, and was not aware, therefore, that it did not even make an allusion to her son. It would be easy to draw from this the most unfavourable auguries as to the future of the young Napoleon. But, as compensation for this neglect, Vincent was obliged to make a declaration by protocol, on June 1, 1817, which was to serve as a preliminary announcement that the future destiny of the disinherited Prince would shortly come under discussion.³

If Metternich felt some pride in having carried out almost all the wishes of the Emperor's daughter, his pleasure in success was soon embittered by Spain.⁴ The Court of Madrid simply declined to ratify the treaty of Paris. It refused to proceed any further, unless the portion of the ex-Queen was increased by half a million francs, and the succession secured to the female line of the future Duke of Parma. The King of Spain laid great stress upon the necessity for inserting a special clause in the treaty, by which the exclusion of Marie Louise's son should be solemnly guaranteed for all time⁵—a proviso which had hitherto been intentionally avoided. There had been a tacit agreement to abstain from any mention of the young Napoleon in the treaty of Paris, just as though he did not exist. Wellington was furious at this fresh delay on the part of Spain. He said to Vincent: "They (the Spaniards) will be forced to agree in the end, so they had better make haste to do so of their own accord."⁶ Wellington had prophesied aright. Madrid was gradually coming to its senses.

¹ Neipperg to Metternich, Sala, July 1, 1817.

² Vincent to Metternich, Paris, December 18, 1817.

³ Declaration by protocol to the Ministerial Conference at Paris, June 1, 1817, No. 122.

⁴ Metternich to Neipperg, Florence, June 29, 1817.

⁵ Vincent to Metternich, Paris, July 1, 1817.

⁶ *Ibid.*

This was the work of the intriguing Tatitscheff, who so far had been inciting the King of Spain to continued resistance by deluding him with all manner of false hopes. But now, observing general disapproval of the attitude of the Spanish Court, he was the first to counsel submission.¹ Consequently, on July 23, the Spanish Ambassador was able to announce to Baron von Vincent that his Court had finally ratified the treaty of June 10.² "Receive my cordial and respectful thanks," wrote Marie Louise to her father, on becoming acquainted with this joyful news, "for what you have done for my son, dear papa, in the recent negotiations in Paris. You have richly repaid my heart for the many sorrows it has suffered, and it will ever be grateful to you."³ Marie Louise, to whom the official text of the treaty of Paris was still unknown, remained under the impression that it contained settlements as to her son's future. She little suspected what intrigues against the fatherless Prince, Metternich had been carrying on unknown to her, and behind her back. Therefore she begged her father to accomplish his "good work" and invest her son, as he pleased, with title, rank and a coat of arms which would secure him the position of a posthumous Prince of the House of Hapsburg. Only after this had been done, could she feel that on all points she had fulfilled her duties as a mother. "Now I believe," her letter says, "that I have done all I can for the peace of Europe, and for my child's future. Nothing remains for me to do but to benefit my subjects as much as possible during my lifetime, for they have shown me great loyalty during this critical state of affairs; and to save as much as I can for my son without impoverishing the country,

¹ Provost (first Counsellor to the Embassy) to Metternich, Madrid, June 23, 1817.

² Vincent to Metternich, Paris, July 23, 1817.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 13, 1817.

and to invest it in your States, so that some day he may come into an independent competency.”¹ Since in Vienna they did not seem to be in such great haste to carry out her wishes as she was herself, she repeated her request towards the end of September. “I commend to your notice, dearest papa,” she wrote to the Emperor at this time, “the title and arms of my son, for his whole existence and future happiness depend as much upon this as upon his means.”² Metternich had long since resolved to make some definite settlement as to the political existence of the young Napoleon. He had promised this to Marie Louise when he met her in Italy during the summer of 1817;³ and the matter was to be arranged on the lines of the protocol of June 1. But he preferred to put it off until Lucca had been handed over to the ex-Queen, the Infanta Maria Louisa. Now that the moment had arrived, he delivered to the Ministerial Conference in Paris, December 4, 1817—through the agency of Vincent—a positive declaration by which the potential conditions of the protocol of June 1, 1817, were to receive force and validity. The new declaration of December 4 was to serve as a supplement to the treaty of Paris of June 4, and to form an integral part of the acts of the Vienna Congress.⁴ Thus, before the assembled representatives of France, Russia, Prussia and Spain, the last word as to the future of the young Napoleon was solemnly pronounced through the medium of the Austrian Ambassador. On December 4, the Emperor Francis imparted to the Allied Powers his resolution to present his grandson, on the death of Marie Louise, with the estates of the Bavarian Palatinate in Bohemia, as

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 13, 1817.

² The same to the same, September 27, 1817.

³ Metternich's despatch, Florence, June 18, 1817.

⁴ Vincent to Metternich, November 29, and his private letter to Metternich of December 10, 1817.

private property, which, however, in default of direct heirs to the Prince, were to revert to the Imperial private revenues. At the same time he proposed to bestow upon him a title which could wake no memories of his past.¹ On this account it was specially advisable to avoid the example set by the King of Bavaria, who had granted the title of "Royal Highness" to the children of his son-in-law, Eugène de Beauharnais.² The young Napoleon was not to be styled "Imperial Highness," simply "Serene Highness"; nor to appear in the eyes of the world as a Prince of the Imperial family. He was only to take precedence after the Archdukes. "In this way," wrote Metternich to the Emperor Francis as early as June 18, "not only will the Prince's existence be assured, but it will be also honourably politic, and cannot in any case endanger the present order of things in Europe."³

The French Premier, the Duc de Richelieu, was not greatly edified by the declarations of the Court of Vienna. He raised special objections to the expression "direct and legitimate heirs"⁴ of the son of the Duchess of Parma.⁵ The mention of his heirs was particularly unpleasant, because hopes had been entertained that, in years to come, the little Napoleon might be consigned

¹ Metternich expressed himself in this sense to the Prussian Ambassador. Krusemark's account, Vienna, February 4, 1818. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² Krusemark's despatch, Vienna, February 4, 1818. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

³ Metternich's despatch of June 18, 1817.

⁴ In the declaration to the protocol of December 4, 1817, No. 181, it states: "... if he (the Prince) leaves no direct male heirs, or in the contrary case, after the death of such heirs."

⁵ Private letter of Vincent to Metternich, December 10, 1817. Count Lottum to the Prussian Ambassador in Vienna, General Krusemark, Berlin, January 24, 1818. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

to the cloister.¹ As a matter of fact, the question of dedicating the King of Rome, as he was then called, to the religious life,² had actually been raised among the Allied Princes in Paris (1815); and the Counsellor of State, Hudelist, had regretted at the time that the Treaty of Fontainebleau had made other dispositions, and declared Napoleon's son Prince of Parma.³ The thought that the child of Marie Louise might marry and leave heirs behind him now disquieted the Bourbons, who were disappointed in their expectations, and had sufficient cause in any case to tremble for the stability of their rule. Baron Vincent felt that he must pacify Richelieu; he endeavoured therefore to allay his fears, and succeeded in doing so. The question of issue, he told him, had only been mentioned so that in default of such, the reversion of the properties bestowed upon the Prince should be secured to the Emperor.⁴ In the opinion of the Berlin Cabinet every cause of anxiety would have been removed by the simple expedient of forbidding the marriage of Napoleon's son.⁵ But however well-disposed the Emperor Francis might be to the Bourbons, he would not hear of condemning his grandson to perpetual celibacy. Without wishing to anticipate

¹ Lottum to Krusemark, Berlin, January 24, 1818. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² *Ibid.* "It is also very true that even at the time of the meeting of the allied monarchs in Paris (Francis, Alexander and Frederick William III.) there was some idea of devoting Prince Francis Charles to the religious life, and thus placing him in a category which would not allow of his joining in dangerous adventures."

³ Hudelist to Metternich, Vienna, April 21, 1817. "I cannot realise the Prince of Parma. I should have made him an Abbé and in time a Bishop."

⁴ Vincent to Metternich, private letter of December 10, 1817. He had been instructed by Metternich in this acceptance. To Vincent, Florence, July 26, 1817, private despatch.

⁵ Lottum to Krusemark, Berlin, January 24, 1818. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

future arrangements,¹ he deemed it too severe a measure to condemn his grandson at present to the solitude of the cloister, at the desire of the foes of the captive Emperor, who wished to destroy the political importance of father and son at one blow. For this reason Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador, one of Napoleon's most implacable enemies, was much displeased with the declaration of December 4, which he desired to exclude from the protocol.² As early as June 1817 he had expressed the opinion that the Emperor Francis took up the Prince's cause far too zealously,³ forgetting that the Emperor of Austria could not with decency do less for his grandson than the King of Bavaria, at the Tsar's instigation, had done for the children of his son-in-law,⁴ Eugène de Beauharnais. "What is the good of the whole Declaration?" Pozzo di Borgo now exclaimed. "Nothing is more easily explained," replied Vincent. "The existence of the person who forms its object cannot be a matter of indifference to any Court in Europe; mine only shares in the general interest involved in the protocol; it seems to me every one should feel grateful to it for this, and I think its intention will not be in the least misunderstood." As the Duc de Richelieu and the Spanish Ambassador himself followed the Austrian's words with nods of approbation, Pozzo also held his tongue. Henceforward he abstained from further objections to the declaration of December 4 in the protocol of the Ministerial Conference,⁵ which was meant to be communicated to the individual Courts in order that it might be incorporated,

¹ Metternich to Vincent, Florence, July 26, 1817. Private despatch. "This stipulation (regarding the succession) does not in any way prejudice the fate and future career of the Prince."

² Vincent to Metternich; private letter, December 10, 1817.

³ Metternich to Vincent, Florence, July 26, 1817.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Vincent to Metternich; private letter, December 10, 1817.

with their approval, as an additional contribution to the Acts of the Congress of Vienna.¹

Meanwhile Poggi, the representative of Parma at the Court of France, had sent Marie Louise the treaty of Paris of June 10, with a request from the Powers that it might be ratified by her. She was intensely agitated on closer acquaintance with this document, the contents of which she now saw for the first time. She had believed that this treaty had determined the fate of her son. Now, however—in January 1818—she was convinced to the contrary. She considered that the Powers had disappointed her, which drew from her the bitter complaint that she was continually condemned to sacrifice herself, although Europe, for the sake of which she had done so much, would do nothing in return for her.² For the first time in her life she showed a power of opposition surprising in a woman of such infirmity of purpose. She refused most decidedly to put her name to the treaty of Paris of June 10, until, either in the treaty itself, or by means of an additional clause, provision for her son as an independent Prince had been solemnly promised.³ Calmed by Metternich, she conferred upon Neipperg full authority to sign on her behalf, and was beside herself with joy, when a copy of the declaration of December 4, 1817, was sent to her from Vienna.⁴ This return to a happier mood was especially strengthened from the time she became

¹ Declaration of December 4, 1817, to Protocol, No. 181. "... to render it (the Declaration) qualified to complete the arrangements destined to form part of the acts of the Congress."

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, February 2, 1818.

³ Neipperg to Metternich, Parma, January 23, 1818. "... But never until the future destiny of the Prince of Parma—of which there is no mention whatever in the treaty of June 10—shall have been fixed and determined positively and solemnly in an article, or in an additional and supplementary declaration, signed by the ministers who have subscribed to the above-mentioned treaty."

⁴ Neipperg to Metternich, Parma, March 8, 1818.

aware that Metternich was occupied in drawing up the deed of patent which was to assure for all time the new position of the young Napoleon. True to his intention of entirely separating the latter from his past, the Minister submitted for the Emperor's choice a great number of titles, all intended to serve the same purpose. Francis decided in favour of the title of "Duke of Mödling," of which Metternich said "it was an illustrious name, borne exclusively by the Princes of the house of Babenberg."¹

As Marie Louise herself insisted upon an ancient title, and would not hear of a new one,² she might have been satisfied with her father's choice. Yet she felt bound to make objections to it. "How gladly," she writes to the Emperor, "I would have accepted for him the title of Duke of Mödling, which recalls the noblest reminiscences of the old Austrian dukedoms; what caused me to demur was the fact that this property is in the possession

¹ Metternich to Marie Louise, Vienna, February 24, 1818. Mödling is a place near Vienna. See for this: "Geschichte der alten Feste Medlich (Mödling), der ersten Burg der Markgrafen in Oesterreich aus dem Fürstenhaus Babenburg," Vienna, 1819. The younger branch of the Babenbergs bore this title in the twelfth century. On the subject of this family see Juritsch: "Geschichte der Babenberger," 1894. The younger branch of the Babenbergs, with the appanage of Mödling bore, together with the Austrian Ducal Eagle, a coat of arms with two lions rampant, frequently divided by a pale or chevron. In this shield we probably see the family arms of the Babenbergs. For further details see Anthony von Siegenfeld, "Das Landeswappen der Steiermark," p. 252. Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 236, speaks of a "Comte de Mülting," who never existed, instead of a Duke of Mödling. This disproves Welschinger's statement that Marie Louise declined the title of a "Comte de Mülting" because the title of Count was far too humble for her son. Edmond Rostand, in "L'aiglon," Act I., scene 13, p. 57, must have followed Welschinger's erroneous view, when he makes Marie Louise address her son as follows:

"Ainsi quand le décret devait te faire comte,
J'ai dit: Non! Comte, non! Au moins duc! Duc ça compte!"

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, February 2, 1818.

of Prince Liechtenstein, and the wonderful old feudal castle forms part of his English garden, but had it been in your possession, I should have preferred this title to any other."¹ It would have answered most completely to her wishes, had they desired to call her son "Duke of Babenberg."² She was firmly convinced that Metternich had promised this. He denied it without hesitation. A misunderstanding must have arisen—he wrote to Marie Louise—he had only suggested "a Babenberg title, but not the family name itself."³ Expressing himself at greater length to Neipperg, he says: "To grant to Prince Francis Charles the title of Duke of Babenberg would be to revive in his person the former dynasty of Austrian sovereigns who preceded the illustrious house of Hapsburg. This alone makes the affair impossible."⁴

As there was no prospect of overcoming the political scruples put forward by Metternich, Marie Louise stipulated that the new title should be at least derived from one of the chief estates of the Bavarian Palatinate, provided—as she says—that this estate brings with it a German sounding name.⁵ But she protested most decidedly against the possible choice of "Duke of Buschtiehrad," which "no one could pronounce outside Bohemia."⁶ "I await in patience," she said to Metternich "the issue of this affair, convinced, my dear Prince, that now, as before, you will justify the confidence I have placed in you." Scarcely was Metternich in

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, March 5, 1818.

² Marie Louise to Metternich, March 3, 1818.

³ Metternich to Marie Louise, March 24, 1818.

⁴ Metternich to Neipperg, March 24, 1818. Metternich says in the report of March 16: "The title of a family which had once ruled Austria could never be conferred again; it would be contrary to all conceivable principles."

⁵ Marie Louise to Metternich, March 3, 1818.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.* Buschtiehrad formed a part of the estates of the Bavarian Palatinate.

possession of this letter, than he instituted an inquiry as to which of the landed properties of the Bavarian Palatinate formed the largest estate. Closer investigation proved that Reichstadt had the preference,¹ upon which the Emperor Francis declared himself ready to create a duchy out of this property; and that the title derived from this estate should be bestowed upon his grandson.² To make this plan quite legal, it was necessary to secure the consent of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, in whose possession the estates of the Bavarian Palatinate—and consequently Reichstadt as a portion of it—were to remain until the death of Marie Louise.³ Marie Louise, who immediately addressed the Grand Duke her uncle on this matter, was delighted with this favourable turn of events. "Nothing in the world," so runs one of her letters, "could have happened more agreeably, for now I am quite at rest as to my son's future, and especially because I have only to thank for the fulfilment of my desires the best of all fathers, not the other European Sovereigns who have soon forgotten all the sacrifices I have made for the general good. It was never of importance to me that my son should reign, but to see his fate irrevocably settled was the most sacred of maternal duties, and you, dear Papa, have restored at last my long lost peace of mind, so that I am quite satisfied with my lot."⁴


Step by step Marie Louise was forced to retire. Without consulting her, the young son of the ex-Emperor had been divested of his pompous title of "King of Rome" and degraded to that of "Prince of Parma."

¹ Metternich to Marie Louise and Neipperg, March 24, 1818.

² The Emperor's decision of March 19 to Metternich's despatch of March 16, 1818. "As to the title, I look upon the dominion of Reichstadt as one of the most important of those in question to be raised to a Duchy, and therefore desire you, if there is nothing against it, to make the necessary arrangements."

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, April 7, 1818.

⁴ The same to the same



THE READING OF THE PATENT (1818) CREATING THE PRINCE OF KARMA DUNE OF REICHSTADT
From a painting in the possession of Dr. August Liepman of 17, rue

Now she had agreed that he should be deprived even of this dignity. She could not even achieve the desire that lay so near her heart—that he should be addressed as “Imperial” or “Royal Highness.”¹ He, the former King of Rome and Prince of Parma, was now to be a mere “Serene” Highness.² Metternich endeavoured to console Marie Louise by telling her that the name bestowed upon her son was of no real importance for his future destiny; the chief consideration lay in the fact that he would be independent and raised above all attacks.³ If Marie Louise herself declared that she had never dreamt of seeing her son reign, she was only trying to quiet her conscience by such empty phrases. She desired to forget the joy she had felt at the assurance that the Prince should ascend the throne of Parma. Her weakness in the face of the least opposition offers the sole explanation of this kind of self-persuasion; that she had never wished anything for her son beyond the assured position of a rich private gentleman. Not once does she seem offended because he was not reckoned as a member of the Imperial family; she welcomed whatever her father was pleased to ordain; and his orders were that the regulation of this entire question of rank and title should not be regarded as the business of the Imperial family.⁴ The Prince who, as the Emperor’s grandson, lived in the Palace and ate at his grandfather’s table, was not to be considered as belonging to this exclusive family circle, but rather as the highest private

¹ Metternich to Marie Louise, February 24, 1818.

² *Ibid.*

³ The same to the same. March 24, 1818. “The Prince is made to render the name he will bear illustrious, and it is certainly not the name which will influence his existence.”

⁴ Metternich’s despatch of April 24, 1818. See Count Pettenegg, “Titel und Wappen des Herzogs von Reichstadt,” in the yearly report of the Imperial and Royal Heraldic Society “Adler,” vol. x. p. 323.

gentleman in Austria, to whom, as such, a rank immediately below that of the Archdukes was accorded. What bitterness of spirit this would bring to the young Napoleon when, in time to come, he would be more fully acquainted with the past? With what feelings would he think of his mother, whose consent to his humiliation had been won gradually and easily, instead of fighting with uplifted head for the rights which had been solemnly promised to him by all Europe? And for whom were Francis and Metternich doing all this? For the Bourbons, who still thought in their ingratitude that Austria was far too favourably disposed to this scion of the Corsican, who had suppressed the "Constitutionnel" for merely mentioning the Prince,¹ and had forbidden the sale of a perfume called after the Duke of Reichstadt.² It is, therefore, more than probable that the Powers, including the Emperor Francis, troubled very little about the opposition of Marie Louise. England declared most emphatically that she would never suffer the ex-King of Rome to ascend any throne. Influenced by this knowledge, Marie Louise wished to secure for her son, under the protection of the Courts, a peaceful, if inglorious, existence: that of a wealthy private gentleman. Thanks to her opposition, he would never be compelled to enter upon the dangerous career of an adventurous prince.³ These considerations explain the felicity of Marie Louise when the patent appeared which announced that the

¹ A. Stern, "Geschichte Europas," vol. i., p. 121.

² Welschinger, already quoted, p. 236.

³ It is interesting to see the way in which the Chancery of State speaks of the eventual non-maintenance of the Prince: "Prince Francis Charles will cease to be the butt of every disturber of the public peace, and the Emperor believes he has avoided another rock upon which we should inevitably have split, if by a complete desertion—unworthy of the character of S.M.J.—we had left this young Prince the victim of the fate which presided at his birth, to become an object of pity and consequently of interest." To Vincent, July 24, 1817.

domain of Reichstadt had been raised to a dukedom, and that under the title of Duke this estate was secured to the young Napoleon as future owner.¹ A date most fatal in its significance was attached to the diploma which bestowed upon him the title of Duke of Reichstadt. It was issued on July 22, 1818, and on July 22, 1832 he breathed his last. In other respects also the patent offers much interesting material for consideration. It is particularly remarkable as referring to Prince Francis Joseph Carl only as the son of Marie Louise, Archduchess of Austria and Duchess of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla.² According to this document the Duke had no father who was known to the world. In their efforts to suppress the still living Napoleon, the diploma avoids all mention of the Emperor's name. Neither Marie Louise, nor the Court of Vienna, seem to have been conscious of the disgrace thus inflicted upon the Prince's mother, nor how deeply injured the former would feel himself by this proceeding. In this case, politics infringed, as they were not entitled to do, upon sacred rights which they ought to have respected under any circumstances. Had not Marie Louise been faithless to Napoleon, she would never have suffered this condemnation of the father of her child. The patent also leaves us with the impression that it was intended to pass sentence of extinction upon the direct descendants of the Emperor Napoleon, as represented by

¹ Four patents were published which determined the creation of the Duchy, the questions of title and heraldic bearings and the adjudication of the Duchy to the Prince. All four decrees are published in Montbel's "*Le duc de Reichstadt.*" The Duke was to receive for the present an income of 500,000 francs from his property. See Larrey, "*Madame Mere,*" vol. II, p. 202, what Napoleon's mother says as regards the title of Duke of Reichstadt. Also Watteville, "*Comment le roi de Rome devint Duc de Reichstadt,*" in "*Revue de la France Moderne,*" May 1890.

² IV. Patent published by Montbel, already quoted. The Hungarian calendars which still spoke of the Duke of Reichstadt as Napoleon were forbidden in Austria. "*Briefe aus Wien 1831,*" p. 41.

the Duke of Reichstadt. For, in contradiction to the declaration of December 4, 1817, which secures the estates of the Bavarian Palatinate to the legitimate male descendants, the patent (IV.) of July 22, 1818, states most distinctly that these possessions shall be enjoyed by the Prince for "his lifetime only."¹ It was probably in order to spare the sensibilities of the Bourbons that an alteration was made in the declaration of July 22, 1818, and all mention of the succession was omitted. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the Emperor had deprived his grandson of the rights of ownership, solemnly promised, and only reduced these to a mere life interest. At the same time, we should be forced to this conclusion without some insight into the secret designs which emanated from the Emperor Francis, and have hitherto remained unknown.² But although, for political reasons, the Emperor could speak in the so-called "document of dotation" of a mere life interest, he had conditions drawn up by which, upon the majority of the Prince, the Duchy of Reichstadt should become absolutely his own, not merely for himself, but for his descendants in the male line.³ In all secrecy, Francis, with the understanding of his daughter, had provided for the possibility of his grandson's marriage when he came of age. On August

¹ Count Pettenegg in his paper upon "The title and arms of the Duke of Reichstadt," in vol. x. N.F. of the annual "Adler," p. 325, has reprinted from the Viennese State archives this patent, which ought to have been originally published, and in which there is a question of posterity. Pettenegg has overlooked the fact that it was not this patent but another which was actually published, in which the expression "descendants" was omitted. Those who make use of Pettenegg's version will, of course, be misled.

² Hermann Hallwich, "Der Herzog von Reichstadt" in "Mitteilungen des Vereines für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen," annual series xxxvii., No. 1, p. 10. Hallwich has rightly called attention to this fact, which, however, is disposed of by the secret order of the Emperor Francis which I have quoted in the text.

³ Hudelist's report, Vienna, August 28, 1818.

30, 1818, the Emperor decided that in case of the Prince's marriage the dukedom should be made subject to the rights of primogeniture and indivisible, and with the complete extinction of the male line it should become once more Imperial private property.¹

Thus the former heir to the throne of France became an Austrian Duke through the Imperial decree of July 22, 1818. All this took place at a moment when Napoleon had charged his physician, O'Meara, who was about to return to Europe, with a last message to his son, bidding him never to forget that he was born a French Prince. But in Vienna no one heeded this admonition. All the less, because a plot had just been discovered for the rescue of Napoleon, which had thrown Marie Louise into a state of mortal terror.² Closely connected with these designs was an attempt upon the life of Alexander I., through which it was hoped to extort some concession in favour

¹ "The decrees of the Emperor Francis respecting the law of primogeniture for Reichstadt which shall apply in the event of his marriage," Vienna, August 13, 1818. On account of the strictest secrecy and in order that it might be admitted hereafter as valid documentary evidence, only three copies of this decree were drawn up and signed by the Emperor: one for the State Archives, one for the Minister of the Interior, Count Saurau, and a third for the chief Burgrave of Bohemia, Count Kolovrat. The sealed documents were only to be opened in case of the Prince's marriage. The enactment says that neither the Duke nor his heirs, male or female, might marry without the consent of the Emperor without losing the succession to the Duchy, and in the case of the women without forfeiting the maintenance suitable to their rank. In the first draft it is said that the descendants would have the right to bear the title of duke, but not the rank, because it was personal and conferred for life only. Only in consequence of a representation made by Hudelist to Metternich on August 11, to the effect that by the protocol of December 4, 1817, the rank also was secured to the descendants of the Duke, "and that nothing can be changed herein (the decree of 1818) without compromising us," a passage endowing the descendants also with the rank was introduced into the decrees of August 30.

² Metternich to Neipperg, private despatch, December 22, 1818.

of the captive Emperor, such as the raising of his son, or of Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, to the French throne.¹ Under these circumstances the poignant words in which Napoleon's mother endeavoured to describe his desperate position to the Princes passed by unheeded.² Equally without effect was the passionate appeal addressed to Metternich from St. Helena, on February 15, 1818, by the Emperor's former *chef d'escadron*, Piontkowski.³ The chorus in favour of Napoleon, raised throughout the world by Madame Mère, Piontkowski, General Gourgaud⁴ and Count Las Cases⁵ found no echo. For the chief rulers of Europe who, assembled at the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, had chained the greatest of commanders to the barren rock, the Emperor Napoleon had ceased to exist. The severest measures were taken to deprive all the Napoleonists and their followers of political activity once and for all.⁶ In future, not one of them was to have access to Napoleon or his son. The education of the young Napoleon, who was now to vegetate

¹ Metternich to Neipperg. See also Stern, "Geschichte Europas," vol. i. p. 476.

² Larroy, "Madame Mère," vol. ii. p. 183.

³ Piontkowski to Metternich, Mantua, February 15, 1818. "The situation in which the Emperor Napoleon finds himself at St. Helena surpasses all description; it will put a speedy end to his life. The courage with which the Emperor endures his misfortunes, his strong soul and robust body, will soon succumb to the unhealthiness of that part of the island where he lives in a damp house, to the bad food and deprivation of necessary exercise, and to the unjust and useless annoyances to which he is exposed!" For further details as to Piontkowski and Santini, who were both agents of Napoleon, see Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz I. und die Napoleoniden," chap. viii.

⁴ Gourgaud's letters to Marie Louise, the Emperor Francis and the Emperor Alexander, given in Gourgaud's "Sainte-Hélène," vol. ii. p. 535-540.

⁵ Las Cases to the Princes of Europe, printed in Schlitter, already quoted, p. 571.

⁶ On this subject see my book, "Die Verbannten des ersten Kaiserreichs,"

as Duke of Reichstadt, was to complete the political annihilation of the Napoleonic party. Metternich himself had foreseen the thorny side of this affair when he said, that even with the greatest care, it would be difficult to keep the Prince out of all those pitfalls of intrigue to which his birth exposed him.¹

¹ Metternich to Vincent, Florence, July 26, 1817, private despatch.

To us should be reserved the care of directing his education in paths of enlightenment, and of endeavouring to teach him how to avoid for himself in the future the snares to which—independent of us, of himself and of his will—his birth leaves him only too much exposed."

CHAPTER VIII

THE EDUCATION OF THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT

ON February 8, 1814, Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph : "I would rather my son were strangled than see him brought up in Vienna as an Austrian prince."¹ But the man, already so heavily tried by fate, was not to be spared this tragic blow. Napoleon's son was in fact already being transformed into a Hapsburger. All the hopes of the prisoner of St. Helena that this might never happen were based upon Marie Louise. He was firmly convinced that neither as wife nor mother would the Empress consent to her son being brought up in Vienna.² But he deceived himself. How could the voice of this weak woman, dethroned and powerless, prevail against her father and Metternich ? What a storm of indignation she had already brought upon herself when it was reported that she encouraged the remembrance of the Empire in the little Napoleon. With what violence she had been required to give up her French *entourage*, she who dreamed only of the glories of bygone days. We know how long she held out against this. When, however, it seemed increasingly probable that an abduction of the Prince of Parma might be attempted, Marie Louise was forced to give way in so far that she allowed the appointment of a *German* as gentleman-in-waiting to her son, "one who," as Metternich says, "by his

¹ Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. xxvii. p. 133.

² *Ibid.*

principles and loyalty to the Emperor, is worthy of the highest confidence."¹ The prince believed he had found such a man in the person of Major Count Vecchietti, chamberlain at the Imperial Court, who, according to Metternich's German statement, "unites to his other qualities the firmness necessary to hold in check the Prince's suite, especially if the French attendants are not to be dismissed from his service."² Vecchietti, who is described in a police report as *ce vieux plaidoyer* of the rights of the ex-Queen of Etruria,³ appears to have refused this responsible post, on the ground of his advanced age.⁴ The choice of gentleman-in-waiting, or rather of tutor and governor to the young Napoleon, now fell upon Count Maurice Dietrichstein, on the recommendation of Baron von Hager.⁵ At the time of the Congress of Vienna he had been told off as gentleman-in-waiting to Frederick VI. of Denmark. King Frederick, high-minded and intellectual, anxious to study all that was of interest in Vienna as regards art and science, was appreciative of Dietrichstein's able guidance in these matters. The Count was now forty years of age. His father, Prince John Charles, had belonged to the narrow social circle of the Emperor Joseph II., and his mother, Princess Marie Christine, had been one of the Empress Marie Theresa's intimate friends. Brought up under the care of his godfather, Marshal Lacy, he took part in the campaigns of 1793-97. Promoted to the rank of Major, he fought, in 1798,

¹ Metternich's Despatch of April 12, 1815.

² *Ibid.*

³ Despatch of February 19, 1815. M.I.

⁴ Metternich's Despatch of April 12, 1815.

⁵ Dietrichstein's Diary, without date. "How I came to the Prince through Hager." Prince Oettingen—Wallerstein's Archives. (In future quotations I shall refer to this source under the initials Pr. Oe.—W. A.) The appointment dates from June 26, 1815, so Weidmann informs us in "Moriz Graf von Dietrichstein," p. 51.

under General Mack against the French in Naples, where he was made a prisoner.¹ After he had regained his liberty, April 1800, he married, in September of the same year, Countess Theresa of Gilleis, and retired from the service with the rank of Major, in order to devote himself entirely to art and science.² His home became a centre for all that was most intellectual in Vienna. Even Beethoven was to be seen there.³

Marie Louise would only approve of the Count's appointment as governor to her son "provisionally" and for a short period.⁴ The child himself was not attracted by him. When, on June 30, 1815, Dietrichstein entered upon his new office at Schönbrunn and was to be introduced to his Imperial pupil, the young Prince refused to greet him. "I will not go into the drawing-room," he cried defiantly to Countess Scarampi, who was sent to fetch him, "because the tutor is there." When finally he ceased to struggle, he took in the Count from head to foot with his great eyes.⁵ Dietrichstein was well aware that this curious reception on the part of the little Prince was due to the influence of his French surroundings,

¹ F. C. Weidmann, "Moriz Graf von Dietrichstein. Sein Leben und Wirken," 1867, p. 55.

² Hallwich, already quoted, speaks erroneously of Dietrichstein as General, and evidently mistakes him for his brother, Count Francis, the successor to the title of Prince, who had been made a Major-General as early as 1796.

³ Weidmann, already quoted.

⁴ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Baden, July 7, 1815. "Yesterday I went to see my son who kisses your hands. He is quite well, and has already made acquaintance with Count Maurice Dietrichstein, who pleases me very much, especially as you have only appointed him provisionally, until my son goes with me to Italy, or I make another choice for his education, which will not happen for another year, since for this purpose he does not satisfy me, although he is an excellent man." Montbel is therefore mistaken when he remarks in "Le duc de Reichstadt," chap. iii., that Dietrichstein was appointed at the suggestion of Marie Louise.

⁵ Dietrichstein's Notes, 1815. Fr. Os.—W. A.



MAURICE COUNT DIETRICHSTEIN, GOVERNOR OF THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT
From a painting by Joseph Kriehuber. 1839. In the Imperial Court Library, Vienna

especially to the womenkind. He at once declared that—from this quarter—he apprehended the greatest opposition to the fulfilment of his mission.¹ He confined himself, for the moment, to the remark that later it might be necessary to insist on a change in the existing household of the young Napoleon. Whilst Dietrichstein was devoting himself to the study of his pupil, Marie Louise came to the conclusion that besides the Count, who would be director in chief, a special tutor would also be necessary. The man she chose was Captain Foresti, strongly recommended to her from various quarters as suitable for the post, which, moreover, he declared himself ready to accept.² On August 21, she writes to her father: "Should this choice please you, I intend to place my son in his hands before my departure, and before the beginning of the winter."³ On September 6, the Emperor declared his approval, and she expressed her thanks in the following terms: "I kiss your hands for your gracious permission to appoint Foresti as my son's tutor; I hope, according to all I hear, that this choice will answer our expectations, and that he will bring up my son to be a good and well-educated man. I shall leave him more contentedly, if I know him to be in good hands."⁴ In an interview with Foresti, Marie Louise

¹ Dietrichstein to Court Counsellor Neuberg, June 30, 1815. Pr. Oe.—W. Ar. "In the meantime I do not conceal from myself the difficulties of my position, especially as long as the female attendants of the Prince remain here." In his *Diary* Dietrichstein writes on July 1, 1815: "The Abbé Landi found me in tears. I had experienced much unpleasantness, which has convinced me all the more that I shall effect nothing until the Prince is in *my* hands. . . . I am tired of the women-folk and the Prince can take no great liking to me, for were he to do so, it would excite their jealousy." Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815. It is a mistake when Montbel in "*Le duc de Reichstadt*," chap. iii. p. 145, says that the Emperor chose Foresti.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815.

⁴ The same to the same, September 10, 1815.

became personally convinced that she was dealing with a serious and capable man. All who knew him intimately spoke of his firm character. Born in Trieste, a Catholic, and unmarried, he had now reached his thirty-ninth year. Educated at the School of Engineers in Vienna, he left it in 1796 to start his military career as ensign in the Italian army. When, after the unfortunate campaign of 1809,¹ the Tyrol was divided and the southern portion—his native land—handed over to the kingdom of Italy, he decided to renounce his military career, so as to avoid having to take up arms against Austria under a foreign ruler. He retired into private life with the rank of Captain. Released from military duty, he entered the wholesale business of Baron Boesner at Brody, where for five years he devoted himself zealously to the important affairs of this house. Baron Boesner found him very useful, for he could write and speak Latin, German, Italian, and French perfectly, besides having a sound knowledge of mathematics.²

¹ According to Montbel (already quoted), Foresti, as the latter related to him, was taken prisoner by the French at Regensburg in 1809. When on this occasion he was brought before Napoleon, the latter expressed himself with great violence on the subject of Austria, saying that she had utilised the war in Spain to his (the Emperor's) detriment. The story does not appear to me very probable, and gives the impression of having been subsequently invented in order to make out that the man who was afterwards to become the tutor of his son, had been harshly treated by Napoleon. Had Foresti actually had such an interview with Napoleon, he would certainly have remembered it in the account of his life intended for Dietrichstein, dated September 3, 1815. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein's report to Marie Louise, Schönbrunn, September 17, 1815. Pr. Oc.—W. A. A copy of this is to be found also in the State Archives of Parma. Foresti himself writes to Dietrichstein (supplementary to his letter of September 3, 1815; Pr. Oc.—W. A.): "The languages in which I am quite willing to undergo a severe examination at any moment are German, Italian, French, and Latin. I am equal to all the arithmetical calculations needed in everyday life, and as an officer I studied mathematics as far as this branch of learning

But Foresti was not to take over the management of the Prince until after the departure of Mme. Soufflot, the under-governess, and her daughter, from Vienna. Otherwise it was feared that a dislike of the new tutor might be instilled in the mind of a child so accessible to suggestions.¹ The dismissal of these two women was the work of Dietrichstein, who was convinced that they constantly talked to the Prince of the glory that had once surrounded him. They were never tired of describing the splendours of his father's court. With such eagerness did he listen to their words, and with such quickness did he impress them on his memory, that he ended by imagining he had really seen and experienced all which he now heard of for the first time. Those who had no knowledge of this psychological process were surprised to hear the little Napoleon talk, as by intuition, of the events of the past, which must have been astonishing at his childish age. Only thus can be explained his frequent references to the time "When I was still King," or his allusions to the days when he had pages in attendance. Dietrichstein reflected with much concern on the sad consequences of such methods of treatment.² He saw how these women, who loved France and its former Emperor above all else, filled the young imagination of the Prince with fancies no longer suitable to his circumstances. For whilst the French ladies brought up the forsaken child of the Emperor upon pictures of his brilliant past, it was Dietrichstein's duty to make him forget all this. All his endeavours, however, were but in vain, while opposed to the homage of others who were

is applied to military subjects. Beyond this I possess no special learning."

¹ Marie Louise to her father, September 19, 1815.

² Dietrichstein's Notes, 1815. Fr. Oc.—W. A. "Only with sorrow could one hear and observe in silence how all possible pains were taken to make him (the Prince) wretched."

for ever referring to the splendid period of the Empire. All geographical games the Prince was always allowed to win, and then, according to the rules of the game, he was declared Emperor.¹ In this way he instinctively came to suspect an enemy in every one who was not French. He who, apart from this, was not disposed to candour, grew distrustful, reserved, shy, and among Germans, shunned the mention of the favourite subjects which occupied his mind. The consciousness of misfortunes undergone, that had deprived him of his former greatness robbed him of the ease and careless happiness which belong to children of his age.² Unless the Prince was to feel himself an unhappy alien in the country where henceforth he had to live, the influence of these women must be suppressed, and they must be commanded to return to France forthwith. Dietrichstein hesitated no longer over this decisive step. "Even if his physical health offered no reason whatever for separating him from his present surroundings," he writes to the ex-Empress, Marie Louise, "there seems to me quite a sufficient *moral* reason in the fact that it is absolutely necessary that all impressions of his former existence should be obliterated; for every one's memory reaches back distinctly enough to the age at which the Prince now is, and it is to be feared that, with the many things that have been told him, he can only think with regret of his past existence, above all, he will carry with him from childhood to adolescence an exaggerated idea of the virtues of a nation to which he can no longer belong."³

Marie Louise yielded all the more easily to Dietrichstein's demand, because she had already expressed her willingness to do so when he had first warned her in

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes, 1815. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein's report to the Emperor Francis, Schönbrunn, June 17, 1816. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

³ Dietrichstein's report, September 17, 1815. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

August.¹ She made one stipulation, however, that Mme. Marchand should remain another year to give physical care to her son, who was still too young to be entrusted entirely to the supervision of men. She feared no harmful influences from Mme. Marchand. "She is a good woman," says Marie Louise, "who never meddles in things that have no concern with her position, and to whom my son has been accustomed from his birth."² Since the medical attendant, Dr. Frank, was of the same opinion, and Foresti also wished it, it was decided that the waiting-woman should remain another winter, 1815-1816, in the household of the Prince. At the same time, precautions were taken never to leave her alone with the child during the day, although he was left entirely in her charge at night.³ The parting from Mme. Soufflot and her daughter took place on October 20, 1815, but did not appear to make the little Prince very unhappy.⁴ Now he came under the supervision of Dietrichstein and Foresti, who had a difficult task before them.

Their first consideration in the mission entrusted to them was to strive against the child's unfortunate condition of mind, brought about by the influence of these ladies. It was their aim gradually to impress upon him that he must no longer seek his vocation in France, but entirely in Austria, which was now his second fatherland. Doubtless this desire entirely to estrange Napoleon's son from his home and the traditions of his father's house may appear cruel. But it was thought necessary to destroy early in life illusions, the development of which was debarred by the existing conditions of Europe. However cruel the task imposed upon Dietrichstein, his intention was to fulfil it as kindly and carefully as possible.

It would be wrong to assume that not a word as to

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, August 21, 1815.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* October 11, 1815.

⁴ The same to the same, October 20, 1815.

the past was allowed to be spoken to the Prince, or that his father's existence could be kept a secret. "It would indeed be impossible," said Dietrichstein himself, "to conceal from the Prince his own descent, or his father's fate; on the contrary, one day he must learn it in its entirety. The question therefore is: that he should not learn these things before he comes to mature judgment, surrounded by the benevolent care that assures him his existence, so that penetrated by gratitude for this attention, which he must recognise as truly paternal, he should learn them in such a way that he would be consoled for the apparent losses he had suffered, because his life would seem to him pleasant and desirable."¹ Already it was regarded as a magnanimous action to permit him to continue his usual habit of inserting his father's name in his prayers night and morning. Any word of blame, or of recognition, in reference to the captive Emperor was carefully avoided. On the other hand, Dietrichstein and Foresti lost no opportunity of inculcating a feeling of reverence in the child towards his grandfather. Their evident aim was to make him feel that the Emperor Francis was his sole support in the world, and that without his approval he could not do, or undertake, anything in the future. On this account they also thought it necessary to crush in him the idea that he was anything out of the common—a notion in which he had been brought up by his French attendants.² Recently this had been not a little aggravated by the bad habit of allowing numbers of people to be admitted almost daily to view the son of Napoleon in his apartments, as a wonderful sight.³ Dietrichstein lost no time in abolishing this abuse, which certainly had not a very beneficial effect on the Prince. "He wished his pupil to assi-

¹ Dietrichstein's report to the Emperor Francis, June 17, 1816. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

milate—untrammelled by past influences—the education which seemed to him best fitted to give him happiness in the future. To this end everything that could have a disturbing influence was set aside. All books stamped with the Imperial eagle were put away, as also all the toys that had been brought with the child from France. If the little Napoleon spoke of the splendours of his childhood, he was immediately told that he only knew these things from hearsay, and was much too young to remember about them himself—a remark which silenced him at once. But there were many impediments to the complete success of the methods employed. So long as Mme. Marchand remained at Schönbrunn there could be no question of completely separating the Prince from former reminiscences. A woman of limited education, Paris was her sole topic of conversation in her daily intercourse with the little Napoleon. Equally unsuitable was his French playfellow Emile, the son of Goberau, Marie Louise's man-servant.¹ As Emile lived with his parents and heard from them of the Emperor Napoleon's heroic deeds and of his brave armies, it was unavoidable that he should repeat some of these tales to his princely playfellow. Their sudden exclamations, delivered quite in the style of the Imperial Grenadiers, or reminiscent of the days of the Revolution, betrayed only too well how they amused themselves. This inconvenience was only in part ameliorated by restricting Emile's visits to the palace to the afternoon. In this way it was intended to prepare the little Prince for Emile's total dismissal. The boy left Vienna even earlier than Dietrichstein had

¹ Friedrich Schütz in his *Feuilleton*, "Aus dem Leben des Herzogs von Reichstadt, Neue Freie Presse," March 5, 1889, says that Collin got permission for Emile to share the Prince's lessons, in order to arouse emulation. This is not correct. Emile had been the Prince's playfellow long before Collin became his tutor. Collin entered upon his duties February 1, 1816, and shortly afterwards—March 1816—Emile left Vienna with his father.

dared to hope. His father had to accompany Marie Louise to Parma, when in 1816 she resolved to take personal possession of her new State. When, before the appointed time, Mme. Marchand also returned to Paris, Dietrichstein was beside himself with joy. Now, at last, the course was clear for the fulfilment of the German education he had planned.

Since February 1, 1816, the Clerk of the Imperial Chancery and Professor of the History of Philosophy in the University of Vienna, Mathew Edler von Collin—brother of Henry Collin, the renowned poet and author of "Regulus"—had shared the work with Foresti. Already, on September 17, 1815, Dietrichstein had given Marie Louise clearly to understand that Foresti alone could not undertake "the heavy task of education combined as it was with so great a responsibility," therefore it was absolutely necessary that a second tutor should be appointed as well. "The Prince," he tells Marie Louise, "requires more than double care and attention. So many tendencies to precocious sensibility should be checked, many of the ideas inculcated in him should be gradually eliminated, but without mortifying him, or breaking his spirit. We must endeavour unremittingly and with special energy to direct his mind towards the good qualities which he can find in himself; and if *moral* cultivation is altogether the first and most important part of every education, with him it is all the more important and difficult, because after the guidance he has already received, only strenuous and indefatigable care can avail anything."¹ For this position Dietrichstein had recommended Collin, "who during the last twelve years," as he remarks, "has given every proof of moral worth and honesty." Collin, who was then thirty-seven years of age, had already for

¹ Report of Dietrichstein to the Empress Marie Louise, September 7, 1815. Fr. Oc.—W. A.

some years past supervised the education of the Archduchess Leopoldine and Marie Clementine, daughters of the Emperor Francis. He was well read in the German, English, Italian, French, and Latin literatures. "His modest manners," declares the Count, "which endow him with a special capacity to approach a child's understanding, and the goodness of his heart, render him particularly suited to the work for which I propose him."¹ Although Dietrichstein considered it of the greatest importance that the education of the Prince should begin under the co-operation of Foresti and Collin,² the latter had not yet been appointed. On January 3, 1816, the Prince's Governor had to renew his entreaty.³ This time his wish was no longer disregarded by Marie Louise, who was now full of praise and appreciation for him.⁴ She wrote to the Emperor Francis: "To-day, dear Papa, I must ask your authorisation in a matter which is of great importance to me, the appointment of a second tutor for my son. It is extremely necessary that I should have two; Foresti only came on this condition. After many inquiries, and much information, my choice has fallen upon Collin; I have spoken to him myself, and am convinced that he possesses the necessary qualifications to be my son's tutor."⁵ The Emperor did not hesitate to release Collin from the Government service at the request of Marie Louise, a "great favour" which

¹ Dietrichstein's report of September 17, 1815. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dietrichstein's report, to Marie Louise, January 3, 1816. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, January 5, 1816. (According to her custom, at the beginning of a new year of continuing to use the figures of the previous one, in this instance too she has written 1815 for 1816.) "Now that I know Count Dietrichstein more intimately, I like him very much, and I cannot but congratulate myself upon the zeal and the trouble that he devotes to my son."

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, January 5, 1816.

filled her with heartfelt gratitude. "I hope," she says, "that under the guidance of three such talented and capable persons—Dietrichstein, Foresti, and Collin—my son will become a worthy and well-educated man."¹

On entering upon his new position, Collin found that some of the difficulties attendant on the education of the young Napoleon had been already overcome. Foresti had changed the methods of instruction which had been followed hitherto. We might suppose that a child of only four and a half would scarcely have been expected to learn anything. But at the Court of Napoleon I., where everything moved with giant strides, other views prevailed. From the age of two, the King of Rome had already been tormented with rules of French grammar and with the Catechism, which he could not understand. He had to recite whole speeches from Racine's plays and knew by heart thirteen of Lafontaine's Fables. He was also expected to read, and to learn the elements of geography and history.² The evil result of these unnatural proceedings was that the Prince took a dislike to all lessons, and it had now become very difficult to interest him in any subject for long together. Overwork had brought on a strange mental fatigue. His French governesses had taken pains to continue in Vienna, the methods of instruction begun in Paris. Always in ecstasies over the child, they never noticed that they were blunting his intelligence, as he himself used to say: "I am thoroughly idle."³ Always absent minded, because in spite of all efforts he could not satisfy the demands made upon him, he was not at this time able to spell correctly. In spite of this, Madame Soufflot and her daughter were convinced that he was making great progress. "You will see," they said to Dietrichstein

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, January 24, 1816.

² Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Fr. Co.—W. A.

³ Dietrichstein's Note. Fr. Co.—W. A.

one day, "how well the Prince reads." He could not read at all, however, but merely guessed at the words and made mistakes which did not prevent the women praising his cleverness.¹

Foresti soon perceived that such methods must be abandoned and some means substituted which corresponded better with the child's age. He endeavoured to avoid all over-pressure, while constantly urging him to greater perseverance and attention. But the Prince, who was not accustomed to this, cried at the very first lesson. At the beginning of it he said, half to himself: "Ah, I will try hard to learn, because I must be good," but in a few minutes his attention wandered, and he began to cry.² This was not the only difficulty; at times he tried to intimidate those around him by outbursts of ungovernable passion, a method which succeeded well enough with his female attendants, but not with Foresti. Once when he fell from his little arm-chair, in which he was rocking himself, and the Captain told him what dangerous consequences might result from such carelessness, he tried to strike his tutor. Thereupon Foresti looked at him severely and, asking the Prince whether he thought he had a woman to deal with, put him in a corner of the room. This punishment subdued the haughty boy.³ To stimulate him to greater industry, his playfellow Emile was admitted to his lessons. He was far more disposed to learn than the Prince. Although the latter noticed this himself, and had his attention repeatedly called to the fact, it did not awake in him the least ambition.⁴ Although he was often refractory, at other times

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ Notes by Foresti, 1816. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

⁴ Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Pr. Oc.—W. A. Foresti's account given to Count Montbel (already quoted, chap. iii.) was quite the opposite. A comparison of the Captain's statement, which he gave to Montbel after the Duke's death, with the contemporary records and reports of Dietrichstein, shows what great pains Foresti now took

he surprised his tutor by the complete submission with which he tried to appease his discontent. On one occasion when Count Dietrichstein was reading aloud, Emile rolled on the ground. The Count, very much annoyed at this, cried out : "Why are you lying there while I am reading for your amusement," to which the Prince immediately added : "and for our instruction."¹

He generally exhibited the liveliest interest in what was read to him, for he was captivated by everything which did not remind him of set lessons. Apart from these, he displayed a lively curiosity and quick powers of comprehension. He was continually ready to assimilate anything new, and the mind of this child of five years old was as mature as that of many very gifted boys of double that age. It was no longer possible to satisfy him with mere nursery tales ; he already demanded, as Dietrichstein relates, more "intellectual employment." His teachers were often surprised at the way in which he assimilated an idea, thought it over, and then came out with some ingenious notion or acute question. Not less remarkable was his unusually retentive memory. He could repeat, word for word, many passages from books he had only once heard read. In his French conversation he employed with ease all the elegant and choice expressions he had learnt from his French governesses.

Sometimes he would prepare a subject he had selected for himself. Those who did not know him well were charmed with the amiability and true French politeness with which he gave out these tales and witty remarks. But the tutor who was always with him, learnt to know him in a less sympathetic aspect. Without any motive, he was in the habit of doing and saying things that

to set everything in the mildest and most favourable light. He must have received orders from Metternich to do so. Therefore Montbel can only be accepted with the greatest caution.

¹ Dietrichstein's Notiz. Pr. Ge.—W. A.

were forbidden, expressly with the view of angering his teachers. Battles and campaigns were his favourite subjects of conversation, and he showed at times a special preference for deeds of prowess. The love of destruction to which he gave vent in his games was applied also to objects in which other people found pleasure. In striking contrast to this passion for destruction, the ill-treatment of a dog would move him to tears, and on one occasion he was observed to cry on seeing a lark devour a worm. It is equally worthy of remark that, in spite of his mania for tormenting his tutor, he never cherished any feelings of resentment or enmity against him for the punishments he inflicted.¹ Often enough his teachers were compelled to have recourse to severity and to put him in the corner, or deprive him of some favourite dish. They had to be constantly on their guard with him and avoid all intimacy. If he chanced to observe that the tutor forgot himself for a moment and laid aside the dignity of his position, he immediately began to invent all kinds of tricks to annoy him, as though he thought him powerless to retaliate. At these times he would be possessed by a spirit of unruliness which led him in his games to use such coarse expressions that he might have been brought up "among French soldiers rather than at Court." Therefore his tutors had to maintain an "almost unimpaired reputation for seriousness." At the same time, they endeavoured to avoid severity and to convince the Prince that he might enjoy all legitimate pleasures so long as he did not misuse them, and that they were always ready to treat him with kindness when he deserved it.²

The education of this child was no easy task. If only it could have been conducted in a language that the Prince liked! But, according to Dietrichstein's decision,

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Pr. Os.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

it was to be "completely and entirely German even to the smallest details."¹ On every occasion he displayed the strongest dislike to this idiom. "I will not be German," he exclaimed one day; "I prefer . . . but I . . . hardly dare say so . . . I will be a Frenchman."² His struggles availed nothing, however, "for," as his head tutor said, "above all, the Prince must learn German, and the instruction he enjoys should be given in that language, so that some day he may be grateful to this idiom for all the insight and clear comprehension that has made him a noble man." Originally, he had been taught a few words of German, half in play, by his man-servant, Joseph Unterschill. After the dismissal of the French household and the departure of his mother, whereby he lost all that could remind him of France, all his attendants were German. They had orders to interpret all that he required in this language, and only to use French for necessary explanations. Gradually, especially after parting with his mother, the Prince submitted to the cruel necessity of learning German. He began, although only after considerable suffering, to lose the sense of being "merely a bird of passage in Vienna." Every day he had to learn by heart a few German words from a lesson book and to repeat those already learnt. Whole sentences, too, were dictated to him which he was expected to commit to memory. In this way, by the end of three months, he

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Pr. Ou.—W. A.

² *Ibid.* In 1820 a book was published in London: "A system of education for the infant King of Rome and other French princes of the blood, drawn up by the Imperial Council of State with the approbation and under the personal superintendence of the Emperor Napoleon." In the English translation and the French original the educational plan of July 27, 1812, is given here. It is drawn up, naturally enough, with the intention of making the King of Rome into a real French prince. I leave it an open question whether this plan of education was actually formulated under the auspices of Napoleon.

was already able to understand a good deal of what he heard, although he did not speak much himself. Those around him, however, carefully avoided talking to him on subjects in which he was interested, in a language of which he knew so little as yet. Religious instruction he received in French. Hitherto this had been carried on in a disconnected and often inconsistent manner. Now, however, Foresti and Collin, who instructed the Prince on alternate days, set to work systematically.¹ Collin read aloud from an edition of the Bible especially prepared for this purpose. Foresti, on the other hand, occupied him with selections of moral tales, in which he never forgot to remind him at every suitable opportunity of that "innocence of heart which is pleasing to God, of His severe judgment upon sinners, and to call his attention to that blessed condition of mind which comes when man is reconciled to his Creator and leads a virtuous life."² Whilst Count Dietrichstein translated the Short Catechism for him into French, Collin undertook the same for Feddersen's Bible History. It may have happened that no suitable Roman Catholic priest was available to give him religious instruction. But Dietrichstein was of opinion that the Prince might wait for a private chaplain to be appointed until he understood sufficient German.³ Besides instruction in languages and religion, the Prince was taught the rudiments of natural history and other popular branches of science suitable to his understanding. By way of entertainment he had "The Adventures of Robinson Crusoe" in Campe's edition.⁴

But with all the pains taken by these three men to accustom the little Napoleon to his new home and pacify

¹ Decree of Marie Louise, Schönbrunn, February 1, 1816. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "Mr. de Foresti and Mr. de Collin will undertake to supervise the education of our beloved son on alternate days."

² Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

his longings for his distant country, they could scarcely hope for complete success. Under all his reserve it was evident that one subject, in which he would yield to no one, continued to move him profoundly. Dietrichstein and both his tutors were well aware that he continually thought of his father. He appeared anxious to know still more about him. If the Count spoke to the French women—so long as they were still on the spot—he would slip quietly into the room to pick up what he could from the conversation.¹ He absorbed everything that had any reference to his father's history. This child, who showed a cold and disdainful indifference to all the world,² who parted from the members of his household with astonishing coolness³—never afterwards asking a word about them⁴—who did not even cry when his mother left him,⁵ this boy, who seemed almost heartless, was occupied day and night with the thought of his father. We can understand that some anxiety must have been felt at the questions which one day he put to his tutor on this subject. Indeed, such questions could not be avoided. In July 1816, while taking a walk with Foresti, he inquired who was now reigning in France? To the answer: "A King," he rejoined: "But I know an Emperor once ruled there. Who was it?" "That was your father," replied Foresti, "who, in consequence of his unfortunate passion for war, lost his crown and empire." After

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ *Ibid.* Compare Dietrichstein's Notes, also Foresti's "Notate." On October 20, 1815, Marie Louise said the Prince had not shown much grief at parting with Mme. Soufflot; on October 28, 1815, she writes that, on the contrary, "countless tears were shed on both sides at the moment of separation." This distinctly contradicts both Dietrichstein and Foresti. But what Foresti here calls heartlessness, he points out to Montbel as a proof of the Prince's self-control.

⁴ *Ibid.* and Notes. Foresti, "Notate." Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

remarking that he had learnt all about his father's wars from a book called "*Fastes de la France*," which he was no longer permitted to have, the Prince pursued his inquiries: "Is my dear father a criminal, since he did so much mischief?" The tutor extricated himself cleverly from the pitfall. "It is not for us to judge him," he said; "continue to love your father and to pray for him." After this conversation the Prince was evidently happier in his mind; he grew more cheerful, and on returning to the palace called out joyfully to Collin: "Foresti and I have had a long talk about France." Thus, as Dietrichstein describes, the barriers were broken down.¹ Now the tutors had to be prepared every day for fresh questions and ready to give him correct information. It was precisely this natural curiosity on the part of the son which urged his tutors to carry on his education briskly, so that he would not have too much leisure for weaving fancies. Contrary to all expectations, however, his thoughts of his father became less frequent and more fleeting.² This was the more remarkable because if some boy who chanced to meet him observed, "Here comes the little Napoleon," he pondered upon it so deeply as to become quite absent-minded.³ After the conversation with Foresti it was evident that some shyness restrained him from making further inquiries on the subject that still occupied his mind. He had understood from Captain Foresti that the latter refused to pass judgment on his father. Having no hope of learning more than he already knew, apparently he resolved to wait for some later time when he could force from others the complete truth as to the Emperor's fate. That this child reflected upon all matters with a maturity of mind surprising at his age is proved by a

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein's report, November 18, 1817. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Foresti, "Notate," 1817. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

number of his observations that have been recorded. He was not easily put out of countenance. When in 1816 the Archduke Anton said to him at table, that he would give him a ride on the little lion in the menagerie at Schönbrunn, he replied quickly: "Yes, yes, you mount first, and I will follow you." The following incident shows what chiefly influenced his mind. At an exhibition of pictures which he had visited with his tutor, the secretary was explaining the meaning of certain paintings. Scarcely had he pointed out that one picture represented the Temple of Valour and another the Temple of Fame, than the Prince, who had moved on a few steps, turned back in haste, exclaiming: "Where is the Temple of Fame?" He thirsted to distinguish himself, which was in accordance with his decided intention to become a General. When Collin asked him what he thought a General had to know, he replied shortly: "Oh, nothing but how to drill the soldiers, how to make them march, and a little arithmetic as well."¹ Everything belonging to this rank attracted his attention and excited him to an unusual extent. "My father," he said once, "gave the Emperor Francis a horse," and added with flashing eyes and in an emphatic voice: "but it was a charger."²

Time passed and the Prince attained his seventh year, which closed the first stage of his education and saw the commencement of a new one. So far, any kind of over-pressure had been carefully avoided, and this had not been difficult, because he disliked any form of regular instruction, as though it were an oppressive burden. At the same time it was considered better that he should not treat his lessons as a mere pastime, since he would have to take life seriously betimes. Doubtful as his tutors had been from the beginning, they observed at the close of this first educational period that their efforts

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oc.—W A.

² *Ibid.*

had been crowned by far greater success than they had dared to expect. "He reads French very fluently"—Dietrichstein wrote of his pupil to Archduke Rainer on September 17, 1816—"so long as there is nothing to make him lazy or inattentive. It is particularly agreeable to notice that during the last three weeks he has mostly spoken German, and already makes himself admirably well understood in this language. What he formerly only made use of to the servants, he now practises with us, without having to be reminded to say it in German."¹ Indeed, according to the Prince's own confession, his German was more fluent than his French,² which doubtless proceeded from the fact that he was hardly ever addressed in his mother-tongue; in order that he should not lose his facility in this language, his teachers had to speak French and German to him on alternate days.³ While at first he was opposed to every form of intellectual activity, he took particular delight in reading. He was especially carried away by the Bible, on account of its historical interest. Already he knew the Old and New Testaments. But he was not sufficiently religious to please Dietrichstein; the Count was always lamenting that he said his prayers without any concentration of mind.

In his less frequent outbursts of temper, as in his increasing attachment to his attendants, Dietrichstein saw indications of an improvement in the Prince's disposition. For the first time he confessed with tears that he loved his mother, which must be regarded as doubtful in view of his past conduct.⁴ "On the whole,"

¹ Autographs in the Vienna Court Library.—Dietrichstein to Amelin in Parma, February 27, 1816. State Archives of Parma. "You would be surprised to hear the Prince speak German." *ibid.*

² Dietrichstein's report, Vienna, November 18, 1817. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Dietrichstein's Notes, 1817. Pr. Oe.—W. A. *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 14, 1817. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "I reduced him to tears when I pressed him as to whether he loved his mother. He confessed to me he did, and this conversation inspires me with the first hope that

declared Dietrichstein in 1817, "the moral condition of the Prince may be said to have improved in many respects during the last year."¹

After all this, it might be confidently expected that in the course of two years he would be fit to enter the classes of the Gymnasium.² Now he would have to take up arithmetic, German grammar, and natural history, as well as mnemonics and the more important events of Austrian history. At the desire of Marie Louise he received religious instruction from Daruaut, the Court Chaplain. As he attended the Court balls, he had dancing lessons from Sedini to improve his deportment. Thanks to his grace of movement, "he won all hearts." Once when he fell down during one of the dances, he blushed for shame. He rejected all attempts at consolation, with the words: "But it is a disgrace, it is really a disgrace."³ To perfect his handwriting, the first calligrapher in Vienna was summoned—Professor Johann Mayer, of the Polytechnic. He was also occupied with gardening. With Collin's assistance he built a log-house in the Palace gardens at Schönbrunn, which was called the "Robinson Cave of the Duke of Reichstadt." He was allowed to let his emotions be worked upon." See Dietrichstein's report of November 18, 1817, *ibid.* "The remembrance of his illustrious mother—judging by a few phrases he involuntarily let slip at the time—appears to occupy his mind more than one supposed."—Marie Louise herself was delighted at this news. On August 29, 1817, she wrote to her son: "Count Dietrichstein has often spoken to me lately of your perseverance and of your goodness of heart, my dear friend, and if you knew what pleasure and happiness this affords me you too would be very glad." Kindly communicated by Anton Count Prokesch—Osten.

¹ Dietrichstein's report of November 18, 1817. Pr. Oc.—W. A. Similar news was also received by Marie Louise.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, December 8, 1817. "I have heard with great pleasure through Count Dietrichstein that you have approved the choice of masters as well as the plan of his education for this year, because, in this as in all else, I wish to act in agreement with you."

³ Dietrichstein's Notes, 1817. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

take part in theatrical entertainments, particularly on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday, when he acted charmingly in Kotzebue's play, *The Two Little Savoyards*, and, dressed in the Savoyard costume, won universal applause.¹

Side by side with his education, efforts were continued to bind him entirely to his mother's family, and thus, without having recourse to forcible methods, slowly and surely to supplant every memory of his father. Dietrichstein was therefore triumphant when his pupil gave a new proof of his affection for Marie Louise, and did not relapse into his former indifference. When, after a visit of two months (August and September 1818), the ex-Empress left Vienna, the Count was delighted to see the Prince altogether upset at the parting with his mother. "The ice is now broken," he wrote to the Archduke Rainer, "at least for a while, and if his habitual coldness returns at times, the remembrance of this sad hour will come like the sunbeams to start better and softer emotions, which alone can lead him in the path of true happiness."² But it was a fatal blunder to hope to stifle one childish emotion by means of another. More frequently and emphatically than before, his lively imagination was at work upon the events of the past—a sure proof that he had not lost sight of his father. From time to time he still wished to know what had become of him. In January 1818 he tried to get direct information from Collin, and the following conversation was carried on between them :

PRINCE : Why was I especially called King of Rome ?

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes, 1818. Fr. Oc.—W. A.

² The Vienna Court Library. Autographs, Fr. Oc.—W. A. Marie Louise writes, September 24, 1818, from Hallstadt, after her departure from Vienna. "The poor child's grief during the last days was really touching, and, although I ought to be glad of it, it made the parting terribly hard."

COLLIN : That belongs to the time at which your father's rule extended so far.

PRINCE : Did Rome belong to my father then ?

COLLIN : Rome belongs to the Pope as a sacred gift.

PRINCE : Where is he (the Pope) now ?

COLLIN : In Rome.

PRINCE : My father is in the East Indies, I think ?

COLLIN : Ah, no, it is not so.

PRINCE : Or perhaps he is in America ?

COLLIN : Why should he be there ?

PRINCE : Where is he then ?

COLLIN : I cannot tell you.

PRINCE : The (French) ladies once said he was in England, and had escaped from there.

COLLIN : That is a mistake. You know, Prince, how often you misunderstand things.

PRINCE : Yes, of course.

COLLIN : I can assure you on my word of honour your father is not in England.

PRINCE : It seems to me I have also heard it said he was in exile.

COLLIN : What ? In exile ?

PRINCE : Yes.

COLLIN : How could that be possible or probable ?

With the laughing reply : "Of course not," the Prince passed on to another subject.¹

His teachers always experienced a momentary embarrassment when their pupil cross-examined them as to his father's fate. Thus he said to Foresti on one occasion :

"Napoleon must have been a famous General since they afterwards made him a King ?" When Foresti in reply corrected the title, he inquired again : "Was it he who afterwards married my mother, a year before I was

¹ Record of January 18, 1818, added to Dietrichstein's Notes. Pr. Oe. —W. A.

born ? Why is he no longer Emperor ? ” To which Foresti made answer that all the Powers had made war against him, because he had tried to usurp the whole world. After a long pause, the Prince again pressed for information as to his father’s present abode. “ I have always heard he was in Africa.” The entrance of the gate-keeper effected a timely interruption in the conversation, and saved Foresti “ from ever-increasing embarrassment,” as he himself remarks.¹ As Captain Foresti related in after years, in this exceedingly unpleasant situation—which was entirely the outcome of their own lack of candour—the teachers applied to the Emperor Francis for instructions, and received this reply : “ Truth must be the basis of the Prince’s education ; answer frankly every question which he puts to you ; this is the surest and indeed the sole method of calming his imagination, and of inspiring him with that confidence which you need for his guidance.”² The records which Dietrichstein has left us do not contain a word about this, consequently we have no test by which to confirm or deny this statement. It appears to us improbable that this pretence at an open and frank method recommended by the Emperor actually slaked the young Napoleon’s thirst for information in a few days, and that he was “ satisfied with these conversations.”³ Was he really pacified ? This would seem quite contrary to his nature.⁴ More reserved ? Yes. And this most probably for the reason that he was dissatisfied with the explanations he received. Already far too intelligent not to have observed that people kept secrets from him, which he had not power to penetrate as yet, he imposed upon himself silence until a more

¹ Conversation of August 4, 1819, added at the end of Dietrichstein’s Notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A. On this point the account given by Montbel (already quoted) is not in accordance with the truth.

² Montbel (already quoted), p. 156.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

suitable time should come. Therefore, what appeared like satisfaction and contentment was only a mask.

His teachers, whose patience was often tried by the Prince's art of dissembling, had to keep their mission constantly in mind, in order to be equal to the difficulties of the task; for their pupil was not one of those who moved steadily in the path of improvement. He constantly relapsed into his old faults. They had recourse to the rod as a method of punishment, but it was abandoned because it had no effect, and was revolting to Dietrichstein's nature.¹ The complaints about his grandson reached the Emperor, who authorised rigorous severity.² The boy's governor clung persistently to the hope that his pupil would finally walk in the right way. "We are now uniting our efforts," he wrote to Marie Louise, "to stir the Prince, after his long holiday (this refers to the period of his mother's visit to Vienna), to a greater inclination to study and to further efforts towards improvement, so that the precious time may be utilised and also to prevent any reproach of neglect on our part."³ Dietrichstein, who would gladly have shone with his pupil, was in despair because no admonitions on his part could induce the Prince to write a single letter either to his mother or to his uncle, the Archduke Rainer,⁴ who took a deep interest in his nephew's education. It was Collin who succeeded in spurring his ambition; the Prince snatched up a pen and composed a letter to the Archduke, of which not a single line was to be altered. After this "well-won victory" the Count flattered himself there would be no "fresh conflicts." In any case, he

¹ Dietrichstein's Notes, 1818. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dietrichstein to the Archduke Rainer, Schönbrunn, September 27, 1818. Court Library of Vienna, autographs.

⁴ *Ibid.* Vienna, September 22, 1819. Court Library Vienna. First draft in Pr. Oe.—W. A.

looked back over the last two years with satisfaction. "He wins universal affection"—so run his words—"by his agreeable manner and engaging speech."

When, in the spring of 1820—in the Emperor's presence—he passed the examinations in the subjects belonging to the normal standard,² his preparation for classical study was complete. But the year in which began his first classes at the Gymnasium was one of the saddest in his life. On May 5, 1821, Napoleon ended his days at St. Helena. For some time past he had felt his end approaching. "I am no longer Napoleon," he exclaimed upon his sick bed; "the sovereigns who persecute me may rest in peace, they will soon enjoy their security." The lack of all exercise, of which he had voluntarily deprived himself, had brought about a disastrous effect upon his health. Extraordinarily weak and very pallid, he could no longer occupy himself. Nevertheless the energy of the man enabled him to dictate his memoirs almost to his last breath.³ His stomach rejected all nourishment, and medical treatment was of no avail. Although, from the nature of his illness—cancer of the stomach—he must have suffered intense pain, he bore it all with heroic fortitude. Only during the last few days, when his mind was already clouded, a few deep sighs and broken words escaped him from time to time, which revealed that the mighty warrior was in great agony.⁴ A courier of the firm of Rothschild brought the news of the great Emperor's

¹ Dietrichstein to Archduke Rainer, Vienna, September 22, 1819. Court Library, Vienna. Autographs.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, April 28, 1820. "I am so thankful to you, dearest papa, that you were so kind as to be present at the examination of my son; it is a great proof of your fatherly love for us both, and my heart is deeply sensible of it."

³ Bertrand to Jérôme Bonaparte, London, September 26 (*copie*): "... sometimes dictated however, for he did this to his last days." See "*Oeuvres de Napoléon I^{er}*," in his "*Correspondance*," vol. 29-32.

⁴ *Ibid.*

death to Vienna. Francis immediately gave orders that the sad news should be communicated to his grandson. As Count Dietrichstein was then in Vienna, this mission was entrusted to Captain Foresti. "I chose the quiet hour of evening," he says, "and saw more tears wept than I should have expected from a child who had never seen (?) or known his father (?)"¹ When Collin spoke to him about his loss on the following day, he again cried very bitterly.² Now the question had to be decided whether the father-in-law ought to wear mourning as well as the son. Under these circumstances, the Emperor Francis, as was his custom, turned to Metternich for advice. If the Emperor was still guided to some extent by humane feelings, his Minister remained quite unmoved by this death. For him, Napoleon's demise presented no interest beyond the fact that it brought a desirable conclusion to a number of expectations and mischievous intrigues.³ In his eyes, Napoleon had been dead since the declaration of outlawry, and therefore even the Emperor had no occasion to command an official mourning. "By the general Declaration of the Powers on March 13, 1815," runs his report, "Bonaparte is to be considered *civiliter mortuus*. Although a similar judgment might have no influence upon a mere family connection, your Majesty stands in a different position to an

¹ Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz I. und die Napoleoniden," "Archives of Austrian History," vol. lxxii, p. 451. Foresti's communication to Neipperg is dated July, 1821. In any case it must be ascribed to a slip of memory on Foresti's part when Montbel (already quoted), p. 157, makes him state that he broke the sad news to the Duke on July 22, "in the same place and on the same day upon which he died eleven years later." This is nothing but a posthumous poetical licence.

² Collin to Dietrichstein, Schönbrunn, July 17, 1821. Fr. Oe.—W. A. "He [the Prince] wept much when Foresti, at his Majesty's orders, informed him, and also on the following day when I spoke to him about it."

³ Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz I. und die Napoleoniden," Archives of Austrian History, vol. lxxii, p. 450, 3rd note.

ordinary citizen. Your Majesty cannot go into mourning unless your Court does so too. Here personality should take a secondary place, and your relations to the Monarchy stand first. As regards the Duke of Reichstadt, matters are different. He occupies a private position, and Napoleon was his father. I can find no precedent against his going into mourning. But this should not apply to *his household*."¹ After Metternich's report, the Court of Vienna actually laid aside every outward sign of mourning for the deceased. But the Duke of Reichstadt and his two tutors were directed to avoid being seen in public.²

Long after the news of the ex-Emperor's death had been known in Vienna, Marie Louise was in complete ignorance of the event which concerned her so closely. She was not a little surprised to learn this great news from the *Piedmont Times* of July 14. At first, Marie Louise did not believe the announcement in this paper. But the accompanying details did away with every doubt.³ "I confess," she writes under the influence of the first impression, "I was extremely affected by it; although I never had a very intense feeling of any kind for him, still I cannot forget that he was the father of my son; and that far from ill-treating me, as all the world supposes, he was always full of consideration for me—which is all that can be expected from a marriage of policy. Therefore, I am greatly grieved; and although one may be glad that he ended his unhappy existence in a Christian way, I could have still wished him many years of life and prosperity—*provided he had kept apart from me*."⁴

She was living in intimate relations with Neipperg,

¹ Schlitter (already quoted), p. 451.

² Collin to Dietrichstein, July 17, 1821. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Sala, July 20, 1821. "I first heard of the death of the Emperor Napoleon through the *Piedmont Times*, and I should hardly have believed it had not such exact details been given."

⁴ "Correspondance de Marie Louise," p. 226.

to whom she constantly alludes in her letters as "the General;" and as she had recently become aware of the result of this intercourse,¹ the prospect of a meeting with her legitimate husband, from whom she was not divorced, would have been extremely disagreeable to her. Thus we understand that astonishing conclusion: "provided that he had kept away from me." The scandal in the eyes of the world would have been altogether too great, if Napoleon had called her to account for the wrong she had done him in the arms of Neipperg. She was now saved from this danger of having to vindicate herself. Scarcely had she despatched this curious letter of July 19 to Vienna, when she received on the 20th, through Baron Vincent, the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, the official announcement of Napoleon's death.² Not until four days had elapsed did she resolve to address a few lines of sympathy to her son. "I have heard, dear friend," she begins, "that you were profoundly moved by the trouble that has befallen us both in the loss of your father, and I feel it is my heart's best consolation to write to you about it and talk it over with you. I am sure you feel the grief as deeply as I do, for you would be ungrateful if you could forget all his goodness to you in your tender infancy; I know you will endeavour to imitate

¹ Méneval, vol. iii., p. 602, says he will not examine into the fact as to whether a legal act legitimatised the child of the marriage between Marie Louise and Neipperg, or whether the matrimonial union between them took place before the death of Napoleon. To which he adds: "In Italy, that land of facile agreements, the sanctification of a union is the easiest thing in the world." Very remarkable is Marie Louise's letter to her friend, dated Parma, September 30, 1822, in which she writes that she has a secret to confide to her which she may have already guessed. Published in "*Correspondance de Marie Louise*," p. 233. Here 1823 is given as the date of the year, whereas 1822 is really correct. The "*Gothaische Genealogische Taschenbuch*" gives August 9, 1821, as the date of birth of Marie Louise's first child by Neipperg, but Napoleon died on May 5, 1821.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Sala, July 20, 1821.

all his virtues, while avoiding at the same time the rocks upon which he wrecked his life."¹ What a contrast between this letter and the one she addressed on July 19 to her friend in Vienna! Far from feeling any genuine sorrow, she and Neipperg had no anxiety but to arrange the mourning solemnities for the mighty dead on the lines which, three years previously, Metternich had already laid down in case of Napoleon's death.² Here political exigencies spoke the decisive word, and nothing was to be done which could remind the world that the man who had just gone to his last home had once been the Emperor of France. The official intimation in the *Parma Times* only mentioned him as "the Most Serene Consort of our august Princess" (*del serenissimo sposo dell' augusta nostra sovrana*³)—and in Italy the title of "Most Serene" is given to every one of princely rank.⁴ Marie Louise equally forbade the name of Napoleon to be used in the prayers for the dead. The priest was to employ the formula especially prescribed: *pro famulo tuo consorte ducis nostræ*.⁵ The memorial service, to which no one received an invitation, was commanded to be given therefore in the palace chapel at Sala. In the middle of the chapel, which was draped in black, without any special pomp, stood the bier, bare of every insignia of Imperial state.⁶ Although efforts were made to prevent her, Marie Louise showed sufficient tact to attend in person the mass for the repose of the soul of him who was father to her child, accompanied by the most intimate

¹ Marie Louise to the Duke of Reichstadt, Sala, July 24, 1821.

² Neipperg to Metternich, July 24, 1821. Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Sala, July 20.

³ *Gazetta di Parma*, July 24, 1821.

⁴ Schlitter, "Testament Napoleon Bonapartes," *Archives of Austrian History*, vol. lxxx., p. 15.

⁵ Neipperg to Metternich, Sala, August 3, 1821

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sala, July 31, 1821.

members of her Court.¹ Only herself, her household and domestic servants were to don mourning for three months, from July 25 to October 24. The rest of the Court and State officials were exempted from this regulation.² Thus Marie Louise got over the unavoidable demands of outward decency without much difficulty. But if she cherished the hope that with the funeral service which—in her own words—“could not but upset her a little,”³ all was now at an end, she must have been considerably embarrassed by one of Napoleon’s last requests. He had expressed a wish that his heart should be sent to Parma—a desire the fulfilment of which necessitated an unpleasant disturbance of her carefully cherished ease of life. “It is my wish,” she writes to her father, “that the ashes of the poor departed should be left in peace, and that his heart may remain in his grave.”⁴ How glad she was to agree to England’s demand that this last wish of the ex-Emperor should not be respected! With great satisfaction, she requested Metternich to publish in an official form her disapprobation to the removal of her husband’s mortal remains.⁵ On October 1 she writes to her father on this subject: “Besides the fact that the burial of his heart in Parma would be a fresh shock to me, it would also be a pretext for all ill-disposed people to make a pilgrimage there, and that would be exceedingly unpleasant for me in my position, for I desire nothing more in this world but peace and quiet; I rely, dearest papa, upon your gracious

¹ Neipperg to Metternich. “Her Majesty absolutely insisted upon attending these funeral ceremonies in her seat of State, surrounded by the members who are in close attendance upon her at Court.”

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Sala, July 20. “I and my household, in accordance with an agreement made long since with Metternich, are to go into a three months’ mourning, the rest of the Court, the officials, soldiers, &c., will wear none.”

³ *Ibid.*, Sala, August 4, 1821.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, Florence, October 1, 1821.

co-operation to put a stop to this affair.”¹ The English Government could have asked no better ally than Marie Louise. The heart of the ex-Emperor was left in St. Helena until, after the lapse of many years, it was brought back once more to France.

The Duke of Reichstadt was still far too young to be initiated into these proceedings. He only knew what his mother had written to him about her grief, but not how completely she had renounced his father in refusing to give his heart a last resting-place in Parma. Full of childish resignation, he had listened to the words in which—in the same letter—Marie Louise had admonished him to win the approval of the Emperor, of the Empress Caroline Augusta—his “protectress”²—and of his tutors, by his industry and exemplary conduct.³ And such admonitions were needful, for he acted on the principle that all instruction meant compulsion, and only followed the dictates of his fancy. It was still a matter of difficulty to keep him at work; to the despair of his teachers, he often made no progress whatever.⁴ “Unfortunately, I am too well aware,” says Collin, “that, from a kind of foolish levity, he is in the habit of making mistakes which he has long since outgrown, and of boasting of them as though they were miracles of cleverness.”⁵ Out of mistaken pride he would never let himself be questioned, and therefore never said what he already knew.⁶ He would purposely play the ignoramus, even in subjects in which he was quite fluent.⁷ He would struggle against

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Florence, October 1, 1821.

² Thus Collin describes the Empress in his letter to Dietrichstein of July 17, 1821, Pr. Oe.—W. A.; other sources of information also confirm the fact that she was so.

³ Marie Louise to the Duke of Reichstadt, July 24, 1821.

⁴ Collin to Dietrichstein, July 10, 1820. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vienna, August 16, 1823. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁶ *Ibid.*, August 18, 1823. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁷ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

the application of a grammatical rule so long as he had to give his mind to it. Suddenly, when it was least expected, he would show that he had quite understood what had been recently explained to him, and also knew how to apply it. After many efforts, Foresti and Collin often found themselves bitterly disappointed;¹ without "displaying indignation of the strongest description," they had to submit quietly to their "hard and difficult lot."² "His conduct to his teachers," says one of them, "is, moreover, unbearable, for he cannot endure any coercion, and this has to be concealed, because it immediately makes him obstinate, which embitters him and is morally injurious."³

¹ Having lived for several years only among men, he was ashamed of his youth, and looked with contempt upon praise which would have been coveted by most boys of his age.⁴ Dietrichstein would not always make allowance for this curious psychological condition, and was consequently very severe at times in his judgment of the Prince. It is remarkable that although both the tutors had so much trouble and annoyance with the Duke, they took his part against the over-harsh reproaches of the Count. "Your Excellency," writes Foresti to Dietrichstein, "generally finds all strange children good and amiable; other people who see ours, for the moment only, extol him as an angel, yes, an angel! I have heard it frequently. So I should advise you to examine the matter more closely."⁵ His unruliness, idleness, frivolity and the obstinacy with which, according to his caprice, he opposed all their endeavours, did not blind Foresti and Collin to the indisputably good qualities of the Prince. They desired to see his character develop

¹ Collin to Dietrichstein, July 4, 1820, and August 18, 1823. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Foresti to Dietrichstein, August 21, 1823. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ *Ib.*

itself, but Dietrichstein did not always pay the necessary attention to these idiosyncrasies. Because Dietrichstein set up too high a standard and wished to make the Duke into a model of virtue, he generally found him unequal to his expectations. This contrariety of perception showed itself also in his judgment of the Duke's style of expressing himself. Dietrichstein wished him to write with a certain fluent ease, which did not lie in the young Napoleon's nature. Frightened by models of this kind, his writing was worse than it would have been under other circumstances. "He has a special bent of mind," Collin declared, "which develops on its own lines, and he would have long since acquired a better style, had he continued to write as he pleased, unchecked by preliminary roughness and perhaps by unsightly irregularities. In this way, with some slight assistance, he would have attained to a natural, self-formed style. This was my opinion from the first, and I have often recalled it to memory."¹ Collin did not despair of his pupil,² but encouraged him to follow his own disposition, and soon he showed a certain satisfaction at his progress. "As regards the art of letter writing," he said to him by way of encouragement, "follow your own ideas in this way, without trying to cramp them in setting them down, then you will soon produce something with which others will also be satisfied."³ Collin had been in frequent correspondence with the Duke, who was staying for a time at the Castle of Persenbeug. These letters won a somewhat more favourable opinion for their author than had hitherto been entertained by Dietrichstein. "I have added two lines in Italian to the Count's letter to Foresti," he writes in German, "but they were in a laconic style, because I

¹ Collin to Dietrichstein, August 18, 1823. Pr. Oe.—W. A. The letter is in German.

² *Ibid.*

³ Collin to the Duke of Reichstadt, Baden near Vienna, August 28, 1823. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

am a young Spartan. 'Yes, yes, a fine Spartan,' I hear you saying, 'who is never served with the black broth without eggs.' But here I spend my life like a Spartan. I get up at half-past six, dress, say my prayers, have breakfast, and jump round the room with a long branch instead of a whip; then the hard head-work begins under the Count's direction, which, however, unluckily (!) does not last long; I am summoned to my mother and often go for a walk before dinner; finally meal-time—after which a pause for digestion. In the afternoon there are walks, excursions on the water, but not to the lake—at last supper and then to bed. Strengthened and refreshed, I write you these lines, commend myself to your family and to your friendship, and sign myself your grateful pupil Franz."¹ Another equally charming letter addressed to Collin by this boy of twelve runs as follows: "I am sitting here in Persenbeug in a very large room, large, that is to say, for this place, and I write you these lines at the window, not for the sake of looking out of it, but on account of the light; yet it often happens that my eyes wander from the paper, although I have firmly resolved not to look about me. *Sunt varia exempla, odiosa dicunt.* I write these five specimens of my Latin scholarship that even amid the noise of amusement I may still reflect upon this agreeable language."²

At the time when the Duke wrote these lines he was in the second gymnasium class, or—as it was then called—the grammatical class. Now commenced his preparation for the first "humanity," or classical classes, which he was to enter in 1825. Collin died on November 24, 1824. His place was taken by Joseph Obenaus, Imperial Counsellor of the Government of Lower Austria, who received a barony in 1827. He had previously superintended the

¹ Communicated from Collin's Literary Remains, by Schütz in the morning issue of the *Neue Freie Presse* of March 5, 1889.

² Also communicated by Schütz (already quoted).

education of the Crown Prince Ferdinand and other members of the Imperial family, for which reason Dietrichstein regarded him as well suited to take over the higher studies upon which the Prince was about to commence. With a whole-hearted devotion, frequently injurious to his health, Obenaus gave himself up to this difficult task, the chief aim of which was to give his pupil the mental and spiritual direction which corresponded best with his birth and prematurely developed talents.¹ Count Dietrichstein gives him a testimonial to the effect that "it would not be easy to find an example more admirably applicable in the whole department of education, and especially as regards the education of Princes;" therefore he seems "in the highest degree worthy of the gratitude of his contemporaries and of posterity."² The plan of instruction drawn up by Obenaus, as it lies before us, may be accepted as a proof that he really endeavoured to make a capable man of the Prince. Out of the lesson hours, too, Obenaus, who was a man of considerable learning, tried to influence the development of his pupil to good purpose.³ It is therefore false and unjust, when Rostand in "L'Aiglon" represents Obenaus as an instrument for the blunting and demoralisation of the Prince. Nothing, neither authentic testimony, nor fabled calumnies, attests to the fact that this tutor degraded himself into the servile executioner of Metternich's designs. Baron Obenaus was an honourable and respectable man, who would have considered it far below his dignity to say a word to the Prince he loved and honoured for which he was not prepared to answer.

¹ Dietrichstein respecting Obenaus. Without date. Judging from the context, must have been written soon after June 1831. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ See his unprinted diary, in possession of Lieut.-Col. Baron Oscar Obenaus

But, like Foresti and Collin, he, too, was to experience the difficulty of keeping this unruly spirit, which seemed to be compounded of contrariety, in the right road. According to the old habit, scarcely had he made some progress in a study, than he took a kind of delight in displaying a complete ignorance of what he knew admirably well. Frequently he gave the entire staff of teachers who lent assistance to Obenaus no opportunity whatever of congratulating themselves on the least success. If for a considerable time he had been writing really nice letters, suddenly he would take a pleasure in making use of a bombastic, almost unintelligible style.¹ Such relapses reduced Count Dietrichstein, as usual, to despair. "The insolent boy," he wrote on one occasion, "must be made to feel ashamed—and if this is no use, we are at an end of our resources."² As in earlier years, the Duke now received a severe reprimand from the lips of his governor, who was angry because his pupil had sent him a letter full of mistakes. "If you really regard me as your greatest benefactor,"³ Dietrichstein said in reply, "and this I am, in so far that for eleven years I have devoted to your education, in every respect, an attention which should have already borne splendid fruits, if you would respond to it in some degree—if you give me such an honourable title and at the same time really *feel* it, how is it possible that your words and actions, your conduct in and outside your household, is daily at variance with such sentiments? How can you, at fifteen!!!—for the pleasure of astonishing me, which was no doubt your object, write me a letter full of corrections and proofs of habitual carelessness, of bombastic notions, disregarding all commonly accepted

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein to Obenaus. Undated. In the possession of Lieut.-Col. Baron Oscar Obenaus.

³ So the Duke called Dietrichstein in his letter of August 3, 1826. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

forms, extending even to your signature?"¹ Finally, Dietrichstein wished to persuade him "to observe propriety, honour and industry, and only to imitate noble examples."² The governor's words appear to have had some effect upon the Duke, for on August 10, 1826, he wrote:³ "My actions will prove what my pen dares not write, and for the future you will have to do with a young man who will be quite satisfied with the high calling to which he is dedicated . . . Obedience and reverence towards my superiors, punctual fulfilment of my duties, attention, love of truth and justice, are the virtues by which I hope to attain to that noble example which I keep before me." All these assurances could not satisfy Dietrichstein so long as the Duke, "even as regards knowledge, considered his own ways the best." He prophesies that instead of "winning honour and respect, he will only serve as a laughing-stock to the world."⁴ "But enough of this preaching," he exclaims. "Do as you please, your fate is in your own hands. My justification and that of the admirable men who instruct you, is easily established; our services are recognised. Consider what you have to answer for here and hereafter."⁵

In spite of all these reproofs, Dietrichstein again took the trouble to stimulate him. By talking of the brilliant future which awaited him he endeavoured to work upon his sense of honour. The Prince ought to know what was expected of him. Therefore he told him of the conversations about him which he—Dietrichstein—had held with prominent people, who

¹ Dietrichstein to the Duke of Reichstadt, Vienna, August 5, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ The Duke of Reichstadt to Dietrichstein, Weinzierl, August 10, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ Dietrichstein to the Duke of Reichstadt, Vienna, September 6, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ *Ibid.*

were following his development with great attention. "From this you can conclude," said Dietrichstein, "how important in every respect is your *complete* education, and how much you should do towards it, because you are intended to play a brilliant part in the State of Austria, and to draw the attention of all eyes to yourself the more you increase in years, and the sooner you meet your vocation half way. You have lost *much time*, but with your natural gifts and with steady goodwill you can make up for all."¹

But it was not always the mere spirit of contradiction which kept the Duke from learning what was first required of him. His imagination, which was continually at work, acted as a counter-attraction, which—as he himself recognised—drew his mind, busy with other matters, away from actuality to far-away regions from which he could only extricate himself by a great effort.² Already he dreamed of the great deeds which he would some day accomplish; and to him, enthusiast as he was, regular and quiet study, with its constraints, was pain and torment. This evidently rash tendency on the Prince's part justified Dietrichstein's complaints, even if—prompted by zeal and affection—they may sometimes sound too pessimistic. It is certain that the Duke made no secret of his dislike of Latin³—an antipathy he appears to have inherited from his father, who made little progress with it at school. On the other hand, however, Napoleon showed from the first a strong predilection for mathematics, which cannot be said of his son.⁴

In 1825 it was decided that the officer of engineers Major Weiss, who was considered a very capable man,⁵

¹ Dietrichstein to the Duke, Carlsbad, July 4, 1827. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² The Duke to Dietrichstein, Weinzierl, August 10, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Tb67*.

should undertake the Duke's entire education as regards mathematics. The knowledge that this study was quite indispensable to his future military career spurred him to industry, the fruits of which were seen in the examinations he passed successfully.¹

His progress in French was not very satisfactory. He spoke well enough, especially as regards accent, but his construction was bad, because he no longer thought in French, but in German. His expressions were full of Germanisms. To the annoyance of his teachers, Podewin and Baron August Barthélemy de St. Hilaire, he displayed great obstinacy in this subject, and tried to frustrate all their efforts.² His compositions and translations from German into French still show the most complete dependence upon the former language. More satisfactory were his studies in Italian, which was taught him by Foresti and the Abbate Pina. But by 1828 he was still unable to write a good French or Italian letter,³ as then—according to his own account—he had taken a great dislike to this literary form.⁴

He listened with far greater interest to the unconventional lectures of Obenaus upon history, statistics and the faculty of jurisprudence.⁵ Universal history had a particular attraction for him when it was unfolded to him in its general aspect, and the connection of events grew clearer to his mind. By 1828 he had got as far as the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Already he endeavoured to anticipate future events by comparing them with those which had been described to him. It could not escape an attentive observer that he caught with eager curiosity at every word which related to the period of Napoleon. He was continually occupied with the thought of his

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The Duke to Dietrichstein, August 3, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1830. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

descent, with his vanished greatness, with his father's fate and with his followers. This world of ideas, to which he so willingly surrendered himself, frequently gave rise to profound emotions.¹ Not without anxiety did Dietrichstein and Obenaus look forward to the lectures upon the latest period which was so dangerous to the Prince's mood, the account of which would have to be given in 1829. Already the professor of history was making preparations for this critical task. Without passion, but with weight and dignity, he wished to relate to the Prince all the events which interested him so greatly and touched him so closely, and to damp his ardour with the needful cool-headedness.²

It was unanimously decided to picture Napoleon to him as the victim of his unbridled lust of conquest. Dietrichstein, who often talked to him of the Empire and its final fall,³ urged Obenaus not to hesitate any longer before initiating the Duke in the history of the ex-Emperor. "Among other things," he wrote to him, "I think it would be well to take up *very soon* the history of the Prince's father, about which he already knows a great deal. It is unfortunate that I know of *no* work which he might read casually, or which would require few commentaries. However, *you* will accomplish your work as cleverly and as satisfactorily for him as you have done hitherto."⁴ Obenaus therefore carried the history lessons down to the latest period.

Looking back over the course of education given to the young Napoleon, it is impossible to dispute its excellence, nor the fact that it was calculated to make him a very capable man. As the Archduke Rainer wrote to him

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dietrichstein to Obenaus. Undated. In the possession of Lieut.-Col. Baron Oscar. Obenaus.

⁴ *Ibid.*

on one occasion : " Believe me, I have no greater wish than to see you some day a good, well-educated and upright man."¹ No methods were neglected of developing the Duke's great gifts, with the avowed intention that they should be devoted to the service of his new fatherland. Dietrichstein, and the army of teachers who supported him, knew no higher aim than to turn Napoleon's son into a second Prince Eugene. Nothing, therefore, is less reasonable than the statement that : " The education of the Duke of Reichstadt, which was carried on by the fatherly Emperor (Francis) in person,² forms a worthy pendant to the deliberate ill-treatment of the prisoners of the Spielberg " (near Brünn).

¹ Archduke Rainer to the Duke of Reichstadt, Milan, October 12. Without the date of the year. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² Treitschke, " Historische und politische Aufsätze," vol. iii. p. 157.

CHAPTER IX

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT

By creating him Duke of Reichstadt, it was to be proclaimed to the whole world that the grandson of the Emperor Francis was henceforth only an Austrian Prince, although ranking immediately after the Archdukes. The title of Duke of Reichstadt should remove every pretext for anxiety on the part of the Bourbons which might be occasioned by the existence of the young Napoleon.¹ Metternich knew only too well that the Bonapartists would always be prepared to support the regency of Marie Louise in favour of Napoleon II. Savary was confident that Austria had only to declare herself in order to assure the victory of the ex-Empress's regency.² He was aware that the Duke of Bassano called Louis XVIII. a usurper, and regarded himself as the Minister of Napoleon II., the only rightful ruler of France.³ Fouché also offered his services towards his restoration.⁴ Nor was suspicion allayed by the fact that the Napoleonists residing in Austria expressed a desire to settle in the neighbourhood of Vienna. Every one was convinced that they united with this wish the intention of some day abducting the little Prince.⁵ The majority of the numerous portraits

¹ Krusomark's despatch from Vienna, February 4, 1818. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² Eduard Wertheimer, "Die Verbannten des ersten Kaiserreichs," p. 252.

³ *Ibid.* p. 300.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 200.

⁵ Statement of May 23, 1817. M. I.

representing the son of the dethroned Emperor were designed to keep in mind the remembrance of the heir of the fallen dynasty. Medallions, pocket-handkerchiefs, neckties, caps, braces, drinking-glasses, knives, pipes, snuff-boxes and all similar articles of daily use, were utilised¹ to bring the portrait of the Prince who lived in Vienna to the notice of the masses. One of the most zealous propagandists of these pictures was the painter Goubeaud.² Naturally, there was no lack of little poems and occasional pieces, all destined to revive the remembrance of those in exile. Although in Vienna they might say there was now no Napoleon, only a Francis Duke of Reichstadt, this made but little impression upon the French Bonapartists.

Soon it was rumoured that Joseph, in conjunction with important and influential partisans of the Empire, was displaying brisk activity in favour of the enthronement of the King of Rome.³ He laboured in soil that was all the more fruitful, because just at that moment the idea of the Empire was being born anew within the mind of the liberal party. Time had softened the remembrance of bitter experiences and only the glory which France had enjoyed under the sway of Napoleon was now recalled to

¹ Welschinger, "Le Roi de Rome," p. 315.

² Sednitsky to Kolovrat, Vienna, August 22, 1817. M. I. "Great propagandist of portraits of the son of the Archduchess Marie Louise; dangerous." Respecting portraits of the Prince, see the interesting book by John Grand-Carteret: "L'Aiglon en images et dans la fiction poétique et dramatique, avec 138 reproductions des portraits et estampes." Paris, 1901.

³ Statement from the Embassy in Russia, 1817. "Some members of Napoleon's family who are in the United States, together with a great number of distinguished army men and other people prominent on account of their genius and enlightenment, have not yet abandoned all hope of seeing the King of Rome on the throne of France. The centre of the conspiracy is in New York, but it extends across Spain to France and Belgium, and comes to a standstill in Italy and a part of Germany."

mind ; of his once hateful despotism nothing was now heard.¹ The Bonapartists—who had cause to fear the Orleanists as dangerous rivals²—endeavoured, with great success, to turn this favourable mood to their own advantage. All minds were, in fact, rendered susceptible to the most impracticable rumours, all directed to one aim : to clear the way for the restoration of the Empire. Thus it was thought possible that Louis XVIII. would voluntarily abdicate in favour of the son of his fiercest foe,³ and that Europe, weary of the indifferent rule of the Bourbons, would make common cause with the young Napoleon.⁴ The Bonapartists, with the Imperial troops at their head, actually dreamed already of proclaiming the Duke of Reichstadt. They had their own signs of recognition.⁵ Now as before, pictures of the Prince were eagerly manufactured. One of the most interesting of the articles produced was a bronze candlestick, of which the upper part could be unscrewed from the base. The uninitiated had no suspicion that the interior of the candlestick concealed a surprise. Examined more closely, the hollow stem was found to contain a beautifully executed statuette of the Duke of Reichstadt, representing him in a warlike attitude, with his right hand grasping

¹ Capefigue, " *Histoire de la Restauration*," vol. v. " The idea of the Empire pleased the people, the image of Napoleon loomed larger as the period of his reign became more remote in the presence of posterity."

² Despatch from Russia, 1817. Esterházy, ambassador in London, informed Metternich on February 22, 1816, that, in the opinion of the Duke of Orleans himself, there were three parties in France, " of which the most powerful is that in favour of the little Duke of Parma."

³ Report of the Police-superintendent Raab, Milan, April 3, 1818. M. I.

⁴ Capefigue (already quoted), vol. v.

⁵ Statement by Kopfenberg, Carlsbad, June 24, 1819. Count Medem, who was staying in Carlsbad on a visit to the Duchess of Courland, relates this. One of the signs of recognition consisted of a case of which the lower part unscrewed and contained a figure of Bonaparte. A case like this was seen in Carlsbad.



THE DUKE OF REICHSTAFT

*From a painting, probably by Daffinger. In the possession of
Dr. August Heymann of Vienna*

the hilt of his sword, as though to promise his protection in days to come.¹

But the incapacity and rage for persecution among the hot-blooded Royalists worked far more effectually for the Empire than all the pictures, emblems and verses about Napoleon and his son which were circulated among the French. This turn of events, which even Metternich condemned,² bore witness to a sultry atmosphere. It led to the Paris conspiracy of 1820, which aimed at the overthrow of the Bourbons.³ According to a despatch from the Embassy at Florence, there existed three separate committees in Paris, each striving for a different object, but united in their hatred of the existing *régime*. While Savary would only fight under the cry of "*Vive Napoleon II.!*" the followers of the two other committees declared that their watchword must be "*Vive la République!*" or "*Vive la Liberté!*" The dispute was finally settled by their all taking an oath for the tri-colour under the war-cry, "*Vive la Constitution!*"⁴ The principal conspiracy, which was of a military nature, was revealed by treachery before it succeeded in breaking forth into revolt.⁵ It is certain that the conspirators intended to set aside the King and his dynasty.⁶ It was kept a dark secret who was to be the successor of Louis XVIII. Undoubtedly it was to be the young Napoleon, if the conflict were crowned with success. This was the meaning

¹ Report of the Director of the Baths, Prince Lobkowitz, Carlsbad, August 19, 1820. M. I. Lobkowitz saw one of these candlesticks, made in Paris, at this watering-place.

² Metternich's despatch of February 27, 1818.

³ E. Guillon, "*Les Complots militaires sous la Restauration*," p. 110 and following.

⁴ Karcher to the Tuscan Minister Fossombroni in Florence, Paris, September 18, 1820. M. I. Pasquier, "*Mémoires*," vol. iv. p. 443 and following.

⁵ E. Guillon, "*Les Complots militaires*," chap. iv.

⁶ Pasquier, vol. iv. p. 443.

of General Gourgaud being despatched to the frontier, commissioned to make preparations for the Duke's flight from Vienna.¹ At the same time, the party sent their agents to Eugène de Beauharnais at Munich, in order to win him over to the plot. Eugène replied very cautiously.² Sednitzky, the chief of the Police, gave no credence to the assurances of Napoleon's step-son, that he avoided all political conspiracies and was merely enjoying his domestic happiness. The former was completely convinced that these assertions were in direct contradiction to the letters of Eugène's confidants, "which"—as he says to the Emperor—"furnish the most undeniable proofs that he played a deep and continuous part in those intrigues and machinations which broke out from time to time in France."³ But what was Napoleon's attitude to all these plots? Pasquier ascribes the conspiracy in August⁴ to the influence of the Emperor and his money.⁵ It is true that he made the possibility

¹ Karcher to the Minister Fossombroni, Paris, September 18, 1820. M. I. "Gourgaud is at the outer frontier to keep up communications with Germany, which aim at the abduction of the Duke of Reichstadt." Pasquier, vol. iv. p. 457. Pasquier is mistaken in speaking of Gourgaud as staying in Vienna at this time. In November 1821 Gourgaud went to Eugène de Beauharnais in Munich to request a pension from him, which was granted (despatch from the Embassy at Munich, November 30, 1821 and December 17, 1822). Gourgaud had certainly expressed his intention of going to Vienna (despatch from the Embassy in Munich, November 30, 1821). On December 11, 1822, it is stated in the Embassy despatch: "he now appears to have given up his visit to the Duke of Reichstadt in Vienna." Metternich's instructions of September 5, 1823, to the Embassy in Munich contain words to the effect that Gourgaud is on no account to be allowed to pass to Vienna.

² Karcher to Fossombroni, Paris, September 18, 1820. M. I. Pasquier, vol. iv. p. 457.

³ Sednitzky's report of October 19, 1820; also his report of October 27, 1820. M. I.

⁴ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. iv. p. 445.

⁵ In 1818 Napoleon received in some enigmatical way £10,000 in Spanish dollars. See Wertheimer, "Die Verbannten des ersten Kaiserreichs," p. 95.

of a return his chief aim, which he pursued with every means at his disposal. It was probably to incite him to this that Madame Montholon and Savary Duke of Rovigo, spread the rumour that the English Government would not stand in the way of a flight from St. Helena.¹ It also points to the activity of Napoleon that he now succeeded in sending a secret communication to Marie Louise.² It was found out, too, that about the same time he despatched a secret emissary with letters to his

¹ Metternich to Esterházy in London, Prague, June 3, 1820. "I am informed from Paris that the Bonapartists, who neglect no opportunity of keeping up the agitation of mind in France, are trying to spread the rumour and gain credence for the view that the English Government, which for some time past has allowed Bonaparte to enjoy far more liberty in his place of detention, would not in certain cases be opposed to his escape and might even connive at it. It seems that Madame de Montholon and General Savary are not without knowledge of the rumours on this subject now circulating in Paris."

² Metternich's despatch, Prague, May 29, 1820. This communication was brought to Europe early in May. Napoleon's relations selected Tito-Mansi, who had formerly been in the service of Murat, as the bearer of it to Marie Louise. They had no suspicion that on April 1, 1820, this same Tito-Mansi had been already made a Councillor of the Government by the Emperor Francis in consideration of services rendered. Tito-Mansi himself was only informed of this privately. He believed it to be his duty as much to the Imperial government, as to his own sense of honour, to inform Metternich, through Field-Marshal Lieut.-Colonel Bubna, of the mission he had undertaken, and added that under any circumstances he must deliver Napoleon's letter to Marie Louise. This he was permitted to do. Napoleon's communication to Marie Louise, of which Metternich obtained knowledge, has not, unfortunately, been preserved. About the same time a Frenchman named Honoré Vidal, who had settled in Livorno, received letters to deliver from Joseph Bonaparte to Marie Louise. His intention was frustrated, and Vidal was imprisoned in the fortress of Mantua. (Metternich's despatch of April 5, 1820, and the same to Apponyi, May 18, 1820.) Did all these letters aim at a single purpose, which was to induce Marie Louise to take steps with the Powers for the alleviation of Napoleon's lot? From a report of Metternich's of April 25, 1820, we see that Vidal expresses a desire to be moved from Mantua to Vienna, "that I may make important disclosures in person." Vidal actually went to Vienna.

relations living in Italy.¹ Meanwhile, communications had reached him which depicted France as devotedly attached to his destiny. Now he yielded to a resignation which amounted almost to indifference. He believed he could be of more service to his heir by remaining in captivity than by making his escape. He was often heard to say: "If instead of suffering here, I lived, like Joseph, in America, people would no longer think of me; my cause would be lost. No, no, it is better for me to die on this rock. My martyrdom will secure the crown to my son."² The adherents of the Duke of Reichstadt made this resignation a cause of reproach against the Emperor; at least, so it would appear from the prayer put into the mouth of the Prince at this time, and sung at the street-corners and on the boulevards of Paris by the ballad-singers. On his knees before God, he bewails his father's indifference, and expresses the hope that the Almighty, in His goodness, will not forsake the little Napoleon.³ The Bonapartists, however, had no

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, June 3, 1820.

² Guillon (already quoted), p. 136.

³ The prayer which accompanied the picture of the Duke ran as follows:

"Mon papa pour sa couronne
Ne fait rien du tout.
Il la donne aux Bourbons,
Il me prive de tout.
Je suis tranquille, patient,
Puisque le Dieu est bon,
C'est de Lui que l'attend
Le petit Napoléon."

M. I.

"My papa for his crown
Does nothing at all.
He gives it to the Bourbons
And strips me of my all.
I am still and patient,
Because our God is good,
Upon His gift awaits
The young Napoleon."

intention of depending only upon the favour of Providence. They did not believe in sitting with their hands before them, but rather in grasping at once some effectual means of action. What was more natural than that they should look towards Vienna? But it was not to Francis, the Prince's grandfather, nor yet to his Minister, Metternich, that they looked for assistance. It is remarkable that the Archduke Charles was still regarded as the guardian-angel of the young Napoleon. This opinion, as we have seen, prevailed in France even in 1815, without any visible cause, and did not appear to have lost its power since that time. As early as 1818, Charles had been asked to use his influence that the Emperor's son might be restored to France.¹ Some years later—1821—he was addressed once again to the effect that the French people recognised his care for the Prince and blessed him for it, while his name lived on the lips of all. "In your Highness," ran the communication, "we see the new Ebroin,² who restored his nephew to the throne after he had long protected him from his enemies. Might to-morrow but dawn as the happy day on which France could proclaim aloud that she owed her salvation to you, thanks to the preservation of a beloved and ardently desired Prince!"³ The author of this letter endeavoured, with considerable skill, to touch Austria in her most vulnerable part. The Court of Vienna—he says—must take care of its own interests, and not let itself be cheated by Russia and England, who are working against Austria in France. Now, before the disaffected soldiers had carried out their intention of emigrating to Spain and South America, would be the favourable moment to effect the change of dynasty. All France would rejoice

¹ The Archduke Charles sent on this letter, received on May 11, 1818, from an unknown correspondent, to Metternich by Count Gr \ddot{u} ne.

² Ebroin was Majordomo under the Merovingians from 656-660.

³ To the Archduke Charles, London, May 31, 1821.

to welcome back the Duke of Reichstadt from the hands of Austria. As his most important confederate, the author of this letter puts forward Decazes, the Minister who had been recently dismissed, and was about to be sent as French ambassador to Vienna. The Archduke Charles might speak frankly and unreservedly to Decazes; he would be instantly convinced that the former favourite of Louis XVIII. was a staunch adherent of Napoleon II.¹ Metternich, to whom Charles showed this letter, was profoundly impressed to find Decazes mentioned as one of the conspirators in favour of the Duke of Reichstadt. For some time past he had cherished a suspicion that Decazes was reckoning on a change of dynasty after the death of Louis XVIII. On these grounds alone he thought it prudent to bring this curious letter, in the strictest confidence, to the knowledge of the Duke of Richelieu, the Premier of France.² Who was the man who had dared to approach Austria with such propositions? The signature was scarcely to be deciphered; the letter itself came from London. Metternich thought it might emanate from a certain Delville, but was even more disposed to believe that the real author of the letter was concealing himself behind the name of Delville, and hazarded a conjecture that it might be Planat, "one of Napoleon's most devoted servitors."³

Naturally enough, these plots were not calculated to lessen the vigilant guard upon the Duke. After Napoleon's death (May 5, 1821) even Metternich himself believed that his party would break up and become powerless for the future. This belief was further strengthened by the assurances of the cleverest of the ex-Emperor's brothers. "Only the most incredible shortsightedness," wrote Lucien Bonaparte to Metternich,

¹ To the Archduke Charles, London, May 31, 1821.

² Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, June 30, 1823.

³ *Ibid.*

"could attribute any political significance to any one of us since the death of our brother."¹ As a matter of fact, the Court of Vienna proceeded to mitigate the very severe measures hitherto directed against the Napoleonists. Yet it did not go so far as to permit one of them to have a personal interview with the Duke, or to live next door to his residence. "Although I have often found myself in the neighbourhood of my nephew," writes Jérôme Bonaparte, "and even in the same town, it has never been possible to speak to him; apart from this, his grandfather looks after him with the tenderest solicitude, and as regards worldly possessions his lot leaves nothing to be desired."² It was, however, a mischievous delusion to imagine that the Emperor's death would cripple the energy and power of his adherents. If so far they had divided their hopes and sympathies between father and son, now they could concentrate these sentiments exclusively on the latter, as the sole head of the dynasty. Henceforward, they looked upon the Duke of Reichstadt as the legitimate ruler of France who, as Napoleon II., was entitled to the throne of this country, which had been unlawfully wrested from him by the usurper, Louis XVIII. Even Manuel who, combined with Fouché, had been most active in setting aside the Emperor's son in 1815,³ was now opposed to the Bourbons.⁴ The accession of Napoleon II. appeared to him the sole salvation of the mother country.⁵ Prince Eugène de Beauharnais was prepared to follow any call that should reach him to make the Duke of Reichstadt ruler of France.⁶

¹ Lucien to Metternich, Canino, August 26, 1821.

² Jérôme to General Bertrand, Trieste, October 21, 1821. M. I.

³ See the chapter "Napoleon II."

⁴ Guizot, "Mémoires," vol. i. p. 310.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Hortense to her sister-in-law, Princess Augusta of Leuchtenberg (wife of Eugène), Rome, January 27, 1831. Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia. Here Hortense relates that in 1821 or 1822 the Duke of Orleans sent Lord Kinnaid to Eugène in Munich in order "*dans tous*

The army numbered many members who were always inclined to mutiny--an eloquent testimony to deep-rooted discontent with the present *régime*. At Saumur, in 1822, it was the design of the military conspirators, who also harboured republicans in their ranks, to raise Napoleon II. to the throne, although not as absolute sovereign with unlimited powers like his father. He was to be Emperor—but only by grace of the republican constitution of 1791, to which he would have to swear allegiance.¹ But this conspiracy miscarried, like that of August 1820. Had General Berton, who led the enterprise, shown more energy, he would, in all probability, have succeeded in bringing about a great revolution. Liberals, Bonapartists, Republicans, Carbonari, greatly as they might differ in their views, would have united forces in support of any effort which aimed at the overthrow of the Bourbons. The King was scarcely allowed any breathing time. The excitement caused by the August conspiracy had only just subsided when, on January 27, 1821, another event threw the inhabitants of the Tuileries into a condition of the greatest anxiety. On this day a small barrel of gunpowder, placed by some criminal hand on the staircase leading to Louis XVIII.'s apartments, exploded with such force that the doors and windows of the Palace were shattered. This outrage, like other explosions

les cas " to secure his mutual assistance should one or the other of them have the good fortune to win the crown of France. According to Hortense, her brother himself informed her that he had replied to Kinnaird as follows: "That he willingly consented for the good of France to unite with the Duke of Orleans, an old friend of his father, and whose honourable character was well known to him, but he must warn him that should fate bestow the mastery upon him (Eugène), it would always be in order to restore to France the son of the Emperor Napoleon; that it would seem like treason on his part to accept the first place for himself, and that should France decide otherwise it would ever be the aim of his ambition to serve her merely as a private individual."

¹ Guillon, "Les Complots militaires," ch. vi.

which took place in different parts of Paris, ought to have warned the Court that the conspiracy, which was believed to be suppressed, still existed, and that at any moment revenge might be taken, should the Government proceed to forcible measures against the August conspirators, languishing in their prisons.¹ The most reckless attempts were made to throw, not only the Court, but all society into such a condition of alarm and agitation that finally the entire nation would be obliged to take up arms. So long as the army remained loyal to the Court, there was no great danger of this. But the days in August had proclaimed loudly enough that there was no dependence to be placed upon it. Nothing was left undone which could win over the non-commissioned officers to the insurrection that was brewing.² Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that we are constantly hearing of military conspiracies. It was even asserted that the affair at Saumur had been only the prelude to an extensive plot in favour of Napoleon II., which—had it not been discovered in time—would have had the support of many important personages in Vienna and at the Tuileries, among them deputies of the Chamber.³

¹ Baron Binder, who filled the place of Baron Vincent in his absence, to Metternich, Paris, February 3, 1821. "It seems more probable (at first it was thought that the explosion was specially directed against the Duke of Angoulême) that this outrage was connected with the last conspiracies, and particularly with that of last August . . . and that it was the intention of the malefactors to alarm the Government and to put a stop to the continuation of this trial by proving that the conspiracy still existed, and that it possessed means of action even in the very interior of the palace where the King and his august family reside."

² Vincent to Metternich, Paris, February 1, 1822. "Also it is known that while they work and distribute money in the poor quarters inhabited by the working classes, they endeavour also to win over the non-commissioned officers of the regiments."

³ Fauché Borel's despatch, Paris, March 9, 1822. Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia, Hardenberg's Memoirs. "Some news actually reached the Palace of the King and the Princes, that Eugène de Beau-

The Government, anxious for its existence, which was threatened from all sides, endeavoured to contrive some method of circumventing the conspirators. It did not even shrink from the unlawful methods of bribery and corruption in order to discover the suspects, as in the case of Colonel Caron.¹ But its chief hopes were centred in its unrelenting severity towards those who had participated in the recent military conspiracy, to which some great dignitaries had pledged themselves, especially Talleyrand.² The general agitation and tension of mind did not abate. Brave men were always to be found, whose one wish was to restore the Emperor's son to France. In August 1823 two French officers, Richard and Lobre, appear to have gone to Vienna intending to abduct the Duke,³ in whose name the French troops

harnais, the Bonapartists and their clique, together with the Austrian party (here on the margin of the despatch pencilled by another hand are the words: "that is to say the partisans of the Duke of Reichstadt") — "seem to be united with the most demagogic deputies of the extreme left, who only appear, however, in a secondary place." Fauché Borel, Counsellor to the Legation and Prussian Consul-General in Switzerland, was staying in Paris at the time, where one of the conspirators seems to have made this communication to him. Goltz does not give entire credence to the matter." Bernstorff to Hardenberg, Berlin, March 16, 1822. Bernstorff himself writes here: "The affair is at any rate peculiar and worthy of close attention." Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia. The Austrian ambassador knew nothing of this concerted conspiracy.

¹ Guillon (already quoted), p. 169. The Government had troops, among which were officers sent out in disguise, who cried, "Vive Napoleon II.!" in order to catch Caron tripping. He fell a victim to this ruse, and was sent bound to Colmar. Baron Binder had no faith in these specious methods of the Government, and ascribes to them the ill-will of the enemies of the Court. In his despatch to Metternich of July 18, 1821, he says: ". . . by assisting the efforts of the malicious who are always trying to represent the Government as imagining or provoking conspiracies for the sake of making criminals and in order to extend its powers by illegal methods."

² Baron Binder to Metternich, Paris, July 18, 1821.

³ Metternich to Sedlnitzky, August 26, 1823. M. I.

recently sent to quell the Spanish revolution had established a regency on the Franco-Spanish frontier.¹ It was even reported that the King of Rome was already in Spain, and would appear to the army as soon as he had crossed the Pyrenees.² The arrest of the adjutant of General Guillemont, commander of the French staff in Spain, shows plainly enough how little confidence the Court had in its troops.³ Chateaubriand himself, then Ministerial President, said to the Austrian ambassador Baron Vincent, that the enemies of the Government were making the most strenuous efforts to bring about the disaffection of the army.⁴ The situation was all the more dangerous because at every moment the condition of the King's health caused grave apprehension for his life,⁵ and it was even reported that his brother, the Comte d'Artois, wished to abdicate in favour of his son.⁶ Had the Duke of Reichstadt been of a suitable age, and had his grandfather and Metternich been willing to support him, truly no better moment could have been chosen for his proclamation.

From time to time one or another of his adherents would venture to Austria in order to work for the Duke's cause in person. On August 24, 1826, when he drove out with his uncle the Archduke Lewis,⁷ to witness the illumination of the Imperial Palace at Persenbeug, a

¹ Guillon (already quoted), p. 274 and following.

² *Ibid.* p. 277.

³ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. v. p. 502. Guillon (already quoted), p. 282. See also Vincent's despatches of March 29 and April 7, 1823.

⁴ Vincent's despatch, Paris, January 17, 1823.

⁵ Vincent to Metternich, Paris, January 30, 1823.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Paris, January 12, 1824. "It seems to be certain that M. le Comte d'Artois intended to abdicate in favour of his son in case of the King's death."

⁷ So says Baron Kutschera, Adjutant-General to the Emperor, in his letter to Count Sedlnitzky dated Persenbeug, August 25, 1826. M. I. Noé von Nordberg is wrong when in his "Aus den Erlebnissen eines Wiener Polizei-Direktors" (*feuilleton* of the *Fremdenblatt*, July 9, 1887). he speaks of the Archduke Rainer as sitting in the carriage.

young man, elegantly attired, suddenly threw a letter into their carriage. It fell upon the Archduke's lap, who immediately observed that it was directed to his nephew, and hastily took possession of it himself. The whole incident happened so quickly that it passed unnoticed by the Duke. On arriving at the Palace, Lewis handed over the letter to his brother the Emperor, who was staying there. The communication contained a pressing request to the young Napoleon to come to France without hesitation. "Sire," it ran, "thirty millions of subjects await your return, and as I have the honour to be of this number, I bring your Majesty the Star of Dawn"¹—an allusion to the tricolour cockade enclosed in the letter. The Emperor Francis was not greatly edified by the Frenchman's audacity. In the darkness which had set in, it was not possible to discover the stranger that same night. But on August 26, Noé, the Viennese Commissioner of Police, came to Persenbeug disguised as a commercial traveller, to look secretly for the Frenchman, who called himself in the letter, Joseph Romain Doudeuil, and did not forget to give his address in Paris.² While the search for Doudeuil was being carried on in the neighbourhood of Persenbeug, he addressed a second letter to the Duke from Linz. Noé immediately set off in pursuit, but the stranger had a long start, and effected his escape over the frontier unmolested.³ Subsequently, it was found that Doudeuil had arrived in Vienna on August 13, showing an ordinary passport, in which he was set down as a commercial clerk, a native of France. In spite of this he was received into the quarters of the Joiners' Guild in Vienna. Here he made

¹ M. I. Noé (already quoted) cites the contents of the letter from memory.

² Doudeuil to the Duke of Reichstadt, Persenbeug, August 24, 1826. M. I. He gives his address: Paris, 23 rue de Lombard.

³ Sednitzky to Metternich, Vienna, November 9, 1826. M. I.

the acquaintance of a member named Staudinger, who had lived in Paris many years and spoke French very well. Doudeuil told Staudinger that in the French capital a club had been formed which desired to place the Duke of Reichstadt upon the throne.¹ Count Sedlnitzky, Prefect of Police, was disposed to put down Doudeuil among the class of lunatics. But he did not venture to offer this opinion as decisive; for Doudeuil's conduct in Vienna, as well as the presence of mind and calm consideration for trifling matters which he revealed upon the return journey, entirely contradicted the assumption that he was a madman. Sedlnitzky was therefore forced to the conclusion that this man had come to Austria with some definite design.² Noé, Commissioner of Police, stated that Metternich had informed the French Government of Doudeuil's proceedings. He was arrested on his return and confined for several years in the fortress of Ham.³ This imprisonment cannot, in any case, have lasted more than two years, since in the summer of 1828 he returned once more to Austria. Arrested in Nussdorf, he was brought to the police station in Vienna, where he again betrayed, in the liveliest manner, his fanatical enthusiasm for Napoleon's son. As it was difficult to know how to deal with him, he was simply sent away, with a caution never again to set foot in Austria under penalty of punishment.⁴ This did not, however, prevent him from risking a third attempt in 1830, after having sent the Archduke Charles a letter for the Duke of Reichstadt. This time he was recognised on the frontier, at Scherding, and sent to Bavaria, the destination for which his passport was made out.⁵ Not all who espoused the

¹ Sedlnitzky to Metternich, Vienna, November 9, 1826. M. I.

² *Ibid.*

³ See Noé's article (already quoted).

⁴ Sedlnitzky to Metternich, October 15, 1828. M. I.

⁵ Sedlnitzky to the Chief of Police at Linz, September 4, 1830. M. I.
In 1832, Doudeuil published "*Stances sur la mort du fils de Napoléon.*"

Duke's cause acted with such unselfishness and devotion as Doudeuil : there were so many who hoped to gain their own ends from the propaganda. Just such an adventurer was the Seigneur de Parrot of Montbéliard, who, in co-operation with a German printer named Scherer, published proclamations in the name of Napoleon II., and distributed thousands of copies, together with tri-colour cockades manufactured by himself. He profited by the situation to visit the Prefect of the upper-Rhenish provinces, under the assumed name of Müller, in order to make important disclosures, for which he intended to be well paid. With portentous and mysterious hints he divulged the fact that a regency in favour of Napoleon II. had been established in Alsace, which was distributing proclamations and cockades among the people. The police of Baden, however, succeeded in unmasking the impostor, who had even carried his proposals as far as that province, and thereupon he and his confederate Scherer were arrested.¹ At the same time, Witt—also called Döring—who was notoriously associated with these secret societies, endeavoured to spread a rumour, which was intended to enhance his credit with his friends, even if he had no further designs in view. It was his object to make them believe that Metternich and Count Bubna—both in Milan and Verona—had tried to persuade him to establish secret societies in Switzerland and Germany, with the intention of bringing about a political revolution in Italy in favour of Napoleon II. Döring represented himself everywhere as persecuted by the Court of Vienna because he had refused to undertake this mission.²

When, however, he asserts that on August 24, 1826, he conversed with the Duke of Reichstadt at Persenbourg, his statement is untrue. His poem and his invocation to the French are printed in John Grand-Carteret's "*L'Aiglon en Images*," p. 385 and following.

¹ Note of the Paris Chief of Police to Vincent, 1823, without date, but in any case written towards the end of June. ² *Ibid.*

Does not the fact that such dissemination of opinion was possible show that the situation was not unfavourable to the Duke of Reichstadt? He had many adherents in Switzerland.¹ Even in France, the Bonapartists increased daily in numbers and influence. Above all, it was the French Government which paved the way for its opponents.

As early as 1822, Metternich had given expression to his apprehensions regarding the fatal course adopted by the all-powerful Comte d'Artois and the Ministry—Villèle, Corbière, Peyronnet—which he had formed.² Even after the death of Louis XVIII. and the accession of the Comte d'Artois to the throne as Charles X., its tendency remained the same. "I have known France," wrote the Chancellor of State from Paris, March 28, 1825, "both under the Empire and later on during the presence of the Allied Armies. After ten years I set foot once more in the country, given over to itself and to the development of its Constitutional relations. I find things far worse."³ With horror he saw the Government approaching nearer the edge of the fatal slope, and asked himself whether the awakening from this situation would not be the result of some terrible catastrophe.⁴ The issue of the elections of 1828 might well bring the narrow-minded to their senses. Neither threats nor cajoleries had availed to procure a majority favourable to the

¹ Frederick von Erlach, Count of the Empire, to the Archduke John, Paris, November 15, 1823. "I have been travelling in Switzerland and Germany, and I observed that the Duke of Reichstadt had a great number of followers in Switzerland, but a want of unity in the Cantons, which would need to be rallied by a chief.

² Metternich's despatch, Vienna, January 6, 1822. "The news from Paris discloses melancholy particulars as to the situation of the Ministry. An unorganised union of weak men, gathered into one party without discrimination or due reflection, renders it impossible to predict much good of the new Ministry."

³ Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. iv. p. 163.

⁴ Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, May 9, 1828.

Court. "The new elections complete the work," wrote the Marquis Alfieri from Paris to Vienna; "the liberal party will be strengthened by nearly a quarter of the Chamber, and the majority of these are violent Bonapartists. All the refugees in other countries are intriguing here to sow the seeds of agitation, and there do not exist sufficient means of circumventing them, nor even of knowing what they are at."¹ Cardinal Latil² and many other Bourbonists, sincere and devoted men, recognised the danger which threatened the ruling dynasty.³ Only Charles X. made light of the situation. The following incident is characteristic of the King's short-sightedness. At a concert given by the Duchesse de Berri, Charles X. approached the ambassadors of Austria and Russia in order to inform them that it had been considered advisable not to give the opera *Masaniello* at the next performance in the theatre of the Tuileries, on account of the revolutionary scene in the market place. "But," said the King, laughing, "I replied that it was a matter of indifference to me; revolutions are things of the past, which will never happen again, and there are only a few madmen who still take pleasure in hatching them."⁴ This careless and self-delusive attitude did not, however, hinder the Court from looking anxiously towards the Imperial Palace of Vienna, whose walls harboured the Duke of Reichstadt. Instead of instilling order in their own country by means of wise regulations, thereby destroying

¹ Alfieri to Pralormo in Vienna, Paris, May 1, 1828.

² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, February 12, 1829. "He (Latil) thinks that in the future only a violent upheaval—of which he does not yet venture to determine the nature—could save the monarchy and the throne from the dangers by which they are threatened."

³ *Ibid.*, Paris, March 1, 1829. "All good French people, who are devoted to the royal family and desire the maintenance of order and peace, are greatly alarmed at the actual condition of things and at the line the Government is taking."

⁴ *Ibid.*

the seeds of revolution, the Bourbonists occupied themselves exclusively with the Emperor's son, who was now approaching manhood.¹ They forgot what the Emperor Francis had done for them in 1814; for he had been the first to lend them a protective hand against Alexander I. of Russia. The imagination of the Bourbons now ran quite in the opposite direction. They believed that in case of a quarrel with the Court of the Tuileries, Austria would not hesitate for a moment to make use of the Duke of Reichstadt as an effective weapon. At that time Vienna and Paris were conferring quite seriously on the subject of Italy, where France was eagerly watching every step taken by Austria towards enlarging her sphere of power. The possibility that Austria might promote the interests of the young Napoleon was being earnestly considered by the French Cabinet, with reference to an eventual conflict.² The fact that his existence was a cause of uneasiness to the French Court was the reason of its being accused of making attempts on his life. The past history of the ultra-Royalists by no means contradicted the possibility of such violent measures. Had they not hired assassins to kill Napoleon in Elba? And had not the adherents of this fanatical party openly

¹ The barrister, M. Delièges, writes from Paris on December 5, 1828, to Pillat, editor of the "*Oesterreichischen Beobachter*" in Vienna: "You must have learnt from some of our newspapers that the portrait of the Duke of Reichstadt is exposed to the public in every print-shop. I can vouch for the fact with my own eyes."

² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, January 11, 1829. "It is not surprising that the attention of the French public should be constantly turned towards the Duke of Reichstadt, nor that this young Prince should be alternately an object of interest or of fear to the various parties now agitating in France. But what is difficult to conceive is the fact that the Government itself, and the Court in particular, should be the victims of a feeling of anxiety, not only as regards the existence of Napoleon's son, but also as to his residence at the Court of Vienna, and as to the designs which this Court might form on his account in case of a rupture with France."

proclaimed in Vienna that a rope must be kept in readiness for this bastard, the son of Napoleon? With them, too, originated the idea of making the unlucky Prince turn monk, in order to render him harmless in the future. Judging from these notorious views of the royalists, the Bonapartists might well believe that the French Court was secretly plotting to get rid of the Emperor's son. For some time past repeated warnings as to the need of caution had reached the Viennese Cabinet. In May 1816, Pietro della Pietra, a native of Friaul, announced the existence in France of a plot against Marie Louise and the Prince of Parma, of which the ringleader was Count Anglès, the Minister of Police. In Vienna this statement was only looked upon as originating in the imagination of a self-interested man.¹ In January 1817² an anonymous person, who was actually a certain Bigaud, wrote to the Archduke Charles from London that Count Jules de Polignac, the Duke of Fitzjames and M. de Bruges, who were entrusted with the management of the project, were prepared to pay 500,000 thalers to the assassin of the Prince, if the deed were accomplished. He asserted that he had learnt all this from the Comte de Beaumont, Inspector-General of the French Police, then staying in London. Furthermore, he indicated Countess Ducquesnoy, who was living in the English capital, as the woman who had declared that neither father nor son should escape, and that she had offered to go to St. Helena to kill Napoleon, while some one else might take upon himself to do away with the son.³ To the Viennese police the matter seemed sufficiently serious to call for precautions.⁴ The Emperor Francis

¹ Sedlnitzky to Metternich, Vienna, June 1, 1816. M. I. Here we find all the information relating to Pietra.

² Sedlnitzky's report, Vienna, August 29, 1818. M. I.

³ To the Archduke Charles, London, January 2, 1817. M. I. The writer of the letter requests a reply to Brussels, *poste restante*.

⁴ Sedlnitzky's report of May 16, 1817. M. I.

resolved, however, that the Prince's governor should be informed of all the measures taken for the safety of the former.¹ This man, Bigaud, who had formerly been a commissioner of police at Lyons, warned Marie Louise in 1818 to travel with greater precautions than hitherto, and took this opportunity of offering to reveal to her important secrets.² In 1821 came a new warning,³ which, apart from many others, was followed in 1827 by a denunciation of a certain Rochaux from Nancy.⁴ Avarice, no doubt, played a part in many such accusations, in order to extort money in return for these disclosures.⁵ Such a base motive cannot certainly be attributed to Savary, formerly Napoleon's Minister of Police, when, on December 21, 1828, in company with M. de Resigny, one of the ex-Emperor's artillery officers, he visited Count Apponyi to inform him of a projected plot against the life of the grandson of the Emperor Francis. He told the Austrian ambassador that the liberal party, flushed with victory, wished to drive out the Bourbons, and bestow the vacant throne upon the Duke of Orleans, against whom, however, the nobility and clergy would declare themselves. These two powerful parties had frankly said that in case of a revolution they would prefer to make terms with Napoleon's son. In this way the Liberals were convinced that the future belonged to the Duke of Reichstadt.⁶ On this account Count Pozzo,

¹ Autograph decision of the Emperor's, May 30, to Sednitzky's report of May 16, 1817. M. I.

² Sednitzky's report of August 29, 1818. M. I.

³ Count Pálffy, Austrian Ambassador in Dresden, to the Chief Burgrave of Bohemia in Prague, Dresden, September 7, 1821. M. I.

⁴ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 3, 1827.

⁵ *Ibid.* Count Kolovrat to Sednitzky, Prague, December 6, 1821.

⁶ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, December 21, 1828. ". . . It will be the Duke of Reichstadt's note which will echo chiefly through France, and this Prince will find numerous partisans throughout all classes in the kingdom, high and low, who will carry the day against the Duke of Orleans."

Hyde de Neuville, Bertin de Vaux, and a general of the Staff had agreed to have the Prince murdered,¹ because they were sure of losing their own lives should he ascend the throne.² "Tell Prince Metternich," said Savary in conclusion, "that I fully believe what I have related to you."³ An equally serious accusation was communicated by the son of the well-known Cavagnari, who had lately returned from France to Parma.⁴ At the same time, Colonel Werklein sent a letter of Dr. Antommarchi, from the residence of Marie Louise, which confirmed the existence of a plot.⁵

Into this heated atmosphere, where the mere shadow of the Duke of Reichstadt sufficed to excite fear—even Metternich did not altogether venture to deny the fact that a murderous plot was being hatched⁶—Barthélemy's celebrated poem, "*Le Fils de l'Homme*," fell like a bombshell.⁷ Eight years previously a far more important

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, December 21, 1828. "*This branch of the throne must be cut off*," this is the expression used in the conferences held to confirm and establish the plot for getting rid of the Duke of Reichstadt. The members of these conferences are General Pozze di Borgo, Hyde de Neuville, Bertin de Vaux, and a general of the Staff, whom I (Savary) *think* I know, but whom I do not wish to name before I am quite certain." ² *Ibid.* ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Metternich to Sedlnitzky, March 21, 1829.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.* "Without its being possible to absolutely deny that so mad a proposal has been made, I must confess that such a plan concocted by men of such high rank, and at least some of them honourable, appears to me highly improbable, because it is not clear to me what advantage these men would derive from such an action. In my opinion these disclosures, which only emanate from the Bonapartist adherents, are far more likely to be the fabrications of this party to discover the intentions of Austria respecting the Duke of Reichstadt, and to arouse the suspicions of the royalist party." On December 15, 1829, after Savary [in June, 1829] had gone back upon his disclosures, which he had described as absolutely reliable, Metternich expressed even greater doubts as to the communications of the Duke of Rovigo. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, December 15, 1829.

⁷ "*Le Fils de l'Homme, ou souvenir de Vienne*, par Méry et Barthélemy," Paris, 1829.

poet than Barthélemy had certainly dared to speak of the "wonderful child." To the great annoyance of the Royalists, Béranger, in 1821, had published a letter in verse in which the young Napoleon warned his cousin, the Duke of Bordeaux, not to let himself be deceived by the homage of courtiers, and to study the fickle ways of fortune in the fate of the King of Rome.¹

Only the intense excitement which prevailed among the French in 1829 can explain the extraordinary effect of Barthélemy's poem, which is especially remarkable among the writings of that time. He, who had formerly been an anti-Bonapartist,² took up the pen to inflame the hearts of others with sympathy for the unhappy Prince, who could no longer be anything more than *le fils de l'homme*.³ With true enthusiasm he speaks of the Duke, whom he describes as the victim of political exigencies, whose undoing the Austrian Court did not hesitate, gradually but surely, to bring about.⁴ Who could read, without deep emotion, Barthélemy's superb description of the Emperor's son living in complete obscurity and ignorant of his father's history? But the poet does not leave his compatriots without a hopeful prospect; he

¹ "Les deux Cousins, ou lettre d'un Petit Roi à un Petit Duc," in the "Chansons de Béranger," Paris, 1821, vol. ii. p. 235. Marie Louise being the daughter of the Neapolitan Princess Marie Therese, the King of Rome could call the Duke of Bordeaux, who was also the descendant of a Neapolitan Princess, his cousin.

² Jules Garsou, "Barthélemy et Méry," in the "Mémoires couronnés publiés par l'académie royale de Belgique," vol. lyiii., p. 25.

³ "Le Fils de l'Homme," p. 25.

"Tu n'es plus aujourd'hui rien que le fils de l'homme !
Pourtant, quel fils de roi contre ce nom obscur
N'échangerait son titre et son sceptre futur ?"

"To-day thou art only 'the son of the man' !
Yet what king's son for this humble name
Would not exchange his title and sceptre to come ?"

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

prophesies that the young Napoleon, true to the greatness of their national hero, will one day break the chains that bind him, and, guided by his father's star, will appear in their midst.¹

In these closing words lies the chief and most dangerous significance of Barthélemy's poem. However severe an indictment he might bring against the Court of Vienna, it is lost in the assurance with which the poet announces the restoration of the Empire. Count Apponyi seems completely justified in his assertion that in composing his poem Barthélemy's aim was not so much to bring forward an accusation against Austria, as to rouse the interest of his fellow-citizens for the Duke of Reichstadt, to goad the courage of the Bonapartist party, and to make the French Government unpopular.²

It was certainly the Court of Vienna that supplied him with the motive for publishing "*Le Fils de l'Homme*," whereby the serious accusation of secret poisoning—groundless though it may have been—was perpetuated. As an enthusiastic Bonapartist, Barthélemy had repaired to Vienna in order to present, in person, his epic poem, "*Napoléon en Egypte*," to the son of his revered Emperor. On December 31, 1828, he met, in the Austrian capital, a pseudo-Countess Pálmaffy, who in reality was the wife of a Hungarian wine-merchant of that name.³ On January 3, 1829, he arrived at Count Dietrichstein's with two copies of his work. One he handed to the governor, the other he asked permission to present personally to

¹ "*Le Fils de l'Homme*," p. 27, and following.

² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, June 12, 1829. "In publishing this work the author seems chiefly to have intended to excite the interest of his compatriots in favour of the Duke of Reichstadt, to revive the hope and courage of the Bonapartists and to discredit the French Government. This intention seems to have weighed more with him than that of accusing the Court of Vienna and making it appear odious."

³ Police report, Vienna, January 25, 1829, supplementary to Sedlitzky's of February 9, 1829. M. I.

the Duke. Dietrichstein declined, because the Prince's position forbade him to receive strangers, therefore not even Barthélemy. As the Prince's governor, he must read the poem, "*Napoléon en Egypte*," himself, before giving it to the Duke. Dietrichstein invited Barthélemy accordingly to return for his reply.¹ The latter did not come back, however, although he made many indirect attempts to become personally acquainted with the Prince.² After a sojourn of four weeks, during which he behaved with the greatest circumspection,³ the poet left Vienna without having effected his purpose. His first act, on arriving in Paris, was to write and publish his poem, "*The Son of the Man*." The response of the Government was the confiscation of the work, of which in the meantime thousands of copies had already been sold.⁴ Count Apponyi called the attention of Portalis, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the scandalous debates which the confiscation and trial would entail. "I must concede," rejoined Portalis, "the existence of such a danger. Nevertheless, the dignity of the Government demands that we should no longer remain silent in face of slanderous fabrications and of principles which

¹ Sednitzky's note, January 20, 1829.—Metternich to Apponyi, January 24, 1829.

² Sednitzky's note, January 20, 1829.—Report of January 25, 1829. M. I.

³ Sednitzky's note, January 20, 1829. Sednitzky's report of February 9, 1829. M. I.

⁴ Viel-Castel, "*Histoire de la Restauration*," vol. xix., p. 571. In a despatch from the Embassy in Stuttgart, September 26, 1829, it is stated that "*Le Fils de l'Homme*" was translated into German. "This work," says the ambassador, "may be expected to have a great sale among the German demagogues, because it contains the grossest insults to the Imperial Court and your serene Person." In Vienna Barthélemy's work was greatly read under the very eyes of the police, both in the original French and in the German translation, and it long remained the fashion to speak of the Duke as "*le fils de l'homme*." "*Briefe über den Herzog von Reichstadt aus Wien, &c., 1831*," p. 29.

tend to shake the legitimate dynasty and to disturb the public peace, especially when advanced with such audacity and perversity."¹ Portalis had gained courage for this step from the conviction that the judges would condemn unconditionally both author and publisher, and punish them severely. He flattered himself with the hope that such a proceeding would have the salutary effect of checking in future the appearance of such "disgraceful and dangerous" writings.² Apponyi, who had followed the proceedings of the Minister with the greatest attention, conceded all this. He could not, however, refrain from remarking that the success of the whole procedure would depend, in the first place, on the fortunate choice of a procurator of royalist tendencies, who would understand the skilful preliminary drafting of the charge and afterwards conduct the prosecution with intelligence. Portalis took leave of the ambassador, promising to devote special care to this highly important point.³ On the day of the trial—July 29, 1829—a considerable number of men appeared in the court of justice, among them Victor Hugo, General Gourgaud, and Schonen. All were curious to see the young poet, who had known how to apply the lash of political satire with such talent and courage. The rumour had also spread that Barthélemy would conduct his own defence and plead in verse, an innovation not without charm, which actually took place. The Government had chosen as their advocate Menjaud de Dammartin who, together with the judges, justified the expectations entertained of them. Notwithstanding the eloquence of the defendant and the spirit with which he delivered his verses, Barthélemy was sentenced to three months' imprisonment and a fine of 1000 francs.⁴

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, June 12, 1829.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "Procès du Fils de l'Homme, avec la défense en vers prononcés à l'audience du 29 juillet 1829, par Barthélemy," Paris, A. J. Denain,

The Government had triumphed, but their victory of July 29, 1829, resembled the conquests of Pyrrhus. Engaged as they were at that moment in a bitter struggle for existence, they would, in this case, have shown greater wisdom in maintaining the silence that Portalis had desired to break at any price. The man whose ruin was aimed at by this lawsuit was not the real sufferer; it was the Bourbon dynasty itself which received the more serious injury. Barthélemy's reputation was enhanced by a triumph greater than he could have hoped for in his wildest dreams. And had the Court attained even the one thing at which it aimed, namely, that after the sentence on the poet it should hear no more about the Duke of Reichstadt? It was in vain that the Ministers instructed the Prefects: "Napoleon's son belongs neither to history nor to France."¹ Charles X. was to learn that now, for the first time, the French were looking with sympathy to Vienna, where the son of their former Emperor was being driven to an early grave. How little the Imperial Court feared this accusation, is shown very clearly by the fact that it gave the order for "*Le Fils de l'Homme*" to be laid before the Prince. Montbel was not deceived when he was told that the Duke had read this poem, which touched him so nearly.² Baron Obenaus himself tells us that he had a long conversation with the Prince on the subject,³ and it is much to be regretted that he did not leave us the substance of this conversation. But even the brief account of it, as given in his diary, is eloquent enough. It refutes,

1829. Schmidt, in "*Zeitgenössische Geschichten*," is certainly misled by a printer's error when he speaks of the fine as 10,000 francs.

¹ Welschinger, "*Le Roi de Rome*," p. 316.

² Montbel (already quoted), chap. iv.

³ Diary of Baron Obenaus, August 11 and 13 (1829). In the possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus. "Conversation upon '*Le Fils de l'Homme*,' and upon Barthélemy's attempt to present the Prince with his epic poem ('*Napoléon en Égypte*')."

in convincing fashion, the assertion that the Duke, up to the time of Marmont's arrival in Vienna—that is to say until after the Revolution of July 1830—had been left in complete ignorance of the events which had occurred in France between 1796–1815.¹ He frequently discussed his political situation with Obenaus,² which is another proof that he possessed more than a vague suspicion of his own importance. If, until 1830, he had really known nothing of the latest phases of French history, how came he to speak of Napoleon in such a remarkable way as early as 1827? When, at that time, Count Neipperg advised him to devote himself with the utmost attention to the study of the French language, he replied to his mother's friend: "This advice has not fallen on an unfruitful or an ungrateful soil. Every imaginable motive inspires me with the desire to perfect myself in, and to overcome the difficulties of a language which, at the present moment, forms the most essential part of my studies. It is the language in which my father gave the word of command in all his battles, in which his name was covered with glory, and in which he has left us unparalleled memoirs of the art of war; while to the last he expressed the wish that I should never repudiate the nation into which I was born."³ Very early in life he realised himself to be the Emperor's son, and gave utterance to these words: "The chief aim of my life must be not to remain *unworthy* of my father's fame."⁴ It was the Emperor Francis who, when his grandson had attained to a certain maturity of intellect, directed

¹ Masson, "L'Aiglon" in *La Revue de Paris*, April 1, 1900.

² Diary of Baron Obenaus, January 18, 1825. "During the afternoon walk conversation upon the political relations of the Prince to the Imperial family and to the rest of the world."

³ Communicated by me in the *feuilleton* of the *Neue Freie Presse* of April 8, 1898; French translation of the same in the *Revue Bleue*, March 24, 1900.

⁴ Adolf Schmidt, "Zeitgenössische Geschichten," p. 387.

Metternich to place before him a presentment of Napoleon, evolved from his full knowledge of all the facts. "I wish," said the Emperor to his confidential Minister, "that the Duke should revere the memory of his father, whose great qualities, like his faults, should serve him as an example of what to emulate and what to avoid, so that he may escape the same unhappy consequences. Do not suppress the truth, but teach him, above all, to honour his father's memory." To which Metternich replied: "I will speak to the Duke about his father as I should wish myself to be spoken of to my own son."¹ It is greatly to be deplored that we possess no written account of the elucidations which accompanied Napoleon's history as set forth by the Chancellor of State. Knowing the Duke's character, he would certainly have been careful not to treat his father's memory from a harsh and hostile point of view. We may be sure, however, that it would be his chief aim to place Napoleon's unbridled ambition before his son in such a light as to be the vindication of Austria's attitude towards him. But no matter how Metternich may have spoken about Napoleon, even if he tried to belittle his former opponent—which is not credible—he did not succeed in estranging the son from the father. Until his death, the young Napoleon knew no higher aim than to cherish the glorious traditions of the Emperor as his most precious possession. He devoured greedily everything which referred to this period, so that General Belliard was compelled to say of him: "He knows the whole history of his father's life and also of his own."² And it was this—his own history—which inspired him with the wish to become something more than fate had hitherto permitted him to be. His

¹ Wilhelm Binder, "Metternich und sein Zeitalter," 3rd edition, 1845, p. 280.

² Belliard to the Duchess of Cr s at Andelot, Vienna, September 6, 1830, Intercept.

vital spirit urged him with demoniac power to escape from the position into which he had been forced by unfavourable circumstances. "I often look at myself in the glass," he once said to Obenaus, "and think : this head has already borne a crown, but now it is robbed of all its glory. If the Poles will elect me as their King, I will hold the balance between Russia and Austria."¹ Scarcely had he uttered these words, when, by some mischance, the little mirror he held in his hand was broken. Like all people of a fatalistic turn of mind, he was immediately convinced that this misfortune was a bad omen for the success of his plan.² Not yet did he suspect that his whole future happiness stood under the influence of a baleful star. The great name he bore was but a curse to him. All the Powers feared that should he come to the throne, he would instantly take up the sword to prove himself worthy of his father's military fame. This conviction was an insuperable obstacle which blocked his path in every direction. It is interesting to note, however, that in contrast to the Cabinets, the nations regarded the young Napoleon as a saviour in their need. In the year 1828, pictures were circulated in Poland which depicted him in Polish national dress ; at sight of which the people whispered to each other that the Duke of Reichstadt was destined some day to play a prominent part in Poland, probably as the future King of their country.³ A young priest, named Smaglowski, hit upon

¹ Obenaus's Diary, July 4, no date of year. In the possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus. According to Prokesch (already quoted), p. 36, the Duke would have been only too glad to let himself be carried off to Poland.

² *Ibid.*, June 14, no date of year.

³ Metternich to Tatischev, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, Vienna, February 18, 1828. "They end by hinting that the Prince is destined to play a great part in Poland on some future day." At this time all kinds of fancy wares were secretly sold in Cracow and Russian Poland, bearing the picture of the Duke, and inscribed below,

the adventurous idea that the Duke, supported by Austria, might, at the head of the Hungarians, invade Poland, and let himself be crowned there.¹ Upon the outbreak of the Polish revolution, a French officer, accompanied by an immense crowd, actually rode through the streets of Warsaw, shouting continually: "Long live Napoleon II., King of Poland!"²

This challenge, however, awoke no echo, for the leaders of the Polish nation thought only of the Archduke Charles, the victor of Aspern, as their future Sovereign.³ It is, however, worthy of notice that the young Napoleon was also considered as the predestined King of Greece, which was now released from Turkish rule. We do not know whether the Neo-Hellenists themselves expressed such a wish.⁴ Prokesch claims the merit of having suggested this idea which, according to him, was sympathetically received by the Archduke John, Count Dietrichstein, and even by the wife of the Emperor Francis.⁵ But Prokesch cannot have known much of the Chancellor of State if he hoped to interest him in this Greek project. Even had Metternich's leading idea been that of conquest—which is improbable—one difficulty alone would have excluded the Duke for ever from the throne of Greece. Before he could have worn the crown of this kingdom, he must have abjured the Roman Catholic faith and

"Napoleon II., King of Poland." Sedlnitzky's report of March 31, 1828. M. I.

¹ Report of Baron von Oechsner from the Consulate at Warsaw, September 16, 1830. Smagłowski was considered either a lunatic or an *agent provocateur*. Oechsner inclined to the latter view.

² Verbal narration of Rénard, the courier of the Cabinet, who arrived in Vienna December 9, 1830. Rénard had reached Warsaw at 7 o'clock on the evening of November 29, just before the outbreak of the revolution.

³ Baron von Oechsner to Metternich, Warsaw, February 22, 1831.

⁴ According to Apponyi's account of September 16, 1825, the French newspapers had spoken of the Duke as King of Greece.

⁵ Prokesch (already quoted), pp. 8 and 9.

entered the Greek Church. But Metternich would never have lent a hand to this proceeding. When a Bavarian Prince was to ascend the throne of Greece at the price of his apostasy, Metternich was indignant that a Catholic Prince should permit his son¹ to do such a thing, and the Emperor Francis shared the disgust of his Prime Minister.² Such being the sentiments of these narrow-minded personages, the Duke of Reichstadt could never have been seriously thought of as King of Greece. Another and far more important throne than that of Greece now fell vacant, in consequence of the revolution of July, 1830. This was none other than that throne which Napoleon I. had occupied, and which in 1815 had been assigned—although but for a few hours—to Napoleon II. These events now claimed all Metternich's attention. After the downfall of Charles X. and the expulsion of the older Bourbon dynasty from France, he had, of course, to consider the question, whether the French would not demand that the grandson of his Emperor should return to fill the empty throne. When the first news of the July revolution reached Vienna, public opinion pointed to the young Napoleon as the probable successor to the fallen dynasty.³ In the Austrian capital, where he was much liked, opinion was generally in his favour. If, mounted

¹ Metternich's despatch, Königswart, July 31, 1830. "Regarding it from an honourable and purely religious point of view, I could only consider the perversion of a Bavarian Prince to the schism of the Greek Church as a most regrettable event. Your Majesty will certainly share my sentiments in this respect. Such an incident would be worse than the case of the Crown Princess of Prussia. There we have a weak woman who succumbed to the poisonous influence of a Protestant family; she yielded and fell. The matter was limited to *one* conscience, but in the other case it was the *father* who gave the first impulse, and this father is a Catholic Prince."

² Decision upon the above despatch in the Emperor's own hand: "Moreover, it would be horrible if such a thing should happen as is discussed here."

³ M. I.

on his charger, he passed through the streets, every one rushed to the windows to admire the graceful rider.¹ A Viennese tradesman endeavoured to introduce gloves with his likeness—an attempt which was speedily suppressed by the police.² Undoubtedly Metternich had long since been occupied with this question. He could not fail to see that, sooner or later, France must come to a Revolution or a Restoration.³

His benediction was naturally given to the cause of the legitimate King, in the conflict he was about to wage against the Liberals. Long ago he had advised those measures which Polignac, by the enactments of July 25—the suppression of the freedom of the Press and the introduction of a new form of franchise—wished to put in practice.⁴ Metternich could hardly have anticipated that the French Minister, Polignac, would be contented to leave so bold a stroke merely to the protection of

¹ Laube, "Reisenovellen," 1836, vol. iii. p. 168.

² M. I. I will only mention here that, when in 1819 the portrait of the Duke was offered for sale in the *Wiener Zeitungsblatt* of August 16, Metternich considered it "undesirable, having regard to the present condition of affairs, to remind the public, especially the outer world, of the date and place of the young Napoleon's birth." To Sedlnitzky, August 30, 1819. M. I. In 1820 a tradesman named Joseph Tschapeck, established on the "Graben" in Vienna, desired to take as his sign "At the Duke of Reichstadt." This was forbidden because, as Sedlnitzky said, "Tschapeck belonged to that class of tradespeople 'who generally begin by getting into debt and soon become bankrupt.' In this case the sign 'At the Duke of Reichstadt' would furnish material for the jests of officious punsters, which might occasion unpleasant gossip." Sedlnitzky's report of December 19, 1820. M. I.

³ Metternich to Apponyi, December 16, 1829. "Some great outbreak will lead on either to a revolution or to a new restoration. I do not say that the crisis would actually take place next winter, but it will come sooner or later, because it is inevitable."

⁴ Metternich to Apponyi, July 2, 1829. "Without the adoption of two measures, the Monarchy in France cannot be saved; one of these measures would be to check the abuse of the Press, and the other to reorganise the present methods of election on a new basis."

Providence,¹ and that he would neglect to support the action of the State by the indispensable addition of a military force.² During the time that elapsed between the success of the revolution and the election of the Duke of Orleans to the throne, Metternich must certainly have thought of the Duke of Reichstadt as the possible future ruler of France; all the more, because he was aware that the Bonapartists went hand in hand with the Liberals.³ Under the cry of "Long live Napoleon II.!" there was fighting in the streets of Paris.⁴ But the party without a leader found no support in itself.⁵ It was the misfortune of the Emperor's son that, far from France and personally unknown to the French nation, he should then be living in Vienna under the control of the Austrian Court. Had he been present in the French capital at the critical moment, there is no doubt that the crown would have fallen to him.⁶ Count Apponyi needed only

¹ Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. vi. p. 247.

² Marmonet to Metternich, Amsterdam, September 6, 1830. "It was only on Tuesday, the 27th, at 11.30, that I received orders to take over the command of a weak garrison, which did not amount to 8000 men, lacking in all necessaries, and of whom at least half were entirely unknown to me."

³ Caraman to Metternich, Paris, August 12, 1830. "Everything was guided by the hatred of the revolutionary and Bonapartist factions against the Bourbons." This letter is not signed; on the back of it the writer is stated by the Chancery of State to be Caraman, formerly French Ambassador to Vienna.

⁴ To Apponyi, supplementary to his despatch, Paris, August 22, 1830. "The revolution of July was under the war-cry of 'Napoléon II.'" Maubreuil to Metternich, Paris, August 12, 1830. Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 16, 1830. "... The party of the Duke of Reichstadt appeared less numerous and enterprising at the time when the troubles began to break out in Paris." Queen Hortense to her son, Charles Louis Napoleon, Arenenberg, August 21, 1830. "Le peuple a combattu au nom de Napoléon II."

⁵ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 28, 1830. "I consider it (the Duke of Reichstadt's party) as of no account so long as it has no hope of rallying round its chief."

⁶ Queen Hortense to her son, August 21, 1830. "But the moment

to have given the Duke's adherents one word of encouragement and the whole movement would have turned in his favour. But the Count remained deaf to all attempts to induce him to intervene on behalf of the Emperor's son. It was useless to represent to him that the Duke alone could put an end to the prevailing anarchy, that his person offered the only safeguard to the maintenance of the thrones of Europe. He is reported to have exclaimed to the Duke of Padua, who went to him to beg for his support¹: "I do not recognise any son of Napoleon, only of Marie Louise."² And yet Apponyi could not but admit that the Duke of Reichstadt would have been the ruler of France, had he appeared in Paris at that moment.³ This was also the opinion of a former Imperialist officer, no longer in favour of the Napoleonic dynasty, who wrote to a friend on September 16, 1830: "If the young Napoleon appears on the frontier within a month, he will become the Emperor and possessor of the Tuileries."⁴ In saying this, he was deeply impressed by the propagandist powers of the Bonapartists, which

was too critical, an unknown child, far away, who would not perhaps be exchanged for a Prince whose children have been brought up in France, who is possessed of every desirable quality and who is on the spot. He was sure to be chosen, I always expected it, it could not be otherwise."

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 7, 1830. "The Duke d'Arrighi (Duke of Padua) and two or three obscure individuals addressed me with the object of finding out the intentions of my Court, but they did not follow up their first proceedings by any ulterior measures."

² Lagracinière, staff officer of the Imperial Guard to a friend in Milan, Paris, September 16, 1830. M. I.

³ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 28, 1830. "But if such a supposition *could* be realised (that the Duke of Reichstadt should come to Paris) I am now convinced that his party would become very dangerous and would cause the Government much embarrassment. The army would be entirely devoted to him and all the malcontents, whose number is increasing daily, would rally round him."¹

⁴ Lagracinière to a friend, Paris, September 16, 1830. M. I.

permeated all classes of society. As in 1815 Napoleon boasted of Austria's concurrence in his flight from Elba, so now the Imperialists spread a report that Metternich had declared himself willing to surrender the Duke to them, if the French wished it.¹ They were well aware of the power of impulse contained within such promises as these, and sought by these means to increase the courage and confidence of the numerous adherents of the Empire, both in the civil and military services. No means were spared to revive popular interest in the young Napoleon. In all the theatres, pieces were played in which the Great Emperor was the central figure. The shop windows were filled with portraits depicting him together with his son. Every peep-show between the Boulevard de la Madeleine and the Faubourg St. Antoine offered to the gaze of the curious passer-by pictures which invariably depicted the famous exploits of the Empire. Lamp-shades were sold by men in the streets upon which the Emperor was represented as emerging from the clouds, in the act of sending down the Imperial eagle bearing the crown of France to his sleeping child. The Duke's conversations with people who were permitted to have intercourse with him in Vienna were universally cited. Troubling themselves little as to the authenticity of these speeches, the Bonapartists were chiefly concerned to represent their future Emperor as a French Prince, warmly attached to his native land.²

¹ Lagrasière to a friend, Paris, September 16, 1830. M. I.

² *Ibid.* The Duke of Fitzjames to Mme. de C., Paris, November 5, 1830. "Next comes the Imperial party, much stronger than you imagine, and very active. We are deluged with souvenirs of Napoleon, the shops are full of his pictures and those of his son; in the provinces the feeling is still stronger, and you may see *twenty Napoleons* for one *Philippe*. He is brought on in all the theatres in Paris, which resound with cries of 'Vive l'Empereur.' The power of this party is in the army, now almost entirely reconstituted, and to which all the old soldiers of the Empire have returned."

Deschamp, formerly a colonel in the Imperial guards, bold, adventurous, and of colossal stature, publicly announced that he was going to Vienna to demand the Duke from Metternich, and pledged himself never to return without him.¹ Thus frankly and unrestrainedly was the agitation conducted. Louis Philippe could not deny the fact of the Colonel's journey to Vienna. He consoled himself with the confidence he felt in the Emperor Francis, who would certainly not allow his grandson to return to France.² But this display of assurance was merely assumed. Inwardly he trembled at the thought that the Bonapartists might even yet succeed in bringing home the Emperor's son. These fears forced from the new King of France that decree which provoked universal astonishment, and pronounced the further banishment of the Napoleonists from the kingdom, even beyond his power of jurisdiction.³ The ostensible motive for this unexpected measure was the king's respect for the treaties concluded with the rest of Europe.⁴ After his proclamation, the July King found nothing more pressing to do than to reassure the Powers, by the abnegation of his revolutionary origin, as to his intention of making no change in the relations which had previously existed

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 16, 1830. M. Dudon's "Mémoire" (according to a note on the manuscript in Metternich's own writing). Undated. "In the late insurrection, he (Deschamp) wanted to proclaim Napoleon II. and actually had the effrontery to give out that he was going to Vienna to carry off the Duke of Reichstadt; how far he pursued his journey we do not know."

² *Ibid.*

³ Molé to Apponyi, August 25, 1830.

⁴ Apponyi to Metternich, August 28, 1830. Prince Charles Louis Napoleon to Prince Louis Napoleon in Florence, Arenenberg, September 18, 1830. "It is terrible (the banishment). All the letters which come to us say that the King (Louis Philippe) is much vexed at it, and that he will revoke the law of exile; but that it was necessary, because Napoleon II.'s name had been pronounced too often for the mention of it not to excite fresh agitations."

between them. In return for this pledge, he begged them to recognise the kingdom which had been conferred on him by the French nation. Such was the mission upon which General Count Belliard was despatched to Vienna.¹ According to Prokesch, this faithful adherent of Napoleon's step-daughter, the Queen Hortense, was one of those conspiring Generals who had signed a memorial addressed to Metternich, by which they pledged themselves to bring back the Duke in triumph to Paris.² All our endeavours to discover this interesting document have been unavailing, nor do we find any proof that Belliard while in Vienna acted in any way contrary to the interests of his new sovereign. It is true he questioned Metternich very closely respecting the young Napoleon, to whom he wished to be presented; a wish, however, which was not gratified.³ But he said nothing about this affair which could be taken amiss.⁴ On the contrary, it was his chief aim to obtain an immediate recognition of Louis Philippe from Austria, with whom, as with the other Powers, he desired to establish a good understanding. "This is my policy and that of my friends," wrote Belliard to Paris.⁵ Had his conduct to Metternich been ambiguous, or his intervention on behalf of Louis Philippe less frank and open, he would scarcely have attained so speedily

¹ See "*Mémoires du Comte Belliard*," published by M. Vinet, vol. i., p. 331, Paris, 1842. Metternich, "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. v., p. 18.

² Prokesch (already quoted), p. 80.

³ Account of the Prussian Ambassador Maltzahn, Vienna, September 5, 1830. Royal Prussian State Archives.—"*Mémoires du Comte Belliard*," vol. i., p. 333.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Belliard to the Duchess of Crès at Andelot, Vienna, August 27, 1830. "It is my policy and that of all my friends. With Metternich, I will adopt a policy both frank and loyal." The same to Count Rumigny in Munich, Vienna, August 28, 1830. "I shall wait, but no longer than is desirable, in order that the dignity of the King and of France may not be compromised. . . . I hope my first steps in diplomacy will be successful, for they are to the interest of all the world."

the object of his mission, namely, the recognition of the new king as sovereign ruler of France. We may be permitted to doubt that he presented to Metternich a document signed by former Generals of the Empire, or that he ever spoke to Prokesch, as the latter makes him speak in his famous book.¹ It is improbable that the Chancellor of State could have told Prokesch that Joseph Bonaparte was involved in the conspiracy.² This brother of the late Emperor, who was residing in America, only received the news of the outbreak of the July revolution about the time when Belliard had already set out for Vienna, so that he was not in a position to form closer relations with the Generals who were said to be taking part in the conspiracy. On the other hand, it is very probable that later, when the general dissatisfaction with Louis Philippe was gaining ground, proposals were made to Metternich respecting the Duke's return. It is obvious that Prokesch mixes up the dates of various occurrences, as he does, for instance, in that flagrant lapse of memory, when he makes out that Fouché, Duke of Otranto, who died at Trieste in 1820, acted as intermediary for the Generals with Metternich in 1830.³ Fouché's son, Count Athanasius, came to Vienna in November 1830,⁴ not as envoy from the Generals, but as Joseph's confidential agent.⁵ When Napoleon's brothers and sisters received news of the downfall of Charles X.—an event for which they were not prepared⁶—they all became very eager to raise their nephew who lived in Vienna to the vacant throne. Joseph Bonaparte felt himself specially called

¹ "Mein Verhältniss zum Herzog von Reichstadt."

² *Ibid.* p. 80.

³ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 80. See also Welschinger (already quoted), p. 353.

⁴ Count Athanasius Fouché to Metternich, Vienna, November 23, 1830.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Jung, "Lucien Bonaparte," vol. iii, p. 398.

upon to advocate his nephew's rights. Before his death, Napoleon had commended his child to Joseph's care. The latter immediately displayed a feverish activity in his cause. From his exile in America, he wrote to Lafayette, to Marshal Jourdan, to Generals Lamarque, Maurice Mathieu, Belliard, to the Duke of Padua, to Counts Bignon, Miot, Röderer, Boulay de la Meurthe, urging them all to espouse the cause of Napoleon II.¹ At the same time, he sent a protest to the French Chamber against the election of the Duke of Orleans, because, by the proclamation of 1815, the Emperor's son had become the sole lawful ruler of France. He alone, maintained Joseph, would give the nation the same freedom they had enjoyed under his father. Faithful to the last injunctions of the dying Emperor, his lawful heir would never forget that he was before all else a Frenchman, and he would always follow Napoleon's motto, "All for the French." Joseph was well aware that without the co-operation of the Court of Vienna, all his work would be fragmentary. For this reason he entrusted Count Fouché with letters to the Emperor Francis, Marie Louise and Prince Metternich, reclaiming his nephew for France. He waxed eloquent in his efforts to depict to the Emperor and his ministers the dangers that threatened the whole world from the rule of Louis Philippe. The new king, he said, could only keep his position by flattering all parties and, heedless of the welfare of Europe, he would inevitably end by submitting to those—meaning the anarchists and republicans—who offered him the best chance of securing his throne. He wished nothing for himself, protested Joseph, only to take his nephew back to France, if Austria would entrust him to his care. "I will answer for the success of the undertaking," he assures the Emperor most emphatically; "only invested with the tricolour scarf, shall Napoleon II.

¹ "Mémoires du Roi Joseph Bonaparte," vol. x., p. 335-367.

be proclaimed."¹ The Court of Vienna did not respond to this communication from the ex-king of Spain. On the other hand, the veteran republican Lafayette hastened to send him a decided refusal. He gave Joseph plainly to understand that he would never vote for the glorious, but despotic, Empire. "Moreover," he added, "the son of your immortal brother has become an Austrian, and you know what the Austrian Cabinet signifies."² Not only Joseph but also Lucien Bonaparte felt called upon, equally with his elder brother, to advance the claims of his nephew. As early as 1827 false reports as to the Emperor Francis's designs on the Duke's life, had disposed him to take steps on behalf of the latter, of which Mme. Lætitia, Napoleon I.'s aged mother, most strongly disapproved.³ Now he demanded from the Government in Florence, whither he had repaired from Rome, a passport to travel to Vienna. But without Metternich's permission no one dared to grant his request.⁴ The Chancellor of State, who desired to keep Lucien out of Austria at any price, was quite in agreement with this method of procedure. Very opportune was the note of Molé, the French minister of August 25, which informed him that all the members of the Bonaparte family were henceforth forbidden to change their present place of abode without the consent of the Powers.⁵ On the strength of this decree, it was easy for Metternich to veto Lucien Bonaparte's proposed journey to Vienna.⁶ When the latter heard from Count Bombelles, the Austrian Ambassador in Florence, that

¹ "Mémoires du Roi Joseph Bonaparte," vol. x., p. 351.

² *Ibid.* Garson, "Barthélemy et Méry," p. 46, adduces proofs that at that time many were of his way of thinking.

³ Larrey, "Madame Mère," vol. ii.

⁴ Stahl to Metternich, Florence, September 4, 1830. See also Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. v., p. 154.

⁵ Molé's note to Count Apponyi, Paris, August 25, 1830.

⁶ Metternich to Count Bombelles in Florence, Vienna, September 23, 1830.

his application had been refused, he said he was quite prepared for this reply. But he complained bitterly of Louis Philippe's double dealing, who, only a short time previously, had made him the most tempting offers through Count Alexander Laborde, on condition that he would attach himself to the new Government. He quite understood, so he said, that under such circumstances a journey to Vienna was not to be thought of; but the moment would come when Austria would stand in need of him. France was steering ahead full sail for the rocks of anarchy. Only with the help of the Emperor's son would it be possible to exterminate "the Hydra of Jacobinism." "Will you tell Prince Metternich," said Lucien to Bombelles, "that he may count on me when the opportunity arises."¹ But since the notion of relying upon Lucien did not seem to occur to Metternich, the former appeared before Count Saurau on December 11 to demand once more a passport for Vienna; for he was of opinion that the present moment was both favourable and urgent for the vindication of his repeated solicitations, in the presence of Metternich himself. It seemed to him that his brother Joseph's protest of September 14 had been a failure, and far more calculated to do harm than good to the Duke's cause. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to set right the errors of this protest and to adopt such measures as would not discourage the Duke's numerous adherents in France. During the impassioned discourse, which he carried on with all his wonted eloquence, Lucien was impelled to make a full confession to Count Saurau. He told him he had received numerous letters from persons of high rank, who all encouraged him to do his utmost for the restoration of the Empire. Among the number he mentioned Molé, who had just retired from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the very same man who had banished the Napoleonists in August. After

¹ Bombelles to Metternich, Florence, October 9, 1830.

Molé came General Bertrand, whose name Count Saurau remembered as that of Napoleon's companion in misfortune at St. Helena; but these revelations did not dispose Count Saurau to grant the required passport. He thought he had done quite enough already in taking upon himself to transmit Lucien's latest request to Metternich. Lucien was the more gratified by this promise because he had assured the Count that he would not stir a finger without the previous sanction of the Viennese Court.¹ This Court was no more anxious to welcome Lucien in December 1830 than it had been in the previous September.² After this decided rebuff, he appears to have troubled Prince Metternich with no further overtures.

Bolder, braver, and more resolute than either of the Bonaparte brothers was Countess Napoleone Camerata, a niece of the Emperor and daughter of Elisa Bacciochi. Whilst Joseph and Lucien carried on their campaign by means of letters and negotiations, this young woman travelled to Vienna, without even asking permission, in order to abduct her cousin. The first news of the July revolution had set her pulses throbbing. How she deplored her inability to take a personal share in the Paris events! "Who," she exclaimed, "can foresee the end of all this? As for me, I believe we are only at the beginning of a long and most significant drama."³ For her, in truth, a veritable drama commenced when, disregarding all obstacles, she boldly grasped the wanderer's staff to make her way from Rome to Austria. On the plea of visiting her father and brother who resided there, she asked the Pope's Secretary of State for a passport to Vienna, by way of Venice and Trieste. She told the

¹ Count Saurau to Metternich, Florence, December 13, 1830.

² Metternich to Count Saurau, Vienna, December 24, 1830.

³ Napoleone Camerata to Mme. Braig at the house of Countess Lipona in Trieste. Rome, August 26, 1830. M. I.

Austrian Ambassador, Count Lützow, whom she begged to endorse it, that, like her father and brother, she regarded herself as an Austrian subject.¹ Not wishing to give undue importance to the affair, Lützow granted her request. He did so in the full conviction that the Countess was an eccentric but perfectly harmless character. It never crossed his mind that this pretty little feminine head could be occupied with projects so high-flown and dangerous to the State. "I venture to say," he wrote, "that she has no political importance whatever; she attaches great value to her pedigree, tries to imitate her late uncle, and loves horses and dogs, pleasure and excitement; but for political intrigues she has neither the talent, discretion nor pecuniary resources."² In Venice, however, one of her intercepted letters soon revealed to the authorities that she was travelling to Trieste³ "on important business." This letter induced the Chief of Police to keep a watchful eye on her movements.⁴ Not only her writing, but her entire conduct, made the police extremely suspicious. She always appeared in masculine attire, adorned with the tricolour ribbon.⁵ The head of the police in Venice never doubted for a moment but that her journey had for its object "the united interests of the Bonaparte family."⁶ But since her passport was in order, and neither the surveillance of her person nor the thorough examination of her effects—discreetly conducted

¹ Count Lützow to Prince Porcia, provincial Governor at Trieste, Rome, September 14, 1830. M. I. The same to Metternich on same day. M. I.

² Count Lützow to Prince Porcia, Rome, September 14, 1830. M. I.

³ Napoleone Camerata to Countess Lipona, at Trieste, Rome, September 4, 1830. M. I.

⁴ Note of the Chief of Police at Venice upon Countess Camerata's letter of September 4, 1830. M. I.

⁵ Report of the Chief of Police Cattanei to Sedlnitzky, Trieste, October 18, 1830. M. I.

⁶ Report of the Chief of Police Amberg, Venice, September 16, 1830. M. I.

under some suitable pretext—revealed anything of a suspicious nature, she was permitted to proceed on her journey unmolested.¹ After pausing at Trieste² on September 15, when she probably divulged her designs to her aunt the ex-Queen of Naples,³ she resumed her journey to Vienna on October 19, travelling as Countess Camerata.⁴ It is evident, therefore, that she did not pass under a false name in the Austrian capital, as Welschinger asserts.⁵ Masson, too, cannot understand how it was that the severity of the Austrian police, who had refused admittance to every other Napoleonist at the gates of Vienna, should have relaxed its vigilance as regards this young lady.⁶ An exception was made in her favour because her passport was in order, because Lützow had reported her as quite harmless and, above all, because she boasted that she was an Austrian and must be treated as such. The police soon had cause to regret their carelessness. When, on November 14, the Duke of Reichstadt was going to his tutor Obenaus, the Countess, who had pursued him, succeeded in greeting her cousin on the doorstep.⁷ She is said to have raised his hand passion-

¹ Report of the Chief of Police at Venice. September 16, 1830. M. I.

² The Governor of the province of Trieste to Count Sednitzky, Trieste, September 23, 1830. M. I.

³ *La Revue de Paris*, June 1900. Masson, "L'Aiglon et la Comtesse Camerata." This article leads us to expect the letter from Countess Camerata to Caroline, Vienna, December 15, 1830, which is communicated here.

⁴ Prince Porcia to Count Sednitzky, Trieste, October 20, 1830. M. I.

⁵ Welschinger, "La Légende et l'Histoire." *Feuilleton du Journal des Débats*, May 1, 1900.

⁶ Masson, "L'Aiglon," in *La Revue de Paris*, April 1, 1900, p. 588. In this essay Masson has even thrown doubt upon Countess Camerata's presence in Vienna. Documents which came into his hands afterwards caused him to abandon this view, and to corroborate the fact of her sojourn in the Austrian capital. His article, "L'Aiglon et la Comtesse Camerata," in *La Revue de Paris*, June, 1900, deals with this.

⁷ Count Dietrichstein's Diary, November 11, 1830. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "The Prince went to Obenaus and saw la Camerata downstairs."

ately to her lips, exclaiming: "Who can prevent my kissing my sovereign's hand?"¹ But she did not rest satisfied with this impetuous greeting. The Countess, who spoke German well,² appears to have bribed a servant of the Duke's to convey letters to him. Count Dietrichstein mentions in his diary two letters from Camerata to her cousin.³ Prokesch speaks of one only,⁴ and even its authenticity has been questioned, owing to its apparently incorrect signature.⁵ It is possible that Prokesch copied Countess Camerata's signature inaccurately from the original, which does not lie before us. But it is an undoubted fact that the Duke received letters from her on November 24,⁶ and there is absolutely no reason for regarding the communication of November 17 as apocryphal. It is quite in keeping with her whole design of drawing her cousin into some decisive action, that she bids him declare whether in future he intends to play the part of an Austrian Archduke, or of a French Prince.⁷ If we pronounce Camerata's letter of November 17 to be genuine, we must consequently regard all the rest which Prokesch relates concerning the Countess as extremely untrustworthy. According to him, the Duke, after meeting his cousin upon the doorsteps, rushed into his tutor's house in the greatest excitement, where he immediately discovered the identity of this lady who had kissed his hands, though with such profound respect.⁸ How could any one have known that she was Countess

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 31.

² Lützow to Metternich, Rome, September 14, 1830. M. I.

³ Diary of Count Dietrichstein, November 24, 1830. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ Prokesch (already quoted). The letter is dated November 17.

⁵ Masson (already quoted), p. 588.

⁶ Diary of Count Dietrichstein. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁷ Countess Camerata's letter to the Duke, as given by Prokesch (already quoted), p. 30.

⁸ Letter from the Countess Camerata to the Duke, Prokesch (already quoted), p. 31.

Camerata? No one but Obenaus had seen her and—according to Prokesch—he had not so much as asked her name. Neither is it true that Countess Camerata only arrived in Vienna a few days before the meeting with the Duke.¹ She must, at the latest, have come to Vienna a fortnight before November 14,² even if we allow ten days for her journey from Trieste to the capital, which is more than necessary. But Prokesch goes to extreme lengths when he makes out that Metternich the Chancellor of State, and Count Sedlnitzky the Prefect of Police, had no knowledge of Countess Camerata's designs, and that neither of these men discovered her well-kept secret until after the death of the Duke of Reichstadt.³ It must always remain a mystery, what can have induced Prokesch to tell such incredible tales; for there is no doubt whatever that both Metternich and Count Sedlnitzky were fully informed of all the Countess Camerata's proceedings. On account of her indiscreet behaviour, she was actually ordered out of Vienna by the police, leaving "very unpleasant recollections" behind her.⁴ It is superfluous to add that Metternich himself tells us how completely he saw through the Countess's designs. "Frau von Camerata," he wrote to the Ambassador in Rome, "had undertaken nothing less than to persuade the Duke of Reichstadt to escape and place himself at the head of the adherents of the house of Bonaparte. Filled with shame at the failure of her attempts, and compelled to leave Vienna, Frau von Camerata did not wish to return to her husband, or her father, but decided, at least for the moment, to settle in Austria and finally

¹ Letter from the Countess Camerata to the Duke, Prokesch (already quoted), p. 31.

² Masson, *La Revue de Paris*, June 1900, gives (p. 615) a letter of hers from Vienna, dated October 30, 1830, which confirms my statement.

³ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 79.

⁴ Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, May 3, 1831. M. I.

betook herself to Prague."¹ Not all Napoleon's family, like Countess Camerata, were enthusiastic in the Duke of Reichstadt's cause. The elder brother of the future Emperor, Napoleon III., who fought against Austria in 1831 and died the same year at Forlì, welcomed the proclamation of Louis Philippe as King of France, as the crowning result of the revolution of 1830.² He completely ignored his uncle's son. "As regards the party of Napoleon, Duke of Reichstadt," writes Prince Louis Napoleon, son of ex-King Louis and Hortense, "I do not believe it exists; if so, it must be exceedingly small. What true Frenchman could desire the Emperor Francis's grandson and Metternich's pupil for his sovereign, or would consent thus to see himself under Austrian influence? No! No! This same Austrian influence has ever been disastrous! The idea would make me shudder, and I have never hesitated to say so to those who do not agree with me on this subject."³

What were the views of the Duke of Reichstadt himself as regards his own position? His eyes were turned towards France, and the condition of that country gave rise to animated discussions with his immediate circle.⁴

¹ Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, May 3, 1831. We may gather from the instructions of Metternich's to Chotek, Chief Burgrave of Bohemia, March 20, 1831, that the Countess Camerata wished to settle permanently in Bohemia; this she was not allowed to do. "As to this lady's prolonged stay in Prague," he adds, "I find, from the information meantime received by the police, no reason to make any change as, so far, I know nothing as to a prospective visit of the Duke of Reichstadt to Prague, so we need apprehend no inconvenience from the Countess in that respect." Towards the end of 1830 the Countess went to Prague, and later on betook herself to Italy. If she had possibly hoped, as Masson suggests, to meet the Duke of Reichstadt in Prague—because there was actually some intention of sending him there—her hopes were not fulfilled. The Duke never visited the capital of Bohemia.

² Prince Louis Napoleon to Count Belliard, Florence, August 29, 1830. M. I.

³ *Ibid.*, Florence, August 19, 1830. M. I.

⁴ Obenaus's diary affords proofs of this. It is also characteristic that he repeatedly said to the Frenchmen returning to their own

Secretly he was preparing himself for the throne which he hoped to ascend as the worthy son of his great father. Those most closely associated with him could not fail to remark how profoundly he was affected by the expulsion of Charles X. They were not deceived by his assumed indifference. He spoke to Foresti about the revolution of 1830 as though it were no more to him than an historical event.¹ He repeatedly referred to it in the Imperial family circle,² probably with the idea of sounding their views with regard to himself. For he had no intention of being merely the first General in his adopted country, the part assigned to him by his intimate circle. He could be of more use to Austria as Emperor of France—so he once declared—than as a second Prince Eugene. The ardent desire to justify his father's last wish would alone have deterred him from becoming an Austrian. It was always his wish to be regarded as a French Prince, for he could not forget that he had been cradled on French soil. But ardently as he might desire to set the crown of France upon his head, he shrank from the thought of snatching at the supreme power merely as the head of a faction. The father who had had to win his way to power might be a party-leader, not so the son. In the proud consciousness of a rightful heir, he said: "I cannot be an adventurer, to lend myself to the tricks of a party. My way must be clear in France ere I set foot there."³ He was anxious to know what was thought of

country with whom he came in contact: "Saluez, de ma part, la colonne de la Place Vendôme." Montbel (already quoted), p. 167. According to information received from Frau Girardi-Latinovics in Vienna, he expressed himself in a similar manner to her great-grandfather, Baron Barthélemy de St. Hilaire.

¹ Foresti's notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.* "At the same time I have observed on several occasions that he often referred to this revolution in his conversation with the Imperial family."

³ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 17.

him there, and whether he was really considered as mentally deficient, as Barthélemy had depicted him.¹ In breathless suspense he waited to hear whether the French people, ruled by Louis Philippe the usurper²—for he looked upon him as such—were longing for his return. In October 1830, the French did actually show a great desire for his recall, and were prepared to realise their wish upon the first sign of encouragement from Austria.³ But he waited in vain for the unanimous appeal of the nation. Its voice could not have reached him. Between him and it stood Metternich, like an impenetrable wall. Never a whisper reached him of all the overtures made on his behalf. Metternich would not give him up. On this question he thought in 1830 exactly as he had done in 1829. When at this time the last ruler of the house of Bourbon showed some anxiety lest the Court of Vienna might destine the grandson of the Emperor Francis to play a part in the affairs of France, Metternich most decisively put aside all such fears.⁴ It seemed almost as though the French Minister of Foreign Affairs were echoing Metternich's own thoughts when, on receiving such reassuring utterances from Count Apponyi, he remarked that: "Austria would be committing political suicide should she harbour the idea of using the Duke—that instrument of confusion and unrest—

¹ Prokesch (already quoted) p. 22.

² Metternich's "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. v. p. 237.

³ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, October 31, 1830. "In case the accession of Henry V. is regarded as impossible, all the partisans of legitimacy would rather declare in favour of the Duke of Reichstadt than see the present state of things perpetuated. . . . I am informed that the plan for carrying off the Duke of Reichstadt, or for inducing him to make some attempt to reach France of his own accord, or at least to draw nearer to it, has not yet been abandoned, and that it would be most important to discover Austria's intentions and the attitude she would assume, were such an event to be realised."

⁴ Metternich to Apponyi, January, 24, 1829.

to disturb the repose of France.¹ Was it probable that the grandson would have found greater encouragement for his ambitious designs from his grandfather than from the Prime Minister? Did the Emperor Francis really say to his grandson: "If the French people demand your return, and the Allies agree to it, I shall make no objections to seeing you upon the Throne of France"?² It may be assumed with tolerable certainty that the Emperor never made use of such words. There was no divergence of opinion between himself and Metternich as to the future position of his grandson. This is clearly proved by the following incident. Shortly before the outbreak of the July revolution, an engraving appeared in the Netherlands, showing the Duke in the act of holding a review of his regiment, and saying to the Emperor Francis: "Sire, I should like to have thirty such regiments." Asked by his Imperial grandfather what he would do with them, he replies: "I would go to Paris to fetch a copy of my baptismal register," whereupon the Emperor rejoins: "It is not yet time for that." When Francis heard of this picture, he ordered the French Ambassador to express his indignation at "the scandalous misuse" of his name.³ It might be contended that this was only a feigned indignation, one of those frequent deceptions which are a part of Court life. But this cannot be alleged against the secret instructions of June 9, 1831, drawn up for the use of General Count Hartmann, the Duke's military Mentor. This document, confirmed, signed and ratified by the Emperor Francis, is characteristic as showing the views which prevailed at Court

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, February 5, 1829. "Austria," said Portalis, "would commit political suicide by trying to make the Duke of Reichstadt play a part; she could not employ this instrument of trouble and revolt without very dangerously compromising her own tranquillity, which is indissolubly bound up with that of France."

² Prokesch (already quoted), p. 41.

³ Despatch of July 22, 1830, with the Emperor's decision of July 25.

regarding the Duke's political significance. It positively contradicts all the Emperor's speeches quoted by Prokesch, in which he held out to his grandson the hope of reigning in France.¹ In this document, the fact is established that with the extinction of the father's rights, those of the son also ceased to exist. "Legally separated from his native land," run these instructions, "the Duke ceases to be a Frenchman." To compensate him for this loss, says the document, he is to be raised to the rank of first subject of Austria, and to take precedence immediately after the Archdukes. "In this way," it continues, "his relations with the members of the reigning house, as well as with the rest of my subjects, are accurately defined, and my knowledge of his noble character and excellent principles are my guarantee that he will always bear in mind the duties arising out of these same exalted relations with me, and my successors on the throne." The greatest stress is laid on that part of Count Hartmann's instructions which points out that the Emperor's grandson, on account of his very peculiar position, will always be a prey for ambitious adventurers, a danger which at the present time, owing to his youth and facile susceptibility for praise and blame, must not be underrated. "The removal of such dangers from his path," the Emperor informs the Count, "is your first duty. Convinced that you will understand how to fulfil these duties,

¹ Marshal Castollane is very well informed when in his Journal (vol. vii. p. 391) he makes the Emperor Francis address Belliard as follows: "I am well aware I could injure Louis Philippe through him [the young Napoleon], but such an idea is far removed from my thoughts. I have brought him up as a stranger to France." Wel-schinger (already quoted) p. 355, is mistaken in doubting the accuracy of these words; they express the Emperor Francis's sentiments exactly. King Joseph Bonaparte was also misinformed in making the Emperor Francis say that he would not oppose his return to France if it were the wish of the nation. See the ex-King's letter in Garçon's "Barthéjemy et Méry," p. 41.



THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT HOLDING A REVIEW UPON THE FORMER GLACIS OUTSIDE VIENNA
By Von Hocké. From a painting in the private library of the Emperor Francis Joseph I

the Duke will meet you half way for his own welfare and security. You unite in your own person the duties of guardian to the Duke in all the various dangers that may beset him, and also those of an adviser. The Duke, on his part, owes you his confidence, without which the means you employ would soon prove a failure, to the great disadvantage of the Duke. Therefore," continues the Emperor Francis emphatically, "you must always keep a watch upon the Duke's *entourage*, and extend the same care even more strictly to his intercourse with strangers. In course of time, persons in disguise, whose intentions are not honourable, will undoubtedly try to thrust themselves upon the Duke. With regard to such men"—the Emperor enjoins Hartmann—"you must always observe them attentively from a distance, and warn the Duke in a friendly spirit as occasion arises. You must never allow any one to come into personal contact with him with whose circumstances you are not duly acquainted, so that you may not have any suspicion of danger or disaster upon your conscience."¹

Undeniably, after the outbreak of the July revolution, people had busied themselves with the effects it might possibly have upon the Duke's position.² Count Montbel, the former Minister of Charles X., who was then residing in Vienna, could not but admit that the Emperor had never allowed his grandson to be mixed up in any political intrigue.³ He was strictly enjoined to keep most carefully to the line of conduct laid down for him. When, on one occasion after he had attained his majority, he transgressed beyond "the limits of Austrian moderation,"⁴ his own princely establishment was ruthlessly broken up, and he was compelled to dine at his grandfather's frugal table. From all that we know, it is evident his nomination

¹ Instructions for Count Hartmann, June 9, 1831.

² Montbel to Esquirol Adelphe in Paris, Vienna, November 25, 1831.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

to the newly established throne of Belgium, by his partisans in that country, met with decided opposition.¹ The protests of Louis Philippe² and Lord Palmerston against such a choice on the part of Belgium³ were hardly needed. Conscious of this blameless demeanour, Metternich asks: "Has it never occurred to any one in Paris that Austria's attitude with regard to Napoleon II. is as prudent as it is virtuous?"⁴ Yet the Chancellor was not disposed to make this self-imposed political restriction a hard and fast rule for the Court of Vienna under all circumstances. He desired to adhere to it so long only as the new French Government did not intentionally disturb the peace and tranquillity of the world. As soon as Metternich discovered that a revolutionary crusade, directed against Austria, was being carried on in Italy with the sanction of France, he laid aside the reserve he had hitherto displayed. Now, for the first time, serious consideration was given—not, indeed, to the idea of placing the Duke upon the throne of France—but of using him as an extremely effective means of threatening King Louis Philippe.⁵ It suited Metternich's purpose that the

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, January 8, 1831. ". . . some orators proposed the election of the Duke of Reichstadt and the Duke of Leuchtenberg."

² Sebastiani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: "that he [Louis Philippe] would equally persist in the exclusion of the Dukes of Reichstadt and Leuchtenberg." Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, January 24, 1831.

³ Despatch from the Prussian Ambassador Maltzahn, Royal State Archives of Prussia, Vienna, December 3, and January 3, 1831.

⁴ Metternich to Apponyi, January 18, 1831. ". . . that we are as prudent as we are virtuous in our conduct with regard to Napoleon II." The wording given by me differs from that of Metternich's published "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. v. p. 116.

⁵ Maltzahn, Vienna, February 15 (second despatch), 1831. Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia. "Prince Metternich concludes by declaring that if the French Government gave its support to the Italian revolutionists, the Cabinet of Vienna would also claim the right to employ all the power of its strong position against the weak

agitation in Italy assumed an entirely Bonapartist character, that proclamations from Napoleon II. to the Italians had been found there,¹ and that both the sons of the ex-King Louis had taken up arms to expel the Pope and the other Italian Princes.²

The Chancellor of State did not hesitate for a moment to initiate Louis Philippe into the movements of this Bonapartist revolutionary propaganda. To complete the picture, he also informed them in Paris of the proposals made to him by members of Napoleon's family. Apponyi was to lay before the King the letter which Joseph Bonaparte had addressed to the Emperor in the Duke of Reichstadt's interests, immediately after the July revolution.³ These revelations made a deep impression, and Metternich was glad he had laid such stress upon the Bonapartist tendency of the Italian revolution.⁴ Louis Philippe constantly applied to the Austrian Ambassador position of Louis Philippe, and would have recourse to the last and most extreme means which it had at command; to set up the Duke of Reichstadt in opposition to him. It is more especially the last part of the private despatch which his Highness rightly wishes to remain entirely a secret between the Cabinets." See as to this Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. v. p. 149, and following. Metternich, as early as September 1830, had actually thought of using the Duke of Reichstadt as a weapon under certain circumstances. Maltzahn writes, September 5, 1830 (Royal State Archives of Prussia): "Prince Metternich thinks that under these circumstances [Louis Philippe's anxiety about Reichstadt] the young Prince may become, in the hands of the Allied Powers, a good means by which to over-awe certain parties in France." A despatch from Ficquelmont, Austrian Ambassador in Russia, to Metternich, St. Petersburg, 22 October, March 1831, shows that the Emperor Nicholas was not in favour of threatening that the Duke of Reichstadt might be brought upon the scene.

¹ Maltzahn's despatch, Vienna, February 11, 1831. Royal State Archives of Prussia. "The name of Napoleon II. is to be found in several of the proclamations seized upon."

² Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. v. p. 118.

³ Metternich to Apponyi, February 19, 1831.

⁴ Maltzahn's despatches to Berlin, Vienna, March 4, 1831. Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia.

for information as to the Duke of Reichstadt, and seemed able to reassure himself regarding the danger that might threaten him in that quarter by remarking that he had perfect faith in the loyalty of the Emperor, and he was convinced that Francis would never encourage any political plot injurious to the general peace. He could not—so he added—deny the Bonapartist tendency of the Italian revolution, the suppression of which was to the mutual interest of the Cabinets of Vienna and Paris.¹ Count Sebastiani—formerly an Imperial General—then Minister of Foreign Affairs for France, might pour contempt upon the limited resources of the Bonapartists,² but it was high time for Louis Philippe to renounce the revolutionary propaganda which threatened to annihilate his tottering throne. The little band of Bonapartists was not to be despised. Louis Philippe would soon be convinced of this fact. In the beginning of March 1831, General Lacroix, at the head of from 10,000 to 12,000 workmen, perambulated the streets of Paris, crying: "*Vive Napoléon II.!*" "*A bas le Roi Louis Philippe!*" Even under the windows of the royal palace similar cries reached the sovereign's ears.³ Bonapartists and Anarchists joined forces to overthrow the "July King" by spreading the report that the Courts of Europe favoured the proclamation of Napoleon II. "In Paris," writes a lady, "1200 to 1500 devils desire the Republic. Those who are twenty-five and having four thalers in their pocket can command a dinner, are for Henri V., or the Duke of Reichstadt. The lower orders and the army are Bonapartists to a man."⁴ Every moment some Bonapartist

¹ Appouyi to Metternich, Paris, March 1, 1831.

² *Ibid.*

³ Despatch of the Prussian Ambassador Maltzahn, Vienna, March 12, 1831. Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia.

⁴ Letter of an unknown lady, Paris, July 20, 1831. Metternich, on September 11, 1831, remarks to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg that this lady, owing to her circumstances, was in a position "to know

excess¹ was taking place, and only the treachery of a Pole saved Paris from the outbreak of a Napoleonist conspiracy, sanctioned by Queen Hortense and led by her son—afterwards Napoleon III.² The French Government was obliged to attach great importance to this discovery, and immediately strengthened the garrison of Strassburg and replaced the governor, General l'Allemand—whose sympathies seemed doubtful—by Marshal Mortier.³ It was certainly no mere accident that just at this time a certain Delaly—probably a pseudonym assumed for the occasion—wrote to Metternich that the Duke of Reichstadt's party was gaining ground daily, and that every heart would go out to him, could he now appear on the borders of France.⁴ A pamphlet entitled "*Révolution de 1830*" gave utterance to the same opinion.

all and see clearly." A memorandum, which probably emanates from Baron Hügel, Attaché to the Embassy in Paris, runs as follows: "The Bonapartists find among the masses sympathies which are nourished by whatever pertains to the old army and the old administration, even down to the smallest communes; everything connected with the military spirit and the glitter of arms accords with national feeling in France." Supplementary to Apponyi's despatch to Metternich, Paris, November 30, 1831.

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 2 and May 14, 1831.

² *Ibid.*, Paris, November 30, 1831. "It is owing to the information of a Pole that a Bonapartist conspiracy has just been discovered here; it was directed by the son of Louis Bonaparte, whose letters were seized by the Government. Mme. Hortense, in spite of M. Casimir Périer's kindness to her, was privy to the plot. I have these particulars from General Sebastiani himself." See also "*Mémoires de M. Gisquet, ancien préfet de police*," vol. i. p. 349.

³ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, November 30, 1831.

⁴ Delaly to Metternich, Paris, November 20, 1831. Supplementary to Apponyi's despatch. "I think I ought to inform your Highness that the Duke of Reichstadt's party gains in strength from day to day." On January 13, 1830, it appears that Delaly wrote from London to the Archduke Charles, informing him of a plot against the life of the Duke of Reichstadt, which he had discovered by chance. From the report of Neumann, Counsellor to the Embassy in London, dated June 22, 1830, it appears that Delaly could not furnish any further or more exact details.

After declaring that France really desired republican institutions, but kept her sympathy for the Napoleonic dynasty, it continued as follows: "We are of opinion that an appeal to the people would place Napoleon's son at the head of the Government, who would give to France those popular institutions which were promised in vain after the July revolution."¹

Except members of the Bonaparte family, with whom France would have no dealings, no striking personality had approached the Cabinet of Vienna with proposals in favour of the Emperor's son. This took place for the first time in May 1831. In conjunction with Maignin, the vain and pompous orator of the extreme left, General Montholon, one of Napoleon I.'s executors, pleaded quite plainly the cause of the Duke of Reichstadt. Montholon, who was then staying in Berne, announced himself one day to the Austrian Ambassador, Count Bombelles. After some unimportant remarks, referring to pecuniary claims on Marie Louise, he proceeded to the subject he had at heart, which he wished to disclose to the Ambassador under the seal of strictest secrecy. "I am commissioned by Maignin"--he said--"to inquire whether, under some assumed name, I could obtain a passport for Vienna, in order to interview Metternich and discover the Minister's intentions in the matter--now imminent--of the proclamation of Napoleon II. Since 1823," he added, "Maignin has been President of those secret societies which have thrown all Europe into a revolutionary fever. His republicanism is only a mask, and the real aim of all his efforts is the restoration of the Empire, for which he would like to claim Austria's assistance." Maignin did not ask for a written pledge, but only for a verbal promise to be given to Montholon that the Court of Vienna would not only abstain from declaring war, but would

¹ Supplementary to Delaty's letter to Metternich of November 20, 1831.

also be the Duke's ally after he had been raised to the throne. In return for this promise, Mauguin would pledge himself to give the Chancellor of State the key to all the secret revolutionary movements of the parties, and he was prepared to aid him in the destruction of Jacobinism by lending all the forces at his disposal.¹ In a memorandum which Mauguin had entrusted to Montholon, to be delivered to Metternich through the ambassador, he set forth a complete plan of a constitution such as he desired might be given to France by Napoleon II.² In this document Mauguin developed, in greater detail than Montholon had done, the argument that Austria's interests urgently demanded the restoration of the Empire, because France, rent by internal convulsions, threatened all Europe with anarchy. As Metternich met these proposals with eloquent silence, Mauguin believed the time had come to compel Austria to participate in his undertakings by means of threats. On August 8, Montholon was to address a letter to Bombelles, in which, in the event of continued refusals on the part of the crowned heads of Europe, the prospect was held out of a frightful and devastating war, brought about by the revolutionary propaganda which, it was further declared, would dismember Austria within six weeks of firing the first cannon shot. "Mauguin," wrote Montholon, "commissions me to inform you that if the Austrian Government agrees to surrender Napoleon II. and to conduct him to the frontier, he will receive him at once with 100,000 National Guards from Burgundy and Lyons, and make over to him, through the Chambers, the Dictatorship for a period of five years. In return for this, my party offers the Emperor of Austria the whole of Italy as well as the crown of Poland and, should it be the Emperor's desire, the restoration of Germany as a monarchy,

¹ Count Bombelles to Metternich, Berne, May 29, 1831.

² Supplementary to Bombelles' despatch of May 29, 1831.

under the sway of his Imperial sceptre.”¹ Mauguin, who felt himself already master of the world, dispensing thrones and kingdoms at will, deemed it expedient during the negotiations with Bombelles to enter into relations with the Duchesse de Berri, mother of Henry of Bordeaux. This at least is Montholon’s account. Mauguin desired to proclaim the Duke of Bordeaux as Emperor Henry I., under the sole guardianship of his mother. His flag was to be tricolour, with the lilies, and the eagle surmounting them. Mauguin was generous enough to grant Charles X., with the Dauphin and his wife, a pension of several millions of francs, on condition of perpetual banishment. Louis Philippe, at whose downfall he particularly aimed, was, on the contrary, to receive no compensation, and, together with his entire family, was to reside permanently out of France, forfeiting all possibility of ever succeeding Henry I.² Taken in connection with the well-authenticated Bonapartist machinations, and the numerous letters addressed to Metternich by less important partisans of the Empire, these new symptoms of activity deserved special attention. The tone which Mauguin adopted here, as of one Power to another, may not have made much impression³ on the Chancellor of State, particularly as the tribune of the people had no evidence to show that Lafayette, Odillon Barrot and Lamarque were of his way of thinking—in short, that he had an overwhelming majority behind him.⁴ But Mauguin, however slightly Metternich might regard his character,⁵ was nevertheless a prominent personality, whom even a Casimir Périer seems to have

¹ Letter of Montholon to Bombelles, August 8. Supplementary to his despatch of August 9, 1831.

² Bombelles to Metternich, Berno, September 12, 1831.

³ Metternich to Bombelles, Vienna, August 21, 1831.

⁴ Montholon to Bombelles, August 8, 1831.

⁵ Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, October 28, 1831.

repented attacking in open debate in the Chamber. Metternich chiefly feared that this man's influence upon the young generation in France might lead to a rebellion, and finally bring about the downfall of Casimir Périer, who had been at the head of the Ministry since March 1831. The Chancellor of State looked upon this Minister as the last Conservative prop of the French monarchy,—the sole person who still possessed the power and strength of will to stem the surging tide of revolution.¹ Innocent of the accusation brought against him by Mauguin, namely that he had conspired with dishonest Bonapartists against Louis Philippe,² Metternich was resolved to warn the French Minister. Political delicacy forbade that he should reveal to Casimir Périer the names of those men who had made him privy to their plots. But nothing could deter him from initiating the French statesman into the secret plans of revolt themselves.³ Périer was not satisfied with such half measures. "Only the knowledge of the actual names," he said to Apponyi, "can be of any assistance in helping us to get to the bottom of these intrigues." Not to give them—he considered—created a sense of alarm rather than of security, and obscured instead of enlightening matters.⁴ Casimir

¹ Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, October 28, 1831.

² In the letter of August 8, Montholon had written to Bombelles: "Mauguin told me, when passing through Berne, that Prince Metternich was carrying on Napoleonist intrigues in France, but that they were in very bad hands." To this Metternich replied to Bombelles, August 21, 1831: "Monsieur le Comte, have the kindness to make the most direct and formal denial of this assertion to M. de Montholon; our intrigues could not be in bad hands, because in fact we are not carrying on any, either with the Bonapartists, or with any other party in France." Consequently Hillebrand's statements in "*Französische Geschichte*," vol. i. p. 642, should be corrected.

³ Metternich to Apponyi, August 24, 1831. The statement given by Hillebrand (already quoted) p. 643, that Metternich entrusted Count Bombelles with negotiations in Switzerland is entirely false.

⁴ Apponyi to Metternich, November 10, 1831.

Périer hoped to get at Metternich's secret by some devious course. He proposed that Austria should keep silence, but--by a trick not unknown to diplomacy--should at the same time manage to lose a despatch addressed to Apponyi, containing the true facts of the case, which might subsequently be found by French agents. Or a courier bearing similar instructions might be stopped on the road to Paris. "The more this scheme is at variance with this Minister's open and honest disposition," remarks Apponyi, "the more plainly it shows what extraordinary importance he attaches to these revelations."¹ But Metternich would not deviate a hair's breadth from the attitude he had assumed, and refused to divulge the names. On the other hand, he now felt less need to show consideration for Napoleon's brothers. As he had not concealed Joseph Bonaparte's aims from the French Government, so he now acquainted Casimir Périer with similar undertakings on the part of Jérôme. In November 1831, the latter came forward with a request that he might send a confidential agent to Vienna to receive from the Austrian Cabinet tacit consent to the restoration of Napoleon II., a request which was abruptly and categorically refused.² The Court of Vienna could scarcely keep pace with the numerous attempts to involve the Emperor Francis in the Bonapartist movement in favour of his grandson. With regard to these unrelenting but fruitless appeals, Metternich could only lay claim before all the Courts, and before Louis Philippe himself, to justice and integrity. No doubt a word from him would have brought about a general rising of the Bonapartists. That was the plan of Marshal Gneisenau, who always reverted to his favourite scheme: Austria was to use the Duke of Reichstadt as a tool for the dismemberment of

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, November 10, 1831.

² Saurau to Metternich, Florence, November 29, 1831. Metternich to Apponyi, December 27, 1831.

France. In his opinion, Austria should assist the strong party of the Duke of Bordeaux in the South and West of France and, by way of counterbalance, support the Bonapartists in the North, where they were in the majority. "From that moment," he said to the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, "France would cease to be a source of danger to us, and we should find in its internal divisions the best guarantee for our tranquillity, which we are now obliged to purchase by unremitting and exorbitant preparations for war."¹ Opposed though Metternich was in his inmost soul to Louis Philippe, who had raised himself to power by the violation of Legitimist principles, he was nevertheless unwilling to apply Gneisenau's proposed antidote. He dreaded lest the downfall of the July King should be followed by a revival of the revolutionary propaganda. Very unwillingly, therefore, and driven to this course by the attitude of the French Government itself, he resolved, in February 1831, to use the Duke of Reichstadt as a menace against Louis Philippe. He did not seriously intend to make a compact with the Duke's adherents, for since Casimir Périer had led the affairs of France, he wished permanence and success to his Ministry.² It was just because he sympathised with this man in his efforts to stem the tide of anarchy, that in October 1831 he drew his attention to Mauguin who, only a short time before, had constituted himself champion of the Duke of Reichstadt's claims; but there is no truth in the assertion that Metternich broke his promise and revealed to Casimir Périer the

¹ Prince Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, March 15, 1831. During the Congress of Vienna Gneisenau wanted to make use of Napoleon, in order to bring a civil war upon France.

² Pralormo, the Sardinian Ambassador in Vienna, declares (June 30, 1831) that Metternich kept the Duke ready for all emergencies. "For that reason," he says, "the young man is being brought forward, his military taste awakened, in short he is being prepared to play a part." Hillebrand (already quoted), p. 643. This is certainly not correct.

secret which had been confided to him.¹ When pressed by this Minister to divulge the conspirators' names, he retorted that it was his duty not to play any double game.² In truth he never betrayed any Bonapartists of high standing.³ Neither did he utter a word as to Mauguin having applied to him for help in his enterprise. He merely pointed him out to Casimir Périer as a revolutionary who, while belonging to no party, was ever ready to form intrigues, whether Radical, Bonapartist, or Carlist, when any advantage was to be gained.⁴ Metternich, however, went a step further when, at the end of December 1831, a new emissary of the Napoleonists, Baron Collins, formerly a French officer, arrived in Vienna. He was supplied with a letter of cordial recommendation from General Hulot, Moreau's brother-in-law, to a prominent personage in Vienna, who was intimately connected with Metternich. The mission entrusted to Baron Collins was not indicated in this letter; but in conversation, supported by the General's good-will, the French officer made no secret of his commission, nor of his earnest desire to get into confidential communica-

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 61. "Prince Metternich would not reveal the names of the leaders, with the exception of Mauguin, who was of no importance to the Duke."

² Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, October 28, 1831. "To give the names of these individuals would be impossible; it would be repugnant to our moral character. On the contrary, it is incumbent upon us not to play a double game."

³ "You may inform this Minister in confidence that those who applied to us were men of mark socially, but well known for their devotion to Bonapartism."

⁴ Metternich to Apponyi, October 28, 1831. "This intriguing person, whose reputation is tarnished in every way, calls for the strictest supervision. It would be impossible to define the party to which M. Mauguin belongs. He serves every one who wants—or may want—to subvert the existing order of things. Bound by no principle, equally ready to support unbridled despotism or unrestricted radicalism, Bonapartist, Carlist, or Radical, he is anything which offers him a part to play, or brings him in a profit."

tion with Metternich. It was no longer a question of a single party, he said, but of a great national movement directed against Louis Philippe, whose throne was untenable and would inevitably collapse before March was over, under the pressure of a general uprising. It was really noteworthy that Collins made use of almost the same phrases recently employed by the envoys from the Bonapartist camp.¹ Thus Collins emphatically declared that only the young Napoleon, Henry of Bordeaux, or the Republic could follow Louis Philippe. Henry was impossible, since the bulk of the people would repudiate him. The Republic meant war, revolutionary propaganda, and general anarchy. All this could be avoided by granting the wish of the French nation: the recall of Napoleon II. Collins was positive in his assurances that, given a genuine sign of encouragement from Austria, a famous French General would proceed to Vienna to give full reassurance as to the measures taken by the devoted adherents of the Napoleonic dynasty in France; but—with the exception of Joseph Bonaparte—he stoutly refused to give up the names of those men who had entrusted him with this mission. He would only take this step when the success of his undertaking was assured.² As Collins resisted all attempts to make him divulge his co-operators, Metternich ordered his expulsion from Vienna.³ The Chancellor regarded this new attempt on the part of the Bonapartists as sufficiently important to be brought to the knowledge of the French Government. He did not mention Collins' visit to Vienna, but spoke only of General Hulot's letter of introduction to some Frenchman. The General's name was to serve as a point of departure for investigation into the doings of his confederates. Casimir Périer was asked to give his word of honour not to adopt any other

¹ Metternich to Apponyi, December 27, 1831.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, January 8, 1832.

means of inquiry, otherwise he would expose Metternich to accusations of breach of faith.¹ The French Minister submitted to this condition. He was not a little astonished to find that the man who was lending a hand in the restoration of the Empire was the brother-in-law of that very Moreau who had lost his life in fighting against Napoleon.² It appeared that Casimir Périer was resolved to oppose with all his might every rising in favour of the Duke of Reichstadt. He feared the Carlists and Bonapartists less, he said, than the ultra-Liberals, who would undo their own work—the July revolution—just as the ultra-Royalists had driven Charles X. into exile.³ The Minister was fully occupied with the suppression of all the attempts, open and secret, made against the Government of Louis Philippe. Unhappily for the purpose he kept in view, this iron personality succumbed, the victim of the cholera epidemic, at a most critical moment, May 16, 1832. He had often been heard to say: "My wings are clipped, my health is broken, but my country is more ailing than myself."⁴ Under the weaker rule of his successor in the Ministry, the parties hostile to Louis Philippe recovered vigour. Caroline, Duchesse de Berri, mother of Henry of Bordeaux, a bold, resolute woman, landed in the south of France to unfurl the Carlist banners. It was from this party that funds were forthcoming, on the occasion of General Lamarque's funeral procession, to assist that outbreak of republicanism which had to be suppressed by force of arms, and which resulted in a victory for Louis Philippe. Had these heroic republicans, who allowed themselves to be used by the Carlists as battering-rams against the King they detested, adopted as their war-cry "*Vive Napoléon !*"

¹ Metternich to Apponyi, December 27, 1831.

² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, January 9, 1832.

³ *Ibid.*, January 12, 1832.

⁴ Karl Illiesbrand, "Geschichte Frankreich's," vol. i. p. 337.

instead of "*Vive la République !*" there is little doubt but that they would have won over thousands to their side. But the cry "*Vive la République !*" which recalled only too vividly to the peaceful citizens the reign of terror under Robespierre, found no responsive echo in the hearts of the people whose idol was Napoleon.¹ Apponyi was entirely wrong when, in his exaggerated devotion to the Carlists, he constantly declared that the soundest part of the nation looked for salvation solely in the return of Henry V. The great bulk of the people and the army were for the Duke of Reichstadt. Heine writes from Paris to Germany : "The malcontents, if they ever adopt any decisive measure, will begin by proclaiming the young Napoleon."² It was a fatal mistake on the part of their leader not to risk giving the signal without the acquiescence of Austria. The Marshals of the Empire, the chief office-holders, wished to proceed carefully, and did not care to stake their property in a doubtful venture without the support of the Court of Vienna. These men lacked the fire which had stimulated them to heroic deeds under Napoleon I. Worn out by age and infirmity,³ their powers of action were paralysed, and they condemned their party to perpetual procrastination. "The despicable inertia of the Imperialists at Court," writes a lady, "has done much harm in the public opinion."⁴ In any case, the proclamation of the Duke of Reichstadt remained merely a half measure so long as the Emperor Francis turned a deaf ear to all demands for his release ; but it would

¹ See Heinrich Heine's interesting letter, Paris, June 7, 1832, in his "*Französische Zustände.*"

² Heine's letter, Paris, January 19, 1832, in his "*Französische Zustände.*"

³ Victor Hugo to King Joseph Bonaparte, September 6, 1831, in Victor Hugo's "Correspondance," p. 119. "The ancient supporters of the Empire are either ungrateful or worn out."

⁴ Letter from a lady in Paris. Without date.

have answered better to proclaim him first, and afterwards to insist upon the young Napoleon's return. Under the stress of approaching anarchy, which would surely follow the downfall of Louis Philippe, Metternich might possibly have been induced to allow the Emperor's son to assume the government of France. Once, indeed, he was heard to say, when the Bonapartists talked of proclaiming the Duke King of Italy: "The King of Rome, energetically demanded by the faction with which we are now striving, would certainly be more preferable to us than a federal republic, or a monarchy hostile to the existence of Austria."¹ None of the Napoleonist leaders had any suspicion that these were the Chancellor's sentiments, and therefore neglected the one measure which alone could have crowned their efforts with success. Even Prince Charles Louis Napoleon, the heir apparent to the Empire, looked for salvation to Vienna, in opposition to his late brother who would have nothing to do with the cousin who had been educated at the Austrian Court. Warned of the impending republican revolt in June, Charles Louis Napoleon contemplated nothing less than to utilise this rising on the part of a section of the people to the advantage of the Imperial cause.² Already, on May 28, 1832, he had written to Metternich that the republicans were preparing to strike a decided blow for the mastery. Now was the time to raise the standard of the Duke, around which would flock the influential men whom he knew; but they must have a written guarantee that he would not refuse the crown thus offered him.³ The document which the Duke was to sign ran as

¹ Metternich to Apponyi, March 12, 1831.

² The same to the same, Vienna, June 21, 1832. "This letter [to Metternich] proves that this young man was accurately informed of the existence of a vast republican conspiracy which he wished to turn to his own account."

³ Charles Louis Napoleon to Metternich, Aronenberg, May 28, 1832. "I know influential persons in a position to serve my cousin. Before

follows: "General! I know your sentiments towards me. I am touched by the devotion which you, in common with other brave Frenchmen, cherish for the memory of my father. I shall be happy if the day comes when I can show my gratitude for this, and prove that the welfare of France constitutes my highest ideal."¹

Metternich paid no attention to this communication from Charles Louis Napoleon. In his enthusiasm for the maintenance of "peace and order," he believed the best answer he could give would be to call the attention of Louis Philippe himself to this step on the part of Charles Louis Napoleon. But before Count Apponyi could apply for an audience, the Viennese envoy, Marshal Maison, had already reported the affair to the King. Delighted with the confidence shown him, Louis Philippe, in his joy, wished to impart the contents of the letter to the entire Ministry. When, however, Apponyi requested secrecy, he admitted that he must accede to Metternich's demand. "But I should have liked," he added, "the widest publicity given to this act of loyalty on the part of your Cabinet. I am even of opinion that it would have served the particular interests of France, as well as the general interests of the repose and tranquillity of Europe."² Was Metternich, however, quite justified in remaining deaf to all the requests of the Napoleonists, and thus debarring his Emperor's grandson from the throne of France? Would it not have been in accordance with the interests of Austrian policy if he had permitted the Duke, who cherished feelings of deepest gratitude to the Court of Vienna,³ to

taking to action, they only require the assurance that he will not refuse the position to which he is entitled."

¹ Supplementary to Prince Charles Louis Napoleon's letter to Metternich of May 28, 1832.

² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, June 29, 1832.

³ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 17.

be proclaimed sovereign ruler of France? The young Napoleon expected this. "After the abortive attempt to maintain the House of Bourbon on the throne of France," he said to Prokesch, "did not the son of the late Emperor, who had been recognised by every Court in Europe, the son of the Archduchess Marie Louise, offer a better security to the Powers than the son of Egalité? And even if they were compelled to make this concession to the revolution, do they not realise themselves that it is vain?"¹ Under Napoleon II. the alliance between Austria and France would have been far more reliable than under Louis Philippe, who betrayed from the beginning a bellicose disposition. How greatly an alliance between Austria and France, governed by Napoleon II., was dreaded by Italy, Metternich had gathered from the observations of Misley, who lived at Modena. This man had declared that one thousand Italian daggers were at his disposal in Vienna to assassinate the young Duke, who was well-disposed towards Austria, the moment he should return to his native land.² Could the Chancellor of State have entirely forgotten why he had once intervened on behalf of the elder Napoleon? Why in 1814 he hesitated even to the last to aid his dethronement? Surely the son, who was not raised to sovereignty by conquest, offered a better security for peace than the soldier-emperor whose career depended upon an uninterrupted series of triumphs? Even if Metternich

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 51.

² "Resumé of a conversation with M. le Baron de Collins," Vienna, December, 1831, supplementary to Metternich's instructions to Apponyi, December 27. "Misley of Modena," Collins said to me, "speaking one day of the future of France and of the alliance which would be formed between her and Austria under Napoleon II., thus strengthening the bondage of Italy, added that he had thousands of Italians in Vienna at his disposal, and that he would know how to do away with the young Prince before he had time to add to his country's yoke."

recognised the advantages which Austria would gain from a France ruled by Napoleon II., he felt himself continually hampered by the treaties which existed between Austria and the other Powers, by which the house of Bonaparte was erased for ever from the list of ruling dynasties. After the successful suppression of the rebels of June 6, 1832, by Louis Philippe, he thought less than ever of the Duke of Reichstadt. Now, in the July King, he saw the strong ally he needed in order to stamp out anarchy; now he had found his model King whom he could hold up as an example to the lesser Princes of Germany, that they too might oppose the arch-enemies of the old order of things with new energy and courage.¹ But even had the Chancellor of State desired to contravene the treaties of 1814 and 1815 in favour of the Emperor's son, the proceeding would have been quite useless at this juncture. Since the middle of May 1832, the Duke had been a stricken man, who had no more need to concern himself with politics. On the same day upon which Metternich handed over Prince Charles Louis Napoleon's letter to the French King, he wrote to Apponyi concerning his sovereign's grandson: "I regard him as an almost hopeless case. His malady is a disease of the lungs which is fully declared, and since this disease does not spare mature age, it kills more rapidly at one

¹ Metternich's despatch of June 12, 1832. "The event [referring to the state of siege in Paris] is of the greatest importance, and bears the stamp of the age. In this case evil outweighs the good, and *vice versa*. In the abstract there could be nothing more untoward than the consolidation of the miserable rule of Louis Philippe, destitute as it is of any equitable basis. Taking into account, however, the agitated condition of the world, the suppression of the revolutionary faction is a blessing, since it affords a possibility to other Governments, especially that of Germany, to work for the maintenance of peace with far greater effectiveness than hitherto. In this, as under all conditions, kings must endeavour to devise some benefit to themselves from such good as events may offer."

and twenty.”¹ The devotion to the Emperor’s son, which Victor Hugo had inspired in the youth of France,² could now avail him no more : Death had already looked him in the face and spoken the decree that his life, upon the very brink of great expectations, must come to a close, not in France, but in exile and abroad.

¹ Metternich, “ Nachgelassene Papiere,” vol. v. p. 277.

² “ Correspondance de Victor Hugo,” p. 119.

CHAPTER X

ILLNESS AND DEATH

THE bright hopes which Austria and the Bonaparte family entertained on behalf of Napoleon's highly gifted son were doomed to speedy extinction. At the very moment when in 1830 his followers were petitioning Metternich for the surrender of his person, while Joseph Bonaparte was seeking to obtain the Emperor Francis's sanction to convey his nephew back to France, the young Napoleon had already developed the germ of a fatal malady. During his childhood there had been no apparent indications that he would be cut off in the flower of his age, to perish inactive—far from the fields of honour and renown—upon a bed of suffering in the Imperial palace of Schönbrunn. He had been an unusually strong and healthy child, who surprised every one by his exuberant physique.¹ Only his teeth were defective, owing rather to want of attention than to natural tendencies.² Except for slight colds, he kept free from all childish ailments till his eighth year. In 1819, however, he was attacked by spotted fever, which, to his great annoyance, confined him to his room for six weeks.³ A peculiar yellowish discolouration of the fingers, which first made its appearance when he was about fourteen or

¹ In spite of this there were people who prophesied he would never live to grow up. "Jahrbuch für Schweizerische Geschichte," vol. xxiii., p. 63.

² Dietrichstein's report of June 17, 1816. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Dietrichstein to Archduke Rainer, June 11, 1819. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

fifteen, and increased to a marked degree towards the close of his life, troubled him very much, especially in damp weather. When it occurred, he owned to a complete loss of sensation in them. He would rub his hands—but in vain—to restore the circulation.¹ This strange peculiarity, however, did not cause such serious anxiety as his abnormally rapid growth. It was the more disquieting because his chest did not develop in the same proportion, but seemed rather to contract.² "His extremely rapid growth," reported Count Dietrichstein, "amounting to two, three, or even four inches in a year (as proved by measurements which are carefully kept),³ has gradually exercised a prejudicial effect on his health. His body is long and narrow, the chest contracted, the arms and legs weak; he has not as yet his full complement of teeth; so far he has not had measles or scarlet fever, and must be guarded against them, and on account of his chest and lungs must be restrained from too violent or too prolonged exercise, as well as from sudden transitions from heat to cold."⁴ The first results of this over-growth appeared in the summer of 1827. While dining at the Imperial table at Baden, he was attacked with sudden indisposition. He complained of dizziness and general weakness, and was obliged to remain in bed for several days.⁵ Dr. Staudenheim's efforts overcame the malady, which he attributed to the Prince's weakly constitution.⁶

¹ Foresti's notes. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² *Ibid.* "He grew visibly, whilst his chest, instead of broadening, seemed rather to contract."

³ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

⁴ The measurements quoted in this report are still in the possession of his Serene Highness Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein at the Castle Waldstein, near Poggau (Steiermark).

⁵ Foresti's notes. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

⁶ *Ibid.* "This doctor [Staudenheim] was convinced that the weakest things about the Prince's constitution were, and always would be, his chest and the pulmonary artery."

According to his diagnosis, there was a scrofulous tendency, which he tried to combat by the use of the swimming bath. The treatment was successful, but the advent of colder weather, and also an inflamed throat, put a stop to it, upon which "the scrofulous tendencies, which were always latent, broke out afresh."¹ Once more Staudenheim's medical skill succeeded in arresting the progress of the disease, but, in order to effect a lasting result, he was of opinion that the Prince's whole course of life must be regulated with the greatest care and prudence. According to his directions, in winter the Prince was not to go out in wet or windy weather, and all violent exercise was to be avoided. Staudenheim also ordered the patient to avoid all injurious foods or liquors until he had finished growing and his weakened constitution had gradually returned to its former condition. Dancing and fencing, which he had taken up in 1823, were strictly prohibited; but riding, and swimming in summer time, were permitted as conducive to the strengthening of his frame. "In this way," writes Dr. Staudenheim to Count Neipperg, on January 1, 1828, "I hope to establish the Prince's health if no complications (such as scarlet fever or measles) or any unforeseen obstacle should intervene."² But it was precisely from the Prince himself that such hindrances were most to be feared. Strongly opposed to all prudential measures, he regarded every form of coddling as incompatible with his future career as a soldier. Above all, he thirsted for his freedom and independence. On the other hand, his physician and his governor dreaded nothing so much as his excitable temperament. Supported by Staudenheim, Count Dietrichstein, therefore, requested Marie Louise and the Emperor to delay his pupil's coming of age. "If this

¹ Dr. Staudenheim to Count Neipperg, January 1, 1828. Pr. Os.—W. A.

² *Ibid.* Montbel, incorrectly, writes "Staudenheimer."

is disregarded," he wrote, "not only might all our cherished plans be placed in jeopardy, but there is another important matter—it would be very prejudicial if the Prince were permitted to enter society and be exposed to great fatigue *before* he had regained his strength. His mind outruns his physical powers and hinders his proper development ; so there are ample reasons why we should turn a deaf ear to his importunate and rash desire for independence, and listen rather to the dictates of wisdom."¹ In the face of such urgent representations there was no serious intention of celebrating the Duke's majority at present. Although in 1829 he was comparatively well,² he still remained under medical supervision. His case was confided to Dr. Malfatti after the death of Dr. Staudenheim in May 1830. Malfatti was one of the leading physicians in Vienna, who had formerly attended King Louis Bonaparte and his sister Elise. Like his predecessor, he attributed the weakness of the Prince's lungs to his rapid growth. He ordered a strengthening diet of milk and seltzer water. He also considered that inaction of the skin was a secondary cause of this pulmonary weakness. He found in various parts of the Prince's body, but especially upon the neck and upper arm, a condition of the epidermis indicating incipient ringworm. This symptom, which seemed to be inherited from his father's side, was the more important, in Malfatti's opinion, because it might easily attack the lining membranes, especially those of the windpipe and bronchial tubes. For this malady he prescribed a course of baths. He was just as emphatic as Staudenheim in condemning all great excitement, extremes of heat and cold, and errors of diet.³ Early in the winter of 1830 the

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Foresti's notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Dr. Malfatti's medical advice regarding the Duke's health, Vienna, July 4, 1830. Printed by Montbel (already quoted). Montbel, however, gives the date as July 15.

Duke caught cold, as had been predicted. "It is the Herr von Malfatti's wish"—runs a letter from Dietrichstein to Obenaus, the Prince's head tutor—"that he should not *ride or bathe or drink seltzer water*, until he has lost the cold which is heavy upon his chest. He also requests that the Prince should not ride too far, nor too fast, so that he should not perspire so freely and take cold so easily."¹ When the chill had disappeared, Dietrichstein allowed him to walk in moderately cold weather, to ride half or three quarters of an hour, and to dance at the Court balls, but only in the French quadrilles. "With these precautions," says his governor, "which I do not carry to excess, I hope he may get through the winter well, and also Lent and Easter, the approach of which always tries him a little every year."² When, in spite of all care, his appearance changed for the worse, owing to his reckless passion for riding,³ it became necessary to forbid all exercise on horseback for a time. This prohibition was the more needful because the Duke entirely disregarded all urgent injunctions to let himself cool gradually, and change his linen after riding further than usual. He would go straight to his box at the theatre, and sit there bathed in perspiration. This utter defiance of medical advice alarmed Count Dietrichstein. He feared dangerous results, not only for the Prince, but

¹ Dietrichstein to Obenaus. No date to the letter, but judging from its contents it probably belongs to the year 1830. In the possession of Baron Oskar Obenaus.

² *Ibid.* Undated. This letter also must have been written in 1830. In the possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Oscar Obenaus.

³ The same to the same. This letter similarly must have been written in 1830. In the possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Oscar Obenaus. "Having seen with my own eyes his reckless passion for riding, to which my attention had often been called by reliable people, I am inclined to attribute his appearance of ill-health chiefly to the fact that riding induces violent perspiration and overstrains the lungs; other people besides myself have observed this after his drill, which is not nearly so exhausting as riding."

for himself. "My anxiety," he writes to Obenaus, "as regards the significant change in the Prince's appearance, his contempt and mockery of all natural anxiety, and my own *heavy responsibility*, are growing too great. I shall see what may be the result of his ceasing to ride, and act accordingly; for, strive as I may to do my duty by the Prince, to make things pleasant for him and gain his increasing confidence (which is hopeless), I must also protect myself from all reproach, and guard against the hateful insinuations of certain writers, which to the evilly-disposed might seem not altogether unfounded, if the Prince continues in this condition, which one can but fear, seeing his unhealthy colour, his hollow eyes, and drawn features."¹ The Duke yielded all the more to his passion for riding, because it offered some compensation for the active military service from which he was debarred by Malfatti's orders. He was not permitted to enter the army until the spring of 1831. He felt this the more keenly because, from his earliest years, all his thoughts and feelings had centred in his desire to become an active unit in the Austrian army. The recollection of his father and his great personality ever loomed before his eyes. A story was circulated in Vienna which told how the Emperor said one day to his grandson: "Frankie, what do you intend to be?" and when the boy, covered with confusion, could make no reply, he added: "If you do not know yourself, I'll make you a Court chaplain"—a suggestion which immediately provoked a remonstrance from the Duke.² Probably the Prince's protest is the only part of the story that agrees with the truth. If the Emperor Francis really uttered the words which have been put into his mouth, they were certainly not meant seriously.

¹ Undated; probably belongs to the year 1830. In the possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus.

² Report of September 16, 1819, supplementary to Sednitzky's despatch of September 24. M.I.



THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT AS AN AUSTRIAN SERGEANT
in a pencil sketch by Peter Krafft In the Collection of the Imperial Court Library, Vienna

The Duke had long been intended for a soldier: his whole education was directed to this end. In 1818, before it occurred to the Viennese public to make him into a chaplain, he had appeared at Court in a corporal's uniform.¹ In November 1822 he was promoted to the rank of sergeant, a promotion which was announced to Count Dietrichstein by Field-Marshal the Imperial Adjutant-General Baron Kutschera in the following terms: "The woman (Marie Louise) who had expected to see her son nothing less than a colonel, is now glad he is a sergeant. It shows how everything in this world is relative."² But the Duke himself was not less enchanted with his new rank, subordinate though it might be, in the grade of military distinction. "The sergeant's uniform is not yet finished," wrote Dietrichstein to Kutschera; "he can scarcely bear to wait for it. Since the recollection of the past would make his desire for a regiment very excusable, I cannot but praise his contentment. Besides, the thing will be treated as a mere matter of amusement, although everything relating to it will assume importance in his eyes."³ With true ardour he underwent his musketry drill;⁴ and great was his happiness when in 1823 he was permitted, as sergeant, to command a march past of the guard of the Court, in the presence of Marie Louise and the King of Naples.⁵ Even his choice of studies were in accordance with a soldier's career. Besides drill and service regulations for the infantry, he was instructed in fortification, gunnery, and all the science pertaining to

¹ Count Dietrichstein's Diary, March 29, 1818. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Kutschera to Dietrichstein, Verona, November 11, 1822. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Dietrichstein to Kutschera, November 17, 1822. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ Dietrichstein's Diary. Pr. Oe.—W. A. A report of July 6, 1822, says: "In this drill the Prince knows already every rule and position in existence, and has begun to command a few men of the Court guard." Supplementary to Sedlnitzky's report of September 3, 1822. M.I.

⁵ Dietrichstein's Diary. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

the artillery.¹ At a very early age Dietrichstein had given him books bearing on military matters, with a view to preparing him for his profession.² The young Duke could hardly restrain his impatience to begin his active career as a soldier. In 1826, Marie Louise, well aware of her son's ardent desire, requested her father to give her, by way of a birthday gift, a commission for the Duke. Francis promised to do so on condition that the young man should first gain the complete approbation of his governor.³ But Count Dietrichstein, for whom the Duke could never work hard enough, did not consider him worthy as yet of such a distinction. "That is not the way," he said to him, "to maintain an officer's rank. Your entire education depends upon your industry, your sense of virtue, justice and order; and the more you have neglected these inborn tendencies of humanity, the harder and faster you must now strive to make up for this culpable negligence."⁴ For two long years Dietrichstein left the yearnings and desires of his pupil unsatisfied. It was not until August 1828 that he consented to the Duke's receiving a captaincy in the Imperial Light Infantry.⁵ This was an event in the life of the Prince; coming so unexpectedly, it transformed him, in his own words, "quite suddenly into one of the happiest of men."⁶ On August 17, after one of his card-

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*

³ The Duke of Reichstadt to Dietrichstein, Weinzierl, August 3, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ Dietrichstein to the Duke, September 6, 1826. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ Dietrichstein to Obenaus, Wieselburg, August 22 (1828). In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus. "I had to promote the affair *myself*, and was glad to do it, for the sake of the soldiers in the camp [in Hungary] for reasons of propriety and in order to influence the Prince favourably. God grant I have succeeded, but only events can show."

⁶ The Duke to Foresti, August 18, 1828. Published by me in the *feuilleton* of the *Neue Freie Presse*, August 8, 1898. Dietrichstein himself writes to Obenaus on this subject: "Meanwhile he is naturally

parties, his grandfather sent for him. "You have long been wishing for something," said the Emperor. "I, your Majesty!" replied the Duke, at a loss, and thinking his mother was playing some joke upon him. "Yes," rejoined Francis, "and as a token of my satisfaction, and of the service I expect from you, I now appoint you Captain of my Light Infantry. Be an honest man, that is all I desire." The Duke was intoxicated with joy. It is a fine trait in his character that, in the moment of his happiness, he did not forget to give immediate information of his promotion to the man who had given him his first military instruction, and who had continually pointed out to him the soldier's career as the only one to which he could devote himself. "Now," he writes to Captain Foresti, "the dearest of comrades," "we will work seriously at all branches of military science; nothing shall be too difficult for me. The dictates of honour and the wish to prove myself worthy of this distinction will alter me; I will lay aside childish things and become a man in the true sense of the word. This is my firm resolve."¹ His appointment to a captaincy did not, however, signify his actual entrance into the army; this was only to follow, as he himself remarks, as the reward of his completed education and matured intelligence.² Only on this condition had Dietrichstein advised that a commission should be given him. In his report of June 30, 1828, he defines the point of view he intends to take on this question. In constant opposition to the Duke, who desired to escape as soon as possible from his governor's guardianship, Dietrichstein was of opinion that this wish ought not in any case to be granted. "I

enchanted; I let him be so." August 22 (1828). In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

¹ Published by me in the *Neue Freie Presse*, August 8, 1898. Translated into French in the *Revue Bleue* of March 24, 1900.

² *Ib.*

repeat," he said, "that there is no hurry for this; his physical, moral and intellectual development make it more advisable that this guardianship should last until his twentieth year. The growth of the Prince, his increasing height, his pleasing behaviour, must not mislead us. The extent of knowledge acquired, and the development of character alone give the right standard. While the latter is still so weak and his education still so imperfect, a precocious emancipation can only be a great danger."¹ Against Dietrichstein's argument it could have been contended that in Austria it was customary to enter the army at a very early age. To this his reply would have been that this was only done for the sake of rapid promotion, and was of no benefit to the army, for these young people were generally deficient in the studies necessary for the higher duties of the service. "Why should the Prince, from whom so much is expected, be placed in this class?" he inquires. "What will be gained if his unbridled passions and obstinacy are given free play so early in life; if the flatterers, to whom he will listen only too willingly, already begin to smooth his path towards deceit and intrigue; if the *control* which is so *necessary* is withdrawn before the attainment of higher convictions, would not this plan soon reveal in the *future* the swift downfall of virtue and all morality, for which his readiness to follow the most recent example should prepare us? His engaging appearance, his fascinating and often impressive observations, have frequently awakened the idea that it was time he made his appearance in the world. Those who know the Prince through and through do not, however, concur in this opinion."² To this class belonged Dietrichstein himself. There must frequently have been fierce conflicts between the Duke, knocking at the gate

¹ Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

which led to the way of independence, and his governor who met him with such stubborn refusals. Nothing could shake Dietrichstein's determination; he turned a deaf ear to all the Duke's urgent entreaties. He considered quite enough had been done for the present in conferring upon his pupil the rank of captain. He wished nothing to be neglected in gradually preparing the way for the completion of his education. Dietrichstein now thought it well to attend public institutions, social gatherings and balls in the Duke's company, so that society should grow accustomed to him and, "ceasing to regard him with such intense curiosity, accept him just as they did all the other Austrian and foreign Princes."¹ Moreover, *two* military equerries were to be found for him at once, as the Prince needed *continual* surveillance. Dietrichstein thought the Duke would keep these gentlemen so fully occupied that two would hardly be sufficient for his personal attendance. It is interesting to learn the requirements which the governor demanded from these equerries; they are highly characteristic of his way of thinking. The two officers were to be noblemen, one at least a chamberlain, so that they might be unquestionably admitted to Court. He also required them to have attained the rank of staff-officers, so that they might protect the Prince from the so-called "comradeship" of the younger officers, to which he was much inclined. If matters had been arranged in accordance with the Duke's own wishes, he would have preferred a *single* subaltern in attendance upon himself. As Dietrichstein suspected, he actually cherished a secret hope of going about just as he pleased accompanied by this subordinate. Dietrichstein feared nothing so much as this. He was, however, quite in the wrong in supposing that in a short time the Prince would abandon himself to

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

indolence, immorality and depravity. A young man, so ambitious as the Duke, was very unlikely to let himself be led into such vices by a subaltern. It was only an excess of zeal which caused Dietrichstein to make use of such figures of speech. For the same reasons he demanded that the officers in attendance on the Duke should possess exemplary qualities, accomplishments, and talents,¹ so that they might assist in further educating him for the great part which Dietrichstein considered his pupil was destined to play in the future. "The whole army," said his governor, "hopes and believes that he has inherited his father's genius and will lead them to victory. Only *in this way* can be explained the enthusiasm which—even in childhood—his appearance has created among the troops, officers and common soldiers alike, a feeling which has steadily increased. It will be well for him, and for us, if he answers to these expectations in the day of danger."² Because Dietrichstein was aware of the public enthusiasm for his pupil, he made it his first care that it should not be disappointed by the Prince. On that account he wished to feel sure he was well equipped for the military career. He thought it of the greatest importance that the suggestions he had set forth in his report of June 30, 1828, should be considered and rightly valued. "But still," he says at the conclusion of his statement, drawn up for the Emperor and Marie Louise, "I must renew my *decided protest* against the *Prince's earlier emancipation* which he desires, prompted by his crude and distorted ideas, and by his *wild efforts for liberty and licentiousness*; regardless of physical and mental activity, of ability, or of qualities that bring honour and fame. Against a plan which overlooks the views I have already expressed, and would inevitably end in the swift and early ruin of the Prince,

¹ Dietrichstein's report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibi* 1.

I most solemnly protest on behalf of my conscience, my honour, and on behalf of others.”¹ Filled with impatience, he awaited the reply to his report, which still lay, unread, in the Archduchess’s study.² But whatever the decision of the mother or the grandfather might be, Dietrichstein felt himself buoyed up by the consciousness of having honestly and honourably fulfilled his duty towards the Duke.³ His joy was all the greater when Marie Louise finally signified her approval of his views.⁴ But the consent of the Emperor, who had only received the report on August 22, was still lacking. “I must now wait,” writes Dietrichstein to Obenaus, “until she (Marie Louise) has spoken to the Emperor on the subject, to hear what he says and whether he desires to speak to me ; if not, I must just remain passive and await further issues. The latter course would be very unfortunate, for it would mean, alas ! that another idea was preferred to mine, and would be carried out ; then I should wash my hands of the affair, stand fast as long as I am suffered, and leave the rest in God’s care. My conscience is free, come what may. I should be heartily sorry, however, if the youth to whom I have devoted myself for thirteen years should be made wretched by the neglect of my well-considered and well-intentioned proposals, simply because they judge him like any one else, and forget all that stamps him as belonging to a *special order*. We shall see what we shall see, that is all I can say.”⁵ It

¹ Dietrichstein’s report of June 30, 1828. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Dietrichstein to Obenaus, Wieselburg, August 22 (1828). In possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus.

³ The same to the same. *Ibid.* In the possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus. “I rejoice daily that I have written this paper [report of June 30, 1828]. My conscience is quieted, and I am safe from all reproach.”

⁴ The same to the same, Weinzierl, August 26, 1826. In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

⁵ *Ibid.*

may be that in the immediate *entourage* of the Emperor the tide of opinion was set in favour of declaring the immediate independence of the Duke, but it was not strong enough to set aside Dietrichstein's warning. The Emperor accepted the governor's views, to the great dissatisfaction of the Prince, who had hoped to the last for a decision in his favour. At first he must have been greatly embittered by his disappointment. At least, we gather this impression from the letter Dietrichstein sent to Obenaus on August 29, containing the following words: "The answer received by the Prince as to his military position, and the questions he put to Count Neipperg regarding the Emperor's declaration, testify to his stubborn frame of mind, and to an indifference bordering on levity. I believe the uniform is of less importance to him than the pleasure of thwarting and getting the best of us. Now he knows his fate, and must have expected it. His last two letters have so put me out of temper that I prefer not to answer them at all."¹ When Dietrichstein discussed these matters which so closely concerned the Duke, he also touched on the question of the separate establishment that was shortly to be set up for him. For the maintenance of Marie Louise's son, on attaining his majority, a sum of about 500,000 francs per annum was provided out of the estates of the Bavarian Palatinate, made over to him by the Emperor Francis. From his father he could expect no inheritance. Napoleon left a will, but the son was not mentioned therein as residuary legatee. When the ex-Emperor dictated his last will and testament, he had far other aims than to endow his child, whose welfare he knew would be assured under the protection of his Imperial grandfather, with a few million francs. To him, who desired to pave the way back to the throne for his

¹ Dietrichstein to Obenaus, Vienna, August 29, 1828. In the possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

descendant, there were things of greater importance than the enrichment of his son. Above all, he desired to secure him a great following, and, with this object in view, he left directions that the old army which he had so often led to victory should inherit the largest share of his private fortune of about 212 million francs, which, however, was still confiscated. For the same reason he had bequeathed to his faithful followers the rest of his money, such as the balance of about six million francs, deposited with the Paris banker, Lafitte. In this way, he strove with all his might to lay a firm foundation upon which his successor might build. Not millions, but the remembrance of his glorious deeds and his great name should form the capital which he would leave to the Duke of Reichstadt. Marie Louise did not attach the slightest importance to such an ideal inheritance. She would have much preferred her child to inherit his father's real estate, so that he should be one of the richest grandees of her native land. Urged by Metternich and the government of Louis XVIII., the Emperor Francis, as guardian to his grandson, was compelled to renounce all his claims to this inheritance. The Ministry of Louis XVIII. had already intimated that a renunciation of this inheritance by the guardians was in fact unnecessary, since after the amnesty of January 12 the Duke of Reichstadt was deprived of the right to enter France as the heir of his father, who, as a usurper, had been placed under an interdict. But the worst feature of the whole matter was, that behind all the steps taken against the Prince's interests, Napoleon's executors—Bertrand, Montholon, and Marchand—intrigued continually against the son of their former master, in order to secure, for their own ends, the money deposited at Lafitte's. Thanks to these machinations, the young Napoleon owed the fact that, of all which his father left behind, he got nothing but a life-sized portrait of the

ex-Emperor.¹ There was, however, some probability that Madame Lætitia, Napoleon's venerable mother, would endow her grandson with a share of her riches. It was understood on good authority that when she was seriously ill in 1822, she had made the Duke heir to half her property,² the interest upon which was estimated at two million of Roman thalers,³ without including the great value of her jewellery. Although the old lady had been brought to the edge of the grave by her grief at the death of her mighty son, she had made a recovery. Her iron constitution gave promise of long life. It would have been foolish to base the Duke's income and domestic expenditure upon the expectation of a future legacy from this quarter. Marie Louise had therefore to consider other means of increasing the resources of his household. She decided to take steps in this direction at the close of 1825. "Count Neipperg," she says in a letter to her father, "has written to Prince Metternich through Werklein⁴ on a subject which lies very near my heart, which I beg you will allow to be brought before you, and afterwards to grant it your support; it concerns the little I have of my *own* which I wish to be secured to my son, and guaranteed to him by my successor."⁵

¹ For further details regarding this will, see the treatise by Dr. Hans Schlitter, "Die Stellung der österreichischen Regierung zum Testamente Napoleon Bonapartes," in the *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* vol. lxxx., 1893.

² Apponyi to Metternich, Rome, September 22, 1822. "Mme. Lætitia must have made her will. One hears that she has named the Duke heir to half her fortune, but with the condition, however, that the Prince should marry."

³ *Ibid.* "The capital invested by Mme. Lætitia is valued at two million of Roman crown pieces. Her diamonds and other jewels would equal this sum in value, it is affirmed."

⁴ Colonel Werklein, who in 1831 had to flee from Parma.

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, December 18, 1825. In February 1826 she agreed to a fictitious loan of 300,000 francs as a yearly income, which Metternich and Werklein had concluded in

Scarcely had these matters been arranged when, on February 22, 1829, the man who had taken part in the settlement, and played no inconsiderable rôle in the life of the Duke of Reichstadt, passed away in the person of Count Neipperg. The second husband of the ex-Empress had exercised the greatest influence upon the Duke's development. It must appear an astonishing fact that it was Neipperg himself who took most pains over the mental culture of this child, whose father he had successfully supplanted in the heart of the ex-Empress. It was he who incited the Prince to study the Emperor's glorious deeds, and it seems to us very strange to hear that the Duke talked about Napoleon's importance to Count Neipperg, of whom he sometimes spoke as "the General." That very intimate relations existed between the Count and the young Napoleon is clearly evident in the Duke's letters to Neipperg.¹ But had he any suspicion that his mother had given her hand to the Count in marriage, thereby making Neipperg his step-father? He certainly possessed to a great extent the art of dissimulation, but whether he carried it as far as this we are unable to know. There is not the slightest evidence that he was aware of his mother's relations with Neipperg while keeping silence on the subject. His immediate circle

Vienna with Rothschild and Mirabeau. Marie Louise's most ardent desire was that her future successor, the Duke of Lucca, should signify his consent to this. (Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, February 16, 1826.) She was glad he put no difficulties in the way. In June 1827 she sent to her father all the documents relating to this affair, that "in case of emergency they should be deposited among the secret archives of the Court and State." (Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, June 17, 1827.) The documents, however, are not to be found in the State Archives, so it is impossible to say more precisely what was the full extent of Marie Louise's money transactions with Rothschild and Mirabeau on her son's behalf.

¹ Published by me in the *Feuilleton* of the *Neue Freie Presse*, April 8, 1898. See also the translation of this letter in the *Revue Bleue* of March 24, 1900.

would certainly not have revealed the secret, and he did not come into contact with strangers, who might have known it. In all probability, the marriage between the ex-Empress and the Count was carefully kept from him. Whatever the actual circumstances may have been, whether he were among the initiated or not, it is certain that he, the enthusiastic worshipper of his father, must have been very deeply troubled by the great grief which Marie Louise displayed at the loss of her second husband. The certainty of Neipperg's approaching death wrung from her words of lamentation: "I feel as though my own life were gradually ebbing out with his; each day passes like another in grief and misery, for the morning brings no improvement, and one must always dread the restlessness of the night. I suffer terribly from my head; I am almost always in pain if I try to use it at all, and it often seems as weak and stupid as though I had been seriously ill myself."¹ When finally the Count, on February 22, 1829, breathed his last, after nearly three days of agony, she was conscious of having lost "the best of men, the most faithful friend, and all her earthly happiness."² "Ah," she says in one of her letters, "I must think of you, dear papa, and of my children, in order to take any further pleasure in life."³

Whilst Marie Louise was lamenting her beloved dead in Parma,⁴ her son in Vienna was waiting with scarcely

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Parma, December 26, 1828.

² *Ibid.*, February 22, 1829.

³ *Ibid.*, February 27, 1829.

⁴ In the despatch of February 28, 1829, Metternich touches upon the "great question" of making known the "fact of the marriage." "In my opinion," he says, "to make this fact public would be in many respects a matter of great importance to her Majesty the Archduchess, and the existence of the two children require it." This was Marie Louise's most inward desire. She writes on March 18 from Parma to the Emperor: "With regard to the announcement of my marriage with the late Count Neipperg, I trust myself entirely to your paternal views; what you decide upon is certain to be the best for us. . . . I can

restrained impatience for the day when he would be emancipated from his tutors. No matter what pains they might take to make him understand the necessity and moderation of their proceedings, he gave no heed to them, but only to his own desires, which continually clamoured for liberty. Things moved too slowly for his impetuous temperament. This hot-headed lad wanted to break all bounds, and felt confident, as he was heard to declare, of his power to occupy—even without preparation—an honourable place in the world. But his tutors kept him sternly to his studies.¹ Equal care was spent upon his *military education*, and opportunity was given him of practical experience. Very interesting in this respect is a short letter to the Archduke Charles.² Wonderfully spirited are those few lines in which he begs the Archduke to let him be present at the manœuvres of the troops under his command, and the way in which the young Duke pays homage at the same time to the conqueror of Napoleon. While the Archduke felt an almost paternal tenderness for the son of his former opponent, the Duke of Reichstadt cherished a profound respect for the hero of Aspern; he regarded it as an honour to complete his military education under the supervision of the celebrated warrior. This affection for the Archduke is intimately connected with his desire to come into personal contact with all who had ever stood in any kind of relation to the father he adored. It was a particular delight, therefore, when just at this time the Prince made the acquaintance of a man who, in a well-known

only add that I could not be otherwise than pleased if this is made generally known, and I am convinced that it would carry out the wishes of my beloved friend."

¹ Plan of studies in Dietrichstein's notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A. Obenaus's Diary, in possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

² Published by me in the *Feuilleton* of the *Neue Freie Presse* of April 8, 1898.

treatise,¹ had defended Napoleon against the insults of petty detractors. This was the knight Anton von Prokesch, who came of a bourgeois family and had once been wrongfully accused of revolutionary tendencies by the police in Vienna.² The young captain had been highly educated in an atmosphere of free thought, which in those days constituted a serious crime in the eyes of the police. Metternich, however, who occasionally displayed a sovereign contempt for the police, to whom at other times he gave his powerful protection, and to whose information he by no means lent a deaf ear, made no mistake in forming a good opinion of Prokesch. He was particularly drawn to this conclusion by "the very valuable and exhaustive"³ reports that Prokesch had sent from the seat of action during the Greco-Turkish war of 1825; here, with utter disregard for his health, or for the risks he incurred, he endeavoured to inquire into the relations between the conflicting parties.⁴ After an absence of some years, during which he had distinguished himself in various missions in the East, Prokesch returned to Gratz in 1830 to visit his family, who resided there. In the capital of Steiermark, where the Emperor Francis was then staying, Prokesch was invited to dine at the Imperial table on June 22. It chanced that his place was next to the Duke of Reichstadt, to whom it was no secret that, some years earlier—in 1818—Prokesch had broken à lance in defence of his father. After dinner, the Prince who, "with his deep blue eyes, his manly brow, his reserve and quiet self-control," had made a remarkable impression upon Prokesch,⁵ turned to the latter, saying: "I have known you a long while," and pressed his hand

¹ "Die Schlachten von Ligny, Quatrebras, und Waterloo." Short treatise by Prokesch-Osten, vol. i. 1842.

² Police report.

³ Metternich's despatch of November 26, 1825.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Prokesch, "Mein Verhältnis zum Herzog von Reichstadt," p. 7.



ANTON COUNT PROKESCH-OSTEN

*From a painting by Turner (probably about 1830). In the possession of
Anton Count Prokesch-Osten of Gmunden*

as though they had been old friends.¹ A secret sense of gratitude drew the young Napoleon to Prokesch, whose interesting accounts of distant lands he had followed with the greatest attention. "I have known you and loved you for a long time past," he reiterated the following day. "You defended my father's honour at a time when all the world vied with each other to slander his name. I have read your 'Battle of Waterloo,' and in order to impress every line of it on my memory, I translated it twice—into French and Italian."² From this time a tie of intimate and devoted friendship was formed between them, of which Prokesch, in his book "*Mein Verhältniss zum Herzog von Reichstadt*,"³ has left a memorial, beautiful as it is imperishable.

Shortly after his acquaintance with this highly cultured officer, whose conversation exercised such charms for him, the Duke—in July 1830—was promoted to the rank of major in the regiment of Salins. A few months later—November 1830—he received another step—a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the Nassau Infantry, the happy news of which was brought to him by the Imperial Adjutant-General, Baron Kutschera.

"I find no words," he writes to the Emperor, "to express the joy and emotion which this new favour, this new mark of your paternal love, has awakened in me. Do not doubt, my best and most revered grandfather, that I shall continue to grow more worthy of your goodness, and that I shall finally fulfil the hopes which my careful education—watched over by yourself—and the gifts God has given me, the development of which is my sacred duty, entitle you to expect from me. The services I shall render to your Majesty and the monarchy must testify to my boundless gratitude."⁴

¹ Prokesch, "*Mein Verhältniss zum Herzog von Reichstadt*," p. 7.

² *Ibid.*

³ Published in 1878 by his son Anton from his literary remains.

⁴ The Duke to the Emperor Francis, November 7, 1830.

The Duke appeared entirely absorbed in his passion for the military profession. Dietrichstein, however, did not consider it advisable that his pupil should entirely cut himself off from society. He was expected to put in an appearance at Court, and during the winter he attended the balls which were given by the leaders of society in Vienna. He was always received with respect, and he awakened the liveliest interest, for his peculiar destiny made him an object of universal attention. His quick wit, which was always ready with a repartee, his fine features, and the distinction of his whole appearance, secured him a social success wherever he might go. The ladies especially, who were captivated by the Prince's good looks, did not conceal their sympathy. On January 25,¹ 1831, at a ball given by the English ambassador Lord Cowley, he made the acquaintance of Marshal Marmont, notorious for having deserted Napoleon. Marmont had quitted Paris after the July revolution. With a curiosity easily comprehensible, he endeavoured to obtain the closest possible view of the son of his old friend and former Emperor. He was greatly struck by the resemblance in features and expression between father and son.² When Marmont states that the Duke met him with the utmost confidence and even warmth,³ he is not altogether truthful. Foresti, in his unpublished notes, distinctly says that the Prince could not stifle his feelings of mistrust for the man who, by his own account, had acquired such doubtful fame.⁴

¹ Dietrichstein in his diary, and Prokesch (already quoted, p. 45), give January 25. Marmont in his "*Mémoires*" (vol. viii. p. 375) says the ball took place on January 26.

² Marmont, "*Mémoires*," vol. viii. p. 375.

³ *Ibid.* p. 376.

⁴ Foresti's notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "In the first conversations which the Prince held on this subject with Foresti, it was easy to observe a certain suspicion on the part of his Highness towards the Marshal, who, said he, had acquired a melancholy fame."

The young Napoleon behaved with the courtesy which his position exacted; he showed just this measure of politeness, because Marmont was introduced to him as a man who enjoyed the favour of the Emperor Francis.¹ Therefore, the presumption that the Court brought Marmont intentionally in contact with the Prince, so that he might learn his father's history directly from the lips of the treacherous General, seems to have some justification. It was only after the Marshal had drawn a most flattering picture of Napoleon's life for the benefit of the Prince, who listened eagerly, that the latter began to forget his suspicions, and Marmont became a welcome guest in the apartments of the Duke.² In his memoirs, the Marshal relates at great length the substance of his interviews with the Prince at which the history of Napoleon was told, beginning January 28 and ending April 6, 1830.³ The succession of historical events, as given by him, does not tally with the sketches left by Dietrichstein, in whose presence the French Marshal depicted the life of the Emperor.⁴ Dietrichstein alone could say for certain whether Marmont kept faithfully to the truth in this course of instruction to the Prince, of which he tells us at the close of his reports. The Count, who was satisfied with the short but precise handling of the subjects treated day by day, is silent on this point;

¹ Foresti's notes. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.* "Later, on account of his frequent visits and the great interest of his narrations, the Marshal was received with pleasure."

³ Dietrichstein's Diary. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ I give here Marmont's digressions from the order of the discourses according to Dietrichstein's notes. Marmont says (vol. viii. p. 386) that he gave an account of the Egyptian campaign after 1814. According to Dietrichstein, after 1814 he took the war of 1805, and then followed the description of the campaign in Egypt. Marmont, p. 390, states that he followed the campaign of 1805 by that of 1809. And while Marmont (p. 391) discussed the Spanish war immediately after 1809, we see, according to Dietrichstein, he first treated this subject after 1813.

but we learn from him, what is also confirmed by Marmont himself—the deep impression produced upon the Marshal by the intelligent and apt comments made by the Duke upon his father's career.¹ On April 15, Marmont received a portrait of the Prince in grateful recognition of his services.² Meanwhile, the Duke of Reichstadt, whose military horizon had been considerably widened by Marmont's valuable explanations, had been nearing the important moment when his education was to come to an end, and he was to enter society as an independent man. Before this took place, Count Dietrichstein considered it his duty to lay once more before the Emperor and his daughter a memorandum upon the subject of his pupil. "The nearer the time approaches at which I am to leave the Prince, who was confided to my care sixteen years ago," he says, "the more urgently do I feel the necessity of speaking out as to the immediate future, all the more because I have no personal or party interest to further."³ The choice of a fixed place where the Duke was to take up his residence seemed to him of the greatest importance. He declared most emphatically against Prague or Brünn, both of which towns had been proposed. He was of opinion that in such troublous times, when all Europe seemed a prey to the revolutionary fever, the Prince could only continue his service in Vienna under the eyes of the Emperor and the highest officials. "He will find as good opportunities of military service," Dietrichstein continues, "here as elsewhere. In any other place he would appear more independent and probably give more occasion for gossip. Even with the greatest care, foreign emissaries and political conspirators will easily obtain access to him, wherever he may be; especially as his increasing susceptibility and want of balance offer a

¹ Dietrichstein's Diary. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² *Ibid.* See also Marmont's "Mémoires."

³ Dietrichstein's memorandum of March 18, 1831, Pr. Oe.—W. A.

congenial soil for plots of this kind. As to his moral seduction," he continues, "even village life offers opportunities for this ; everywhere he would find means to this end even more conveniently than in Vienna." Dietrichstein also advised that the Prince should remain in Vienna because it contained all that was needful for the satisfaction of his intellectual tastes and for the cultivation of "good tone," and also because—as he said—the society of educated people had become a necessity as well as a point of honour to the Prince.¹ There was another equally weighty reason which caused Dietrichstein to implore the Emperor not to send his grandson to Prague or Brünn. At that time, February 1831, the revolution had broken out in Italy, necessitating the flight of Marie Louise from Parma. She entreated the Emperor to hasten to her aid with such Austrian troops as were encamped at Piacenza, so that her rule might be re-established by the help of the Imperial bayonets.² The suppression of the revolution was of the greatest political importance to the Court of Vienna, as its success would have meant the downfall of Austrian power in Italy. Even at the price of a war with France, which seemed likely to oppose the entrance of the Austrian soldiers into the Italian Duchies and the Papal States, Metternich was resolved to achieve the pacification of the Apennine Peninsula, even by recourse to arms. He was prepared, if need were, to use the Duke of Reichstadt as a menace against Louis Philippe.³ Dietrichstein, who knew nothing as to the Chancellor's policy, considered that at this moment, when a collision with Louis Philippe seemed inevitable, the removal of the Duke from Vienna to any other Austrian town would provoke useless

¹ Dietrichstein's memorandum of March 18, 1831. Pr. Os.—W. A.

² Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Piacenza, February 20, 1831.

³ Metternich to Apponyi, February 15, 1831. "Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. v. p. 116.

agitation and unnecessary gossip. "One thing seems certain," he says, "that he never could or would fight against France or the French; this is absolutely prohibited by his *birth*, his *filial* duty, as well as by the dictates of *sound policy*. But if, at this juncture, he were to appear in a military capacity in camp, or at the concentration of the forces, would it not be said that he was to be permitted to take part in the war against France?"¹ Prokesch tells us that the Duke wished to take the field, not against his native land, but against the Italian revolutionaries who opposed his mother, and that he even implored the Emperor's consent to this step.² This is also confirmed by Count Dietrichstein. On February 20, 1831, when the news arrived of Marie Louise's flight from Parma, the following entry appeared in his diary: "Noble resolution on the part of the Prince."³ Marie Louise, however, was far from attributing such a noble impulse to her child, since on February 22 she writes to her father from Parma: "I also wished to ask you, *on account of the present crisis*,⁴ to leave Count Dietrichstein with my son, so long as he remains under your paternal roof. The Count appears to have won his entire confidence, and now that the Prince goes into society he can warn and guard him from much harm, which is a great consideration with all these revolutions going on."⁵

¹ Dietrichstein's memorandum of March 18, 1831. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Prokesch (already quoted), p. 49.

³ According to Prokesch (already quoted), p. 49, the Duke, on February 19, at the first news of the reported capture of his mother, expressed his intention of hastening to her help. Dietrichstein only observes in his diary, on February 19, "Bad news from Parma." It is only on the 20th that he writes: "Release of the Archduchess. Noble resolution of the Duke." Therefore it was on the 20th, not on the 19th, that the Duke first expressed the wish to go to his mother's help.

⁴ Underlined by Marie Louise herself.

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Piacenza, February 22, 1831.

But is not Prokesch—whose book contains several errors—telling posterity in this instance more than he actually saw? If we are to believe him, the Emperor, at this moment, in the face of the impending conflict with Louis Philippe, gave the Duke some hopes of the French throne.¹ But such an assurance is in direct opposition to all the Emperor's views.² We know on the best authority that Francis never at any time harboured such ideas. Neither was he the man to encourage in his grandson illusions which he never intended should become actualities. Even if Metternich thought well, for political purposes, to make use of the Duke as a standing menace, this remained a mere threat, the realisation of which no one would have shunned sooner than himself. At no time would he have experimented seriously with the young Napoleon. For these reasons Dietrichstein's warning had to receive attention, and the Duke was kept in Vienna. In reality, it seemed too great a risk to let him leave the capital for some place not so well guarded, from whence he could easily have carried out his high-flown plans and escaped to Italy or another country. This was certainly not agreeable to the Prince, and he was greatly annoyed on learning that he was not to be allowed to go to Prague.³ Would not his visit there have withdrawn him from the argus-eyes of the Court? But now he must remain in the Imperial residence. Here he was informed that on June 14, 1831, his tutors would leave him for good. "Count Dietrichstein came," says Obenaus in his diary, "and explained that our work was now at an end, and that we should leave quietly, without any formal resignation."⁴ Before Obenaus resigned

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 50.

² See the previous chapter, "Politische Stellung des Herzogs von Reichstadt."

³ Obenaus's diary, May 15, 1831. In the possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

⁴ *Ibid.* June 14, 1831.

his place as Mentor, he wrote one more memorandum, in which he expressed his opinion as to the character of the people who should be henceforth in attendance on the Prince. These, he considered, should be men of proved integrity, of unimpeachable morals, and possessing enlightened views of life. He also required that they should be able "to perceive the events which are developing before our eyes, and to estimate their higher significance for the State and for the human race in their concatenation of cause and effect, so that in following the political discussions, for which the Prince has a special inclination, they could set him right and give him information." Therefore he laid stress on the fact that they should be well grounded in history, and, at the same time, be distinguished soldiers, "in order to forward his higher military career." Long years of intercourse with the Duke had convinced Obenaus that the requirements set forth in his memorandum would not of themselves suffice to win for these new-comers the entire confidence of their Prince. Besides this, he said, they must be quite conversant with the ways and talk of the fashionable world, "so that they may not make themselves objects of ridicule to the society wits." It was equally necessary that, with firmness and energy, they should unite delicate tact, which should pass unnoticed by their Prince; for that would only excite his opposition. Furthermore, it was important to bestow on them a position of such consideration in the political world that the Duke should feel himself honoured by their society. Obenaus is convinced that the lack of these qualities would invariably prevent the Duke from disclosing "the inmost recesses of his mind" to those about him; that, at the first favourable opportunity, he would endeavour to trip them up in order to make them ridiculous and ensure their dismissal. Such a conflict, thought the tutor, would be the greatest misfortune for the future of his

pupil. "Under such influences," he says in conclusion, "the Prince would never become what otherwise he might so easily be made—the worthy heir of his father's fame, an honourable member of the Imperial family, and a powerful upholder of the Austrian State. By committing such a blunder, the Government would rob itself of all the advantages it might otherwise derive from the possession of such a political treasure, and would incur the well-merited reproach of its contemporaries and of posterity, that it had either failed to appreciate him from ignorance, or had intentionally placed him on the edge of a precipice in order to ensure his political ruin."¹ These warnings of January 1831, if indeed they ever reached the Emperor's notice, arrived too late. The men who were to form the Duke's new *entourage*, although their duties were only to begin on June 14, had been appointed to their positions as early as October 1830.² These were Colonel Prokop, Count Hartmann, soon afterwards made a General; Riding-master Johann Bernard, Baron von Moll and Captain Joseph Ständeiski. Count Hartmann, who was actually to be his guide in military matters, now took over the part that had hitherto been played by Dietrichstein. Before the Emperor Francis called the Count to be in attendance upon his grandson, he made searching inquiries from the President of the Council of War as to the Colonel's character, capacity, and education. His superiors described him as a man of agreeable appearance, who had fought with courage and determination in the campaigns of 1805, 1809, 1813–15. He was extolled for his remarkable attainments in military science as well as for his fluency in many languages.³ Prince Liechtenstein speaks of him

¹ Obenaus's memoir, January 18, 1831. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² The Emperor Francis to Count Gyulai, Pressburg, October 26, 1830. Imperial Archives of War in Vienna.

³ Conduct report. I. and R. Archives of War.

as an officer of great distinction, admirably suited to fulfil important duties either in peace or in war. "He is endowed with a noble character," runs the memorandum of the Minister of War, "full of honourable feeling and punctilious in the discharge of his duties; benevolence is his chief characteristic. He keeps an establishment very suitable to his circumstances, and leads quite a satisfactory and respectable life."¹ But, in spite of this, the choice does not seem to have been a very happy one. Notwithstanding all the virtues attributed to him, Prokesch declares Hartmann was of a dry, unambitious nature, incapable of winning the Prince's affections.² He made his first mistake when, instead of knowing how to proceed from intuition, he began by inquiring in what way he should set to work to win the Duke's confidence.³ Prokesch does not exaggerate when he pronounces Hartmann most unsuitable for so important a post. Those who knew everything were soon convinced of this. The Duke, who stood in need of an impressive personality, amused himself at the expense of his new Mentor, and wrote a character sketch of him in which he is represented as narrow-minded.⁴ It would have been far better to entrust this important mission to the Prince's friend Prokesch. He alone could have been a worthy successor to Dietrichstein. "He has never loved but us two," Prokesch wrote to the latter; "he has often assured me of this."⁵ Metternich, it

¹ I. and R. Archives of War.

² Prokesch (already quoted), p. 40.

³ Obenaus's diary, April 19, 1831. In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

⁴ *Ibid.* May 24, 1831. In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus. "The Prince read aloud from his diary a character sketch of General Hartmann and Riding-master Moll, in which the former appeared as narrow minded, &c." Among the staff officers Dietrichstein proposed for the Duke's service were Hess, Schell and others, besides Prokesch. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ Prokesch to Dietrichstein, August 22, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

seems, feared lest Prokesch should not have the necessary strength of character to keep the Prince out of all adventurous conspiracies. The Chancellor of State must have been apprehensive that, from enthusiasm for his noble friend, Prokesch would be led to follow him along paths which Metternich's policy would never have suffered them to tread. On this account he much preferred the capable, but dry and spiritless, Count Hartmann. So long as the latter was by the side of the young Napoleon, Metternich could rest assured that he would not be upset by any ill-considered step. But it must have been a bitter disappointment for the Duke, after he had been drawn into closer intimacy with Count Dietrichstein, to find himself now confronted with a man whose narrow, insipid nature was repellent to him. Whether he really exclaimed, "With what kind of people do they surround me?"¹ we do not actually know. It seems certain, however, that, of all the gentlemen of his new household, he only got on with Baron von Moll,² who proved a devoted and zealous nurse throughout the painful days of his last illness. The information respecting this officer imparted by his Colonel, Baron von Waldstätten, had not proved false; he fulfilled all that was expected of him.³ A more subordinate part was played by Captain Standeiski, whom Count Hartmann praises as an excellent officer.⁴ But the Duke simply found him good-natured,⁵ and never seems to have become intimate with him.⁶

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 45.

² *Ibid.* p. 40.

³ Sedlnitzky to Metternich, Vienna, October 23, 1830. M. I.

⁴ Count Hartmann's note, July 30, 1832.

⁵ Diary of Baron Obenaus, April 19, 1831. In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

⁶ According to accounts given by some one who calls himself "a fellow officer and contemporary of the Duke," Standeiski was charged to watch every movement of the young Napoleon. "Wiener Sonn-und

On the morning of June 14, 1831, Hartmann presented himself in his capacity as adviser to the Duke.¹ He had already been furnished with instructions as to his authority and duties. According to Prokesch, Metternich requested the Count to draw up for himself the orders which should serve him as a rule of conduct; but Hartmann, who felt the full weight of his responsibility, succeeded in convincing the Chancellor, after many vain attempts, of his unfitness for such a task. "Prince Metternich, therefore," continues Prokesch, "promised to supply this composition, and undertook to draw it up himself. To my knowledge he never fulfilled his promise."² In this instance, as in many others, Prokesch was mistaken. Taking for granted the fact, which is not confirmed by any other testimony, that Count Hartmann, conscious of his incapacity, turned for help first to the Duke and then to Metternich, he is altogether wrong in asserting that the latter gave a promise which he failed to fulfil. There is no doubt the Chancellor wrote the instructions for Hartmann with his own hand. The original document has been preserved, and is dated June 9, 1831.³

Hoping for the best, but filled with a sense of heavy responsibility, Count Hartmann entered upon his official duties. Was it not the Emperor's grandson, whose great gifts he heard praised on all sides, who was to be entrusted to his guidance? He was a witness of the boundless passion with which the Duke devoted himself to his military duties. The troops under the Prince's command felt instinctively that a born leader was at

Montagszeitung," 1869, No. 52. Ständeiski died at Trieste during the fifties, having become Field-Marshal Lieutenant.

¹ Diary of Baron Obenaus, June 14, 1831.

² Prokesch, "Mein Verhältnis, &c.," p. 49; see also the same, pp. 43-

45.

³ Part of these instructions are to be found in the previous chapter.

their head. On one occasion these soldiers, accustomed to the strictest discipline, carried away by their enthusiasm, had broken their usual silence and hailed his appearance by ringing cheers.¹ This devotion to his person spurred him on to further efforts, and caused him to disregard all the warnings to exercise prudence and care. Major-General Prince Vasa, in whose regiment he served, paid the following tribute to the excellent way in which he performed his duties: "He has a fiery temperament and an extremely lively nature. In society his manner is courteous and engaging. He is strict, but just, with his subordinates. He shows the best will and the most praiseworthy zeal in perfecting himself in the various branches of the service to which he has adapted himself in a very short time; he leads and commands his battalion judiciously and with dexterity, is a very good and rapid rider and well-mounted."² Another of his superiors supplements this statement by the remark that "this Prince unites the most excellent abilities and qualities which offer great expectations for the future."³ It is, however, astonishing to find Prince Vasa writing in the Duke's report: "Has good health and is able to bear any fatigue."⁴ Was he really ignorant of the fact that Dr. Malfatti, visiting the barracks, often surprised the Duke in a state of complete exhaustion, and that once, impatient of his weariness, the Prince exclaimed: "I am angry with this miserable body of mine, which is incapable of keeping pace with my will."⁵ Malfatti was right when he preached to the Duke, who gave himself no time for food or repose, that he possessed a soul of iron in a body of crystal.⁶ The doctor was the

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 60.

² Conduct report of Lieutenant-Colonel the Duke of Reichstadt, 1831. R. and I. War Archives.

³ Conduct report of the Duke of Reichstadt, 1831. R. and I. Archives of War.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Montbel (already quoted), p. 285.

⁶ *Ibid.*

more disposed to recommend prudence because he knew that, even in 1827, the Prince's condition had caused Dr. Staudenheim some anxiety. For this reason Malfatti himself had been against the Prince's early entrance into the army.¹ His persistently rapid growth, the sudden fatigue which overcame him, and his frequent attacks of hoarseness were not calculated to lessen anxiety as to his health. Count Hartmann was of opinion that the Prince's loss of voice when commanding the battalion need cause no anxiety. He assured every one that this was an ordinary occurrence, even with the strongest people who were not as yet accustomed to giving the word of command to a long line of troops. There was no need, he considered, to hinder him in the performance of his duties on this account: but when, in August, the Duke suffered from a severe feverish catarrh, and the Emperor, at Malfatti's suggestion, sent him to recover at Schönbrunn, he resented the doctor's interference, and said with an angry frown: "It is you who have placed me under arrest."² In the quiet of the beautiful park of Schönbrunn he quickly recovered. When Prokesch paid him a visit there, he found him looking well and scarcely any thinner. This faithful friend had the impression that the Emperor's grandson was worried by too much, rather than too little, attention.³ Prokesch sympathised too deeply with the Duke, who was condemned to inactivity, to recognise the necessity of the measures which were prescribed; but he soon confessed that the Duke's strength was not equal to his career. With a heavy heart he observed a great loss of energy towards the close of 1831. The Prince no longer took any interest in the work he had formerly loved. Attacks of fever now set in. Weary in mind and body, he ceased to go

¹ See his memorandum as to the Duke's illness of July 4, 1830.

² Montbel (already quoted), p. 288.

³ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 60.

into society, which had hitherto been an enjoyment.¹ Notwithstanding these symptoms, no one as yet dreamed of any real, imminent danger. Soon his condition greatly improved. Once more he was allowed to take the air in a carriage or on horseback, but he was enjoined to exercise moderation. One day, however, the Duke, who hated doctors and only submitted reluctantly to their directions, took a long and exhausting ride on the Prater in cold wet weather. He had hardly recovered from his fatigue when in the evening he drove in an open carriage to this damp pleasure-resort, where he remained until after sunset. By an unlucky accident a wheel of his carriage gave way. He started to go home on foot, but his strength failed him, and he fell in the public street. The immediate consequences of this foolish escapade were a violent fever and cough.² As may be imagined, these symptoms caused great anxiety. On the evening of April 14, Malfatti held a consultation with the doctors Wirer and Raimann.³ The next morning all three physicians visited the Prince.⁴ From this consultation Malfatti drew some hopes of the invalid's recovery, and wished to send him to the Baths of Ischl as soon as the favourable time of the year should arrive.⁵ He sent to Marie Louise the highly comforting news that he would guarantee the complete recovery of her child.⁶ "I was so disheartened," writes Marie Louise to the Emperor, "and so depressed and troubled about my son's state of health, that I had not even courage to inflict upon you, dearest papa, the laments of my anxious heart. Now that Heaven has been gracious to me and things are going better, I must kiss your hands a thousand

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 69.

² Montbel (already quoted), p. 332.

³ Dietrichstein's diary. Fr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "Correspondance de Marie Louise," p. 298.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 301. "... In all Malfatti's bulletins he guarantees his recovery."

times for all your goodness to him during his illness, and I pray you, dear papa, to continue this. The thought of your kindly and paternal care for him is my only solace during my absence, which under these circumstances falls doubly hard on me."¹ Even while the Duchess of Parma was writing these lines, a change was already taking place in the conditions of which she speaks. The Prince had suffered a relapse. There is no doubt the Emperor and his wife, Caroline Augusta, as well as the Archduchess Sophia and Archduke Rainer, showed him the most devoted sympathy in this trying time. The Emperor loved his grandson tenderly, and the Empress always spoke of him as "Dearest Frankie," "my dear little son," and signed herself "Your very loving grandmother."² To the Archduchess Sophia he was always "her dear, good old fellow,"³ and her husband, the Archduke Francis Charles, signs himself "Your loving Franz."⁴ It was the Archduchess Sophia who took upon herself the difficult task, which she fulfilled with the utmost consideration, of receiving with him, from the hands of the Court chaplain, the sacrament of the dying. To guard him from the painful impression that he was already a dying man, she told him they must unite their prayers; he for his recovery, and she for her approaching confinement.⁵ But however great the love and sympathy of the Imperial family, the invalid stood most in need of his mother's attention and that of his friend Prokesch. Marie Louise, however, considered it her first duty as a sovereign to remain in the country confided to her

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, May 5, 1832.

² The Empress Caroline Augusta to the Duke, 1822. Pr. Oe.—W. A. Marie Louise writes, March 1, 1821: "He [the son] is the idol of my father and of the Empress, who is like a second mother to him." "Catalogues des lettres autographes, Charavay."

³ Archduchess Sophia to the Duke, 1829. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁴ Archduke Francis Charles to the Duke, 1827. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

⁵ Montbel, (already quoted), p. 335.

care, which had just been visited by a severe earthquake, and was now in danger of an outbreak of cholera, then raging in Vienna.¹ Prokesch was far away in Rome, where, on July 24, he gave the most reassuring news of her grandson to the grandmother, now in her eighty-fifth year and almost blind; little dreaming that at this moment, Napoleon's son had but a few hours to live.²

The Prince had not even the comfort of seeing his grandfather, who was away from Vienna at the time. Count Hartmann, his Mentor, was charged to keep the Emperor constantly informed of his grandson's condition. The news was not very favourable. Confined to his room by the cold, damp weather, the Prince was distressed to find himself deprived of the outdoor exercise for which he longed.³ The Emperor, anxious to give pleasure to the invalid, made him Colonel of the 60th regiment, that of Prince Gustavus Vasa.⁴ The sick man was gratified by this fresh proof of his grandfather's "graciousness and affection"; but he was now so weak that he could not put pen to paper to express his gratitude.⁵ He recovered somewhat with the return of better weather, which permitted him, although in a very limited degree, to get out of doors on foot or in a carriage.⁶ Profiting by this improvement, on May 22 he was taken to Schönbrunn, where the Archduchess Sophia gave up for his use some of the rooms she usually occupied.⁷ A few

¹ "Correspondance de Marie Louise," p. 302, May 14, 1832." "For if, as ill-luck would have it, he [her son] should get worse, and that we had the cholera here, I could not go to Vienna, because I feel it to be the duty of every sovereign to sacrifice his dearest affections and to stay with his subjects in the midst of danger." See also *ibid.* p. 298.

² Prokesch (already quoted), pp. 71-73.

³ Hartmann's report of May 18, 1832, published by me in the *Revue Historique*, May—June, 1897.

⁴ Count Hardegg to the Duke, Vienna, May 13, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W.A.

⁵ Hartmann's despatch, Vienna, May 22, 1832. *Revue Historique*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

days after his arrival, Hartmann was able to inform the Emperor that the short stay in the country had already proved beneficial. "The fever," he wrote on May 28, "is not so violent, but it lasts longer, the nights somewhat quieter, the cough easier and the expectoration less, but always of the same nature. The Prince has begun to drink asses' milk, diluted at first with seltzer and afterwards with Marienbad water, but it is too soon as yet to observe any results."¹ The welcome improvement was not of long duration. From June 3 the fever and cough grew more violent, there was complete loss of appetite, and the improvement in his sleep now gave place to a kind of lethargy which only exhausted him. As his pulse grew more rapid, and his cough kept away all refreshing slumber, leeches were applied. The asses' milk was discontinued because it upset his digestion. "The Prince"—it was said on June 4—"is taking medicine for his lungs and liver and also some Marienbad water, consequently his appetite has somewhat improved and his head is clearer; but his nights are bad, his cough severe, the expectoration continuous and unaltered in character, his strength does not increase, his fever has not yet worn itself out, and the pulse remains too quick."² In consequence of these symptoms, Dr. Malfatti expressed a wish that three Viennese physicians should be called in consultation, Vivenot, Türkheim and Wirer. They declared themselves unanimously agreed as to the wisdom of the course hitherto adopted, but they could not stifle the conviction that the Prince's state was exceedingly precarious.³ He was so emaciated that he looked more like a very old man than a youth of one and twenty.⁴

¹ *Revue Historique*, May—June, 1897.

² Hartmann's despatch, Schönbrunn, June 9, 1832.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ So Foresti informs his brother in one of the letters communicated by Dr. Hermann Hallwich. "Mittheilungen des Vereines für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen," 1898, 37th year, No. 1, p. 36.

In the meanwhile, rumours of the dangerous character of the Duke's illness had reached the outer world. The Viennese who, on account of his tragic destiny, always greeted him with the greatest sympathy whenever he appeared in public, now openly displayed the warmest compassion.¹ In the French capital the Bonapartists took care that the most alarming news should be cried in the streets.² The intelligence also reached Florence, where Louis Bonaparte, the former King of Holland, was residing. Many times he had desired to write to his nephew but, convinced of the hopelessness of such an attempt, he invariably laid aside his pen.³ Now he believed that he would not be prohibited from speaking a few words of comfort to a sick man. With this idea in view, on May 23 he addressed a long letter to the Duke, in which he advised him only to have recourse to natural remedies, especially frequent change of air.⁴ Although Count St. Leu—as Louis called himself after his abdication in 1810—begged the Austrian ambassador in Florence to deliver the letter to his nephew by hand, the latter was never permitted to know of its existence. Metternich would not have suffered it; but by the time the letter reached Vienna the Duke's condition was so much worse that there could have been no question even of reading its contents to him. Since the beginning of June all hope of saving the Prince had been abandoned.⁵

¹ Despatch from Brockhausen, Prussian Ambassador, to Berlin. Vienna, July 22, 1832. Royal State Archives of Prussia.

² Confidential communication, Paris, May 22, 1832. M. I. "The Napoleonist party . . . cause the most sensational and ridiculous reports to be cried in the streets as to the desperate condition of his health."

³ Louis Bonaparte to the Duke of Reichstadt, Florence, May 23, 1832.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Despatch in Metternich's own handwriting, Vienna, June 7, 1832. "The Prince's condition is in keeping with his malady. His weakness increases in proportion as his illness progresses, and I see no possibility of saving him." Hartmann's report to the Emperor, Schönbrunn, June 14, 1832. ". . . Unhappily they [the doctors in consultation] are

At this time Marie Louise was visiting her father, who was staying at Trieste. At the commencement of May it had been arranged she should meet the Emperor there, and then return immediately to Parma.¹ As Counts Hartmann and Dietrichstein reported a slight improvement in the Duke, the Archduchess, having regard to the condition of her Duchy, considered it best to postpone her proposed journey to Vienna.² She was a good mother to her country, but she certainly failed in motherly love for her son. It was an unpardonable crime on her part to rest satisfied with these official communications, instead of finding out for herself the condition of the invalid. It was not until letters from Vienna described her child's state as very serious—in contradiction to Hartmann and Dietrichstein—that she sent Baron Marshall, who had been her adviser since Neipperg's death, to inquire from Metternich whether these rumours were really well-founded. Then, indeed, unless she would incur the blame of the whole world, the Empress must hasten from Trieste to her son's sick-bed.³ The mother's absence produced a bad impression in the capital. Every one thought it strange that, having come as far as Trieste, she should not continue her journey to Vienna.⁴ Already Metternich was afraid the Austrian people would never forgive her neglect. Therefore he considered it

unanimous in their opinion that the Prince is in an extremely grave condition, and they can hold out scarcely any hope of his recovery."

¹ Baron Marshall to Metternich, private letter, Bologna, May, 9, 1832.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* "Your Highness knows that for reasons of order and economy, as well as for the peace of the country, I should not lightly counsel her Majesty to leave home for Vienna without good reason; but you will equally understand my anxiety not to contribute unwillingly to the possibility of this august Princess being blamed some day for her indifference (which would certainly be merely apparent indifference) towards her son; I venture to ask you, my Prince, to give me your opinion on this subject."

⁴ Metternich's report of June 7, 1832.

most important that this feeling of irritation should not be concealed from the Emperor: he assured him Marie Louise must come to Vienna under any circumstances.¹ Malfatti, too, urged her coming without delay.² The Emperor replied to the Chancellor of State in his own handwriting: "My daughter had already resolved to go to Vienna, and actually starts to-morrow afternoon: to my sorrow I fear that she too is becoming a victim to consumption, for she also has fever and a cough, but I beg you not to mention this to her. Since writing my decision as above, my daughter has been ill, so that I do not know when she will be able to start."³ Marie Louise was ready to depart earlier than the Emperor expected. On June 24 she clasped her child in her arms. "The meeting, as is only too explicable," says Hartmann, "was very affecting for both of them; but her Majesty felt calmer for having seen the Prince, and his Highness himself was more cheerful, so that everything pointed to the fact that it did him good to see his mother once more."⁴

It was remarkable that, in spite of the fact that the Prince grew steadily worse, Dr. Malfatti still cherished illusions⁵ which he confided to Count Hartmann.⁶ But the mother-glance of Marie Louise was quicker; she was not to be deceived.⁷ The unusual and parching heat of July had a bad effect upon the invalid. The nights

¹ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Trieste, June 3, 1832. Published by me in the *Revue Historique*.

² Metternich's despatch, June 7, 1832.

³ The Emperor's decision, Trieste, June 12, 1832.

⁴ Hartmann's despatch, June 25, 1832.

⁵ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, June 30, 1832. "Malfatti still thinks him in a serious state, but always cherishes illusions."

⁶ Baron Moll to Count Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 6, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "General Hartmann, as is well known, does not quite believe the case is hopeless."

⁷ Marie Louise to the Emperor Francis, June 30, 1832.

were sleepless, and sometimes he would be seized with such a violent bout of coughing that he seemed in danger of suffocation. His voice sounded hoarse, and his legs, which were white and bloodless, swelled increasingly. Now he would no longer go into the palace garden, where, up to the present time, he had been carried twice a day; the most emphatic arguments were necessary in order to induce him to go at least once a day. Forebodings of death now possessed him; since July 13 he had spoken quite plainly of his end. Even Malfatti's optimism could not stand out against such a spectacle. Hard as it was, he was finally forced to admit that, "we are making no progress, but rather the reverse; the excessive heat has upset all my plans."¹ On July 15 no doubt could exist as to the danger which threatened the Duke; it was a terrible day for him.² His limbs remained cold for hours, and could only be kept warm by hot fomentations. Every symptom seemed to point to the fact that the inflammation of the lungs had now attacked the bronchial tubes.³ On the 19th he was a little quieter. This did not last long, and the expectoration returned. For three days he had refused all nourishment; even liquids were swallowed with great difficulty. As he was only kept alive by small quantities of barley water, his mind became clouded. His eyes alone remained clear, and showed a kind of excitement as their glance wandered restlessly from corner to corner of the room. When spoken to he fixed his eyes upon the person who addressed him, but made no reply. "I think the catastrophe is imminent," said Moll, summing up events on July 21,

¹ Baron Moll to Count Dietrichstein, then on a visit to his daughter, July 4, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Princess Metternich wrote on July 16: "Since yesterday evening the Duke of Reichstadt has been unconscious." Metternich's "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. v. p. 225.

³ Moll to Dietrichstein, Saturday, July 22, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

"but no one can speak with certainty, and I must confess that I mistook the crisis of Sunday last (July 15) for the beginning of his last hours."¹ The agony did not actually begin until the 21st. The difficulty of breathing, the result of increasing pneumonia, brought on weary hours of oppression and nervous agitation. "I desire death," he exclaimed in heartrending tones, "only death"; with these words he clenched his hands together and then let them fall upon the bed in the limpness of despair. When he was easier, he laughed and listened with languid pleasure to the "visionary accounts" of a journey to Naples with which Baron von Moll sought to cheer him.² Even in May the doctors had promised they would send him to the South as soon as he felt a little stronger—a prospect which had afforded him great pleasure, and could still distract him momentarily from his sufferings. He was touched whenever Moll spoke of it. The latter waited upon him with admirable devotion and attended to all his personal needs,³ for which the Duke thanked

¹ Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Baron Moll to Count Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 6, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A. Moll had promised Dietrichstein to write him a full account of the Duke's last moments, of which he had been a witness. But he was not able to fulfil his promise at once, on account of his departure for Linz and other claims upon his time. "If my account comes rather late, it has at least the merit of being more complete than any others you may have received, and in this respect you will not be sorry for my involuntary delay. It has lost nothing in truthfulness and accuracy, because my diary, in which I noted all the principal circumstances immediately after the catastrophe, has helped to refresh my memory." Moll's account is the sole authentic description of the Duke's last moments. From it we may correct those of Montbel (already quoted), Welschinger in "Le Roi de Rome" (p. 446), and others, in which truth is mingled with falsehood.

³ *Ibid.* "I cannot describe in words how disagreeable was the operation of removing the secretions which clung to his mouth and tongue; each time this had to be done I felt upset and the Prince thanked me with a look which showed that he realised the full unpleasantness of the task."

him with a look which showed that he fully appreciated these services. "To what things you have had to accustom yourself!" he exclaimed with difficulty: "you have had a bad time with me!" To distract him a little, Moll read aloud. But the Prince could give so little attention to this that half the book might have been skipped without his being in the least aware of it. The reader's tone had to be loud and clear: if he dropped his voice, or became inaudible, the Duke would immediately open his eyes and seem to be asking why the reading had ceased. "*Les Rebelles*" by D'Arlincourt was his last book.

During the day Marie Louise visited him occasionally. It created a profoundly tragic and injurious impression not to see her constantly near the Duke during these hours of suffering. A woman remains a mother, even though she may wear the Imperial diadem, and still more a mother when her child is lying on his deathbed. For this no hired service or consolation can make amends. Nature, religion, humane feeling should have told her that her place was at her son's bedside. In such cases, nature endows maternal love with power to overcome all fatigue: a mother needs so little repose! But Marie Louise believed she had done her duty when the last thing before her son fell asleep she came to bid him good-night!

Malfatti now began to observe that after a violent bout of coughing and expectoration the pulse became very weak. In case the oppression should return, he ordered fomentations and blisters. At ten o'clock, as though his vitality had rallied, the Duke asked Baron Moll if his carriage was ready for the journey to Naples, and was almost angry when the latter replied that Koller, the coach-builder, would have to mend the vehicle. But the difficulty with which he spoke and the long pauses between the words were symptoms that the end was near. As Moll did not actually expect the final catastrophe would

occur before the following day, at midnight he retired to the next room with the idea of taking a few hours' rest. In the absence of his mother, who was asleep, and of Moll, who was worn out, the patient was left alone with the valet Lambert. At about 4 A.M. (July 22) Lambert awoke Moll with the news that the Duke was at his last gasp. The Baron hastened to the sick-bed in time to catch the words: "I am sinking! I am sinking!" They then raised the Prince, and the sudden movement seemed to relieve the suffocation, which returned, however, with renewed violence. In a weary and broken voice he cried: "Call my mother! Call my mother! Clear the table, I want nothing more!"¹ This cry for his mother reverberates in our ears; a cry which will never be silenced; it affects us like a reproachful warning, like a bitter, poignant accusation. All the world stood by his cradle—his deathbed was deserted even by his own mother. In the poorest hovel there could be no lonelier passing away!

Moll showed too much consideration for Marie Louise by refusing, even then, to send for her. Because he believed the crisis was over for the time being, he made a sign to Lambert not to have her called as yet. The valet stood by the door, while Moll and Nickert, the so-called "doctor-in-waiting," remained by the bed to support the patient in an upright position. Suddenly the Baron felt the Duke clutch at his arm convulsively with one hand, while with the other he beat his breast and ejaculated with great effort: "Poultices, blisters!" These were his last words. Hardly had he spoken them before his eyes grew fixed and glazed; the convulsive movements of his body relaxed, and he fell into a state of torpor. When

¹ Moll to Dietrichstein, August 6, 1832. Pr. Os.—W. A. "These are the authentic words used by the Duke. Montbel (already quoted), p. 339, only cites the words: "I am sinking! My mother . . . my mother!"

the valet returned in haste with the cataplasms, Moll left the dying man to him and Nickert, while he went to announce to the mother, to the Archduke Francis Charles and the Court in general that the end had come. When he came back, the Prince was dying peacefully and without suffering; he breathed quietly, but could no longer articulate. He was still perfectly conscious and recognised every one. When Marie Louise, led by Moll, entered the death chamber, she was trembling from head to foot and clung to the Baron's arm for support. Reaching the bedside she remained standing there, incapable of uttering a word. The Prince recognised her, and made a slight motion of the head. Besides the Archduchess, Hartmann, Standeiski, Baron Marshall, Countess Scarampi and Dr. Malfatti were present. After the arrival of the Archduke Francis Charles, whose wife the Archduchess Sophia had not yet recovered from her confinement, Moll brought in the priest, who was waiting in the ante-room. He was the young Chaplain¹ of the Castle of Schönbrunn who now attended a death-bed for the first time, but in administering extreme unction he avoided all that was painfully emotional, as though he had been an experienced celebrant. All knelt while the priest performed his office; Marie Louise leant against a chair, the Archduke Francis Charles at the foot of the bed, the others behind or at the side. After extreme unction had been administered, during which the dying man, his hands folded, followed with his eyes each ceremonial function, the priest asked the Duke if he should read or pray aloud. To the first question he shook his head, but made an affirmative sign in reply to the second. The Chaplain now began to

¹ Montbel (p. 340) and Welschinger (p. 446) are quite wrong in representing the Court Chaplain Wagner as having performed this function. Montbel speaks only of a bishop, Welschinger mentions Wagner by name

pray half-aloud and laid his hand as though to mesmerise him, first on the forehead and then on the folded hands of the dying man. While this was taking place, Marie Louise was seized with faintness. When she recovered, she knelt down once more. At a few minutes past 5 A.M. the Prince, whose last hour was peaceful and easy, moved his head twice from side to side. Then his breathing ceased and his lips no longer moved. Malfatti and Moll then went to the bedside. Malfatti smoothed the lines from the Prince's brow, remarking to Moll that the warmth of life was already extinguished. Marie Louise caught these half-whispered words. When she tried to rise, she slipped back again, weak and shaken, upon her knees. Hartmann and Marshall hastened to her assistance and led her from the death-chamber, in which the candles still burned in spite of the daylight, back to her own apartments.¹ On the anniversary of his creation as Duke of Reichstadt—June 22, 1818—the Emperor's son who, in his cradle, had been entitled King of Rome, ended his existence in the very room which had been occupied by his father in 1809, at the zenith of his fame and glory. Even to-day it is impossible to enter this apartment in the palace of Schönbrunn without being deeply touched. No such feeling of reverence, however, seems to have deterred those who almost instantly after his death set to work to rob him of his curls.² Prompted

¹ The account is entirely derived from Moll's letter to Dietrichstein, August 6, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Foresti to Dietrichstein, August 14, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "De Jonge will not be able to bring you many hairs belonging to the deceased. He told me that in a few minutes, before it could be prevented, the head of the unfortunate Prince was shorn of almost all its hair. An hour after his death a number of people had been to look at him, who either did not care what they did, or could not be forbidden to come." The same to the same, August 15, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "I do not really believe the Prince had sufficient locks of hair on his head to supply the supplicants who came to beg for them. When I think of the number

by the craze to secure souvenirs of the Duke, people crowded in and carried off what they could lay hands upon. Before it was found out, a considerable number of articles which he had in daily use disappeared entirely.¹ Before the funeral a sculptor, hitherto unknown, named Klein, asked permission to make a death-mask of the Prince; but this was not done on the day of his death, as it has been asserted,² but just after the post-mortem examination of the body, when the dead man's features had been made to resume as far as possible their normal form.³ In order to get a better likeness, Foresti introduced the sculptor to several people who had known the Prince intimately and were able to give him information on many points.⁴ Several Viennese artists of that day have spoken well of this mask.⁵

of people who came to ask me for one, *me* who could not get a single one of his hairs. Not an announcement of his death, nor a mourning card—I could get nothing at all. I do not know who were favoured, nor who used the scissors so thoughtlessly upon the head of the poor dead man. I was not living in Schönbrunn and did not share in the watch." In 1865 a certain Marie Klier (*née* von Kappler) sent Napoleon III. a lock of the Duke's hair, which, however, he did not accept. See a book, in many respects highly interesting, by Henri Bordier, "*L'Allemagne aux Tuileries 1850-1870*," p. 208.

¹ Foresti to Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 27, 1832. Pr. Oc.—W. A. "It is as though everything had been scattered to the winds. I can find none of his usual sticks or whips." Foresti was entrusted with the sorting of the Prince's papers. He laid aside their own letters for Prokesch and Dietrichstein. At the same time he packed up all family correspondence for Marie Louise. What became of all these documents? In Parma, where I made personal inquiries, they are no longer in existence.

² Welschinger, "*Le Roi de Rome*," p. 448.

³ Foresti to Dietrichstein, Vienna, September 8, 1832. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1832. Pr. Oc.—W. A. At the present moment we know of four death-masks of the Duke. One is in the "*Musée Carnavalet*" in Paris, one in the possession of Prince Victor Napoleon, the third in the "*Musée Lorrain de Nancy*," and the fourth in the town museum of Baden (near Vienna). In 1857



THE ROOM IN WHICH THE DUKE OF KLEISTADT DIED, IN THE CASTLE OF SCHNBRUNN,
NEAR VIENNA

On July 24 the funeral obsequies were celebrated with all the ceremonies customary at the Imperial Court. The Prince, once called to the throne of France, could not be buried in his native soil; the vault in the church of the Capuchins, in which members of the Imperial family were interred, was also the last resting place of the Duke of Reichstadt. Although the patent which conferred this title upon him in 1818 spoke of him only as the child of Marie Louise, and completely ignored his father's name,¹ he appears as the son of Napoleon and Marie Louise in the inscription which embellished the sarcophagus.²

Was this prompted by a desire to spare the dead the obloquy of being handed down to posterity as a fatherless child? Or was it only an accident that his epitaph mentioned Napoleon also? Whether by an error or not, the Court thus escaped the reproach that out of hatred for Napoleon his dead son had been made to pass as illegitimate: but this did not alter the fact that—strangely enough—the death of the Duke severed the last tie between Marie Louise and that past in which she had been the Empress of France and the wife of a certain Klein of Brunn (in Bavaria) offered a death-mask of the Duke to Napoleon III. Henri Bordier, "*L'Allemagne aux Tuileries, 1850-1870*," p. 207. Was this a descendant of Klein the sculptor, and is this mask now in the possession of Prince Victor Napoleon? The French painter Goubeaud, King Joseph Bonaparte's famous envoy to Metternich, asked permission to make a sketch of the room in which the Duke died. Sednitzky to Court Counsellor Mérey, Vienna, September 3, 1832.

¹ See the chapter entitled "The Duke of Reichstadt."

² The inscription runs: "*Aeternae memoriae Jos. Car. Francisci, ducis Reichstadiensis Napoleonis Gall. imperatoris et Mar. Ludovicae Arch. Austr. filii nati Parisiis XX Mart. MDCCCXI in cineribus regis Romae nomine salutati. Aetate omnibus ingenii corporibusque dotibus florentem procera statura vultu juveniliter decore singulari sermonis comitate, militaribus studiis et laboribus mire intentum phthisis tentavit tristissima mors rapuit in suburbano Augustorum ad pulchrum fontem prope Vindobonam XXII Julii MDCCCXXXII.*"

Napoleon. What must have been her feelings, what the workings of her inmost soul, when, kneeling by that death-bed, she raised her head and heard from Malfatti's lips the fateful words that her child, Napoleon's child, had breathed his last! Or was this page of history, so closely linked with her name, so completely erased from her memory, that she never gave a thought even in that moment to the father of the dead man? It really seems that she was not greatly troubled by any echoes from the past. The sense of filial duty weighed far more with her, and reminded her, almost before she had crossed the threshold of her room, that she must inform the Emperor of his grandson's death. "My poor son," she wrote, "has just this moment passed away, at ten minutes past five. Heaven heard my poor supplications and let him fall quietly asleep. I kiss your hands, best of fathers, for all the gracious kindness you showed him during his lifetime: my tenderly loving heart will always be grateful to you."¹ Half an hour after death had entered the palace, Metternich despatched Moll with this letter to the Emperor, then staying at Linz. He was to give from his own lips a detailed account of the Duke's last hours. Metternich himself wrote to his Imperial master as follows: "It is fortunate for your Majesty that the Duke, who could not have been saved, passed away before your return. Your Majesty has been spared a heartrending spectacle. I have recently visited him, and I do not remember ever to have seen a more terrible wreck."² Although the Emperor Francis was prepared for this issue, yet he was greatly distressed at the news of the death of his grandson, for whom he had cherished a warm and sincere affection. This man, who had never been known to shed a tear, wept bitterly at this moment.³

¹ Published by me in the *Revue Historique*, May-June 1897.

² Metternich to the Emperor, Vienna, July 22, 1832.

³ Foresti to Dietrichstein, Vienna, July 24, 1832. "Moll told me

But he immediately collected himself, and, grasping the universal importance of this sad event, replied to Metternich: "With his complaint, my grandson's death was a blessing for himself, and perhaps also for my children and the world in general; he will be a loss to me."¹ Those who formed his immediate surroundings were not less deeply affected. "God alone knows," wrote Count Hartmann to Dietrichstein, who was still away, "why so precious a life should have ended, and only religion can bring consolation in course of time to us who were loyally devoted and attached to him."² Prokesch, who returned to the capital shortly after his friend's death, could hardly contain himself for grief when he found his home deprived of this being, to whom he was bound by ties of the warmest sympathy.³ "I cannot express my feelings, my dear patron,"⁴ says Foresti to Dietrichstein: "the sympathy shown in the town and in the provinces is indescribable. The bustle in the streets, the crowding to the Imperial Palace, as though it were a great European event."⁵

"No eyes," sings a poet, "but were cast down in sorrow, when the passing bell sounded in Schönbrunn: "The beautiful Duke of Reichstadt is no more." "⁶

If the Austrian ambassador is to be credited, Paris received the news of the young Napoleon's death with indifference. "The death of the Duke of Reichstadt," that the Emperor shed many tears, when first he saw him." Pr. Oe.—W.A.

¹ Schlitter, "Die Stellung der Oesterrichischen Regierung, &c." Archives of Austrian History, vol. lxxx., p. 122.

² Hartmann to Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 3, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W.A.

³ Prokesch to Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 22, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W.A.

⁴ Foresti to Dietrichstein, Vienna, July 22, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W.A.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vienna, July 24, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W.A.

⁶ Levitschnigg, "West-Oestlich," Vienna, 1846, p. 168, "Die Wacht-parade in Walhalla." See also Béranger's "Madame Mère," when the latter gives vent to her grief for her grandson's death.

he writes on August 20, "has made but little impression here, and this Prince will be far more sincerely regretted in Vienna as the grandson of the Emperor, than in Paris as the son of Napoleon."¹ This, however, does not tally with the experiences of an Englishman, staying in Paris at this time, who found the shop-windows of the capital filled with pictures portraying every possible incident of the Prince's last moments. He was to be seen borne by the Imperial eagle to heavenly regions, where Napoleon awaited him, surrounded by his Staff. Another engraving showed him upon his death-bed making a last effort to grasp his father's sword. A third picture represented the great Emperor with Ney, Desaix, Lannes, Kléber, Labédoyère, embracing his son in Heaven.² Do not even the plays then being performed in Paris, such as "A vingt-et-un ans! ou l'agonie à Schönbrunn," "La mort du Roi de Rome," "Vienne et Schönbrunn," "Le fils de l'Empereur," "Le Duc de Reichstadt," testify to the great sympathy of the French?³ "A vingt-et-un ans," in particular, had a real *succès de larmes*. Even before the curtain was raised the women began to cry, while the men could not help being deeply touched. Whenever the Jesuit Evrard was made to desire the death of the Emperor's son, a number of voices exclaimed: "This is revolting! Down with the Jesuits!" On the other hand, a storm of enthusiasm was evoked when the Duke spoke in favour of the Bonapartist propaganda. A deep impression was also produced when the dying Duke has the tricolour flag brought to him, and with his last words—as spoken on

¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 20, 1832.

² "Austria and the Austrians," vol. i. p. 254. The author states that he was in Paris in August 1832.

³ L. Henry Leconte, "Napoléon et l'Empire racontés par le théâtre 1797-1899," gives (pp. 318-321) a list of the plays and the names of their authors.

the stage—requests it may be used as his funeral pall.¹ One of the greatest of French poets, Victor Hugo, has also given touching expression to the grief occasioned by the death of the Duke. A whole tragedy lies in the words:

“Seigneur, votre droite est terrible !
 Vous avez commencé par le maître invincible,
 Par l’homme triomphant,
 Puis vous avez enfin complété l’ossuaire :
 Dix ans vous ont suffi pour filer le suaire
 Du père et de l’enfant ! ”²

Heinrich Heine, who so well understood the French situation at that time, also bears witness to the grief displayed by the nation, as reflected in the pictures, poems³ and plays of the day. He writes: “One can

¹ This is related by Wurzbach, “Biographisches Lexikon,” vol. xxv., p. 191, according to the account of an eye-witness at the “Théâtre de l’Ambigu.”

² Victor Hugo, “Oeuvres complètes,” edition 1880, vol. iii., p. 52.

³ A few French poems were published in John Grand-Carteret’s “L’Aiglon en Images” (p. 384 and following). Of German poems devoted to the death of the Duke of Reichstadt I must mention N. Müller’s “Der König von Rom” in the *Argus*, Hamburg, 1837, No. 77; and further, “Napoleons Wiegenlied,” by an unknown author, of which I quote the last verse:

“Schläfst du noch nicht, toller Bube ?
 Deine Kronen sind zerschellt !
 Statt des Throns—die dunkle Grube !
 Eine Insel—statt der Welt.”

“Not yet asleep, thou madcap lad ?
 All thy crowns are shattered now !
 In place of a throne—a gloomy vault !
 An island—in place of the world.”

The well-known poem below originated with Saphir :

“Im Garten zu Schönbronnen,
 Da liegt der König von Rom,” &c.

“In the garden at Schönbronnen,
 There lies the King of Rome,” &c.

In Saphir’s works, popular edition, vol. xiv., p. 103; *ibid.* p. 101; also “Der Tod des jungen Napoleon.”

form no conception what an impression has been made upon the lower classes in France by the death of the young Napoleon. I was travelling along most of the northern coast of France just when the news was spreading. Wherever I went I found the same wonderful display of grief among the people. The fair women of Normandy were especially loud in their lamentations over the early death of the hero's son. In every hut hangs a picture of the Emperor. It is invariably crowned with garlands of *immortelles*, like the pictures of the Saviour during the Passion week. Many soldiers wore crape. An old man with a wooden leg shook hands with me mournfully, saying: "*A présent tout est fini.*"¹

Apponyi really seems to have been led astray by King Louis Philippe when he speaks of indifference as the prevailing feeling in Paris. The French King might still protest that for him and his Government this event could have no further result than to evoke sincere sympathy.² The fact remains that the people of his capital were far more occupied with the Prince than could have been agreeable to him.³ What was the meaning of that report which, originating in Paris, spread far and wide, that the Duke had been poisoned by the Court of Vienna? Was it indifference which prompted a French Academician, M. Arnault, to relate in the *Revue de Paris* that the young Napoleon, disgusted by his false position, had killed himself by refusing all remedies?⁴ These accusations, directed against the Emperor Francis and Metternich, found universal and ready acceptance immediately after the Duke's death, and were propagated so long and assiduously that, even now, they have not alto-

¹ Heine, "Französische Zustände," letter from Dieppe, August 20, 1832, "Der Tod des Herzogs von Reichstadt."

² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 20, 1832.

³ "Austria and the Austrians," vol. i. p. 254.

⁴ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, August 20, 1832.



THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT ON HIS DEATH-BED
From a water-colour drawing by Feder. In the Archival Collection, Archives, in Vienna

gether lost their vitality. So widely was the poisoning fable circulated that, in September 1832, even the King of Bavaria questioned the Austrian representative at his Court as to its authenticity. "Tell me," he asked, "did the Duke of Reichstadt die a natural death?" Then, becoming aware, by the ambassador's answer, of the impropriety of his question, the King added in haste: "Do not misunderstand me; I mean that as there are two parties in France who might derive some advantage from his death, might there not have been an attempt from this side against the life of Napoleon's son?"¹ The author of a *brochure* that appeared in 1842, even dared to offer to the world the fiction that Metternich had sent the Prince, by Prokesch, a poisoned melon, the enjoyment of which had slowly, but surely, ensured his end.² It was also hinted that an Italian dentist, named Carabelli, living in Vienna, had been bribed to administer slow poison to the Prince.³ Even Dr. Malfatti did not escape similar suspicions.⁴

When the celebrated Viennese comedian and humourist, Nestroy, appeared in 1848 at the Hamburg theatre, made up as Metternich, he wanted the actor Hesse to ask him the apparently improvised question: "What really happened with regard to the poisoning of the Duke of Reichstadt?" But during the performance Hesse lost courage, and only muttered something without

¹ Münch-Bellinghausen's report, Frankfort, September 22, 1832. Published by me in the *Revue Historique*, May—June, 1897.

² "Marie Luise und der Herzog von Reichstadt, die Opfer der Politik Metternichs." Published by a former servant of the State. Paris, 1842, p. 206.

³ *Nouvelle Revue*, January 15, 1897. "Le Duc de Reichstadt, par A."

⁴ "Révélations sur la Mort du Duc de Reichstadt," Philibert Audebrand, in his work, "Napoleon a-t-il été un homme heureux," Paris, 1897, takes the view that Austria intentionally brought about the Duke's death. Lichtenberger censures this in his indictment of Audebrand's work, which appeared in the *Revue Historique* (p. 362).

even bringing in the Duke's name, so that the intended sensation fell flat, and the public had no notion to whom the question and answer referred.¹ Similar accusations, namely, that the seeds of precocious decay had been intentionally implanted in the Prince, were made against the Imperial Court even before his death. It was said in 1829 that his life in Vienna was nothing but a "moral St. Helena" that must speedily lead him to the grave.² Nor was Metternich spared the reproach that he had beguiled the Duke into excesses and, with the help of the beauties of the ballet, had purposely kindled passions which caused his early decline. His love affair with the charming and universally admired dancer, Fanny Elsler, was especially commented upon.³ After the Duke's death it was said that a wealthy young Englishman made brilliant offers to Fanny, which met with her ready acceptance. When, however, his wish had been fulfilled, he took leave of her and, eye-glass in eye, as if to appraise her charms from every point of view, said in atrocious French: "Thank you, now I have seen the grave of the Duke of Reichstadt," upon which he promptly retired, leaving a well-filled purse behind him.⁴

The funeral of the Duke had not yet taken place when Metternich, stung by the unveracious accounts of his illness that had appeared in the *Temps* of July 14, 1832, felt bound to contradict the lies already in circulation, and those which might certainly be looked for in the future. He resolved through the medium of the French newspapers to publish the true facts bearing upon the death of the

¹ Holtei, "Simmelsammelsurium," vol. i, p. 290.

² "Le Fils de l'Homme, ou Souvenirs de Vienne, par Barthélemy et Méry," Œuvres III.

³ Heinrich Laube in 1836 writes in his "Reisenovellen," vol. iii, p. 168: "The elderly Elsler appears to have been for a considerable length of time the object of his affections." Welschinger (already quoted), p. 148, always writes "Eslser" in mistake for "Elsler."

⁴ *Nouvelle Revue*, January 15, 1897. "Le Duc de Reichstadt, par A."

young Napoleon. An anonymous subscriber, who was of course no other than Metternich himself, wrote from Vienna on July 23 to the editor of the *Journal des Débats*. This reader desired to inform the French newspaper that the Duke did not suffer from melancholia, as stated in the *Temps*; nor had he met his death, as had also been said, in consequence of being sent on military duty when the thermometer registered 18 degrees of frost, for such a thing had never occurred.¹ But Metternich did not rest content with this defence only. He commissioned Count Montbel, the Minister of Charles X., then staying in Vienna, to write a book at once upon the Duke of Reichstadt, with the express object of giving the lie direct to all erroneous views respecting the life and illness of the deceased.² Montbel, immediately after the revolution of July 1830, had come to Vienna, where he settled as a Swiss under the assumed name of Capdeville,³ and in frequent interviews with Metternich had gained the complete confidence of the Chancellor.⁴ Prokesch would gladly have undertaken this duty; but since Marie Louise scarcely responded to his offer, and also because he observed that Count Montbel was preferred on account of his nationality as a Frenchman, he condemned himself, as he says, to silence.⁵ But he

¹ Metternich to Apponyi, Baden near Vienna, August 4, 1832. The letter to the editor is included.

² Foresti to Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 27, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "Who gave him [Montbel] the authority to do it? Prince Metternich. Who gave him the materials for it? For the later periods Count Hartmann and also Prokesch. For the earlier days I was his chief source of information. But you may be sure I only said what was favourable. The majority of my communications referred to the plan of study and the instruction given." See also Metternich's "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. v. p. 236.

³ Maltzahn's despatch, Vienna, September 7, 1830. Royal Secret State Archives of Prussia.

⁴ Metternich to Ficquelmont, February 3, 1832.

⁵ Prokesch to Dietrichstein, Vienna, September 16, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W A

did not, therefore, entirely suppress his voice. "Starting from this point of view," he writes to Dietrichstein on October 13, 1832, "that it is a duty of friendship to raise some memorial to the Duke out of my slender means, I have resolved upon a small work that may not only exist side by side with Montbel's, but can even be of assistance to his book. I have drawn a warm and truthful character-sketch of the Prince," he continues, "in which I throw light on his ways of thinking, his dreams and desires, and discuss the greatest questions quite frankly. This account will be a crushing answer to those who accuse Austria of having intentionally shortened the Duke's life."¹ With the consent of Metternich, whom Prokesch had previously told of his work, the short treatise now appeared: "Letters to * * * about the Duke of Reichstadt. By one of his friends."² But Prokesch was mistaken when he regarded his publication as a "crushing reply" to all the accusations directed against the Court of Vienna. As we have already seen, these calumnies continued to be industriously circulated, and, even in recent years, Rostand in "l'Aiglon" has not refrained from drawing false conclusions. Not long since, Dr. Cabanès, a French physician, made a new and searching analysis of the case, and came to the conclusion that the Duke died from tuberculosis.³ This result had also been ascertained at the post-mortem examination, which took place at Schönbrunn, on July 23, 1832. The six doctors⁴ then present found that whilst the left

¹ Pr. Oe.—W. A.

² Freiburg in Breisgau, 1832. Metternich only permitted the appearance of this work on condition that it should be published abroad.

³ L'Aiglon, "Comment est mort le Duc de Reichstadt par le docteur Cabanès," appeared in the *Gazette des Hôpitaux*, March 15, 1900. See also Dard, "Le Duc de Reichstadt," in *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, May, 1896.

⁴ Semlitsch, Royal and Imperial Court surgeon; Johann Malfatti, physician-in-ordinary; Franz Wirer, M.D.; Joh. Fr. Edler von Hieber,

lung was only slightly affected, the right one was in a terrible condition, being almost destroyed by tubercular disease.¹ The post-mortem examination further revealed the fact that the brain, heart, and liver were in perfectly healthy condition, as well as the stomach, which was abnormally small; the chest, however, was much too narrow for a healthy person.²

The post-mortem examination having proved beyond all doubt that the Prince died of an unusually rapid form of consumption, all suspicions of his having been poisoned by Metternich or his accomplices should have been finally silenced. The fictions as to traps set *on purpose* to catch the young Napoleon seem equally incredible. Not only Fanny Elsler herself declared that she had never had any intimate relations with the Prince,³ but Prokesch, too, when requested by Napoleon III. to tell him the truth as to these alleged love affairs, assured the Emperor that these rumours were entirely without foundation.⁴ They were originated by the visits of the Duke's servant to the house where Fanny Elsler lived. In this house Gentz, who was passionately in love with the dancer, had furnished a study or writing-room for himself and Prokesch. Whenever the Duke wished to send a note to his friends, he despatched his servant to

Royal and Imperial Court physician; Dr. Rinna, Royal and Imperial Court physician; Dr. Zangerl, Royal and Imperial physician to the household and actuary.

¹ Result of post-mortem examination, published in Montbel (already quoted).

² *Ibid.* p. 421.

³ "Mémoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris," vol. iii. p. 257. "It was reported by several German newspapers that Mdle. Fanny Elsler had inspired the Duke of Reichstadt with a great passion; I questioned the ex-dancer of Vienna on this subject with lively curiosity; I always found her sincere and free from prudery, and she assured me that this passion for her on the part of the Emperor's son was nothing but a made-up story."

⁴ "Briefe des Grafen Prokesch, 1849-55," published by his son Anthony, Vienna, 1896, p. 456.

Fanny Elsler's.¹ But were all his thoughts and feelings, actually so absorbed in other matters as to leave no room for more than the most fleeting impressions of the fair sex?

"Natural instincts awoke in this youth of twenty," says Prokesch. "He often spoke to me of these feelings, but in a tone of perfect innocence. This he would never have done had he known closer intercourse with women. The shame of misdoing would have betrayed him. He was strictly moral. He had impulses but nothing more."² It is natural enough that all the poets who write about the Duke represent him as being passionately in love.³ But this is only a figment of the imagination. As a matter of fact, only two instances are known in which certain Countesses, whose names have not transpired, fascinated the Emperor's son by their beauty and amiability. In spite of this, people could not be made to believe that he did not indulge in excessive dissipation. In 1836 Laube writes: "The Duke's death may be attributed to the narrow chest of the Lorraines and to

¹ Prokesch, "Mein Verhältnis, &c.," p. 68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³ Hayn, "Bibliotheca Germanorum erotica," p. 216, mentions "Des Herzogs von Reichstadt einzige Liebe." Together with a supplement. Derived from French sources. Leipzig, Lit. Museum, 1833. "Napoleon II.," historical romance by Jean Charles (Braun von Braunthal), Prague, 1863. There also appeared in German: Luise Müllbach, "Erzherzog Johann und der Herzog von Reichstadt," three volumes; Otto von der Pfordten: "Der König von Rom," dramatic poem in five acts, Heidelberg, 1890; J. B. Bardou: "Palmyre, Fils du Duc de Reichstadt," 1871; Alexandre Dumas, "Les Mohicans de Paris." See also in "Le Carnet historique et littéraire," April 15, 1900, the interesting article by J. Garson. In the "Mémoires des Herzogs von Reichstadt," Berlin, 1870 (Part XIV. of the "Sittenbilder"), another love affair of the Duke's and its consequences are related. I need hardly mention that these are not authentic memoirs. In the Italian play, "Il duca di Reichstadt, dramma in sei atti di Ricardo Castelvecchio," Milano, 1861, the Duke is represented as having relations with a dancer.

his youthful indiscretions.¹ When the grandson grew up, the pretty girls," he adds, "kept him fully occupied."² Rumour even went so far as to provide him with a legitimate as well as an illegitimate son.³ All these assertions might easily have been treated as malicious slanders had they not been partly caused by the Duke's tutor, Obenaus himself. At the end of his diary he makes the following ominous remark: "The Prince died on July 22 1832, at 4.30 A.M., at Schönbrunn, of consumption, the result of — — — —, as Obenaus frequently prophesied — —." What is the meaning of these dashes? That the Duke came to his end through unrestrained association with women of light character? ⁴ We must be careful before coming to such a conclusion. Since, in his diary, Obenaus never says a single word as to his pupil's immorality, may not these dashes refer only to some mistaken medical treatment? Here the question

¹ Laube, "Reisenovellen," 1836, vol. iii. p. 168.

² *Ibid.*

³ On December 18, 1900, Clara Ludwig, *née* Wendt, announced in the Chemnitz *Allgemeine Anzeiger* the death of her husband the "Master-tailor," Ludwig Bonaparte, on December 17, at the age of sixty-eight. This master tailor pretended to be an illegitimate son of the Duke of Reichstadt by a certain Frau von Reitzenberg. If he was really sixty-eight in the year 1900 he must have been born in 1833, after the death of the Duke. In Wurzbach's "Biogr. Lexikon," vol. xxv., p. 191, a teacher at Warnsdorf near Wurzen, Saxony, is mentioned as the Duke's legitimate son by his marriage with a Hungarian Countess. The Duke's marriage is supposed to have taken place on an estate situated near Debreczen. The Prince, however, never went further than Pozsony (Pressburg), and therefore can never have been in Debreczen, or in its neighbourhood. This teacher, in a petition he addressed to the Embassy of Saxony in Vienna, asking that his baptismal certificate should be delivered to him, signed himself "Prince Eugène Joseph Napoleon Bonaparte." See also the novel (already quoted) by Bardon.

⁴ The Baron du Bourget, whose mother, born a Princess Festetics, had known the Prince in Vienna in her youth, relates what he heard from her: "My mother reproached his *entourage* for having encouraged, rather than checked such excesses as his health was not able to resist." *Le Carnet Historique*, April 15, 1890, p. 273.

may actually be raised : whether the Prince's condition during his illness was always correctly diagnosed by his doctors ?

Foresti expresses himself very frankly on this point. On August 2, 1832, he writes to Count Dietrichstein : " It is really sad to see how both the great lights in Vienna continued to insist upon the presence of a malady which did not exist, and how, on the other hand, they denied the one of which the symptoms were so evident."¹ By one of these " great lights " he means Malfatti. It seemed to Foresti that this doctor devoted his medical skill exclusively to the treatment of a liver complaint and regarded the lung disease as of secondary importance. This is evident from the scornful tone in which Foresti informs his brother that at the post-mortem examination " this liver that was so frequently blamed, was found to be quite *healthy*, whereas the right lung was quite *destroyed* by tubercular disease."² Malfatti certainly told Montbel later on that, as long as the condition of the liver and the hemorrhoids predominated, the chest complaint did not make nearly as much progress as had been feared.³ Although as early as 1830 he had diagnosed the Duke's illness as consumption, he is still open to the reproach that he did not bring the whole weight of his medical skill to bear upon this serious disease.

It certainly strikes us as strange to hear it constantly reiterated that the Prince would not carry out the doctors' orders, and insisted on going out in wet and windy weather, which was bad for him. Could no one convince him of the folly of such proceedings ? When he did not obey the doctors' orders, why did they not complain directly to the Emperor, as Dietrichstein had always done in

¹ Pr. Os.—W. A.

² Foresti to his brother, Vienna, July 26, 1832, published by Hallwich in " Mittheilungen, &c." 1898, p. 36.

³ Montbel (already quoted), p. 487.

similar cases? The Prince invariably submitted to the authority of his grandfather. Under these circumstances we are compelled to blame the physicians for not sufficiently emphasising the importance of keeping the Duke from experiments which must have been dangerous to his life.¹

In the tragedy of this unhappy Prince many mysterious influences played their part, all of which combined to hasten his end before he could give proofs of his incontestably great mind. It was not only disease that consumed his energy. His health was equally undermined by a continual struggle against his destiny, his false position at the Imperial Court, and his restless yearnings for action and renown. Prokesch justly observes: "A happy and active youth would have proved beneficial to his physical development."² Accustomed from childhood to practise all manner of arts in order to conceal from others his most intimate thoughts, he must indeed have become an adept at dissimulation if a Metternich could speak of him as "a first-rate actor." He was aware that he was continually watched and spied upon; that every step he took attracted the attention of the world. What must have been his feelings when he received letters asking him to declare whether he regarded himself as an Austrian or a French Prince? This was the profoundly seated discord which so powerfully agitated his soul. As grandson of the Emperor Francis he wished to be, for Austria, a second Prince Eugene; on the other hand, he was continually being admonished to remain the son of the great Napoleon. At such moments his thoughts turned with profound sadness towards France,

¹ Count Hartmann to Dietrichstein, Schönbrunn, July 17, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A. "You know that they [the doctors] unanimously declared that all M. Malfatti had done was right and suitable to the Prince's complaint, that nothing better could have been done or given."

² Prokesch, "Mein Verhältnis, &c.," p. 85.


the throne of which was occupied by another. To emerge triumphant from such a conflict he needed a stronger and more resistant nature. "I am quite of your opinion," writes Foresti to Dietrichstein a few days after the Duke's death, "that it is far better for the poor Prince to have passed into a quieter world. His entire position was so artificial, so constrained, so unnatural, his character so perplexing and incomprehensible, his dangers so many, that contentment and true happiness were impossible for him in this life. On the other hand," he says emphatically, "the loss to the State is all the greater, as people are now beginning to realise. Such a guarantee against the wanton aggression of foreign Powers we are *never* likely to possess again."¹ It is an interesting fact that it was only after the death of the Duke that the Viennese became conscious of his importance. "Now the poor Prince lies in his grave," says Foresti, "we wish him back again, or, at any rate, attach some importance to his name."² This was proved to the world by the distinctions conferred on all those who had been in close attendance upon the Prince.³

Austria, said a contemporary witness, had indeed lost

¹ Foresti to Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 2, 1832. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² *Ibid.*, August 7, 1832. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

³ In an undated memoir Dietrichstein says the same to Marie Louise. He writes: "His Serene Highness the Duke of Reichstadt, by his high birth on both sides, by his political position, and also by the great expectations which he certainly justified, had attracted the attention of the world more than any other prince. His death in the flower of his youth is so terrible and, especially for the [Imperial] House, so prejudicial and lamentable, that the painful impression it has everywhere created (as is shown by the sympathy which, during his life and illness, he received here and throughout Europe) can only be partly alleviated if his memory is honoured in some worthy way by the *last* august and generous orders of his Serene Mother, and the blame which awaits far and wide may be deprived of the smallest foundation." Dietrichstein's suggestion was followed by the award of various distinctions to those who had been in immediate attendance upon the Duke.



THE DAY OF THE BARRAGE OF RENT-PAID WAS CANCELLED FROM SUNDAY TO VIENNA DURING THE
MARCH OF 1848

in the Duke her "best hope and her protective spell" against the foreign Powers.¹ At the first moment it seemed as if the Napoleonist party in France had suffered a still heavier blow: but those who expected the death of the Emperor's son to bring about the disruption and total extinction of the Bonapartists were mistaken. Immediately after hearing of the Prince's death, Carrel wrote in the *National*: "No, the people will never believe this. They will say, Napoleon's son is not dead." For the moment the Bonapartists ceased to be a really Imperialist party. Under the pressure of circumstances, they went over to the liberal side because the French had always looked upon the Empire as upholding liberal ideas.² Under the banner of freedom, they felt more equal to conquest than under the insignia of Cæsarism. But the leaderless party soon found a head in that young man who, as he says of himself, had been brought up to love and honour the descendant of the Emperor Napoleon.³ This was Prince Charles Louis Napoleon, the second son of Queen Hortense and the ex-King of Holland. While all the world regarded the Bonapartist cause as lost for the want of a suitable leader, Metternich picked out,

¹ Prokesch to Dietrichstein, Vienna, August 22, 1832. *Pr. Oc.*—W. A. "In him the army has lost its brightest hope, the monarchy a protective spell, the world perhaps the foundation stone of an enduring edifice of peace and order."

² Vêron, "*Mémoires d'un Bourgeois*," vol. i. p. 76.

³ Charles Louis Napoleon to the Duke of Reichstadt, Arenenberg, June 12, 1832. "If you knew all the affection which we feel for you, if you knew how far our devotion extends, you would understand how grieved we are to have no direct relations with him whom we have been brought up to cherish as a kinsman and to honour as the son of the Emperor Napoleon." He also says that he would be glad to hasten to him, to nurse him, and hopes that this letter "will fall into the hands of compassionate people," who will give it to his sick cousin. The Duke received neither this letter, nor that of the ex-King of Holland. Metternich kept it for himself, and the original is still to be found in the archives of the princely house of Metternich. In Welschinger, "*Le Roi de Rome*," p. 444, a passage from this letter is reprinted.

before any one else, the future chief of the faithful adherents of the Empire. As early as June 21, 1832, he called the attention of Louis Philippe to this man, pointing out in these words how dangerous he was to the reigning dynasty: "On the day of the Duke's death he will feel called upon to place himself at the head of the State of France."¹ The Chancellor of State prophesied correctly. The standard that had dropped from the hands of the dying Duke was to be raised once more by his cousin, Prince Charles Louis Napoleon, when, some twenty years later, he ascended the throne of his renowned uncle as Napoleon III. But he too was to let fall the banner of the Empire.

¹ From Metternich's "*Nachgelassene Papiere*," vol. v. p. 277.

CHAPTER XI

THE DUKE'S CHARACTERISTICS

WHAT experience, what knowledge of human nature, is needed even for the judgment of a character whose energy of spirit, set free in the world, has brought about great and far-reaching movements! Yet how much harder to fathom a nature which, highly gifted and set apart for great ends, has to fulfil an obscure destiny, and can only reveal itself to us through small and obvious actions, as in the case of the Duke of Reichstadt! It was almost impossible, even for the elect, to come into immediate contact with him. Gentz, for so many years Metternich's trusted adviser, spoke to the young Napoleon for the first time, not in Vienna, but at Pressburg, during the sitting of the Hungarian Parliament in 1830.¹ General Belliard, the envoy of Louis Philippe, was only permitted to see him at a distance, at the theatre, or during his walks.² No French person, no stranger, could approach him without express permission. The consciousness of perpetual supervision, of which he frequently complained,³ gave him the impression that he was a captive held by golden chains, and developed his tendency to reserve.

¹ Gentz to Pilat, October 7, 1830, vol. ii. p. 310.

² Belliard to the Duchesse de Crès, Vienna, September, 1830.

³ According to a verbal communication made by Frau Léonie Girardi-Lonovics in Vienna, whose great-grandfather, Baron Bartholémy de St. Hilaire was one of the Duke's teachers. In the "*Briefen aus Wien über den Herzog von Reichstadt, 1831*," p. 50, it says: "He is invariably

The Duke died at twenty-one; can there be any question of a formed character? At this age, as a rule, no final judgment can be passed upon the intellectual faculties. But the son of the great Emperor is an exception. We may venture to assert that he was "laden" with great hereditary talents. He seems to have been mature in most respects; the chief characteristics were sharply defined. He had, perhaps, all that goes to the making of a great man, save the *one* thing essential: the *opportunity* to become one. An actor without a part, a sculptor without marble, a general without a field of action—these are not easy to evaluate.

So little information respecting this Prince reached the outer world that it was not known whether he most resembled Napoleon or the Hapsburgs. This question was on every one's lips, and curiosity eagerly awaited a reply. The majority very superficially drew their conclusions from external appearances. Some thought that physically he resembled his father, others that he was more like his mother. Most of his contemporaries, however, agreed that although in many respects he took after Marie Louise, it was easy to recognise the eagle glance and the energetic chin of Napoleon I. "He has his father's glance," says Marmont, "in which he most resembles him. His eyes, which are not so large as Napoleon's, are deeper set and have the same expression, the same fire and energy. His voice immediately recalls that of his father, and there is also a likeness in the lower part of the face and chin."¹ "He has something of his father's look," writes Count Montbel on November 25, 1831.²

accompanied by a keeper, generally a man who seems to have more ideas in his belly than in his head."

¹ Marmont, "Mémoires," vol. viii. p. 375. Wolfgang Menzel's "Denkwürdigkeiten," p. 368. "The Duke, a well-grown youth, has only the energetic chin of Napoleon."

² Montbel to Esquirol Adolphe in Paris, Vienna, November 25, 1831. Belliard writes to the Duchesse de Crès, Vienna, September 6, 1830:

"The flash of his eyes"—says another witness—"reveals the fire of his youthful spirit"—a true heritage from his father.¹ It must have been true that his face combined the classical features of Napoleon I. with the gentle beauty of Marie Louise.² But it is wrong to speak of the Duke—in consequence of this strain of Austrian blood—as a degenerate Bonaparte, whom it were better to leave in the mysterious darkness which has hitherto shrouded him, without any effort to let in the light.³ Napoleon's son has nothing to fear from a closer investigation of his personality. He was a Napoleon, for good and for evil, although externally there was much about him that recalled the Hapsburgs. His immediate circle respected and stood in awe of the fiery spirit within him, and of the kindling ambition which consumed his whole frame like some corrosive poison. "From all I hear," wrote the Sardinian Ambassador from Vienna in 1831, "the young man is hot-headed, vehement, possessed by a quenchless thirst for action and an extraordinary ambition."⁴ The

"He is graceful, his face shows intelligence, he is very like his father, and they say he is extremely vivacious, has plenty of capacity and a remarkably active mind."

¹ "Briefe aus Wien über den Herzog von Reichstadt, 1831," p. 11.

² *Ibid.*

³ Masson, "L'Aiglon" in *La Revue de Paris*, April 1, 1900, p. 598. "That is why it is better to dream of him than to see him, to imagine what he might have been rather than to inquire what he actually was; that is why, closing misleading books of history, we must leave this life to the mystery which will enshroud it for ever, and, rather than accept harsh conclusions, believe what the poets have sung of him, be it Burthélemy, Hugo, or Rostand."

⁴ Hillebrand, "Geschichte Frankreichs," vol. i. p. 642. The French Ambassador in Vienna, Montmorency, writes on January 15, 1829, to La Ferronnays in Paris: "This young man, who is about to keep his eighteenth birthday and already reveals military tendencies and a kind of vivacity which is traceable to earlier sources, must naturally become every day more and more the object of active solicitude." Dr. Albin Flür, Vienna, December 4, 1826, in his "Briefe aus Innsbruck, Frankfurt und Wien, 1825-1853," p. 21, says exactly the opposite: "His eyes [the

moderating of this unbridled impulse, which made itself felt even in childhood, and caused him to be a stubborn and disobedient boy, led to continual conflicts between his tutors and himself. His education was a real school of suffering for his governor and teachers. He always wanted to be different from other people; nothing filled him with such bitterness as the thought of having to submit to the will of another. This was the reason why he neglected the tasks that were set him; while he exhausted his energies upon any work he undertook of his own free will. So strong was his passion for freedom and independence, that it led him to be unjust to those whom he had not chosen as his companions. He annoyed and provoked his teachers, whom he would otherwise have loved, simply because he was obliged to obey their orders. He was even set against every pleasure which was not of his own devising. He never lost a chance of making a show of independence. As a child it gave him indescribable delight to steal into some room unknown to his tutor and spend a little time there all by himself. So jealously did he guard this sense of freedom that he erected a kind of screen round his desk, to protect himself from the surveillance of his teachers. Merely to show that he dare take a walk alone, on one occasion he suddenly left the box at the theatre occupied by the Emperor and Empress. This strong desire for independence showed itself even in trifles. He would not wear an overcoat when he went for a walk simply because he was told to do so.¹ Turning over the leaves of Obenaus's diary, we find the following entry almost every day of

Duke's] do not reveal the great soul from which he is descended." Of course, Flir only saw him from a distance when walking out of doors.

¹ All the above is taken from Baron Franz Obenaus's "Portrait caractéristique de Napoléon II., tiré des écrits laissés par feu le Baron Joseph d'Obenaus." In the possession of Lieut.-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus.

the year : " He was obstinate, perverse, violent, unruly." ¹ This madcap was only happy on the heights or in the depths. The small houses and narrow streets of Vienna oppressed his spirits ; in autumn he returned very unwillingly from the Imperial country residence to the town.

Closely connected with all this was the very high opinion which he had of himself, which influenced all his actions. " He has the most unbounded confidence," thus Obenaus describes him, " partly in his cleverness and partly in his good luck. His imagination overleaps every obstacle, recognises no impossibility, and only entertains the flattering picture of success." ² He once said that he did not believe that *honour*, but rather that self-consciousness, was the highest good, and this feeling was so implanted in him that he went on to say he had so much intellect and such a superabundance of ideas that he could easily spare some for other people. ³ Young as he was, he had already reflected upon the most weighty problems of human existence. He discussed every subject with wonderful acumen and with great fluency of expression. " How much passes through my mind," he wrote once to Prokesch, " about my position, about politics, about history and about our great science, the maintenance or the destruction of States." ⁴ After Goethe and Schiller, his favourite poet was Byron, of whom he said : " At the bottom of this profound nature lurked a painful secret, something dark as night, which corresponds to my own temperament ; I like to let my thoughts stray hand in hand with his." ⁵ Among prose

¹ Diary of Obenaus. In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

² Obenaus's memorandum for the Emperor, January 18, 1831. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

³ Obenaus's diary, May 28, 1831. In the possession of Lieut.-Colonel Baron Oscar von Obenaus.

⁴ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 62.

⁵ Montbel (already quoted), p. 291.

writers he gave the preference to that deep thinker, La Bruyère. Like his father, or perhaps in imitation of him, he laid great stress upon religion as the indispensable basis of every law of the State ; he unhesitatingly accepted it as the strong staff upon which to lean on the journey through the night of our life.¹ Thus spoke the politician in him, the man who already saw himself in his own mind the ruler of a great and powerful nation. Personally he was very far from being a believer, in the orthodox sense. He was opposed to frequent confession ; the constant repetition of this ceremony, he thought, easily ended in blunting the soul against such a need.² He also criticised those pious people whose rule of conduct did not accord with the religious spirit.³ On one occasion he was very angry with his footman because the latter had admitted to his study his confessor and spiritual master, the Court preacher Wagner, without having first announced him. "I do not choose," he said, "to have the priest on such an intimate footing with me."⁴ His governor, Count Dietrichstein, had so little confidence in the Duke's religious views that he had serious doubts whether he had died "in a very Christian-like state."⁵ "You can never have expected," wrote Baron Moll to Dietrichstein, "that the Prince would be remarkable for a religious attitude, and a *truly* devotional spirit ; during the last eight days of his life he was milder and softer than he used to be. For the world, and even for those around him, he had fulfilled the duties of a Christian, and we must trust that this was not merely a matter of conforming outwardly, since his weakness during the

¹ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 66.

² Obenaus's diary, July 4, 1825. In possession of Baron Oscar Obenaus.

³ Prokesch (already quoted), p. 66.

⁴ "Portrait Caractéristique." In possession of Lieut.-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus.

⁵ Baron Moll to Dietrichstein, September 8, 1832. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

last days disposed him to a genuine devotion."¹ This lukewarm attitude towards religion is the more surprising because he grew up in an atmosphere in every respect the contrary, and the Imperial family set him an example of the greatest devotion for the Church. But enigmatical as this fact may appear at first, it is more explicable when we remember that he could never endure to have any limit imposed upon his way of thinking. All who came near him were impressed by the complete maturity of his mind. It was always his highest aspiration to prove himself the worthy son of his father, and to be acknowledged as such. He set great store by what others said and thought of him, and grudged no pains to produce a favourable impression. The fascination and charm of his personality were irresistible. He was a master in the art of managing men. He was skilful in discovering the weakness and *vanité* of others and turning them to good account. He behaved as though the fate of those to whom he was speaking touched him very closely, so that he played upon their affections. His talent for adapting himself to other people's views, as though they were his own, was quite remarkable. He was not ashamed of taking up a contrary opinion merely with the intention of discovering by argument the actual views of his opponent, to whom, however, he never vouchsafed a glimpse of his own way of thinking. Some of those who saw through him pronounced him crafty; others, like Metternich, declared him to be a first-rate actor. Above all, he proved himself such in his conversations with Marshals Marmont and Maison,² whom he tried to carry away and win over to himself by the audacity of his ideas. But if he set no value upon the

¹ Baron Moll to Dietrichstein, September 8, 1832. Pr. Ou.—W. A.

² The Duke did not wish to visit Maison, the representative of a usurper, as he called Louis Philippe. He met him at a ball at Metternich's. Prokesch (already quoted), p. 47.

opinion of those with whom he came in contact, he showed himself taciturn, reserved, and mistrustful. Like his father, he had not a high opinion of human nature. With few exceptions, he regarded men as covetous and self-seeking and generally incapable of being managed by noble motives only. In conformity with this point of view he based the development of his ideas upon the turpitude of mankind.¹ He considered it a sign of greatness to attain the goal by any kind of means, for, as he once remarked: "Leading spirits must not be judged by ordinary standards."² Had he any notion that Napoleon had once exclaimed to Talleyrand: "What do I care about a base action if it leads to success?"³ In spite of his belief that doubtful methods were justifiable, the Duke was at some pains always to adopt the semblance of truthfulness. Faults and mistakes of his own committing he invariably put upon other people's shoulders, just as his father used to do. When in 1829 he read the Archduke Charles's history of the campaign of 1796, he was astounded that this general should confess his mistakes so frankly as he does in these pages. He openly avowed that he would never have perpetrated such a "blunder."⁴ He was firmly convinced nothing could be more injurious to a man in a high position than the avowal of his errors. This lack of truthfulness was coupled with his passion always to be prominent. He was consumed with the longing to distinguish himself. Like Cæsar, he preferred to be first in a village than second in a great city.⁵ For this reason it excited his envy that Alexander the Great had won his laurels at Charonea before he was nineteen years of age. No other

¹ "Portrait Caractéristique."

² Obenaus's diary, May 7 (probably 1828). In possession of Lieut.-Colonel Baron Oscar Obenaus.

³ Mmo. de Rémusat, "Mémoires," vol. i. p. 108.

⁴ "Portrait Caractéristique."

⁵ *Ibid.*

sentiment dominated his imagination so entirely as ambition. With unusual self-control he bore physical pain without wincing, rather than appear weak. At fourteen he looked down without fear or shrinking from the unprotected parapet of a tower to a great depth below, which would have made most people shudder. When he learnt swimming, he sprang into the water at the first sign, without the least hesitation. Afterwards he confessed he felt at the moment it would cost him his life, but he would rather have died, then and there, than have betrayed his fear before so many spectators. Obenaus never saw him afraid; the nearest approach was his embarrassment in the society of elderly ladies. All that was audacious, eccentric and unexpected exercised a spell over him. Therefore he admired Napoleon, Cæsar, Hannibal and Murat. He was also attracted to novelty. He always dressed in the latest fashion, and displayed a tendency to extreme eccentricity in his clothes. Striking colours and walking-sticks of extraordinary design won his approbation in particular.¹ On this account his teachers thought it necessary to guard against a certain inclination towards what was trivial, and even vulgar.² It would have been more correct to see in all these peculiarities the eloquent expression of his unsatisfied longing to distinguish himself by brilliant exploits. For a young man of high-flown ideas, who aspired to a throne, the monotony of garrison duty was not sufficient. He had too much fiery ambition to feel at home in the well-beaten path of everyday life. He watched with feverish unrest the pulses of political life when, after the expulsion of

¹ "Portrait Caractéristique."

² Baron Moll to Dietrichstein, September 8, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A.
"I need to talk over with you much that should throw light on our mutual darkness; unfortunately, we can now speak more openly *between ourselves* than during the lifetime of him whom it was our constant effort to exalt, and whose tendency to vulgarity we had, so to speak, to keep to ourselves."

Charles X. and the accession of Louis Philippe, early in February 1831, the situation became extremely critical. At this time he was very much depressed and dissatisfied, because he saw himself without any sphere of action, and did not know how to acquire influence.¹ Perhaps it was from his mother that he inherited his submission to the force of circumstances, instead of boldly creating for himself an opportunity which must have led him to the foot of the throne. He craved for power, but at the decisive moment he shrank from the reckless use of such means as alone could have assured its attainment. Perhaps he had not in his veins the wild Corsican blood which overset every obstacle with fiery impatience. For he always found one last insurmountable difficulty, and invariably postponed the fulfilment of an important project until a more favourable time.²

In France a strong Bonapartist faction was undoubtedly only awaiting the appearance of the Emperor's son in order to clear his way to the throne.³ But the fear of seeming an adventurer paralysed his will-power. He only desired to conquer by legitimate principles. He hoped to rule as his father's heir and as the lawfully elected sovereign of the nation.⁴ He, who had the most exalted conception of his position, found it uncommonly

¹ "Portrait Caractéristique."

² The Duke wrote as follows to some one whose name is not known : "Nothing would be more agreeable to me than to be able to respond to such confidence, but an insurmountable obstacle in the situation in which I am placed absolutely prevents my fulfilling the object of your letter. Permit me to postpone, until happier circumstances arise, the execution of this project which would have made me happy at the present moment." Sale catalogue, April 1900, of the antiquarian book-sellers Gilhofer and Ranschburg, Vienna.

³ See the statements of the Prefect of Police Gisquet, in his "Mémoires," vol. i. p. 260.

⁴ The Duke wrote in 1831 : "In our time there is but one legitimate form of Government, no other title but that which the nation's will has made law." Sale catalogue of Gilhofer and Ranschburg, Vienna.

painful to be called simply "your Highness" after having been entitled King of Rome. "If God gave me permission to address Him a petition which He would fulfil, I should ask Him to descend from His throne and let me occupy it."¹ In a campaign he saw the sole means of retrieving his past greatness; this alone would furnish the desired field in which to win a hero's renown. Military glory seemed to him the highest and most desirable thing in the whole world; everything else only counted in his eyes in so far as it concerned the art of war. Even as a child, nothing gave him such delight as the sight of soldiers passing by in their accoutrements. When at mid-day the Grenadiers changed guard in the Imperial Palace, the little Prince of Parma could not be dragged away from his window, where he would clap both hands to mark his approval. He, who had no talent whatever for music,² was very much stirred by a military march. The sound of trumpets and the roll of drums excited his ear far more than the arias of Rossini.³ To him Julius Cæsar appeared the greatest of all the Romans because he had won most victories; he ranked him far above Cicero or Horace. We know he devoted himself with great zeal to the study of military science, and endeavoured to learn everything that had the remotest connection with it. Arms he considered were a man's finest decoration. "Like Achilles," said one of his contemporaries, "he would have been recognisable in any disguise by his unconquerable desire to possess himself of weapons wherever he saw them."⁴ He had a fine collection of pistols, guns, and daggers of every kind. Equally great was his passion for horses, and he gave the preference to the swift, light-

¹ "Portrait Caractéristique."

² Foresti's notes. "It would be impossible to have less talent for music than he had. . . . No ear for a cadence, his voice was harsh: there was not a musical sound in his throat." *Pr. Oe.—W. A.*

³ "Portrait Caractéristique."

⁴ *Ibid.*

footed, unwearying animals of Arab breed. When he was able to spend hours mounted upon a mettlesome steed, he forgot all the troubles which were the outcome of his unsatisfactory position at his grandfather's Court.

In all these matters the Duke was sustained by an unusual will-power. "His will," says Obenaus, "penetrates his entire being and modifies all his powers. What he wills, his mind can formulate and his body endure; what he does not wish, he understands how to frustrate. He pursues his plans with restless energy, and believes himself disgraced by every throw-back; he only yields to stern necessity."¹ When he learnt from Obenaus's history lessons—on September 9, 1830—that Napoleon had sent every one away from the Court who had contributed to his accession, the Duke said: "I should assure excellent promotion to my coadjutants, but I should not suffer them to remain long about me, lest the world should think I acted only on their suggestions, not on my own initiative." When asked why he did this or that, he replied curtly: "Because it pleases, or does not please me, and that is enough."² He often wrote down the sayings which he knew to have originated with his father, such as: "*Réculer, c'est se perdre*," or: "*Je ne veux pas avoir tort*." Since he did not choose to acknowledge any master but his own will, a contemporary declared his motto to be: "*Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas*."³

It is obviously unjust to say of this strong-willed Prince, who thirsted for independence and doughty deeds, that he was merely a good young man of mediocre talents, without intellect, who liked playing at soldiers. This is what the Austrian poet, Bauernfeld, writes in his diary

¹ Obenaus's memorandum for the Emperor, January, 18 1831. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² "Portrait Caractéristique."

³ *Ibid.*

for 1833.¹ But he had never spoken to the Duke, and judged him only by Montbel's work, which had just appeared in a German translation. All those who came in contact with Napoleon's son praised his rare intellectual gifts. "No one can persuade me," writes Prokesch, "that this Prince did not possess great qualities."² "Nature, like a kind and wealthy mother, has endowed the Emperor's son with intellectual gifts,"³ says another. It speaks well for him that he did not suffer the fate which so frequently attends the sons of celebrated men: merely to inherit the fame of an exceptional genius. In any case he was predestined to win some kind of halo as the son of Napoleon I. But his own personality carried weight and, wherever he appeared, he excited attention, not only as the son of the great Emperor, but because he knew how to attract by his own brilliant qualities.⁴ Every one who conversed with him came away with the impression that he was a worthy heir of Napoleon, in whom there lay a future pregnant with great actions.

We should draw an incomplete portrait of the young Napoleon, however, if we failed to mention that he inherited—apparently from his mother—a sanguine, cheerful, and extremely vivacious nature. His melancholy, taciturnity and self-control, which had so strange an effect on those who witnessed them, were more the

¹ Annual publications of the Grillparzer Society, 1895: from Bauernfeld's *Tagebüchern*, p. 64, March, 1833.

² Prokesch to Baron Moll, August 22, 1832. Pr. Oe.—W. A.

³ Letters from Vienna about the Duke of Reichstadt, 1831.

⁴ Foresti's notes: "It is no exaggeration to say that he was received everywhere with pleasure, that his entrance into a drawing-room produced a stir of general interest, and that ladies and gentlemen alike were eager for the honour of conversing with him." Pr. Oe.—W. A. Wessenberg says of him: ". . . it is sad to think a soul so noble and lofty, so devoted to his country, so eager for great things, has had to succumb to so pitiless a fate at the age when the activity of most men is just beginning." Wessenberg's Collections, No. 141.

product of circumstances and the reflections to which they compelled him. He was accessible to the finer feelings of friendship and gratitude. Although during his student days Count Dietrichstein treated him with severity, and often censured him more than was necessary, the Duke's feelings for him were not unfriendly. Rather, he cherished a sense of gratitude towards him to the end of his days. "My heart's gratitude," he wrote to his governor, "is as imperishable as the pains you took with my education."¹ He felt warmly for the poor, to whom he often gave alms out of his modest pocket money. He would deprive himself with pleasure of some object he was attached to, in order to give enjoyment to others.


The young Napoleon flashed like a bright meteor across the skies of France, to disappear after a brief illumination. Although he accomplished no remarkable deeds, either for his own country or for humanity in general, he is not without historical importance. All classes of society looked to him as to a strong bulwark against the encroaching ruin in political life. For this reason his death called forth the deepest regret. At the news of his passing away the French felt themselves face to face with a very unsettled destiny. Since the fall of Louis Philippe was imminent, and no one knew what would follow it, the loss of the Duke of Reichstadt meant a great calamity to France.² His birth had

¹ The Duke to Dietrichstein, Schönbrunn, September 28, 1831. The letter itself is not signed. Pr. Oc.—W. A.

² Bulletin of Baron Hügel, Paris, Tuesday, July 31, 1832. (Hügel was the Counsellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris.) "Thinking men in this country are moved by this event: in their eyes the death of the young Prince is a loss, for it is one cause, one halting-place the less, against which social disorganisation might have come to a pause; and the vast dominion of the unknown, towards which events are pushing society, grows greater as individuals disappear. It is in this sense that

seemed to the French to herald a period of peace ; his death was the announcement of a troubled future, heavy with evil and sinister forebodings.

the leading persons of all parties have expressed themselves to me, not excepting those of moderate views."



seemed to the French to herald a period of peace; his

Wunderbar! Gen. Camille!

Ich habe mich Ihnen, als angestrichenem Genie, in
meinem Leben nicht vorgestellt. Ein Genie ist nicht
das, was es aussieht, als angestrichen, wenn man
Genie ist, das sieht man nicht, man sieht nur
das, was es ist, das ist die Glückseligkeit. Das ist die
Wahrheit.

Ich habe mich Ihnen, als angestrichenem Genie, in
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